March 31 – April 1, 2016
Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, Netherlands, participating States have reported a number of substantial actions and achievements that – individually and collectively – have strengthened nuclear security implementation at the national, regional, and international levels and built up the global nuclear security architecture.
Taken together, several common themes emerge. Over 40 Summit countries have engaged in capacity building, whether through training, Centers of Excellence, or exercises. Over 30 countries have updated national laws, regulations, or structures relating to nuclear security. Over 20 countries have held or invited peer review missions, either bilaterally or through the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) International Physical Protection Advisory Service. Three more countries – China, India, and Jordan – have pledged to strengthen nuclear security implementation through subscribing to the 2014 Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation (INFCIRC 869), bringing the total number to 38. Eighteen countries have taken steps to increase the security of radioactive sources. Seventeen countries have been involved in removal or disposal of nuclear materials, or minimization of highly enriched uranium (HEU). Sixteen countries have ratified nuclear security treaties or taken particular steps to implement them. Fifteen countries have carried out physical security upgrades or acquired security or detection equipment. A dozen countries have joined or launched new international or regional structures to support nuclear security cooperation. Twelve countries have indicated their financial contributions to support bilateral or international cooperation in nuclear security. And 10 countries noted steps taken to support or implement United National Security Council Resolution 1540. These represent tangible, practical steps towards locking down nuclear and other radioactive material and building up the global nuclear security architecture.
Algeria: Issued a comprehensive governmental decree governing the physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, and the security of radioactive sources; established a national-level Nuclear Security Committee; developed work plan to strengthen national detection capabilities, in particular at borders; continued national and regional activities through the Nuclear Security Training and Support Center.
Argentina: Down-blended and disposed of four kilograms of HEU, enabling Argentina to be declared free of HEU; co-hosted with Chile the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Radiological Emergency Management Exercise “PAIHUEN,” focused on demonstrating best practices for communication and coordination needed to respond to a criminal event involving radiation sources; is planning with Chile to organize another joint exercise, possibly “PAIHUEN 2;” jointly organized a national workshop with the IAEA on Design Basis Threat; in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, sent a technical assistance mission to Grenada covering nuclear regulatory issues and will undertake training activities in that country, including in the field of nuclear security; will host an IAEA regional training course on security of radioactive material in transport in 2016.
Armenia: Committed to further strengthen efforts to combat nuclear smuggling, in part through the development of nuclear forensics capabilities; hosted a two-week security mission by the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA; submitted a National Action Plan for 2015-2020 to the United Nations 1540 Committee.
Australia: In its role as the chair of the Nuclear Forensics Working Group of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, will host nuclear emergency planning and response exercise “KANGAROO HARBOUR” in May 2016; requested a 2017 follow-up mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA; updated their report pursuant to Article 14.1 of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM); contributed over AU$2.4 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund since its inception.
Azerbaijan: Acceded to the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM; endorsed the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources; signed a Country Program Framework for 2015 – 2020 with the IAEA, establishing a basis for national projects to improve the regulatory and legislative infrastructure, security of nuclear materials, and radiation monitoring and control of border and customs checkpoints; received assistance from the IAEA to strengthen the implementation of nuclear security measures before and during the 2015 Baku European Games.
Belgium: Established a Cyber Security Centre under the authority of the Prime Minister, and expanded the scope of nuclear facility “stress tests” to include manmade events such as cyberattacks; established a Design Basis Threat for the nuclear sector nationwide; received a mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA; continued progress towards minimizing the use of HEU fuel in research reactors and medical isotope production; pledged an additional U.S. $300,000 dollars to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund in 2016.
Brazil: Revising national regulation on security in transport of nuclear and radioactive material, taking into consideration IAEA recommendations; currently working on the revised text of its regulations on nuclear and radiological security applicable to material and associated facilities, taking into account international best practices, the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM, and other relevant IAEA guidance; conducted annual Regulatory Security Inspections; is continuing activities with the IAEA through the Brazilian Nuclear Physical Security Support Centre.
Canada: Provided CAN $28 million in funding to improve global nuclear and radiological security through Canada’s Global Partnership Program, including CAN $5.5 million to enhance the physical security of nuclear facilities in Southeast Asia, CAN $12 million to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological material in the Americas and the Middle East, and CAN $10.4 million to promote the security of radioactive sources in Africa, the Americas, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia; dedicated an additional CAN $42 million in Global Partnership Program funding over the next two years; repatriated four shipments of U.S.-origin HEU stored at Chalk River Laboratories; is taking steps to decommission the SLOWPOKE research reactor at the University of Alberta, with its HEU fuel to be repatriated by 2019; will commence, in 2016, the repatriation of HEU-bearing liquids generated as a by-product from medical isotope production; assessed that approximately three-quarters of its inventory of plutonium is ready for dispositioning, and initiated discussions with the United States to determine whether it would accept the material for long-term management; assisted the U.S.-led reactor conversion and cleanout project for an HEU-fueled SLOWPOKE research reactor in Jamaica; is upgrading Canada’s Radiation Detection Network to help prevent illicit trafficking; hosted its first mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA; published a national standard to address cyber security at nuclear power plants and small reactor facilities; hosted an IAEA National Training Course on Computer Security and Conducting Assessments; provided the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee with an updated National Implementation Action Plan; with the World Institute for Nuclear Security, held a workshop on “Meeting Canadian Commitments for Demonstrable Competency in Nuclear Security Regulation and Implementation;” funded a regional Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Seminar in the Caribbean and hosted a meeting of the PSI Operational Experts Group; continued activities towards the development of a national nuclear forensics capability.
Chile: With the United States, continued strengthening the physical protection of nuclear installations and five large-scale radiological installations; established the Radiological Emergency Security Commission (CONSER); officially launched a Border Strengthening Project offered by the IAEA to consider the implementation of the detection of radioactive material in selected border points and across “green borders;” conducted joint bilateral exercise “PAIHUEN” with Argentina under the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to improve communication channels between both countries to address trans-border radiological emergencies, and considering “PAIHUEN 2;” joined the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction; is designing training and implementation programs of the required equipment for the Nuclear Physical Security Support Center of Excellence at Lo Aguirre; is developing a centralized system of radiological, environmental, and operational monitoring of the nuclear and radioactive installations of the Chilean Commission on Nuclear Energy.
China: Committed to convert the remaining Miniature Neutron Source Reactors (MNSR) at Shenzhen University from HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, to support the conversion of MNSR in Ghana and Nigeria as soon as possible, and – upon request of respective countries – to convert all remaining Chinese-origin MNSR worldwide; successfully completed and officially opened the Nuclear Security Center of Excellence in Beijing on March 18, 2016; launched an Annual Nuclear Security Dialogue with the United States; passed State Security and Anti-Terrorism laws which make it clear that nuclear security is a vital aspect of national security and formulated specific tasks and measures; published a Policy Statement on Nuclear Security Culture; invited a mission by the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA and a follow-up mission of the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Services for 2016; through 2015, donated U.S. $1.15 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund; conducted joint exercise with Russia on preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material on borders; conducted a national-level exercise on nuclear emergency response, “SHENGDUN-2015,” with 2,900 participants and international observers; pledged commitment to INFCIRC 869.
Czech Republic: Issued a new Design Basis Threat for Czech nuclear facilities and material that now includes airborne and cyber threats; is preparing a new Atomic Act and Regulation that addresses these new aspects of nuclear security; in 2014 and 2015, carried out security exercises including the Czech Army and Police response units at the Dukavany and Temelin Nuclear Power Plants, respectively; in cooperation with the United States, organized a Physical Protection and Security Management Course in Prague; continued technical support to countries repatriating their HEU stocks: Belarus, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Serbia, Ukraine, and Vietnam.
Denmark: Put into force a revised nuclear emergency preparedness plan; continued actions to limit the number of high-activity sources at blood irradiator facilities; committed to lifting reservations made when ratifying the CPPNM and its 2005 Amendment, and when ratifying the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, so that these instruments will also apply to Greenland; in 2014, contributed DKK 8 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund; committed to enlisting relevant national operational assets to the IAEA Response and Assistance Network in 2016; plans to call for a mission of the Integrated Regulatory Review Service of the IAEA.
Egypt: Signed the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan with the IAEA, leading to the implementation of: national workshops on drafting nuclear security regulations and the design basis threat, training courses on the security of research reactors and associated facilities, and a national training course on preventative measures against the insider threat; with the IAEA, upgrading the physical protection systems of Egypt’s first and second research reactors; established a nuclear security support and training center; submitted its national report to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee.
European Union: Euratom acceded to the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities following its ratification by all Member States; the Euratom Supply Agency, entrusted with securing the supply of nuclear materials for European Union (EU) users, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the United States under which the EU will eliminate HEU that is not directly usable, and the United States will supply the EU with the requisite HEU until its technological conversion to LEU is complete; Europol organized courses in Portugal and Poland focused on response to a radiological emergency resulting from a nuclear security incident; is continuing courses on training for first responders, incident commanders, and medical emergency staff on the triage, monitoring, and treatment of mass casualties following a terrorist attack involving ionizing radiation; held five sessions designed to meet the needs of customs officers from all member states responsible for detecting radioactive and other nuclear materials at border-crossing points; continued activities through the dedicated European nuclear security training centre (EUSECTRA); with the United States, co-chairs the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group; hosted the nuclear detection and forensics workshop and tabletop exercise 'Radiant City'; with the United States, is implementing a border-monitoring project in South-East Asia to enhance detection at border crossings, support capacity-building in selected countries, and involve the other ASEAN countries in regional initiatives; provided equipment and training to assist the Democratic Republic of Congo and countries in Central Asia and the Mediterranean to build capacities to counter the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials; since 2014, held two Senior Officials Meetings with the IAEA to ensure and exploit complementarity and avoid overlap between the parties’ activities in nuclear security; signed a contract with the IAEA on a 20 million euro contribution to the procurement of LEU for the Bank for the Utilisation of Nuclear Energy, and committed to provide 5 million euros for security-related costs; co-organized the Conference on International Cooperation for Enhancing Nuclear Safety, Security, Safeguards and Non-Proliferation; co-hosted a Counter Nuclear Smuggling workshop; co-organizing for October 2016 a workshop in Jordan on regional cooperation to enhance a worldwide nuclear security culture; ongoing U.S.-European collaboration for the development of high-density LEU fuels for research; the European Commission will report to the Council and the European Parliament on implementation of the Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Directive in 2016.
Finland: Established a Standing Nuclear Security Committee; is initiating a revision of national Design Basis Threat, to include information security/cyber threats; conducted an international training course on preventive and protective measures against insider threat; hosted a Plenary meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and a GICNT Nuclear Detection Working Group Workshop and Tabletop Exercise.
France: Committed to close the high-performance research reactor Orphée, which is fueled using HEU, by 2019; continued its leadership in the security of high-activity radioactive sources, to include repatriation of French-origin sources from requesting States and new national legislation; comprehensively revised its national report to the United Nations 1540 committee to provide highly comprehensive information on the status of national nuclear security legislation; prepared a report in 2014 under article 14.1 of the Amended CPPNM; contribution of U.S. $1.2 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund since 2014; will host a follow-up IPPAS mission in 2017; will co-organize the annual meeting of the nuclear forensics International Technical Working Group and a forensics exercise CMX-5 in 2016 in Lyon.
Gabon: Intends to ratify and put in place the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Security of Maritime Navigation and its 2005 Protocol; through law, established an independent body empowered todevelop regulations and issue guidelines regarding the safety and security of radioactive sources and to issue licenses for their management; is organizing a national workshop on domestic threats related to radioactive sources; is establishing a New Memorandum of Understanding with Customs services to control the import and export of radioactive sources.
Georgia: With the support of the IAEA, adopted an Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan through 2019; is currently elaborating a new regulation for physical protection of material; in cooperation with the European Commission, acquired modernized equipment to conduct nuclear forensics investigations; adopted the legal act “The Procedure for Responding to the Illegal Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Substances;” in collaboration with the United States, established a Joint Maritime Operations Center on the Black Sea coast to facilitate interagency exchange of intelligence to address maritime threats, including nuclear smuggling.
Germany: Removed all excess plutonium and HEU; established a central, national-level register to ensure the comprehensive traceability of high-activity sealed radioactive sources; will host a workshop in September 2016 on the adequacy of the Code of Conduct for Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources; established a federal-level information platform to enable swift interagency information exchange in the event of serious WMD-related crime or terrorism threats in Germany; continued efforts to develop high-density, low-enriched uranium fuel.
Hungary: Issued a new governmental decree on actions to be performed in connection with missing, found, and seized nuclear and other radioactive material; revised design basis threat of nuclear facilities to include cyber threats; requested a 2017 mission by the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA; continued activities through its Nuclear Security Support Centre; joined the G7 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.
India: Establishment of a national-level Counter Nuclear Smuggling Team for effective and coordinated response to threats involving the acquisition of nuclear and radioactive materials for malicious purposes; is equipping all major sea and air ports with radiation portals and detection equipment; continued regional and international activities through the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership; contributed to the upgrade of the IAEA’s Seibersdorf Laboratory in 2015 and plans for a contribution in 2016 of U.S. $1 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund; pledged commitment to INFCIRC 869.
Indonesia: Acceded to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; established a Mobile Expert Support Team for the detection and response to illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials; installed radiation portal monitors in seven main harbors; launched the Centre of Excellence on Nuclear Security and Emergency Preparedness to contribute to the development of nuclear security at the national and regional level; received a mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA; is establishing a Center for Security Culture and Assessment dedicated for nuclear security culture; will submit to Parliament in 2016 a draft law intended to enhance the national nuclear security architecture.
INTERPOL: Launched Project STONE, increasing the ability to control illicit nuclear trafficking by providing technical resources and training to member countries interested in developing their counter nuclear smuggling capacity; organized and hosted a Global Counter Nuclear Smuggling Conference, bringing together representatives from almost 120 countries and organizations to share best practices as well as operational and investigative experiences; in September 2016, will launch Project MERCURY at the Nevada Nuclear Test Site to prepare international law enforcement to take immediate, decisive action in preventing or responding to terrorist use of nuclear or other radioactive materials; plans to develop a national counter nuclear smuggling capability in capacity, preparedness, and prevention for countries that either request it, or for countries where there is a strategic need.
Israel: Established a national nuclear forensics laboratory; launched Phase II of the Soreq Applied Research Accelerator Facility, which will replace the IRR-1 research reactor fueled by HEU; conducted the large-scale exercise “BRIGHT SANDS,” simulating a terrorist attack on a nuclear research reactor; joined the IAEA Response and Assistance Network, and put its assets at the disposal of states facing a nuclear or radiological emergency; with the United States, conducted a workshop on human reliability and countering insider threats.
Italy: Ratified the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM; intends to remove remaining excess HEU and plutonium; continued activities through its international School on Nuclear Security.
Japan: Completed removal of all HEU and separated plutonium fuels from the Fast Critical Assembly; pledged to remove all HEU from the Kyoto University Critical Assembly; continued regional capacity building through Japan Atomic Energy Agency’s Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security; concluded the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM; contributed approximately 900,000 euros to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, including the cost of dispatching cost-free experts; received a mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA; is establishing a system with concrete regulations to determine trustworthiness of personnel at nuclear facilities; adopted a Code of Conduct on Nuclear Security Culture, and is establishing a nuclear security culture through education and the personal interviews of Chief Executive Officers; incorporated transportation security measures in line with the IAEA’s INFCIRC/225/Rev.5; facilitated the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) table-top exercise “MARU 2015” in New Zealand, and will host a PSI exercise in 2018; implemented field exercises based on threat scenarios such as design basis threats at all protected facilities, as well as field exercises to counter cyber-attacks to the control system of nuclear facilities, including in combination with physical attacks; chairing the G7 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and its Nuclear and Radiological Security sub-Working Group; conducted two table-top exercises and two field exercises focused on the improvement of transport security; continued activities at Japan’s Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security; led discussions in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism on the technical aspects of nuclear forensics; will soon issue a report to further enhance the security of radioactive isotopes in line with IAEA guidelines.
Jordan: Acceded to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; announced its commitment to “Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation” as contained in the IAEA document INFCIRC 869; signed with the United States a Joint Action Plan on Combating Smuggling of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials; hosted an international workshop on Counter Nuclear Smuggling Teams in Volatile Regions, presenting itself at the Workshop as a case study; with Canada, organized a regional Workshop towards Universal Implementation of International Legal Instruments for Nuclear Security hosted in Amman; hosted a Nuclear Security Peer Review Mission from the IAEA.
Kazakhstan: Eliminated all fresh HEU from the VVR-K research reactor at the Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP); completed the conversion of INP’s VVR-K research reactor from highly-enriched to low-enriched uranium fuel; committed to eliminate all HEU from INP; committed to convert the IVG.1M and IGR research reactors to LEU fuel when an acceptable fuel comes available, and to return the highly-enriched spent fuel from these reactors to Russia once their conversion is completed; upgraded physical protection at the INP, Ulba Metallurgical Plant, and the former Semipalatinsk Test Site; hosted table-top exercises on the security of rail-road transportation of nuclear and radioactive materials; revised the Law on the Use of Atomic Energy to include further enhancement of the state system for control of radioactive materials and basic requirements for a state system of nuclear security; initiated construction of the Nuclear Security Training Center, to be completed October 2016; will finalize construction of the Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Bank storage facility in 2017.
Lithuania: Passed new national legislation and guidelines on radioactive material security; officially requested a 2017 mission by the International Physical Protection Service of the IAEA; installed radiation detectors to counter illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials through Klaipeda Seaport; continued activities through its Nuclear Security Centre of Excellence.
Malaysia: Approved the establishment of the Malaysian National Nuclear Security Support Centre, including a nuclear security detection laboratory; developed a high-level strategy to counter smuggling, involving all law enforcement and border authorities under the National Security Council; successfully cooperated on a planned nuclear security exercise with the Canadian Army; will continue joint nuclear security exercises with Thailand at shared borders in 2016; plans to host a mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA in 2016.
Mexico: Received missions of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA in all its nuclear facilities; with the United States, created intergovernmental cooperation for the training of specialists in export controls and the identification of sensitive materials, with specialists from Panama and Columbia participating in 2015; created an Export Controls Committee, which is determining the export of special materials, taking into account their final use and destination; publication expected in 2016 of regulations for the transport of nuclear and radioactive materials.
Morocco: Ratified the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM; passed new legislation on nuclear and radiological safety, security, and safeguards; established the Moroccan Agency on Nuclear and Radiological Safety and Security; with Spain, organized the “GATE TO AFRICA” maritime transportation security exercise; equipped customs-controlled borders and exit-entry points with radiation detectors; continued activities through its National Nuclear Security Support Center.
The Netherlands: Updates to the Executive Order on the Security of Nuclear Facilities and Fissionable Materials to come into effect in 2016, incorporating all applicable parts of IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.5; updated Design Basis Threat (DBT), to be implemented in the course of 2016; DBT for cyber security to be updated in 2016, with regulations related to mandatory reporting of cyber incidents in the nuclear sector expected to come into force in 2017; hosted three regional training courses and a train-the-trainers course on physical protection (with one more planned for May 2016), as well as courses on security culture, DBT, protection against sabotage, and identification of vital areas; chaired the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance Committee; currently chairing the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) Implementation and Assessment Group, and will host the GICNT 10th Anniversary Meeting in June 2016; one million euros contributed to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund from 2014 – 2017; awarded a one million euro grant to three leading Dutch nuclear operators to further develop and improve security measures.
New Zealand: Ratified the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; enacted the Radiation Safety Act, which completely overhauls the legislative framework dealing with the safety and security of nuclear and radioactive material; implemented a Code of Practice for the Security of Radioactive Material; hosted its first mission from the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA and plans to invite a follow-up mission; contributed over NZ$1 million to international work to improve nuclear security; hosted Proliferation Security Initiative Exercise MARU with participants from 21 countries, focused on steps countries with limited resources and capacity can take to intercept weapons of mass destruction and their components.
Nigeria: Established a Nuclear Security Support Centre to serve sub-Sahara Africa, aimed at enhancing human capacity development in the area of nuclear security; developed a program for search and security of orphan and legacy radioactive sources; in 2016, will sign the Project and Supply Agreement for China to procure a low-enriched uranium core to replace the HEU fuel at Nigeria Research Reactor 1; commenced a comprehensive review and the updating of existing nuclear security regulations and the drafting of new ones, with review and development to be completed and published in 2016; review of Design Basis Threat to be completed and communicated to operators in 2016; by 2017, install three radiation portal monitors at strategic ports of entry; by 2017, ensure the passage of the Nuclear Safety, Security, and Safeguards Bill; continuing cooperation with United States on implementation of a Human Reliability Program for the Nigerian nuclear industry.
Norway: Is supporting activities to secure nuclear material in northwestern Russia; strengthened Ukraine’s capacity to counter nuclear smuggling through provision of equipment and training; initiated a collaborative project with Slovakia to improve border control against nuclear smuggling; hosted a mission by the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA; hosted a World Institute for Nuclear Security workshop on progress towards enhancing radiological security; replaced all Cesium-137 Category 1 radioactive sources with X-ray technology; will host a 2016 international meeting on minimization of HEU stocks in a uranium-thorium mixture.
Pakistan: Ratified the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM; established Pakistan’s Centre of Excellence on Nuclear Security (PCENS); in collaboration with the IAEA, hosted the annual meeting of the “International Network of Nuclear Support Centres,” the first such meeting outside IAEA headquarters in Vienna; with the IAEA, is upgrading security measures at all nuclear medical centers with category 1 radioactive sources; with the IAEA, is enhancing nuclear security systems and measures at civilian nuclear power plants and research reactors consistent with global good practices; established a national-level Nuclear Emergency Management System; deployed radiation detection equipment at several entry and exit points to deter, detect, and prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials.
Philippines: With the United States, installed additional security upgrades in hospitals and Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) facilities with category 1 radiological sources, conducted radiological security incident response training for the Philippine National Police, and upgraded the PNRI perimeter fence to harden the physical protection along the Radioactive Waste Facility; received four mobile detection vans with handheld-based detection and identification systems to enhance capabilities for countering radiological and nuclear material smuggling; hosted a U.S. Bilateral Assessment Visit Update to review plans and discuss topics on threats and physical protection based on the IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.5; in preparation of the 27th APEC Economic Leaders Meeting in November 2015 in Manila, conducted training workshops on Threat Assessment and Design Basis Threat, Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for a Major Public Event, Concept of Operations between Front Line Officers and Mobile Expert Support Teams, and Responding to Nuclear Security Events at Venues and other Strategic Locations; with Canada, and in furtherance of the G-7 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, finalized a Memorandum of Understanding and initiated installation of a physical protection system at Philippines’ research reactor; with the European Union, is developing a training center at PNRI to train port operators, customs police, and other first responders in the field of nuclear detection and response.
Poland: Will, in 2016, complete the removal and shipment of HEU spent nuclear fuel from the “Maria” nuclear research reactor; adopted the National Anti-terrorist Program, which includes objectives related to strengthening nuclear security against terrorist threats; conducted the intensive operational exercise “PATROL 2015” at the Maria reactor to improve preparedness of experts and first responders to effectively react to incidents and emergencies involving radiological and nuclear materials; adopted a National Plan for Management of Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel; received a mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Serviceof the IAEA; will host a follow-up mission of the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service in 2017; will host a follow-up mission of the IAEA Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review in 2016; updated regulation related to Design Basis Threat expected to enter into force in 2017.
Republic of Korea: Ratified the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; incorporated IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 into its national regulations; established the legal and administrative framework for the security of Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources as provided in the IAEA Code of Conduct; contributed U.S $1 million annually to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund; will hold in September 2016 a regional outreach event to promote implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 amongst relevant stakeholders in industry and academia; included cyber threats as an element in the Design Basis Threat of nuclear facilities, and, since 2015, conducted regular cyber security inspections and reviews; with the IAEA, hosted a Regional Workshop on Computer Security for Nuclear Facilities; initiated development of a national nuclear forensics system, including a national response plan and nuclear forensics library; continued activities through the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Security Academy; continued work with Belgium, France, Germany, and the United States on a joint project to develop and qualify new high-density LEU fuels for research reactors, including the provision of atomized U-Mo powder for use in the fabrication of LEU test fuels.
Romania: Approved updates to its National Strategy for Nuclear Safety and Security; received a mission of the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service of the IAEA; invited a follow-up mission for 2016 of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA; is contributing to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, fulfilling a 2014 Nuclear Security Summit pledge; completed the installation of radiological detection portals at road, rail, and pedestrian access points on the Romanian northeastern border, and at Romania’s national airport.
Saudi Arabia: Committed to contribute U.S. $10 million to the IAEA for a new center to combat nuclear terrorism; committed to contribute 500K euros to support the renovation of the IAEA’s Seibersdorf Laboratory; conducted a national workshop in cooperation with the IAEA on nuclear safeguards and security; organized a joint meeting on nuclear security between border control experts from the Republic of Yemen and Saudi Arabia, in cooperation with the IAEA; joined the European Union Centers of Excellence on Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation and became a member of the Regional Center of Excellence under this initiative, which is based in the U.A.E.; organized a workshop in collaboration with Japan on the development of human resources in security and nuclear safety and safeguards; organized a national workshop for protection from the risks of chemical, biological radioactive, and nuclear materials in cooperation with the United Nations crime and Justice Research Institute (UNCRI); signed the Convention for Practical Coordination between the IAEA and Naif University for Security Sciences for cooperation in the field of education and training programs related to nuclear security; organized a symposium on nuclear security presented by the head of Nuclear Security at the IAEA; organized a workshop in cooperation with the IAEA on capacity assessment and strategy for education and training in nuclear disciplines.
Singapore: Became a Party to the CPPNM and its 2005 Amendment; established an interagency working group to assess nuclear security measures, conduct inspections, and make recommendations to further improve security at storage sites; joined the International Nuclear Security Education Network of the IAEA; established a Cyber Security Agency; is establishing a border laboratory equipped with nuclear detection and analysis to interdict illicit activities at the border; is working towards ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
South Africa: Hosted and participated in workshops with the objective of enhancing nuclear security, to include an International Training Course on Nuclear Material Accounting and Control and a Fact Finding Meeting on the Detection and Response to Nuclear and other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control; continuing its program to recover, consolidate and return disused and orphan radioactive sources throughout Africa and some non-African countries; is finalizing the establishment of a nuclear forensics capability; committed to establish a Nuclear Security Support Centre to ensure the sustainability of expertise.
Spain: Amended and updated its regulations through a new Royal Decree for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, adapting it to new threats including cyber and insider threats; approved a new National Security Act which organizes the management of prevention and response to national threats; approved the National Action Plan for Compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540; is serving as Chair of the UNSCR 1540 Committee and in 2016 will lead the “Global Review” for a full and universal implementation of the Resolution; with Morocco and in collaboration with the IAEA, organized in Madrid a joint exercise, “GATE TO AFRICA,” on security in the transportation of radioactive sources; organized a national exercise on security in land transportation of spent fuel from nuclear power plants; with the United States, organizing the “Second International Regulators Conference on Nuclear Security” in Madrid in May 2016; with the IAEA, organized an International Workshop on Nuclear Security Culture; joined the G7 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.
Sweden: Ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; will receive a follow-up mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA in 2016; issued new requirement to strengthen physical protection (including arming guards) at relevant nuclear sites, for highly-radioactive sealed sources, and materials in the medical, industrial, and university sectors; together with Georgia, the United States, and Poland, preparing a conference in October 2015 in Tbilisi, Georgia for states in the Black Sea region on the implementation of Nuclear Security Summit commitments and objectives.
Switzerland: Removed approximately 20 kilograms of separated plutonium, leaving Switzerland free of all separated plutonium; removed 2.2 kilograms of HEU; is updating the design basis threat for nuclear facilities nationwide; is planning to invite another mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA by 2018; is developing a nuclear security culture program based on the IAEA Nuclear Security Series No 7.
Thailand: Organized annual training and drill exercises for frontline officers who may be faced with nuclear incidents; conducted national emergency exercises in compliance with the National Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Plan; with the European Union and the United States, initiating a Project on Border Monitoring Activities aimed at strengthening national capacity in countering illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials; in cooperation with Canada and the United States, will, in 2016, begin upgrading the physical protection system of the Thai Research Reactor and waste storage facility; entry into force of an amended Customs Act; is establishing principles for transit and transshipment in line with international standards as obligated under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; hosted workshop for concerned Thai agencies on obligations related to non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; National Legislative Assembly considering amendment to the Nuclear Energy Act that, once enacted, will enable accession to the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment, and the International Contention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
Turkey: Ratified the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM and deposited its instrument with the IAEA; will receive a mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA in 2016; hosted a training course on nuclear security detection architecture; with support from Japan, organized a national workshop on the “Nuclear Security Plan.”
Ukraine: Approved a new design basis threat to nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste, and other sources of ionizing radiation; approved an Integrated Nuclear Security Support National Plan for 2016–2018; continued installation of radiation detectors, training, and exercises at borders to counter nuclear smuggling; with Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, and with funding from the European Union, agreed to create a regional network of nuclear forensics expertise; with the United States, is creating a scientific and methodological basis for determining attributes of uranium-bearing materials of different origin and development of nuclear forensics library data and materials; established the trilateral Swedish-Norwegian-Ukrainian Initiative with seven projects implemented from 2014 – 2015, to include security upgrades at Khmelnytsky nuclear power plant, modernization of the radioactive source register, and the 13th Ukrainian conference on nuclear security to be held October 2016; in 2016, will revise the respective Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers to adjust national legislation on physical protection to IAEA recommendations.
United Arab Emirates: Hosted the Inter-Arab Nuclear Detection and Response Exercise “FALCON,” aimed at enhancing national and regional interagency coordination and cooperation; is hosting a mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA in 2016; hosted an IAEA workshop and issued a new regulatory guide on nuclear transport security; provided its national report to the United Nations 1540 Committee; updated its regulations on the export and import control of nuclear material; hosted a regional training course on nuclear forensics.
United Kingdom: Invested £20.8 million in global threat reduction across 20 countries, to include physical security upgrades in Tajikistan, the Philippines, Georgia, and Kazakhstan, expert advice and majority funding for the construction of a new facility in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone to ensure secure storage of up to 500,000 disused radioactive sources from across Ukraine, and improving cooperation in countering nuclear smuggling in the Black Sea region, including through a regional conference in Georgia and a response exercise in Moldova; supported the IAEA, providing over £5.8 million in funding and expertise; hosted a workshop for participants from 25 countries to develop good practice in responding to radiological and nuclear emergencies; supported INTERPOL’s Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit with £650,000 of funding; hosted a visit by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee, and served as Vice-Chair of the Committee; became the first nuclear weapon state to host a follow-up mission by the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA; hosted two tailored workshops leading to the development of best practice guidance on measures to enhance supply chain security and the transportation of civilian nuclear material by sea; continued to consolidate unused “exotic” fuel stores, with the majority of moves scheduled to be completed by 2018.
United States: Publicized specific information outlining the measures utilized to secure military nuclear materials, including through the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 reporting process; declassified and publically released updated data on the national inventory of HEU, highlighting the fact that the inventory has decreased by more than 20 percent since 1996; disposed of an additional five metric tons of weapons-usable HEU domestically, bringing the total to more than 150 metric tons; pledged to explore the feasibility of converting navy submarine reactor cores from HEU to LEU fuel; established a pilot production line for high-density LEU fuel to support the conversion of remaining high performance research reactors in the United States and abroad; deposited instruments of ratification for the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM and International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; contributed an additional U.S. $30M to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund; supported the expansion and acceleration of international capabilities to arrest nuclear smugglers, seize illicit nuclear material, investigate illicit nuclear trafficking, and effectively prosecute perpetrators.
Vietnam: Approved a Master Plan for Nuclear Power Infrastructure Development, instructing relevant Ministries and agencies to carry out their respective duties to ensure nuclear security and safety; with the IAEA, organized a national seminar on "National Regulatory Framework for Nuclear Security for Vietnam;" invited a mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA; organized three seminars on nuclear security culture for local authorities, radiation facilities and research facilities; since 2014, put into operation eight radiation portal monitors at an international airport, and 12 others at a major seaport; established an integrated nuclear security network between the customs authority and the nuclear regulatory body, creating a national early warning and response network; with the IAEA, organized multiple training courses for first responders and the Mobile Expert Support Team to ensure the sustainability of the radiation detection system and effective response to radiation alerts; organized the International Workshop on Combatting Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Materials in Ho Chi Minh City; joined the Proliferation Security Initiative.