National Progress Report: Malaysia

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Malaysia has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by…

1)            Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

  • Malaysia has implemented the provisions of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. Awareness and competency programmes have been carried out to increase the level of competency among authorised users of radioactive sources in Malaysia. Malaysia also adheres to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactor.
  • Malaysia has received the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) which reviewed the relevant Malaysian laws and regulations to determine where provisions specifically related to nuclear security issues (physical protection, sabotage, illicit trafficking, import-export, penalties) could usefully be added taking into account international legal instruments and IAEA guidelines (gap analysis).
  • Malaysia is planning to host the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission from 11 – 22 April 2016, to provide an avenue to discuss new concepts and exchange best practices on the subject of physical protection of nuclear material. This will enhance Malaysia’s physical protection measures. 
  • Malaysia is participating in the IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP) entitled “Strengthening Nuclear Security at PUSPATI TRIGA Reactor (RTP)” with the aim to review the level of security arrangements of the relevant facilities, taking into account the threat assessment, regulatory requirements and IAEA recommendations.
  • Malaysia is in the process of developing a disposal facility using the borehole technology on a cost sharing basis with the IAEA. This is to manage the Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources (DSRS) in a safe and secure manner.
  • Malaysia is preparing to build our capacity in nuclear forensics. In this regard, Malaysia plans to receive an IAEA expert mission on nuclear forensics in May 2016.
  • Malaysia is organising a domestic training programme on radiological security. This includes the requirements and methods to ensure radiation protection safety and the security of radioactive materials used in nuclear application technologies.
  • Malaysia is integrating nuclear security elements into the national security perspective. The planning and implementation stages are conducted by the National Security Council, the highest national security platform. All nuclear security elements are coordinated by Atomic Energy Licensing Board (AELB) based on the IAEA Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP), involving all identified relevant stakeholders.
  • Malaysia will continue to pursue nuclear security, based on IAEA’s recommendations. Malaysia encourages other countries to utilize IAEA nuclear security framework for its comprehensive approach and for the purpose of harmonizing implementation globally. Malaysia stands ready to share experiences and best practices in the development and implementation of nuclear security capabilities through INSSP.

2)            Countering Nuclear Smuggling

  • Malaysia has enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2015 (POTA) which is an anti-terrorism law, on 7 April 2015.
  • To enhance detection capability, Malaysia, with the cooperation of IAEA, has developed a nuclear security detection laboratory, focusing on maintenance and configuration of radiation detection equipment. The lab is established under the Malaysian National Nuclear Security Support Centre (NSSC) that was approved by the government in February 2016.   
  • Malaysia continues to report to the IAEA on any cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and other radioactive sources since joining the IAEA Database on Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Materials and Other Radioactive Sources in 2001.
  • Malaysia is a registered user of the International Catalogue of Sealed Radioactive Sources and Devices (ICSRS), which provides data on sources, housing devices of the sources, and details of manufacturers and suppliers worldwide.
  • Since 2004, Malaysia has invested in deploying radiation detection equipment at all points of entry and exit as well as other locations through national funding, IAEA and US cooperation. Malaysia has updated detected cases to the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) when such events occur.
  • Malaysia has developed a high level strategy to counter smuggling, involving all law enforcement and border authorities under the National Security Council. Malaysia has actively conducted exercise and activities on national detection to shares experiences and best practices with IAEA and other countries.
  • Malaysia acknowledges the importance of networking in enhancing effectiveness for nuclear security detection. In this regard, Malaysia has been working closely with Thailand in conducting joint table top and field exercise from 17 to 20 August 2015 at our shared borders, and has also shared these experiences with other ASEAN countries. Malaysia and Thailand will continue the exercises in 2016 (scheduled to take place from 31 October to 4 November 2016) with the cooperation of IAEA.
  • Malaysia stands ready to share with all interested countries the established national systems and capabilities on nuclear security detection, which have been developed since 2004, based on IAEA nuclear security detection architecture.

3)            Supporting Multilateral Instruments

  • Malaysia is nearing completion of its revision of the Atomic Energy Licensing Act (Act 304) that would incorporate the provisions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), and its 2005 Amendment Protocol; the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT); and the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
  • This comprehensive nuclear law would enable Malaysia to become a party to the various Conventions and Protocols on nuclear security, including Malaysia’s accession to the CPPNM, ratification of the ICSANT and the IAEA Additional Protocol, and adoption of various outstanding IAEA Codes of Conduct.
  • Malaysia will undertake to have the comprehensive nuclear law approved by the Parliament once the revision is completed.

4)            Collaborating with International Organizations

  • Since 2010, Malaysia has continued to actively participate in the European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative (EU CBRN COE) programs, which aim to strengthen the institutional capacity of countries outside the European Union to mitigate CBRN risks.
  • Under the Global Partnership Programme 2010-2018, Malaysia is also currently working to establish cooperation with the Department of Foreign Affairs Trade and Development of Canada (DFATD) to seek support in the form of expertise, technical advice and funding for the purpose of strengthening the safety and security of nuclear and radioactive materials.
  • Since 2012, Malaysia has received assistance to enhance its physical security infrastructure through Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). Several facilities in Malaysia which use radioactive materials have been equipped with advanced security systems to detect unauthorized movement of radioactive material.
  • Malaysia strongly believes in regional approaches in discussing nuclear security matters, and have successfully chaired the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM) in August 2015 during Malaysia’s chairmanship of ASEAN. A revised action plan on sub regional activities that covers nuclear security activities were identified and defined.
  • Malaysia reiterates the central role of IAEA in nuclear security and encourages international organizations and other countries to cooperate in nuclear security activities through the IAEA. Malaysia also extends national resources to support IAEA nuclear security series development, expert missions and training.
  • Malaysia has also actively hosted technical visits to the Malaysian National NSSC since 2012 focusing on nuclear security detections.
  • Malaysia will continue to cooperate with and support IAEA nuclear security programs. In this regard, Malaysia believes the overall objective of nuclear security can be met through confidence building and harmonizing implementation based on IAEA nuclear security guidelines.  

5)            Partnering with External Stakeholders

  • Malaysia has endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) on 27 April 2014. And is in the process of drawing up, the ‘Provisional Guidelines on the Operationalisation of the Proliferation Security Initiative’.
  • Since 1 July 2011, Malaysia has enforced its Strategic Trade Act (STA) 2010 which is a comprehensive export control law. The enactment of the STA reflects Malaysia’s commitment to implement UNSCR 1540. The Act aims to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by controlling the export, transit, trans-shipment and brokering of strategic items.
  • Malaysia actively cooperates as a standing partner with the United States National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the United States Department of Energy, in nuclear security and non-proliferation. This is done through an exchange of Letter of Intent focusing on capacity building programs.
  • On CBRN issues, the Malaysian Armed Forces and the Canadian Army successfully cooperated on a planned exercise on nuclear security in February 2016. Such exercises promote networking and experience sharing while strengthening national response capability.
  • At the regional level, Malaysia cooperates with the Indonesian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (BAPETEN) through a memorandum of understanding. Malaysia is in the process of finalizing a similar cooperation with the Korea Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC). Malaysia through the IAEA has also initiated negotiations for cooperation on nuclear security with Sudan and Mauritania focusing on nuclear security detections.
  • Malaysia strongly believes that international cooperation with other external partners are critical not only in strengthening nuclear security capabilities, but more importantly in promoting harmonized nuclear security implementation in line with IAEA nuclear security framework. In this regard, Malaysia pledges to continuously contribute to achieving nuclear security. 

National Progress Report: Mexico

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Mexico has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by…

1. SUPPORT FOR CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL (CPPNM) AND INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM (ICSANT)

  • The Government of Mexico deposited with the IAEA its instrument of accession to the CPPNM on April 4, 1988 and deposited its instruments of ratification of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) on 1° August 2012.
  • Mexico deposited its instruments of ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and entered into force on 9 July 2007.

2. STRENGTHENED NATIONAL NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL MATERIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

  • Mexico’s government development, implementation and maintenance of a system of physical protection of radioactive and nuclear materials and nuclear facilities on the recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency in its document entitled: Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC / 225 / Revision 5).
  • The Government of Mexico has accepted the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, which is the basis for the establishment of the regulation on this issue.
  • Furthermore, Mexico actively participated in the IAEA technical meeting on the formulation of guidelines for the import and export of nuclear and radiological sources.
  • In March 2014 the Federal Penal Code was modified to establish the crimes and penalties for terrorist acts, sabotage, theft, attacks on means of communication or international terrorism, those who use radioactive material, nuclear material, nuclear fuel, radioactive mineral, radiation source or instruments that emit radiation in order to carry out acts against goods or services, whether public or private, or against the physical integrity of persons that produce alarm, fear or terror in the population or a group or sector, for acting against national security.
  • In 2016 the publication of Regulation transport of radioactive and nuclear materials is expected.

3. CONTRIBUTION TO THE IAEA’S NUCLEAR SECURITY-RELATED ACTIVITIES

  • Mexico, actively contributes to the development of the Nuclear Security Series, most recently by participating in the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee.
  • Mexico conducted with the cooperation of the IAEA National Training Course on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials in transport.
  • Mexico has received International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions in all its nuclear facilities.
  • Mexico has received the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) missions to review the general status of measures that protect against nuclear terrorism and identify ways to improve a broad spectrum of nuclear security activities. The recommendations provide a platform for preparation of a country-specific Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) for future implementation, through IAEA programme and bilateral assistance.
  • Mexico participated in the meeting of contact points of the CPPNM, held at the headquarters of the IAEA in December 2015, recognizing the commitments based on the Convention and its amendments.

4. SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY-RELATED INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES

  • Mexico participates in the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. In May 2013, Mexico hosted the 8th Plenary Session of Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) which took place in Mexico City, and cooperates with the 1540 Committee.
  • From the 25th to the 28th of February 2014, the Government of Mexico in coordination with the GICNT Nuclear Detection Working Group (NDWG) hosted a Workshop and Field Training Exercise in the Port of Manzanillo, Colima.

5. CONTRIBUTION TO MINIMIZATION OF HEU

  • Mexico, in collaboration with US, Canada and IAEA, converted, in 2012, the HEU fuel of the nuclear research reactor “Triga MARK III”, to use LEU fuel. The reactor intends to use only LEU targets for the production of medical and research radioisotopes.

6. BILATERAL COOPERATION

  • Mexico since 2011 cooperates with the US to improve the security of medical, industrial and research facilities where radioactive category I and II sources is improved. This includes physical security infrastructure and training. In this process, more than 150 facilities have participated.
  • With the Governments of Canada and USA, Mexico has signed an agreement to monitor radiation sources from its origin to its final destination, which includes transportation sources category I. These agreements are operational currently.
  • Likewise, with cooperation to Canada, took place in 2013 a regional workshop for Central America on the safety of radiation sources in medical facilities.
  • With the cooperation of the US, Mexico has improved infrastructure mega-ports to import and export 80% of goods by sea.
  • Additionally, with the US, Mexico has created an inter-governmental cooperation for the training of specialists in export controls and the identification of sensitive materials, which has resulted in trainers of trainers. In 2015 specialists from different institutions participated in training courses for specialists from Panama and Colombia.

7. FULFILLMENT OF RESOLUTION 1540 (2004) OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

  • In 2012, Mexico began the process of joining the four export control regimes. By March 2014, Mexico is a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Australia Group (AG). It has the legislation and the process for granting permits to export products subject to control under these schemes. Mexico joined to WA in January 2012, and accepted on NSG in September 2012. Additionally, August 12th, Mexico was admitted as a fully-fledge Member State to AG.
  • Within the export control process, Mexico created an Export Controls Committee, determining the export of special materials, taking into account the final use and destination.

8. RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF INDUSTRY IN PROMOTING AND EXCHANGING BEST PRACTICES AS APPROPRIATE, INCLUDING THE PROMOTION OF BEST PRACTICES GUIDES RELATED TO NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE AND NUCLEAR SECURITY INFORMATION

Mexico is promoting into industry (nuclear power owner), and other institutions in the government the nuclear security culture, in order to have the response to an attack involving nuclear or radiological material.

National Progress Report: Morocco

Since the 3rd Nuclear Security Summit (The Hague 2014), the Kingdom of Morocco has undertaken the following actions, in line with its commitments, to implement the Action Plan adopted at the1st Nuclear Security Summit (Washington 2010):

Supporting Multilateral Instruments on Nuclear Security:

Morocco continues to support the international instruments aiming at enhancing global efforts for nuclear security:

  • Morocco chaired, in 2005, the 6th Committee of the UN General Assembly and played a significant role in facilitating the consensus for the adoption of the Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). Morocco has been party to this important instrument, since February 23rd, 2010.
  • Morocco has been party to the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement between Morocco and IAEA, since April 21st, 2011. Morocco continues to fully comply with the IAEA’s inspection reports, and positively considers their recommendations.
  • Morocco updated and submitted, on July 28th, 2015, its last report to the UNSC resolution 1540 (2004) and subsequent resolutions, pursuant to its obligations to implement the resolution 1540.
  • Morocco ratified, on October 18th, 2015, the Amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM), adopted in Vienna on July 8th, 2005.
  • Morocco promulgated, on August 22nd, 2014, the Act 142-12 on nuclear and radiological safety, security and for safeguards. This law aims at harmonizing the national legal arsenal with the relevant provisions of the international conventions on nuclear law.
  • The Decree on the establishment of the” Moroccan Agency on Nuclear and Radiological Safety and Security” (Moroccan Regulatory Body) was published on October 26th, 2015.
  • The Director of the “Moroccan Agency on Nuclear and Radiological Safety and Security” was appointed at the last Council of Ministers, held in Lâayoune, on February 6th, 2016. He is responsible for setting up this new National Regulatory Authority and implementing the law provisions.

Supporting International Initiatives on Nuclear Security:

As a founding member of the Global Initiative for Combating Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), Morocco continues to implement its statement of principles and terms of reference as amended at the 6th GICNT Plenary Meeting (Abu-Dhabi-UAE, June 2010):

  • Morocco has chaired, since June 15th – 16th, 2011, one of the GICNT three working groups, “the Response and Mitigation Working Group (RMWG)”. The main focus of the RMWG is to examine best practices related to crises or emergencies involving radiological or nuclear terrorist threats or incidents.
  • Morocco organized the Mid-year IAG meeting, in Rabat, on February, 17th-19th, 2015, to facilitate the adoption of the Response and Mitigation Fundamentals Document entitled “Fundamentals for Establishing and Maintaining a Nuclear Security Response Framework: A GICNT Best Practices Guide”.
  • Morocco submitted at the 9th GICNT meeting held in Helsinki, on June 16th–18th, 2015, “the Response and Mitigation Fundamentals Document”. This document, which was endorsed by Helsinki CICNT Plenary meeting, is a collection of key considerations that a country with “limited capabilities” should consider when designing or enhancing its national nuclear and radiological emergency response system.
  • Morocco organized, on January 20th- 21st, 2016, in cooperation with the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), the European Commission, and the GICNT, the final planning meeting of the Inter-Arab Nuclear Detection and Response Exercise “Falcon”, conducted, in Abu Dhabi, on February 23rd- 25th, 2016.

Contributing to the Global Efforts and the IAEA’s Activities to Strengthen the International Nuclear Security Regime:

Morocco hosted, organized and coordinated with the IAEA, several activities by adopting an integrated and global approach, aiming at strengthening the international nuclear security regime. The areas covered range from training, capacity-building and information-sharing to exercises on nuclear security (prevention, detection, forensics, response and mitigation):

  • Morocco has, also, built its notification, information exchange and assistance request System with the IAEA, pursuant to the relevant dispositions of the “Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident” and “the Assistance in case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency”.
  • Morocco presented the lessons learnt from the exercise ConvEx 3 named “Bab Al Maghrib at the Competent Authority Meeting, held by the IAEA, in Vienna on May 18th, 2014, and at the International Conference on Challenges Faced by Technical and Scientific Support Organizations (TSOs) in Enhancing Nuclear Safety and Security: Strengthening Cooperation and Improving Capabilities, in Beijing on October 2014.
  • Morocco and Spain organized, with this dynamic, on October 26th- 28th, 2015, in cooperation with the IAEA, a maritime transportation security exercise of radioactive material from the port of Algeciras to the port of Tangiers-Med, namedGate to Africa”. The context of the exercise program was driven by the political instability in the Sahelo-Saharan region that requires collective efforts, on the bilateral and regional levels, due to terrorism threat.
  • Morocco and Spain took part, in Vienna, on February 2nd-5th, 2016, in the Consultancy Meeting on the Preparation Executive Summary and the Report from the “Gate to Africa” exercises, organized by the IAEA. In the meantime, Morocco presented the lessons learnt in the areas to be improved and to gather good practices. The latter’s will be submitted as      a summary executive exercise to be shared with IAEA members, and as an input to Washington NSS (2016).

Promoting Nuclear Security Culture:

Morocco attaches the highest priority to human resources development and to the promotion of a nuclear security culture, through nuclear security education and training by establishing nuclear security support centers and international nuclear security education network:

  • Morocco updated in 2015 with IAEA its Integrated Nuclear Security and Support Plan (INSSP) for the period 2016-2017.  This plan considers the main actions to be conducted to support nuclear security enhancement. The INSSP covers legal and regulatory framework, prevention, detection, response and human resources development. 
  • Morocco continues to organize and host, at the premises of the National Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC), training activities on nuclear security to disseminate knowledge and information, as well as to promote international standards on nuclear security for representatives of African and MENA region countries.
  • Morocco organized, in the framework of its Nuclear Security Support Center, several training activities at the national and regional levels. In 2014-2015, the National Training and Support Center of the National Center of Energy Sciences and Nuclear Techniques (CNESTEN) conducted 15 training events (9 national and 6 regional) for 380 participants on various topics related to nuclear security: detection architecture, radioactive sources physical protection, sources security transportation, emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security information management, nuclear forensics, borders control. These trainings were organized, in cooperation with the IAEA, the USA and the Arab Atomic Energy Agency.
  • Morocco (General Directorate for Civil Protection – DGPC) has been hosting, since 2013, a Regional Center of Excellence CBRN for the African countries of the Atlantic coast to share best practices, to enhance collaboration at the regional and sub-regional levels, with the following objectives:
    • To reduce the risk of illicit nuclear trafficking;
    • To raise awareness on chemical, Biological, Radiological and nuclear materials
    • To reinforce capacity building on the use of personal equipments for detection of ionizing rays.
  • Morocco equipped its customs-controlled borders and exit-entry points with devices detecting and identifying nuclear and radioactive materials.
  • Morocco’s National Center for Radiation Protection (NCRP), organized many trainings, in cooperation with the General Directorate for National Security (DGSN) and the Radiological Security Office (ORS) of the US Department of Energy.

 

National Progress Report: The Netherlands

1.    Support for the CPPNM (as Amended) and ICSANT

The Netherlands has ratified both the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). Although the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM has not yet entered into force, legislation, regulations and policies of the Netherlands have been developed in accordance with the treaty as amended.

In addition, the Netherlands has cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in organising outreach activities aimed at promoting the Amendment’s entry into force. The Netherlands has also submitted a report on its laws and regulations giving effect to the treaty in accordance with article 14.1 of the CPPNM.

2.    Strengthened National System for Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material
Current national rules and regulations are based on the IAEA Nuclear Security Series documents, in particular the Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 and parts of Rev.5).

The Netherlands has hosted International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions on four occasions (2005, 2008, 2009 and 2012), covering all of its nuclear installations. The general conclusion of the last mission in 2012 was that a firmly grounded physical protection regime exists in the Netherlands, and that appropriate physical protection measures are in place at nuclear facilities. Two recommendations for further improvement were made: (1) incorporate all applicable parts of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 into the domestic regime, and (2) develop a Design Basis Threat (DBT) for cyber security.

With respect to the first recommendation, the Netherlands took steps to strengthen its domestic rules on physical protection requirements by means of the Executive Order on the Security of Nuclear Facilities and Fissionable Materials, which came into force on 1 January 2011. An updated order incorporating all applicable parts of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 will come into effect in 2016.

A national DBT relating to the longer-term physical threats to the nuclear sector was introduced in 2008 and adopted in 2011. By 2012, all of the nuclear facilities had implemented the measures as required. This DBT was updated in 2015, the implementation of which will take place in the course of 2016. In line with the second recommendation deriving from the series of IPPAS missions, a DBT specifically concerning cyber security for the Dutch nuclear sector was introduced in 2013 and had been fully implemented by 31 March 2014. The nuclear operators were actively involved in the discussions regarding the design and the implications of both the DBT relating to physical protection and the DBT relating to cyber security. In the second half of 2016, integration of the two DBTs will be discussed, and the DBT for cyber security will be updated. Further, legislation to set up mandatory reporting of cyber incidents in the nuclear sector is currently being discussed in parliament. It is expected that related regulations will come into force in 2017.

The start of a comprehensive review of the Executive Order on the Security of Nuclear Facilities and Fissionable Materials is anticipated for 2016. The aim of this comprehensive review is to achieve an integrated (safety, security and crisis management) performance-based approach with respect to the protection of nuclear facilities rather than a security-only performance-based approach. Among other things, the review will entail an exchange of views and experiences among public and private stakeholders.

In order to assess the effectiveness of the physical protection systems at nuclear sites as well as to test the interfaces between the contingency planning of the operators and the State, several force-on-force exercises have been conducted in the Netherlands, involving all nuclear sites and all relevant state organisations.

With respect to radioactive sources, the 2012 Executive Order on the Security of Radioactive Materials further strengthened relevant security requirements. The Netherlands follows European directives and regulations and, where applicable, has reflected the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the supplementary Guidance on Export and Import of Radioactive Sources in the national legal framework. The Executive Order on the Security of Radioactive Materials will be evaluated in 2016.

Finally, in recent years security and awareness has been enhanced at organisations that work with high risk CBRN-material through the national CBRN/E programme. The Netherlands remains committed to continuing to improve nuclear security architectures through these practical actions.

3.    Contribution to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security-Related Activities

The Netherlands actively contributes to the development of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Series, most recently by chairing the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC) for the term that began in June 2015.

The Netherlands has contributed financially to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund every year since 2002. Its contribution for 2014-2017 is €1 million. The Netherlands continues to advocate for an increase in the IAEA’s budget for nuclear security.

 The Netherlands also contributes expertise in forensics and other areas to the IAEA in order to support the global nuclear security framework and nuclear security services. It has hosted three regional training courses and a train-the-trainers course on physical protection, as well as courses on security culture, DBTs, protection against sabotage and identification of vital areas. Another regional training course on physical protection is planned for May 2016.

4.    Support for Nuclear Security-Related International Initiatives

Together with the other Summit hosts, the US and South Korea, the Netherlands introduced the “Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation” initiative at the 2014 Summit in The Hague. The Netherlands is part of a large group of NSS-participating States that has thus far subscribed to the initiative’s Join Statement.

In addition, the Netherlands participates in the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), as well as in the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP). It currently chairs the GICNT Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG) and will host the GICNT 10th Anniversary Meeting in June 2016. The Netherlands also provides financial support to the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and cooperates with the 1540 Committee.

In 2012, the Netherlands hosted the international table-top exercise @tomic 2012, focusing on preventing (the threat of) nuclear/radiological terrorism. The exercise included cyber security and forensics components. In February 2014, the Netherlands hosted a follow-up exercise: @tomic 2014. This latter exercise was organised by the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) and the Ministry of Foreign A­ffairs, in cooperation with the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI), the Ministry of Economic Affairs, INTERPOL, the IAEA, the European Commission, UNICRI, the EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence and Europol.

The Netherlands also supports the following NSS 2016 gift baskets: the Canadian initiative on certified training for nuclear security management; the Italian initiative on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres and Centres of Excellence; the Jordanian initiative on countering nuclear smuggling, the Australian initiative on forensics in nuclear security; the British initiative on cyber security; the Norwegian initiative on minimizing use of HEU; the American initiative on insider threats; the French initiative on security of radioactive sources; the Canadian, South Korean and Spanish initiative on Security Council Resolution 1540; and the initiative on sustaining action to strengthen global nuclear security.

For the 2016 Summit, the Netherlands initiated a gift basket on Sustainability in Reporting and Information Sharing with an accompanying template for a Consolidated National Nuclear Security Report. This gift basket aims to improve and streamline the process of reporting and information sharing on national nuclear security efforts.

5.    Contribution to Minimisation of HEU

The Netherlands has converted all of its nuclear research reactors to use LEU fuel. Dutch industry intends to use only LEU targets for the production of medical radioisotopes, as soon as technically feasible. Almost all HEU has been removed and disposed of.

6.    Establishment of Centres of Excellence

The Netherlands supports the international CoE network coordinated by the IAEA and will contribute to improving cooperation between centres of excellence.

The Reactor Institute Delft at Delft University of Technology (one of the IAEA Collaborating Centres) started a Master’s programme in nuclear security in October 2012, open to qualified students from all IAEA member States. It was developed in collaboration with partner institutions in the UK, Germany, Norway, Austria and Greece, and was aligned with and supported by the IAEA. This programme is currently being evaluated. There are currently plans to establish a centre of excellence (CoE) on nuclear security in Delft.

The Centre for Conflict and Security Law (CCSL), based in Utrecht and Amsterdam, continues to conduct research on strengthening the international legal framework for nuclear and radiological security, as well as corresponding domestic laws and regulations. It collaborates in this area with its extensive academic and research network, in accordance with its ambition to become a CoE on this issue.

7.    Enhanced Efforts to Combat Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Radiological Material

The Netherlands contributes to the sharing of international information on illicit trafficking in nuclear material through the IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) and nuclear security information portal (NUSEC), through the GICNT IAG, as well as through bilateral cooperation.

Since 2011, the Dutch government and the NFI have established, together with other countries, a comprehensive programme to foster cooperation among nuclear and forensic institutes worldwide. This programme entails the development of a glossary of internationally accepted definitions and rules regarding both nuclear and forensic science; an education and training curriculum; an interactive website providing a platform for discussion and exchange of knowledge; and a survey of best practices with respect to investigating nuclear security events. Furthermore, the NCTV has organised table-top exercises on nuclear forensics, cyber security and incident response. In 2015, the NFI organised an international conference and mock trial on nuclear forensics in the framework of the GICNT. This event, that took place in The Hague, addressed the role of nuclear forensics experts in the investigation and prosecution of nuclear security incidents, the admissibility of nuclear forensics expert evidence into judicial proceedings, and the importance of pre-incident coordination and communication among scientists, law enforcement, and prosecutors.

8.    Strengthened cooperation between government and nuclear industry

Raising security awareness in the nuclear sector is a priority for the Dutch government. To this end, three leading Dutch nuclear operators have each been awarded a €1 million grant to further develop and improve security measures. The IAEA and WINS have both recognized the merits of this concept and have encouraged its application in other countries.

The government consults with plant security managers and information officers when adjustments to national nuclear security policies are needed. By doing so, the government is able to understand their visions and profit from their experience. Nuclear operators are also consulted on policy evaluations in order to gain a better understanding of implementation practices. In these consultations, the different positions of responsibility of the regulator and operators are respected.

National Progress Report: New Zealand

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, New Zealand has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by the following actions.

Supporting Multilateral Instruments

  • Ratified the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in March 2016.*
  • Ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in March 2016.*

Strengthening National Nuclear and Radiological Material Security

  • Enacted the Radiation Safety Act 2016 in March 2016. The Act is a complete overhaul of our legislative framework dealing with the safety and security of nuclear and radioactive material. The Act provides for a new type of licence enabling increased regulatory control over persons who manage or use radioactive or nuclear material.*
  • Implemented in March 2016 a Code of Practice for the Security of Radioactive Material.*

Countering Nuclear Smuggling

  • In November 2015, New Zealand hosted a Proliferation Security Initiative exercise – Exercise Maru 2015. Over 130 participants from 21 countries attended the exercise which was designed with the Asia Pacific region specifically in mind. The exercise focused on what steps countries with limited resources and capacity can take to intercept weapons of mass destruction and their components.* 

Collaborating with International Organizations

  • In November 2015, New Zealand hosted an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission. The voluntary mission reviewed the national nuclear security regime for radioactive material, associated facilities and activities.*
  • New Zealand is currently working to implement the IPPAS mission recommendations and plans to invite a follow-up mission.*
  • New Zealand concluded a Modified Small Quantities Protocol with the IAEA in 2014 and hosted a successful ad hoc inspection in February 2015 to verify our nuclear material holdings.*
  • New Zealand has contributed to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund regularly since its inception in 2002, and has donated $286,000 since NSS 2014.*

Partnering with External Stakeholders

  • New Zealand continued to make targeted contributions to a range of voluntary nuclear security-related initiatives.*
  • New Zealand has continued its partnership with the United States’ Department of Energy and since the 2014 Summit has contributed NZ$510,000 to a range of nuclear security related projects in Africa, Latin America and Asia.*
  • New Zealand has also continued its partnership with the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation to partner on Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism projects. Since the 2014 Summit New Zealand has contributed NZ$160,000 to regional nuclear security training workshops in the Philippines and Sydney.*
  • New Zealand has continued its partnership with the World Institute of Nuclear Security, and since the 2014 Summit has contributed NZ$50,000 towards development of its online training facility for nuclear security.*

*Denotes an accomplishment associated with Information Circular (INFCIRC) 869

National Progress Report: Nigeria

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Nigeria has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the nuclear security architecture by:

Strengthening Nuclear and other Radioactive Material Security

Development and Review of Regulations

Nigeria has commenced a comprehensive review and updating of the existing Nuclear Security Regulations as well as drafting of new ones to ensure nuclear materials and other radioactive sources are secured. The following regulations are at various stages of review:

  • Nigerian Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials Regulations
  • Nigeria safety and security of radioactive sources regulation

The following regulations are at various stages of development:

  • System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material
  • Physical protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities

The review and development shall be completed and gazetted in the third quarter of 2016.

Design Basis Threat

With the changing nature of global and national threats, Nigeria in conjunction with relevant stakeholders is currently reviewing the Design Basis Threat (DBT). This shall be used to guide holders of nuclear and radiological materials on the appropriate physical protection systems to put in place.

The review shall be completed and appropriately communicated to operatos in the third quarter of 2016

Oversight

Nigeria Undertakes regular security inspections of facilities to ensure materials are secured.

Nigeria shall ensure inspectors get requisite training and the inspections shall be regular

Nuclear Security Support Centre

Nigeria established a Nuclear Security Support Centre which is aimed at enhancing human capacity development in the area of nuclear security.

The Centre shall actively liaise with IAEA and other International Organizations to develop and undertake training programmes for stakeholder organizations in 2016 and beyond. The Centre is intended to serve sub-Sahara Africa.

Search and Secure of Orphan and Legacy Radioactive Sources

Nigeria has developed programme for search and secure of orphan and legacy radioactive sources. The programme has been established with the ultimate aim of identifying, securing and recovering vulnerable orphan and legacy radioactive sources in the country and to ensure they are secured to prevent unauthorized access by terrorists and criminals.

The Search and Secure programme has been a yearly exercise. The latest exercise was conducted in January 2016 in three geopolitical Zones of Nigeria.

Nigeria shall acquire more equipment and expertise to ensure efficiency and sustainability of the programme.

Depleted Uranium Survey

The survey of Depleted Uranium (DU) which commenced in 2011 is on ongoing. Nigeria has compiled reports in the IAEA required reporting format and has also created a new material balance area for location outside facilities (LOF) for submission of the report  to the IAEA.

The programme shall continue and comprehensive reports sent to the IAEA

Legacy Sources at Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited

Nigeria conducts regular inspection of the 234 legacy sources at Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited to guarantee their security pending their relocation to a temporary Radioactive Waste Management Facility.

Sources shall be moved to Temporary Waste Management Facility and efforts shall be made for final repatriation to their countries of origin.

Repatriation of Other Disused Radioactive Sources

The Nigerian Government undertakes regular inspection of disused radioactive sources located at the Temporary Waste Management Facility.

Efforts shall be made for final repatriation to their countries of origin.

Minimising Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

HEU Conversion Programme for Nigeria Research Reactor 1 (NIRR-1)

The Nigeria, China and USA had a tripartite meeting in October 2011 in Abuja and agreed to develop a joint statement on cooperation to the objectives of the HEU to LEU fuel Conversion Programme for the Nigeria Research Reactor-1.

The Nigeria in collaboration with the IAEA commenced discussions on developing human capacity for the HEU fuel conversion to LEU, IAEA fellowship was secured for two Nigerian regulatory Officers at Argonne National Laboratory on core conversion studies in 2012.

Nigeria attended the 35th International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors and the Consultancy Meeting on MNSR held in Vienna, Austria in October and December 2014 respectively. The Consultancy meeting was primarily to look into Nigeria’s progress on the HEU to LEU core conversion.

Nigeria will in the second quarter of 2016  sign the Project and Supply Agreement which will allow the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) procure the LEU core and commence the design and fabrication of the cask.

Countering Nuclear Smuggling

Oversight of NIRR-1

Nigeria undertakes regular inspection of NIRR-1 and supports IAEA safeguard inspection of the facility.

Training of Frontline Officers

Nigeria conducts various training and retraining programmes for its Frontline Officers from the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, Nigeria Customs Service, Nigeria Police Force, State Security Service, Nigeria Immigration Service, Federal Fire Service, Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria, Nigeria Ports Authority and the Defence Headquarters of the Nigerian Armed Forces. Frontline Officers are also nominated to attend IAEA organized training courses on Illicit trafficking/border monitoring, nuclear security, physical protection of nuclear and radiological facilities, response to unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive materials, Advance Detection of nuclear and radioactive materials, etc.

Installation of Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs)

Nigeria installed its first Radiation Protection Monitor (RPM) at the Murtala Muhammed International Airport, Lagos in 2008 and put into operation in April 2009. The RPM was donated by the IAEA and meant to prevent accidental or undeclared import and export of radioactive sources as well as checking illicit trafficking of nuclear materials.

Three more RPMs have since been procured and discussions are on-going with the manufacturer for the purpose of installing them at strategic ports of entry into the country.

The Installation of the three portal monitors shall be completed before the end of 2016 and the NSSC shall give training of frontline officers a priority.

Supporting Multilateral Instruments

Nigeria adheres strictly to all the International Instruments that it is a signatory to. It is also reviewing its Act with a view to domesticating the instruments.

Nigeria shall ensure the passage of the Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards Bill before the end of 2016

Collaborating with International organizations

To enhance Nuclear Security Nigeria Collaborates with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), United States Department of State’s Partnership for Nuclear Security (PNS), World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) etc. Nigeria actively participated in the WINS professional Certification programmes.

Nigeria is collaborating with Oak Ridge National Laboratory of the United States of America to implement a Human Reliability Programme (HRP) for the Nigerian nuclear industry. A pilot HRP programme is being developed at the Centre for Energy Research and Training, ABU Zaria and is being facilitated by the ORNL with support from Partnership for Nuclear Security (PNS). The programme shall be replicated at other high risk nuclear and radiological facilities in the country.

Nigeria has signed an agreement of cooperation with the United States Department of Energy (US-DOE) Office of Radiological Security (ORS). The objectives of this corporation are to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive material located at civilian sites; remove and dispose excess nuclear and other radiological materials; and protect nuclear and other radiological materials from theft or sabotage. The cooperation included Physical Security upgrades of some high risk radiological facilities.

Nigeria shall partner more with the International Organizations for capacity building particularly in the development of the Nigerian Nuclear Security Support Centre, Physical security upgrades and HRP implementation.

Partnering with External Stakeholders

Nigeria partners actively with external stakeholders with similar objectives.  More partnerships are being explored and would be entered intoafter the NSS 2016 for sustainability of the NSSprocess.

The partnership shall be sustained

GIFT BASKETS

Nigeria joined the following gift baskets for the 2016 Summit:

  • Mitigating Insider Threats
  • Nuclear forensics
  • Education and Training

National Progress Report: Norway

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Norway has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by… 

Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

  • Norway hosted an IPPAS mission in October 2015, in line with our support to IAEA Information Circular (INFCIRC) 869. The mission recommended that Norway should:
    • Ensuring effective financial and legal independence of the regulatory authority;
    • review its regulations on physical protection, incorporating input from the IPPAS mission;
    • strengthen national measures against insider threats;
    • strengthen measures against cyber threats;
    • improve coordination between different authorities with particular emphasis on threat assessments and response.
  • Norway has increased its cooperation with Ukraine on nuclear safety and security, including the following measures:
    • A Norwegian–Swedish–Ukrainian initiative on improving nuclear safety and security in Ukraine was launched at NSS 2014.
    • Bilateral regulatory cooperation with Ukraine has been enhanced. This includes establishing an overview of regulatory challenges to improved nuclear safety.
    • Cooperation with the US has been entered into on projects in Ukraine to counter illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials.
    • In 2016, Norway will host an international meeting for closer coordination of efforts to improve nuclear safety and security in Ukraine.
  • Norway has been engaged in several projects over the last two decades on securing the nuclear legacy from the Cold War and other radioactive material in north-western Russia.
    • We are currently supporting activities aimed at securing nuclear material at the former military base in Andreeva Bay and at Atomflot in Murmansk

Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

  • Norway launched a Gift Basket at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit on Minimising and Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications. A follow up International Conference will be organised in 2018.
  • Norway has replaced all Cs-137 Category 1 radioactive sources with X-ray technology.
  • In 2016, Norway will host an International meeting on minimisation of stocks of highly enriched uranium in a uranium-thorium mixture.

 Countering Nuclear Smuggling

Norway has:

  • contributed to improved border monitoring in Ukraine by installing additional border monitoring portals, in partnership with the US;
  • helped to improve Ukrainian border guard capabilities in handling nuclear smuggling incidents;
  • contributed to training activities in searching for and securing radioactive sources for relevant Ukrainian authorities, in partnership with the US;
  • initiated a collaborative project with Slovakia, on improved border control against nuclear smuggling.

Supporting Multilateral Instruments

Norway has:

  • signed and ratified the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities (CPPNM);
  • adopted the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources including its supplementary guidance document;
  • signed and ratified the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism;
  • promoted additional measures for material transparency, control and production cut-off, and early start and conclusion of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).

Collaborating with International Organizations and Initiatives

  • Norway has contributed approx. USD 5 mill. to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund since the first summit.
  • Norway participates in the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance Committee.
  • Norway is an active member of the G7 Global Partnership.
  • Norway participates in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
  • Norway has reported on implementation of UNSC resolution 1540.

 Partnering with External Stakeholders

  • In January 2016, Norway hosted a WINS workshop, in collaboration with the US, on the implementation of the 2014 Gift Basket on Enhancing Radiological Security

National Progress Report: Philippines

Nuclear Safeguards: The Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) ensures that nuclear materials are not diverted to non-peaceful applications. As part of the reporting obligations under the Additional Protocol, the PNRI submitted an annual update of the declaration and quarterly reports of Export of Annex 2 items.

US Department of Energy (US DOE) Funded Programs/Projects: Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Radiological Security Program formerly Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GRTI)

  • Additional security upgrades installed in the hospitals and PNRI facilities with category 1 sources in view of the latest development in radioactive source security requirements, updates on threat assessment and new security system technologies.
  • Conducted Radiological Security Incident Response Training (Train-the-Trainer) for the Philippine National Police on 16-19 February 2015 held in Bohol. The objective of the training is to enhance the capability and effectiveness of PNP to conduct training by integrating its curriculum to the Police Academy. This is in support for sustainability of PNP’s human resource development
  • Upgraded the PNRI perimeter fence to harden the physical protection along the Radioactive Waste Facility.
     Megaports Initiative/ Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence
  • Memorandum of Agreement was signed on 20 July 2015 among the implementing agencies, Bureau of Customs, Philippine Ports Authority and Philippine Nuclear Research Institute in the implementation and sustainability of installed Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) at the Port of Manila. The US DOE supported the transition turnover to the Philippine government, the RPMs and other radiation detection equipment for the maintenance.
  • Recovered radiation source from the radiation equipment particularly a TROXLER moisture/density gauge which was sold for scrap during the tertiary inspection at Cebu International Port in July 2015. The moisture/density gauge has an americium and cesium sources. Unfortunately, only the americium was recovered. The PNRI informed the Bureau of Customs in Cebu to monitor possible gamma alarm on future scrap metal export of the Consignor. The PNRI continued to assist the BOC in the interdiction of radiation sources in the scraps and contaminated goods with radioactive sources detected at the ports.
  • The Philippine National Police received four (4) mobile detection vans with handheld based detection and identification systems in November 2015. This is to enhance the capabilities for preventing, mitigating, and apprehending suspects and criminals in the act of radiological and nuclear material smuggling. The PNRI will support the PNP through our Mobile Expert Support Teams (MEST) also with one (1) MDS van.
  • US Bilateral Assessment Visit Update on 20-21 July 2015. The purpose was to hold discussions with appropriate Government and PNRI officials to review the plans and discuss topics on threats and physical protection based on the IAEA INFCIRC 225 Rev. 5. Representatives from NICA and NSC were present in the meeting. The US Team was composed of the following: US DOE, US Dept. of State, US NRC and Sandia National Laboratory.

IAEA’s Support for Nuclear Security Major Public Event

  • NSSS hosted the Coordination Meeting on Major Public Event with IAEA from 11-13 March 2015. The workshop was attended by relevant government agencies and PNRI staff. The Joint Action Plan was signed on 29 April 2015 between the Division of Nuclear Security of the IAEA and PNRI in relation to the 27th APEC Economic Leaders Meeting in November 2015 to be held in Manila.
  • In preparation of the APEC, training workshops were conducted:
     
    • National Workshop on Threat Assessment and Design Basis Threat, 21-24 April 2015
    • Workshop on Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for Major Public Event in cooperation with the USDOE/NNSA.
    • Workshop on Concept of Operations between Front Line Officers and Mobile Expert Support Teams
    • Workshop on Responding to Nuclear Security Events at Venues and other Strategic Locations
  • Received equipment on a loan basis to be deployed during the APEC Meeting: 
    • 60 Personal Radiation Detectors
    • 8 Radionuclide Identification Devices
    • 6 Portable Radiation Scanners (Backpacks)

US DOE EQUIPMENT

60 pagers, 16 backpacks, 14 RIIDS, 2 linear radiation monitor, 2 high purity germanium detector, 2 SPARCS mobile system, 2 health physics kits

4.      The PNRI MEST performed the scanning/monitoring/paneling together with PNP, AFP and Bureau of Fire CBRN teams at the venue of the APEC Economic leaders meeting, hotels, staging areas and routes. Hotels requested to be installed with radiation equipment.

Cooperative Agreement with the Global Partnership Program of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFATD) –

The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) and the PNRI concerning activities in furtherance of the G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction was finalized and signed by the contracting parties on 12 January 2015. The Implementing Arrangement under the Appendix 1 of the MOU was signed on 23 January 2015. The MOU was to install physical protection system at the research reactor. The installation is on-going.

E.      European Commission project on Border Monitoring Activities in the Philippines. The purpose is to support the development of a training center at PNRI dedicated to train port operators, customs police and other first responders in the field of nuclear detection and response. The assistance is to install Radiation Portal Monitor at the front gate of PNRI, handheld equipment and train-the-trainer program. The installation of the RPM is on-going and projected to finish in January 2016.

National Progress Report: Poland

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Poland has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by:

1.      Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

All the nuclear and radiological materials are subject to strict and continuous control. To fulfill its international obligations related to nuclear materials, Poland runs the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC), which significantly enhances the security of nuclear materials. Additionally, a register of radioactive sources is kept. The radioactive sources register contains data on more than 23,000 sources including spent sealed radioactive sources, information concerning their movement as well as related documents. In the years 2002-2015 the physical protection systems for a high active radioactive sources possessed by over 80 medical, research and other institutions were upgraded under the GTRI program.

In an effort to optimize the security of nuclear facilities in Poland, a special task-force group for developing proposals to strengthen the anti-terrorist security of the nuclear research reactor “Maria” in Świerk was established as a part of the Inter-ministerial Team for Terrorist Threats. The group formulated a number of recommendations aimed at improving the nuclear security of the reactor.

Moreover, the National Anti-terrorist Program has been adopted by the Government of Poland on 9 December 2014.  Its priorities include – among others – objectives related to strengthening nuclear security against terrorist threats.

On 17-20 November 2015, “Patrol 2015”, an intensive operational exercise was conducted at the nuclear research reactor “Maria” facility in Świerk. It was organized by Europol, in cooperation with IAEA and with support of the Polish Police and the National Centre for the Nuclear Research. The overall goal was to improve preparedness of the CBRN experts and first responders to effectively react to incidents and emergencies involving radiological and nuclear materials. The scenario of the exercise included a terrorist attack against the facility.

2.      Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

Under the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), Poland is about to complete the process of removing highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from the nuclear research reactor “Maria” in Świerk.

In August 2014 the last HEU fuel element was unloaded from “Maria’s” core. From now on, it operates on LEU fuel solely. In September 2014, 44 SNF elements containing 10,4 kg of HEU were shipped to the radioactive waste disposal site, located in the Russian Federation. The last shipment (51 SNF elements containing 12,1 kg of HEU) is due to be completed in the second half of 2016.     

Measures strengthening security of the Różan radioactive waste disposal site have been also recently applied. Process of selection of the new waste disposal site (due to total filling of the Różan capacity) will comply with the highest nuclear security standards, in accordance with IAEA recommendations.

3. Countering Nuclear Smuggling

In cooperation with the US Department of Energy, Polish Border Guard continued process of improving its counter-smuggling capabilities with regard to nuclear materials. A number of relevant trainings and exercises was conducted. Technical infrastructure of border-crossing points was also subject for improvement.

Poland will continue cooperation with external partners in strengthening national responses to the nuclear and radioactive smuggling. In this context, we welcome the initiative of Sweden to organize a conference in 2016 to discuss implementation of NSS commitments and objectives in the wider Black Sea region.

4.      Supporting Multilateral Instruments

Poland already ratified all relevant international nuclear security conventions and is a member of international initiatives and mechanisms aimed at strengthening nuclear security and preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear materials.

We will continue to support universal application of all relevant international instruments.

5.      Collaborating with International Organizations

Poland has committed itself to ensuring that the highest nuclear security standards are observed in the development of its peaceful nuclear power program. At the request of the Government of Poland, an international team of senior safety experts met with representatives of the National Atomic Energy Agency (PAA) in 2013 to conduct an Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission. The purpose of the mission was to examine Poland’s regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety, and its effectiveness. Based on the IRRS evaluation against the IAEA safety standards, the review team identified good practices as well as offered several recommendations and suggestions to be addressed by the PAA. As the result, the action plan has been developed and the recommendations of the mission are being implemented. In order to verify the process of implementation Poland will host IRRS follow-up mission in 2017.

After hosting the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) Workshop and Preparatory Meeting in 2015, the IPPAS Mission was conducted in Poland in February 2016. The recommendations and suggestions received from the Mission will strengthen national nuclear security regime.

In order to assure better compliance with the IAEA guidelines and recommendations, a national workshop on Design Basis Threat (DBT) implementation was held in Warsaw in September 2013. As a result of discussion conducted during the workshop, the series of high-level and working-level meetings of all interested Polish institutions were held and led to draft an amendment to the national security legal framework. It is foreseen that updated regulation related to the DBT will enter into force in 2017. Among the options suggested by the IAEA, approach of a single DBT covering all threats and potential targets in country has been chosen.

In the aftermath of IAEA’s Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) mission, hosted by Poland in March 2013, Poland prepared the National Action Plan to implement relevant recommendations and suggestions. This Plan has been approved and signed by the Minister of Economy in April 2014. It confirmed i.e. the Polish Nuclear Power Program to contain all necessary provisions on nuclear security. In May 2014, the IAEA representatives visited Poland to elaborate the Integrated Work Plan for INIR conclusions. The next INIR mission (so-called Follow-up mission) will take place in June 2016, with the aim to assess the level of compliance with the INIR mission recommendations and suggestions. At the same time it will look at Phase 2 of the development of the Polish nuclear power Program (using the “Milestone approach”) following the announcement of the technology tender by the investor/operator (“PGE EJ1 Ltd.”) at that time.

In addition, in October 2015 Council of Ministers adopted the National Plan for Management of Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel.

National Progress Report: Republic of Korea

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, the Republic of Korea (ROK) has strengthened nuclear security and built up the global nuclear security architecture by:

1. Supporting Multilateral Instruments

Accomplishments

  • Korea ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) in May 2014, after incorporating both conventions into the national legislations. Korea has also incorporated IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 into its national regulations.
  • Korea has established the legal and administrative framework for the security of Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources as provided in the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the revised supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.
  • Together with 35 countries, Korea participated in the joint effort to share, through IAEA INFCIRC/869, the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation with the IAEA Member States. Its intention is to incorporate the broader community of states outside the NSS process by giving them a chance to subscribe to the Statement.

Commitments

  • Korea will continue its support for multilateral legal instruments and work with the international community to achieve full implementation and universalization of the relevant legal instruments.

2. Strengthening the National Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security System

Accomplishments

  • Korea received an IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission in 2014 to review its national nuclear security architecture and reflected the recommendations for the improvement of its physical protection system.
  • Korea carries out regular inspection of its nuclear facilities and periodic force-on-force physical protection exercises, which is mandatory under domestic law. These exercises are designed to detect and respond to mock adversaries, and use state-of-the-art devices and systems. 

Commitments

  • Korea will continue to review and update its legislative framework for nuclear security with a particular focus on areas such as consolidating transport security of nuclear materials taking a graded approach in sabotage response, introducing a licensing system for physical protection for the front-end life cycle of the nuclear power plant mitigating insider threats, and identifying vital areas at nuclear facilities.

3. Collaborating with International Organizations

Accomplishments

  • (IAEA) Korea has been an active supporter of IAEA nuclear security activities, providing expertise and financial support. Since 2012, Korea has been contributing 1 million US dollars annually to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) and its experts have been participating in the development of the IAEA’s nuclear security guidance, training courses, and research projects.
  • (UN) As the Chair of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 1540 Committee for the 2013-2014 term, Korea played a leading role in the international efforts to promote full implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004), such as providing financial support of 1 million US dollars and presiding over the Security Council open debate on Resolution 1540 in May 2014 at which the Presidential Statement (PRST) was adopted by consensus.
  • (GICNT) Korea served as the Coordinator for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG) from 2013 to 2015. In this capacity, Korea hosted the annual IAG Meeting in July 2014 at which the development of the future strategy was discussed.
  • (GP) Korea has made contributions to multiple nuclear security-related projects under the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP).  Those projects include securing high activity radioactive sources, establishing mobile radiological detection system, building remote monitoring center for nuclear facilities in various regions around the world.

Commitments

  • Korea will serve as the Chair for the Ministerial Segment of the 2016 IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security to be held in Vienna in December 2016, as part of the efforts to contribute to maintaining the political momentum created in the Nuclear Security Summit process.
  • Korea will hold in September 2016 a regional outreach event to promote implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 amongst relevant stakeholders in industry and academia.  
  • Korea will continue to strengthen its capabilities in the field of nuclear security through close technical cooperation with relevant international organizations and continue to render technical, financial, and political support.

4. Enhancing Cyber Security in Nuclear Facilities

Accomplishments

  • Korea revised its national laws and regulations to add cyber security requirements at nuclear facilities. In accordance with these laws and regulations, Korea has been conducting regular inspections and reviews of cyber security at nuclear facilities since 2015. In addition, Korea has included cyber threats as one of the elements in the Design Basis Threat (DBT) of nuclear facilities.
  • Korea hosted the IAEA-ROK Regional Workshop on Computer Security for Nuclear Facilities in November 2014 and participated in the IAEA International Conference on Computer Security in a Nuclear World in June 2015 sharing its experience of an attempted cyber attack against nuclear facilities.

Commitments

  • At the national level, Korea will further strengthen its legislative and regulatory framework for cyber security at nuclear facilities through the development of cyber security regulation procedures, review of cyber security training programs, and building up of capabilities in responding to cyber incidents.
  • At the international level, Korea will continue to cooperate with the IAEA to strengthen cyber security at nuclear facilities. The planned activities include collaborating on a Coordinated Research Program on the development of evaluation methods for cyber incident response, participating in the review process of the Nuclear Security Series publications to reflect cyber security considerations, and hosting the IAEA Regional Training Course (RTC) in 2016, and the IAEA International Training Course (ITC) in 2017.

5. Promoting Nuclear Security Education and Training

Accomplishments

  • Since its inauguration in February 2014, the International Nuclear Non-proliferation and Security Academy (INSA) has trained more than 3,200 experts, operators, and officials through domestic and international training programs on nuclear security, safeguards, and strategic trade controls. It has run 12 international nuclear security training courses inviting experts from 23 countries, including those from emerging nuclear power States.

Commitments

  • Korea will continue to provide nuclear security training, especially for regulators and officials in emerging nuclear power countries.
  • Korea will continue its efforts to enhance regional cooperation between Centers of Excellence (COEs), building on the Asia Regional Network (ARN) within the IAEA International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers (NSSC Network), with a view to strengthening measures for nuclear security in nuclear facilities and building confidence among the countries in the region.

6. Minimizing the Use of HEU

Accomplishments

  • Korea is working with Belgium, France, Germany and the United States on a joint project to develop and qualify new high-density low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels for research reactors. As committed to in the 2014 Joint Statement, Korea has provided 100 kg of atomized U-Mo powder for use in the fabrication of LEU test fuels and has committed to produce and provide any additional powder needed for further research and qualification. 

Commitments

  • Korea will continue to render technical and political support to achieve the goal of converting the remaining HEU-fueled research reactors.

7. Countering Nuclear Smuggling

Accomplishments

  • Korea supports active information sharing to combat nuclear smuggling, including reporting through the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB).
  • Korea is operating the domestic Radiation Source Location Tracking (RADLOT) system for the prevention of loss or trafficking of radiological materials. It has also been working with the IAEA and Vietnam on the pilot project for the establishment of the RADLOT system in Vietnam.
  • Korea has also started developing a national nuclear forensics system, including a national response plan, and nuclear forensics library.

Commitments

  • Korea will continue to enhance its capacity to counter nuclear smuggling, especially by strengthening nuclear detection activities at borders, including at airports and ports, and working with relevant international organizations.  

National Progress Report: Romania

Romania is strongly committed to the efforts of strengthening nuclear security and reducing the continuing threat of nuclear terrorism.

Ensuring the highest possible standards of nuclear security lies at the core of Romania’s nuclear energy policy.

Therefore, since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Romania has continued to resolutely implement its nuclear security commitments, and to contribute to the efforts of building up the global nuclear security architecture through the following main actions:

A. Supporting Multilateral Instruments

Romania is a State Party to the following multilateral instruments which promote nuclear security: the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendment; the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSTANT); the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Romania encourages all States that have not yet done so to become party to the CPPNM, to ratify its Amendment, and to sing and ratify CTBT.

Romania is actively involved in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), subscribing to the commitment to detect, prevent and respond effectively to acts of nuclear terrorism by carrying multilateral activities aimed at improving interoperability among participating States. Romanian experts take part regularly in the activities of two specific GICNT working groups, namely, Nuclear Detection Working Group – NDWG and Nuclear Forensics Working Group – NFWG.

B. Strengthening national legislation

Romania has in place the necessary regulatory framework and has the capacity to ensure a proper management of nuclear materials, including preventing terrorists from acquiring such materials.

In 2014, Romania updated its National Strategy for Nuclear Safety and Security, which was approved by Governmental Decision in July 2014, with the objective of strengthening national legislation framework on nuclear security.

C. Collaborating with International Organizations

Romania recognizes the leading role of IAEA, fully supports the IAEA’s nuclear security programme and commends the Agency for its tireless efforts to strengthen international cooperation and improve nuclear security worldwide.

Romania reiterates its readiness to engage in international cooperation projects, to share its experience in the field of nuclear security and safety and to offer relevant expertise in this field.

The national regulatory authority in Romania (the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control - CNCAN) strictly follows the standards and guidelines issued by the IAEA. It participated in most of the relevant activities organized by the IAEA, including the International Conference on Advances in Nuclear Forensics: Countering the Evolving Threat of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control (July 2014), or the International Conference on Cyber Security: Discussions and exchange of information (June2015)[1].

D. Undertaking Unilateral Commitments

In the margins of NSS 2014, Romania undertook a number of unilateral commitments, which were or are currently being implemented, namely:

i) A voluntary contribution of 30,000 Euro to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund: the payment is in the process of being made;

ii)   Receiving, in 2014, an IAEA INSServ (International Nuclear Security Advisory Service) mission: The mission took place on 12-16 May 2014, and ensured an independent assessment of the national capabilities for detection and response in case of illicit trafficking, identifying means for enhancing nuclear security related activities;

iii) Inviting, in 2016, an IAEA IPPAS (International Physical Protection Advisory Service) follow-up mission to assess the stage of implementation of the recommendations presented on the occasion of the previous IPPAS mission, in 2012: Romania is in the process of officially inviting the IPPAS follow-up mission for the last quarter of 2016.

E. Securing all Nuclear Materials

Romania repatriated to the country of origin (the Russian Federation) the entire quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and low enriched uranium (LEU).

F. Controlling the Radioactive Sources

Since 2009, Romania has in place an agreement with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) on cooperation for enhancing the physical security of special nuclear materials and radioactive sources in Romania. Under this agreement, during the period 2014-2016, Romania carried out several activities, such as improving the physical protection systems at several hospitals and oncological institutes, and placing into safe storage all existing highly radioactive sources in hospitals and research institutes.   

In the framework of the "Second Line of Defense" initiative, Romania continued to commission equipment, thus completing securing the Romanian north-eastern border by installing radiological detection portals at the access points for road, rail and pedestrian traffic. In 2015, detection portals for luggage and passengers were installed at Romania’s national airport, in Bucharest.

G. Countering illicit trafficking of nuclear materials

Romania is one of the countries which voluntarily report to the IAEA database on illicit trafficking of radioactive substances in the event that such developments ever occur. No high-risk events regarding illicit trafficking in dual use (civilian and military) nuclear items occurred in Romania so far. Since the launch of the IAEA database, Romania only reported some minor incidents.

During the period 2014-2016, the frequency of such recorded events was about 3 or 4 per year. They are, nevertheless, insignificant in what concerns their impact on the environment and the population.

H. Supporting the Nuclear Security Culture

Romania attaches great importance to the promotion of the nuclear security culture. The Romanian authorities contribute actively to efforts of raising awareness and improving understanding of the nuclear security culture, not only among governmental agencies, but also among individuals. As of 2016, a dedicated curricula is considered to be included in the training programme for all staff in the field of nuclear installations and law enforcement institutions. 

I. Gift Baskets

Romania supports the following 2016 NSS Gift Baskets: Nuclear Security Contact Group; Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling; Strengthening the security of high activity sealed radioactive sources – HARS; Minimizing and Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications; Insider Threat; Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

[1] On the basis of a specific cooperation agreement with IAEA[1], CNCAN organized, at national level, several events aiming at a better dissemination of specific aspects referring to the cyber security issues of the devices used in nuclear installations, and also to the strengthening of national, regional and international capacity for preventing, discovery and response to criminal and unauthorized acts involving nuclear and/or radioactive material, such as: National Training Course on Information and Computer Security Advanced Practices for Nuclear Security (July 2014), Black Sea Regional Meeting Nuclear Security Detection and Response: Information Exchange and Coordination (November 2014), National Training Course on Security of Radioactive Material in Transport(May 2015), National Training Course on Nuclear Security Events significance – assessment and response(April2015).

National Progress Report: Saudi Arabia

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Saudi Arabia has strengthened nuclear security implementation through effective participation in a number of events and international activities related to nuclear security, including the following:

1. Participated in the annual meeting of the International Network of Training and Assistance in nuclear security of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) held in Vienna in February 2014

2. Participated in a diplomacy workshop for ambassadors on disarmament and nuclear security held in Baden-Austria in June 2014.

3.  Conducteda national workshop in cooperation with the IAEA on nuclear safeguards and security, held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in September 2014

4. Organized a joint meeting in cooperation with the IAEA on nuclear security between border control experts from the Republic of Yemen and Saudi Arabia in Riyadh-Saudi Arabia in January 2015.

5.  The Kingdom joined the European Union (EU) Centers of Excellence on Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation (CBRN CoE Initiative) in January 2015 and became a member of the Regional Center of Excellence under this initiative, which is based in the U.A.E. The Kingdom has actively participated in the third meeting of CBRN CoE Initiative, held in Brussels, Belgium in May 2015.

6. Organized a workshop in collaboration with Japan on the development of human resources in security and nuclear safety and safeguards, held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in February 2015.

7. Participated in the meeting of the Working Group of the International Network of Nuclear Security Education (INSEN) at the Agency's headquarters in Vienna-Austria, in February 2015.

8. Participated in the regional workshop on integrated nuclear security support plans for Arabic-speaking countries in Cairo, Egypt in April 2015.

9. Participated in the regional meeting to exchange information about the Database of Illicit Trafficking in Radioactive and Nuclear Materials held in Kuwait in October 2015.

10.  Organized national workshop for protection from the risks of chemical, biological radioactive, and nuclear materials in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in 15-17 November 2015 in cooperation with the United Nations crime and Justice Research Institute (UNCRI).

11.  Signed the Convention Practical Coordination between the IAEA and Naif University for Security Sciences in December 2015 for cooperation in the field of education and training programs related to nuclear security

12.  Organized a symposium on nuclear security presented by the head of Nuclear Security at the IAEA, which was held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in December 2015.

13.  Organized workshop in cooperation with the IAEA on capacity assessment and strategy for education and training in nuclear disciplines, which was held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in December 2015. 

National Progress Report: Singapore

Singapore is firmly committed to working with the international community to strengthen the global nuclear security architecture.  We take a serious view of our international responsibilities.  In this regard, we fully comply with and implement our international obligations.  This includes the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 and other country-specific UNSCRs.  Singapore participates in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) aimed at preventing the illicit trafficking of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).  In September 2016, we are due to serve on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s Board of Governors for the fifth time.  We look forward to this opportunity to work with other Member States to enhance nuclear safety and security as an active member of the Board. 

Singapore also consistently supports various regional efforts to build capacity and strengthen collaboration in the area of nuclear security.  We participate actively at ASEAN Regional Forum Meetings and regional seminars on export controls and non-proliferation.  We also work with the European Union’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Centre of Excellence (CoE) in Southeast Asia on its projects and activities.

On the national front, Singapore is committed to playing our part in countering proliferation.  As a major transit and transhipment hub, Singapore has a robust export control system.  We subscribe to effective implementation and rigorous national legislation standards, which are regularly reviewed.  This is a reflection of our desire to maintain our position as a safe and secure trade and shipping hub, taking into account the evolving security environment. 

Following the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Singapore has consistently contributed to the enhancement of the global nuclear security architecture through the activities outlined below.

Strengthening the Security of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material

To ensure the safe and secure use of radioactive materials, Singapore has an effective licensing regime for the import, export, possession, handling, transport, use and storage of radioactive materials.  Singapore maintains a national register for radioactive materials to ensure they are properly accounted for. 

Singapore works hard to strengthen security measures in local storage sites for radioactive materials.  To this end, a working group consisting of home-front agencies and regulators was established in 2014.  This working group focuses on:

a) conducting inspections at storage sites for the security of sensitive materials, including radioactive materials;

b) assessing the adequacy of existing security measures; and

c) making recommendations to further improve security at storage sites. 

The working group has carried out site inspections at storage sites where higher risk radioactive materials are kept.  Appropriate security measures are issued to the licensees for implementation, while compliance is ensured through follow up inspections.

Singapore has also been educating and promoting awareness of nuclear security. Singapore, represented by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) of the Nanyang Technological University, became a member of the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) of the IAEA in July 2014.  As an INSEN member, RSIS aims to develop academic courses and conduct training modules in partnership with the IAEA to educate its students on nuclear security policies.

Singapore recognises the emerging cybersecurity threats and risks of cyber-attacks on critical information infrastructure.  To boost Singapore’s cybersecurity infrastructure, Singapore set up a Cyber Security Agency (CSA), which began operation on 1 April 2015.  The CSA is a high-level central agency to coordinate public- and private-sector efforts to protect national systems from increasing cyber threats.  Given the trans-boundary nature of cybersecurity threats to critical infrastructure, Singapore recognises the crucial need for like-minded countries to cooperate closely on cybersecurity initiatives, through cooperation between Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), sharing of best practices and procedures, joint training and drills as well as cybersecurity capacity building.  CSA has already established close working relationships on these areas with our ASEAN and international partners through existing ASEAN platforms as well as through the signing of MOUs.  Singapore also organised and actively participated in a workshop on cyber confidence building measures in the ASEAN region.

To support international law enforcement to counter multi-dimensional, transnational and fast-evolving security threats, Singapore hosts the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation (IGCI).  The IGCI allows INTERPOL to better disseminate real-time alerts and coordinate operational responses.  These alerts also allow member countries to be better placed to stop transnational security threats.  The IGCI’s focus on innovation enables INTERPOL to further develop advanced tools and training techniques for countries to tackle emerging threats.  Law enforcement agencies can access INTERPOL’s tools and programmes through the IGCI to better train and equip their officers to combat these threats, thereby enhancing collective regional safety and security around the world.  

Minimising Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials

Singapore has taken a number of measures to fully implement UNSCR 1540.  We participated in regional workshops on promoting the full implementation of UNSCR 1540, organised by the Philippines in July 2014 and by the Republic of Korea in October 2014.  More details of our efforts can be found in Singapore’s reports to the UNSC Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540.  Singapore submits these reports regularly, which demonstrates our commitment against the proliferation of all WMD and their delivery systems.

Countering Nuclear Smuggling

Singapore’s Immigration and Checkpoints Authority Ports Command is equipped with Radiological Portal Monitors to detect cargoes carrying radiological or nuclear consignments.  To strengthen our efforts in the area of nuclear detection and nuclear forensics, Singapore has developed its first border laboratory - “Protective, Analytical and Assessment Facility”.  The laboratory, which is expected to be operational by mid-2016, is equipped with capabilities in radiation-nuclear detection and analysis to interdict illicit activities at the border.

Singapore regularly reviews and updates our export control list to ensure that our system is in line with international practices.  This includes the four multilateral export control regimes, namely the Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement, Nuclear Suppliers Group and Australia Group.  On the domestic front, we regularly organise outreach programmes to ensure that the Singaporean business community is updated on the latest developments and requirements.  As a major financial centre and a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Singapore is committed to following up on FATF Recommendations to combat proliferation financing.

Support for Multilateral Instruments

Singapore is committed to implementing and fulfilling the obligations of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment.  To this end, several legislative amendments were made to our Radiation Protection Act.  These were passed in Parliament on 7 July 2014.  Singapore deposited the instrument of accession and acceptance to the CPPNM and its 2005 Amendment with the IAEA on 22 September 2014 and became a party to the Convention on 22 October 2014.  Since then, Singapore has implemented a licensing and monitoring regime to track maritime vessels carrying nuclear material transiting through Singapore’s seaports.  Singapore also participated in the Technical Meeting of the Points of Contact and Central Authorities of States Parties to the CPPNM in December 2015 to learn the best practices adopted by CPPNM Member States in fulfilling their obligations to the Convention. 

As part of our efforts to counter nuclear terrorism, Singapore signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) on 1 December 2006.  Following Singapore’s accession to the CPPNM and its 2005 Amendment, we are working towards the legislative framework necessary to ratify ICSANT in the upcoming months.

Singapore fully supports and endorses the IAEA’s efforts to enhance the safety and security of radioactive sources.  In this regard, Singapore is working towards following the guidance contained in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.  Singapore has been a member of the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) since 2012.  As the National Focal Point for the ITDB, Singapore’s National Environment Agency (NEA) disseminates notifications on nuclear/radiological-related incidents filed by Member States to Singapore’s Government agencies.  NEA also files local incidents to the ITDB.

Collaborating with International Organisations

Singapore is a strong supporter of the IAEA’s work in helping Member States strengthen nuclear security.  Since 2014, Singapore has been actively participating in various IAEA emergency exercises organised by the Incident and Emergency Centre.  These exercises are aimed at testing arrangements for a transnational radiological emergency, such as sending notifications on the accident and requests for international assistance.

We renewed a MOU for the Singapore-IAEA Third Country Training Programme (TCTP) in January 2015.  The Programme provides joint technical assistance to developing countries across a wide range of areas including nuclear security.  Singapore is also working with the IAEA to organise a Regional Workshop on Nuclear Law in 2016 under the Singapore-IAEA TCTP, which will cover various topics including the international nuclear legal framework for nuclear security.

Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs’ Chief Science and Technology Officer, Dr Lee Fook Kay, contributed actively as a member of the IAEA’s Emergency Preparedness and Response Expert Group.  He was also part of the organising committee for the International Conference on Global Emergency Preparedness and Response, which was held from 19 to 23 October 2015 in Austria.  At the conference, Singapore presented a paper on nuclear detection technologies entitled “Evaluation Study of High Purity Germanium based Technology in Detection of Radiation Sources at Container”.

Partnering with External Stakeholders

As a partner nation of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), Singapore works with other participating states to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism.  To enhance our national capability, Singapore attended a workshop on Public Messaging for Emergency Management in the Philippines in April 2015.

Together with China and the US, Singapore co-chaired the first three ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, which took place annually from 2009 to 2011.  We continue to support this initiative and have participated actively in subsequent ISMs every year.

Singapore was an early supporter of the European Union’s initiative to establish the CBRN CoE in Southeast Asia.  The CBRN CoE was subsequently launched in Singapore in 2009.  Since its inception in 2011, we have participated regularly in the CBRN CoE National Focal Point meetings.  Singapore also takes part in related projects, such as on biosecurity, chemical and biological waste management, and e-learning in order to enhance our domestic capabilities.  We have hosted CBRN CoE projects and activities.  These include the working session on knowledge development and transfer of best practices on chemical and biological waste management in Southeast Asia in July 2014 and the Regional Experts Meeting on Non-Proliferation Nuclear Forensics for ASEAN states in November 2014.

Through our participation at the annual Asian Export Control Seminars held in Japan, Singapore shares our experiences on reaching out to our domestic industry and working closely together to counter WMD proliferation by maintaining a robust export control regime.

Singapore participates regularly in the annual Asian Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP) meetings in Japan.  At the 12th ASTOP meeting held on 20 January 2016, Singapore gave a presentation on our efforts in non-proliferation and counter-proliferation through initiatives such as the PSI.

Singapore is a participant in the PSI and the only Southeast Asian member of the PSI’s Operational Experts Group (OEG).  We believe that PSI helps to promote more international cooperation in the global effort to combat the illicit trafficking of WMD. The exercises allow participating states to build up critical interdiction capabilities and practices.  Singapore has hosted two PSI exercises to-date, each of which was attended by approximately 2,000 participants.  We will host a third exercise in September 2016.  Singapore also participates regularly in OEG meetings as well as in policy discussions, such as the High Level Political Meetings.

National Progress Report: Spain

I. INTRODUCTION

At The Hague Summit 2014, the Spanish Government pledged to carry out a series of measures that would contribute to improving Global Nuclear Security. These are: (1) Promoting the entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM); (2) Developing a National Plan for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540; (3) Fostering a nuclear security culture on a national scale; (4) Joining the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

In order to strengthen specific technical areas of nuclear security, Spain supported the following Gift Baskets: (1) the National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security; (2) Strengthening the nuclear security implementation; (3) Forensics in Nuclear security; (4) Enhancing the security of the maritime supply chain; (5) Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres/Centres of Excellence.

This report focuses on the measures adopted for legal and regulatory development; for developing technical, human and operational capabilities to ensure the security of nuclear and radioactive material and facilities; and for strengthening international bilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation.

II. LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: National Implementation and Support for the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and UN Security Council Resolution 1540

1)     In 2007 Spain ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Since then Spain has been integrating the provisions of this Convention into its national legal system and has been working for the international promotion of the entry into force of this Amendment.

2)      Since The Hague Summit, Spain has made remarkable progress in adapting its legal and regulatory framework to the international instruments and regulations. More specifically, in September 2015 Spain approved a new National Security Act (Ley 36/2015 of 28 de September) which defines the national security system, assigns responsibilities to the different departments of the Government, and organizes the management of prevention and response to national threats.

Furthermore, Spain has amended and updated its regulations for the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities (RD 1308/2011) through a new Royal Decree 1086/2015 of 4 December, with the aim of: (1) Incorporating the new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommendations; (2) Adapting it to the new threats, including cyber and insider threats; (3) Improving law enforcement forces response; (4) Incorporating the basic elements of the new 2013 national cyber-security strategy; (5) Taking into account experience and lessons learned since the ratification in 2007 of the Amendment to the Convention (CPPNM).

In order to foster the entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the 1987 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Spain’s embassies with representation in 37 States have carried out demarches aimed at accelerating their ratification process of this Amendment.

3)      The Spanish “National Security Council” approved the National Action Plan for Compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on 24 April 2015. The 1540 Action Plan establishes appropriate measures for the full implementation of Resolution 1540 and those of nuclear security in particular. In addition, from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2016, Spain is chairing the 1540 Committee of the UN Security Council. In 2016 Spain will lead the “Global Review” for a full and universal implementation of Resolution 1540.

III. DEVELOPING NATIONAL CAPABILITIES: National Security and Security of Nuclear and Radioactive Material and Facilities

1. Security of Material and Facilities

Spain has made substantial progress on the security of its nuclear material and facilities: (1) The Physical Protection Plans for nuclear facilities have been amended, incorporating protection criteria specified in the national Regulations on Protection of Critical Infrastructures (Act 8/2014 and RD 704/2011); (2) A new protection model has been developed for the comprehensive protection of nuclear facilities by Security Forces; (3) Insider Trustworthiness programmes have been developed for monitoring personnel at nuclear facilities; (4) Criteria have been included for protecting data and computerized control systems in the physical protection plans.

Regarding the security of transportation of nuclear and other radioactive materials, the Spanish Nuclear Regulatory Authority (Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear, CSN) continues to develop technical standards on transport security. In this regard, the Ministry of the Interior organized in 2015 a national exercise on security in land transportation of spent fuel from nuclear power plants.

As regards the security of radioactive sources, the CSN is drawing up the technical standards on the requirements for the physical protection of sources in categories 1, 2 and 3, as well as the practices to guarantee the physical protection of those in categories 4 and 5. Spain continues to provide support to other States for them to strengthen security measures for their radioactive sources. Spain also chairs the open-ended international Working Group on developing international guidance for the security of disused radioactive sources, to complement the provisions of the “Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources”.

The Spanish Nuclear regulatory Authority (CSN), together with the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, is organizing the “Second International Regulators Conference on Nuclear Security” which will take place in Madrid in May 2016.

2. Developing Nuclear Detection and Nuclear Forensic Techniques

Spain continued developing its national nuclear detection architecture. Spain’s current detection capabilities make it possible to carry out radiological monitoring on more than 80% of the national maritime cargo containers. Progress continues on the development and implementation of the national plan for nuclear radiation detection in cross-border areas. In addition, with the participation of the Ministry of Defence, a National Maritime Security Strategy has been adopted. A Spanish delegation participated in the international Nuclear Security Summit Maritime Security Workshop organized by the United Kingdom and the United States in November 2015. The international experts agreed on the need to review the duties of customs agents and to develop comprehensive nuclear security systems in port facilities.

Spain’s National Nuclear Forensics Task Force, led by the Ministry of the Interior, is now working towards establishing a technical-operational procedure which will integrate all the technical areas and operational groups involved in Nuclear Forensics, including prevention, detection and respond to nuclear security events.

3. Promoting a Nuclear Security Culture: Technological and Human Capacity-Building

Spanish institutions regularly organize, in cooperation with the IAEA, national and international courses on nuclear security. As part of these activities, Spain organized, together with the IAEA, an International Workshop on Nuclear Security Culture in Madrid from 29 February to 4 March 2016. Seventy international experts from 40 countries convened in Madrid to work, together with Spanish experts, with the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Culture Model for nuclear facilities.

As part of national efforts to promote security culture and to develop know-how and technologies relating to nuclear security, Spain’s National Centre for Energy, Environmental and Technological Research (CIEMAT) has signed specific agreements with the European Commission’s Research Centres seeking to promote human and technological capacity-building in the physical protection of nuclear and radioactive material and associated facilities. In this context, CIEMAT has established joint training programmes with national Law Enforcement Forces and the Army.

In order to promote nuclear security in Spanish industry, it is worth noting that the Spanish Nuclear Society, a non-profit association of professionals and institutions, held its annual meetings in the autumn of 2014 and 2015. These meetings include the participation of representatives from the nuclear industry and academia and, increasingly, presentations on nuclear security.

IV. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: International Coordination, Cooperation with International Organizations and Initiatives, Multilateral and Bilateral Relations

1. Support for the Nuclear Security Summits Process

Spain has been very present and active in the Nuclear Security Summits process. In Washington Spain will support the official Communiqué and the five institutional Action Plans. Spain, together with Morocco, has led and successfully concluded the preparation of the Action Plan supporting the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). Spain, together with Canada and the Republic of Korea, has prepared and submitted to the Summit a “Joint Statement” for improving the implementation of Resolution 1540.

2. Support for the IAEA’s Nuclear Security-Related Activities

Spain has made a contribution to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund. Spanish experts participate in nuclear security-related activities organized by the IAEA. Spain is a permanent member of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Standards Committee and it is represented on the Organizing Committee for the Second International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Security to be held in Vienna in late 2016. Spain contributes actively to the development and implementation of the IAEA’s technical programme and it is an active member of the Illicit Trafficking Database. During this period, Spain has contributed with technical experts to the improvement and implementation of International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions.

3. Contribution to Other International Nuclear Security-Related Initiatives: The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and The G7 Global Partnership

In 2014, 2015 and 2016, Spain continued to play a key role in the GICNT. During these years, Spain has insisted on the need to prioritize practical activities, such as technical workshops and exercises on realistic security scenarios. At the Plenary Meeting held in Helsinki in 2015, Spain presented its strategic proposals for the Initiative’s future: (1) Review, in light of the rapid evolution of terrorist threats, the Initiative’s priorities and technical working plans on the basis of its eight principles; (2) Promote technological development and scientific knowledge, among the Initiative’s members, with regard to combating nuclear terrorism.

In compliance with the commitment it undertook at the latest Nuclear Security Summit, in 2014 Spain joined the G7 Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

4. Bilateral Cooperation

Spain has continued to work with the international community to prevent and improve response to security incidents related to nuclear and radioactive material and facilities. Particularly relevant here is the cooperation with Morocco. Spain and Morocco have made substantial joint progress on combating nuclear terrorism and establishing a system to enable enhanced protection of nuclear and radioactive material and their associated facilities. As part of this joint effort, Spain and Morocco organized in Madrid, from 27 to 19 October 2015, and in collaboration with the IAEA, a joint exercise called Gate to Africa, on security in the transportation of radioactive sources. Sixty-four observers from the IAEA Member States and representatives from seven international organizations took part in the Gate to Africa exercise, which constituted a major contribution to strengthening the international nuclear security system.

This bilateral relationship between Morocco and Spain, established during the past eight years, has set an international standard that will be promoted as a model at the GICNT and the IAEA.

National Progress Report: Sweden

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Sweden has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by:

Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority has issued new requirements with the objective of strengthening physical protection at relevant sites. Measures to bar access of vehicles to the vicinity of nuclear power plants have been put in place. Decisions have been taken to arm guards at the sites of nuclear power plants. Operators of nuclear power plants are required to install bunkered independent core cooling systems for the event of station blackouts. These safety systems, along with required security measures, have to be in place by 2020.

Minimizing Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials

New license requirements have been introduced to strengthen the physical protection measures that have to be in place for highly radioactive sealed sources and materials in the medical, industrial and university sectors. Further decisions have been taken to strengthen security requirements for licensees possessing and using Cs-137 in medical applications. This is expected to lead to a technology shift away from the use of Cs-137.

Sweden converted its HEU-fueled research reactors to LEU in the 1990s. Today, Sweden does not have any HEU reactors in operation.

In a joint effort with the United States in 2012, Sweden transferred separated plutonium from historical Swedish nuclear research and development activities to the USA. The shipment was carried out under the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.

Countering Nuclear Smuggling

The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority has, together with partners, arranged conferences for authorities from states in the Black Sea Region aiming at strengthening regional networks and interaction. Projects to strengthen national control of radioactive and nuclear materials and to detect and respond to incidents of illicit trafficking have been implemented in cooperation with Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. Together with partners in Georgia, USA and Poland, Sweden is preparing a conference in October 2016 in Tbilisi, Georgia, for states in the Black Sea region on the implementation of NSS commitments and objectives.

Supporting Multilateral Instruments

Sweden ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) on 18 August 2014. Sweden ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) on 23 March 2012.

Sweden participates in international efforts to promote nuclear security, including the G7 Global Partnership and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority carries out a number of projects aiming at strengthening security for nuclear and other radioactive materials and installations in cooperation with partners in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova. These projects are presented in a separate report: “Nuclear Security, Safety and Non-Proliferation: Sweden’s International Cooperation in 2015”.

Collaboration with International Organizations

Sweden has regularly contributed to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. In 2015, Sweden participated in the two exercises “Pilot 2015” in support of the IAEA’s development of an exercise manual. In 2011, the IAEA carried out an International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS mission) in Sweden, and a new IPPAS mission will take place in 2016.

Partnering with External Stakeholders

In 2015, authorities in Sweden, Norway and Finland started to develop agreements regarding information exchange with nuclear regulatory counterparts in Belarus. The agreements focus on emergency situations, including cases of nuclear terrorism and smuggling of radioactive and nuclear materials. Furthermore, the Swedish regulatory authority has, together with Finland, Norway and Russia, started to negotiate protocols to establish procedures to enhance the joint capacity to act in case of emergency. Sweden remains committed to strengthening ties at regional and international levels to ensure the efficiency of authorities and their interaction related to the prevention, detection and response in the nuclear security domain.

National Progress Report: Switzerland

Underlying Principles

Implementing and ensuring nuclear security is the responsibility of every State.

Switzerland is fully committed to maintaining the highest standards and implementing the best practices possible regarding nuclear security and the physical protection of nuclear and radiological material as well as of nuclear facilities on its territory.

Nuclear Security-Related International Initiatives

Support for the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

Measures pertaining to nuclear security, including transport security measures, are implemented in Switzerland in accordance with the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM).

Switzerland also ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) on 15 October 2008.

Support for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the G8 Global Partnership and UN Security Council Resolution 1540

Switzerland participates in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and in the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. It is committed to the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and has fulfilled its national reporting obligations in this regard. Switzerland also supports regional implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Support for Nuclear Security Summit initiatives

Switzerland supports the following Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) gift baskets in the context of the 2016 Summit: the Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security, the Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security, the Joint Statement on Strengthening the Security of High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources (HASS) and the Gift Basket on Cyber Security of Industrial Control and Plant Systems at Nuclear Facilities.

Contribution to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security-Related Activities

Switzerland actively supports the IAEA’s nuclear security activities through regular participation of Swiss experts.

Switzerland actively contributes to the development of the Nuclear Security Series. This is manifested by Switzerland’s participation in the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee and as a member in the interface group.

Furthermore, Switzerland contributes with expertise in forensics and other areas to the IAEA in the interests of the global nuclear security framework and nuclear security services.

For instance, Switzerland shares information on the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials by participating in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB).

Strengthened National Nuclear and Radiological Material Security System

Nuclear Material

By ratifying the amendment to the CPPNM on 15 October 2008, Switzerland committed to reflect in its domestic regulations the Fundamental Principles of this instrument and to adapt its legislation accordingly. This process has since been concluded.

Switzerland has strengthened and updated its legal and regulatory framework for physical protection. The new laws and ordinances that have been passed ensure compliance with the relevant international conventions, in particular with the CPPNM and its 2005 Amendment. In addition, they reflect, to the largest possible extent, the INFCIRC/225 document as revised and other recommendations contained in documents of the IAEA Nuclear Security Series.

The Swiss Federal Intelligence Service and the national authority responsible for nuclear security, the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI), have pooled their activities to update the design basis threat for the nuclear facilities nationwide and to complete the DBT-process.

In order to ensure an efficient implementation of its nuclear security policy, Switzerland makes use of the feedback provided by expert teams of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions of the IAEA. Switzerland received an IPPAS mission in 2005 and is planning to invite another IPPAS mission by 2018. And in the field of nuclear safety and security, Switzerland also avails itself of the International Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) full scope mission including module No12 (interface nuclear safety and security).

To assess the effectiveness of the physical protection system, with a particular focus on coordination of safety and security where they overlap, and to test the interfaces between the contingency planning of the operators and the State, exercises have been conducted in Switzerland, involving all nuclear sites and all relevant state organizations.

In June 2012, the Swiss Government adopted a National Strategy for the Protection of Switzerland against Cyber Risks.

Switzerland recognizes that HEU and separated Pu require special precaution. Therefore, Switzerland is committed to reducing its stocks in these materials to a minimum level. Switzerland has removed approximately 20 kilograms of separated plutonium. With this removal of separated plutonium, Switzerland is now free of all separated plutonium. In addition, Switzerland has removed 2.2 kg of highly enriched uranium. With these contributions, Switzerland emphasizes its role as a global leader in nonproliferation and its strong endorsement of the international goals of consolidating and minimizing inventories of sensitive nuclear material. Switzerland is now free of category 1 material as defined by the IAEA.

Radiological Material

Switzerland applies the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, and the supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, published by the IAEA in 2004. It has established a national register of radioactive sources for categories 1 and 2 present on its territory.

Switzerland is in a process of improving the compatibility of its legislation with the requirements of the Code of Conduct.

Nuclear Security Culture

Nuclear equipment and radioactive sources used in Switzerland in industry, the medical field, educational institutions or research institutes are subject to particular attention with regard to their security. Heads of units responsible for such equipment and the personnel using them are trained and given compulsory basic instruction in nuclear security and radioprotection. Every year, refresher courses have to be attended. Heads of units receive more extensive and specialized training.

Switzerland has participated in regional training courses on physical protection against sabotage organized by the IAEA. It supports the ongoing or planned development of Regional Training Centres, such as the one in Delft for Europe, and those in the Republic of Korea or in China for the Asian region. Switzerland would welcome the transformation of these regional centres into Centres of Excellence.

In addition, Switzerland is developing a nuclear security culture programme based on the IAEA Nuclear Security Series No 7.

Regional Cooperation

Switzerland actively promotes the basics of nuclear security at a regional level. In this context, Switzerland is a former Chair and a current member of the Troika of the European Nuclear Security Regulators Association (ENSRA). Furthermore, Switzerland provides ENSRA with a secure platform for the exchange of sensitive information regarding nuclear security.

National Progress Report: Thailand

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Thailand has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by:

1. Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

  • Human resources development: Training courses for national security officers has been conducted annually, since 2005. Each year there are approximately 60 participants from various agencies, such as Customs Department, Border Patrol Police, Port Authority of Thailand, Central Institute of Forensic Science, and National Intelligence Agency. The purpose is to enhance capabilities of the authorities concerned in their implementation of the UNSC Resolution 1540 as well as other relevant measures or standards in order to strengthen national nuclear and radioactive security infrastructure.
  • The Office of Atoms for Peace, as the national coordinating agency for all nuclear-related matters, as well as other competent agencies, including the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, and the Ministry of Public Health, in collaboration with IAEA under technical cooperation projects, have been, for over 20 years, organizing regional workshops and seminars on various issues related to peaceful application of nuclear technology, for participants from Thailand and other countries in the region. Government officials from relevant agencies have also attended international workshops and seminars on various topics related to nuclear security. Thailand has also established a Master’s degree program on nuclear security education -- the only one in the ASEAN region -- and receives on a regular basis, students from the region and beyond. All these efforts contribute to building up capacity of Thailand and beyond.
  • Capacity building and drill exercise: Thailand attaches importance to awareness raising and capacity building among government officials and the general public on the potential risks of nuclear incidents and response measures.  Training and drill exerciseshave been organized annually, since 2009, for frontline officers working with nuclear and radioactive materials or who may be faced with related incidents, as well as local officers and people who live in the surrounding areas of nuclear facilities in case of emergency situations. The relevant authorities in nuclear technology also conducted national emergency exercises (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical: NBC) since 2010 in compliance with the National Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Plan.
  • Rules and Regulations: Thailand continues to strengthen the national infrastructure for regulating the security of nuclear and radioactive materials. In early 2016, the revised regulation on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, as well as the draft Act on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, in line with the IAEA’s INFCIRC 225/Revision 5 - Nuclear Security Series No. 13, have been submitted to the Atomic Energy for Peace Commission for consideration. Once approved, they will become national guidelines for relevant agencies to further enhance nuclear security.
  • Environmental impact: Thailand is also committed to improving the national environmental radiation monitoring capabilities by expanding the Early Warning Environmental Stations to 17 ambient and 3 underwater Gamma Radiation Monitoring Stations.
  • Regional cooperation: Thailand hosted the second formal meeting of ASEANTOM [1] during 25-27 August 2014 in Chiang Mai, Thailand. The meeting reviewed the activities conducted during the past year, since its establishment in 2013, and discussed further activities under the work plan for 2015-2016. These activities include a number of regional workshops and training courses on emergency preparedness and response, as well as on nuclear security culture and management. In addition, ASEANTOM has also been working to set up an environmental radiation monitoring network in order to provide a platform for sharing environmental radiation monitoring activities and data. To complement such effort, the Office of Atoms for Peace organised a Technical Meeting for ASEANTOM on Environmental Radiation Network during 25-27 August 2015 in Phuket.
  • International cooperation: Thailand is committed to continuously enhancing the capacity of relevant agencies in nuclear safety and security, including through international cooperation. The Global Threat Reduction Programme (DNN RSP), supported by the United States Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA), has been implemented since 2008 and is still ongoing today. The Programme has upgraded the Physical Protection System (PPS) at the nuclear facilities under the control of Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology, including Co-60 Irradiators and waste storage facility. Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology is also working with Canada’s Nuclear and Radiological Security Department (NRS) under the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), on the upgrading of the PPS of the Thai Research Reactor and the waste storage facility under G-8 Global Partnership Programme against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. The upgrading is due to start in 2016.
  • Awareness raising and outreach activities: As radioactive materials have many peaceful applications in our daily lives, the Office of Atoms for Peace, as national focal point, has been conducting several awareness raising and outreach activities for the general public through various means, such as radiation security manual, TV programmes and You Tube, radio and printed materials, social media, and news briefing and other public forums.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand also targeted young audience by organizing Youth Public Speaking Contest on the occasion of International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 10 September 2014, in collaboration with the Embassies of Mexico and Cuba in Bangkok. The contest was well received and many university students participated.  They were well prepared and educated on the issue and delivered impressive speeches with great ideas.

 2. Minimising Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials

            N/A

3. Countering Nuclear Smuggling

  • National mechanism: In order to strengthen efforts in countering nuclear smuggling, Thailand has improved coordination among relevant agencies working on matters relating to non-proliferation, in line with the UNSC Resolution 1540 and other international frameworks such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). In 2013, the National Security Council of Thailand, as the focal point on this issue, established a Sub-Committee on Coordinating for Prevention and Solution of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction as national coordinating mechanism. This body has conducted several outreach and awareness-raising activities among relevant agencies by organising site visits to border checkpoints around Thailand. Briefing sessions have also been provided to local government officials to inform them of Thailand’s obligations and commitments as well as to enhance coordination and cooperation among relevant local offices in implementation of such obligations. The Sub-Committee also visited ports and points of entry to assess preparedness and understanding about non-proliferation among working officials on the ground. The whole-of-government Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) is being drafted to ensure efficient implementation and smooth coordination for cases of interdiction in various WMD-related scenarios.  It is expected that this SOP will become operational by the end of this year.
  • Rules and regulations on export controls: As part of the obligations under the UNSC Resolution 1540, Thailand’s amended Customs Act has entered into force in March 2015, establishing principles for transit and transshipment in line with international standards. The amended law also empowers Customs officials to inspect, search and confiscate suspected merchandise in transit or transshipment without requiring a warrant. At the same time, Thailand’s dual-use items (DUI) regime has also been revitalised and strengthened.  In October 2015, the Ministry of Commerce issued a ministerial announcement on Export Control for Dual-Use Goods requiring permissions for export of items under the updated DUI list, which is similar to the one being used by the European Union.  Thailand has also put in place more effective tracking and management of dual-use items with the application of an IT system, known as the e-TMD system.
  • Capacity building: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand invited experts from relevant Sanctions Committees to speak at a workshop held in Bangkok during 25-26 August 2014. The purpose was to enhance understanding of Thai agencies concerned on the obligations under the UNSC resolutions related to non-proliferation of WMD and how to ensure full and effective implementation of diverse measures.  Officials and experts from agencies concerned also participated in various exercises hosted by other states and international organisations.

4. Supporting Multilateral Instruments

  • Rules and regulations: The Royal Thai Government is moving ahead with amendments of domestic laws so as to provide appropriate legal basis to fulfill our international obligations. The amendment of the Nuclear Energy Act has been approved by the Cabinet and is now under consideration of the National Legislative Assembly. Once it is enacted, it will enable Thailand to accede to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment, as well as the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). Thailand is also in the process of considering accession to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 as well as the 2005 SUA Protocols.

5. Collaborating with International Organisations

  • International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): In February 2016, the Office of Atoms for Peace, as national coordinator on atomic energy, in collaboration with IAEA, organised a regional workshop on Nuclear Forensics and Bio-dosimeter, aimed at building national capacities of ASEANTOM Member States and strengthening regional cooperation in these fields.     

Through ASEANTOM, Thailand will work with IAEA under the Technical Cooperation (TC) project on “Regional Cooperation Project Concept in South East Asia to Support Regional Environmental Radioactivity Database and Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response”, with funding support from IAEA.  The objectives are to develop and implement emergency preparedness and response arrangements, both at the national and regional levels, in order to protect the people and the environment, in case of a severe nuclear and radiological incident. The project duration is four years, commencing in 2016.

  • Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT): The Office of Atoms for Peace participates in Joint Working Group Meeting and Mid-Year Implementation and Assessment Group Meeting annually since 2011.
  • European Union: The Office of Atoms for Peace has been working with the European Commission Joint Research Centre (EC JRC), in collaboration with IAEA and the United States Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration under the Project on Border Monitoring Activities in Thailand.  The Project is aimed at strengthening national capability in countering illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials, through capacity building of personnel and provision of equipment to the Thai authorities concerned, including Customs Department, Port Authority of Thailand, Airport Authority of Thailand, Thailand Post, Royal Thai Police, and Bureau of Immigration. The Office of Atoms for Peace, together with Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology, have also continued its collaboration efforts with EU CBRN projects, including the integrated national security system for nuclear and radioactive materials, Network of Excellence for Nuclear Forensics in Southeast Asia, and a course on Regional Human Resource Development for Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards Management under Chulalongkorn University’s Masters Programme on nuclear non-proliferation.
  • Australia Group: Apart from nuclear safety and security, Thailand is committed to her obligations under the BWC and the CWC, as these bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins as well as chemical agents should also be secured in order to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands.  Therefore, Thailand has also worked with other partners, such as the Australia Group, to strengthen the implementation in this regard.  On 23 November 2015, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand and the Australian Group organised a briefing for relevant government agencies on the harmonization of national export licensing measures and developments in the Australia Group, including updates on the control lists.  

6. Partnering with External Stakeholders

  • Regional and international cooperation: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, in collaboration with Norway’s International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI), organised “9th Regional Roundtable on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons and the Prospects for a Ban Treaty” during 26-27 March 2015 in Bangkok. This forum brought together key individuals from the Asia-Pacific region, including government officials, academic and civil society actors, in order to share thoughts and ideas on how the humanitarian initiative could be taken forward. The forum was aimed at raising awareness of humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, as well as seeking appropriate measures to promote transparency and reduce risks associated with nuclear weapons.  Thailand is of the view that efforts on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including enhancing nuclear security, are mutually reinforcing and therefore, aims to contribute to all efforts in a comprehensive manner.

[1] The ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy, or ASEANTOM, was established in 2013 at the initiation of Thailand. ASEANTOM has been designated as an Annex-1 sectoral body under the ASEAN Political-Security Community. ASEANTOM provides an official framework to facilitate cooperation among the nuclear regulatory bodies of ASEAN Member States in order to promote nuclear safety, security and safeguard in the region, as well as serves as the key point of contact with IAEA to promote cooperation in these areas, including capacity building for the benefits of all member states.

 

National Progress Report: Turkey

I. SUPPORT FOR CPPNM AND ICSANT

i) Turkey has been a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) since 1985 and has also ratified its 2005 Amendment. The instrument of ratification was deposited with the IAEA on 8 July 2015.

Already before the ratification of the Amendment, the national regulation on the physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear material had been revised by taking into account its provisions.

The revised regulation, broadening the scope of physical protection measures in Turkey, governing the measures that should be taken to safeguard nuclear facilities and nuclear material from sabotage and theft during handling, use, storage or transport, was published in the Official Gazette and entered into force on 22 May 2012.          

Based on lessons learned and experience accumulated during its implementation, work on new updates to this regulation is underway and is expected to be completed by the end of 2016.

ii) Turkey is among the initial signatories of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). Already before the 2012 Seoul Summit, the Turkish Grand National Assembly had ratified ICSANT. Turkey has been party to this Convention since its instrument of ratification was deposited on 24 September 2012.

iii)   An amendment has been proposed recently by the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority to adapt the relevant provisions of the Turkish Penal Code in accordance with Turkey's international undertakings in this domain and in light of global developments. Interagency consultations on the draft amendment is underway.

II. STRENGTHENED NATIONAL NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL MATERIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

i)  Turkey continues to update its nuclear legislation and practices in line with the IAEA's latest safety and security standards and guidance, including Nuclear Security Series documents, in particular the Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5).

ii)  In accordance with the mentioned national legislation, a “Design Basis Threat” (DBT) document was prepared.

Based on the DBT document, a Physical Protection Program has been prepared for the research facilities at the Çekmece Nuclear Research and Training Centre and the research facilities of Istanbul Technical University. The draft is currently being examined by the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority.

iii) Training activities concerning the inspection and physical protection of the nuclear facilities and nuclear material and accounting of nuclear material and controls are being conducted inside and outside of the facilities regularly, on a yearly basis.

iv)  Turkey has also concluded both the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA. The broader conclusion obtained from the Agency in 2012, confirming that all nuclear material in the country have remained in peaceful activities, is testimony to the high standards that Turkey's system of accounting and control of nuclear material has reached.

III. CONTRIBUTION TO THE IAEA’s NUCLEAR SECURITY-RELATED ACTIVITIES

i)  Turkey participates in and contributes to the work undertaken by the IAEA for the preparation or review of its “Nuclear Security Series” documents.

ii) Turkey also actively participates in the courses and technical meetings organized by the IAEA on nuclear safety.

Within this context, Turkey has contributed to technical meetings such as “Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threats at Nuclear Facilities”, “Enhancing Nuclear Security for Research Reactors and Associated Facilities” and “Computer Security”.

A national workshop on the “Nuclear Security Plan” was organized in Ankara on 2-6 March 2015 with the support of the Integrated Support Centre for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security, subordinate to the Japanese Atomic Energy Agency.

iii)  Turkey maintains close dialogue with the IAEA on the development of the country's nuclear infrastructure. In this context, Turkey will receive International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) consultancy from the IAEA in October 2016. A preparatory meeting with the IPPAS Mission was held on 13-14 January 2016.

IV. SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY-RELATED INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES

i)  Turkey fully supports the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and supports the work of the 1540 Committee. Government experts from Turkey have actively participated in a number of regional and international outreach and training events on matters relevant to the implementation of the Resolution.

In line with its commitment to the implementation of the Resolution, Turkey is considering submitting an updated version of its national 1540 matrix in the coming period, to reflect partial updates in its legislation.

ii) Turkey regards multilateral counter-proliferation initiatives as important voluntary cooperative mechanisms, complementing the existing international instruments and export control regimes. Turkey contributes to the work of initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative among others, on the basis of potential added value that the specific activity or Turkish participation may bring about. Based on this approach, Turkey has continued to observe, host or participate in selective activities of such initiatives in support of broader nuclear security and counter-terrorism efforts.

V.  CONTRIBUTION TO MINIMIZATION OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM

Having returned the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel used in the 5 MW research reactor at the Çekmece Nuclear Research and Training Centre to the US, Turkey continues to discourage the use of HEU and plutonium and encourage the development and use of low enriched uranium alternatives.

VI.  ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE AND SUPPORT

i) Ankara Nuclear Research and Training Centre (ANAEM) was established in August 2010 in order to conduct national and international training, including on radiation protection, radiation safety, nuclear power, nuclear safety, nuclear security and nuclear applications. ANAEM's main duty is to meet the qualified manpower needs of the industry as well as those of the public sector. ANAEM is also responsible for public information activities. Becoming an innovative and productive research and training centre meeting high international standards in this field, is also among the objectives of ANAEM.

ii) Turkey also regularly participates in the meetings of the “International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres” as an observer and supports its activities.

VII.  ENHANCED EFFORTS TO COMBATING ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS

i)   In addition to adhering to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, Turkey has formally notified the IAEA of its support for the Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

ii)  Turkey hosted a training course titled “Training Course on Nuclear Security Detection Architecture” which was held in Istanbul on 12-16 October 2015.

VIII. STRENGTHENED COOPERATION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND NUCLEAR INDUSTRY

Turkey continues to work closely with its industry to identify the nuclear security requirements and to develop necessary legal and practical infrastructure for its current and future nuclear facilities, particularly in the context of its planned nuclear power plant projects.

National Progress Report: Ukraine

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Ukraine has strengthened nuclear security implementation and contributed to building up the global nuclear security architecture by:                                           

Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security                   

As part of the comprehensive action plan on improving physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation, strengthening security of nuclear and radioactive materials on nuclear and radiation hazardous objects is a constant process.

Organization and implementation of measures for physical protection of the Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs) is being carried out under real threats caused by the Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine and deterioration of social and political situation in the country. In these conditions, to ensure stable operation of nuclear power facilities, significant efforts are directed at strengthening physical protection, defense and practical training focused on anti-terrorism and anti-sabotage measures at nuclear power plants. Systematic monitoring of crisis situations and development of new approaches to protect nuclear facilities are underway.

Taking into account unstable military and political situation in the east of Ukraine, in order to prevent provocations, mass disorders, incidents with unpredictable consequences, illegal actions towards nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation, in January, 2014 the state system of physical protection of Ukraine was switched to a high alert regime.

Acts of inter-agency committees on protection of nuclear material, facilities, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation have been revised and reapproved by competent authorities of Ukraine. According to their provisions, protection of all nuclear power plants in Ukraine has been significantly strengthened.

New Plans of coordination in case of sabotage and relevant Action Plans in case of crisis situation were developed and introduced at all Ukrainian NPPs. All-round automated data control systems of engineering and technical means of physical protection have been placed in operation.

Vulnerability assessment studies of all Ukrainian NPPs have already been completed.

Physical protection of Ukraine's nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation is organized according to the current legislation in this area. In order to verify its conformity with the legislation, in 2014 -2015 regular state inspections were carried out at all nuclear power plants, research facilities, radioactive waste management facilities and entities that use category I sources of ionizing radiation in their work.

However, due to the inability to safely perform their duties by state inspectors in Crimea and certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in 2014 only 3 inspections of the systems of physical protection of radioactive waste management facilities were carried out.

Within the framework of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, in order to enhance security of sources of ionizing radiation, in 2015 physical protection systems were examined at the following facilities:

  • Vinnytsia regional oncology center;
  • Zhytomyr regional oncology center;
  • Kyiv regional oncology center;
  • Chernihiv regional oncology center;
  • Cherkasy regional oncology center;
  • Kirovohrad regional oncology center.

Systems of physical protection of radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation were installed and put into operation at radioactive waste management facilities.

On August 27, 2015 "New design basis threat to nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation in Ukraine" was approved by a Presidential Decree.

Project proposals on modernization of systems of physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear waste management facilities, announced in 2014-2015 during the G7 Global Partnership meetings, have been incorporated into Integrated Nuclear Security Support National Plan (INSSP) of Ukraine for 2016-2018 and to the Action Plan on its implementation, in particular:

  • Technical re-equipment of physical protection system of South-Ukraine NPP's perimeter;
  • Technical re-equipment of physical protection system of South-Ukraine NPP's units 1-3;
  • Technical re-equipment of physical protection system of Khmelnytsky NPP (establishing main control panel);
  • Technical re-equipment of physical protection system of Rivne NPP's personnel and vehicles access control points;
  • Technical re-equipment of physical protection system of Rivne NPP's unit 3;
  • Construction of interim storage facility for long-term storage of vitrified high-level radioactive waste, returned from the Russian Federation after processing of spent nuclear fuel from Ukrainian NPPs with WWER-440 units;
  • Establishing a communication subsystem of physical protection system of Zaporizhia NPP;
  • Technical re-equipment of physical protection system of Zaporizhia NPP;
  • Establishing automated complexes of physical protection system of radioactive waste processing of Zaportizhia NPP;
  • Technical re-equipment of physical protection system of Kmelnytsky NPP's unit 1;
  • Strengthening physical protection system of specialized radioactive waste management enterprises of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation;
  • Liquidation of radioactive inheritance of the former Soviet Union at specialized radioactive waste management enterprises of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation;
  • Improving capabilities of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation for ensuring nuclear and radiation safety of spent radiation sources.

Currently, after taking into account comments and recommendations of the IAEA experts, in February 2016 the INSSP was approved.

Central long-term storage of spent sources of ionizing radiation is scheduled to be put into service in 2016.

In order to adjust national legislation on physical protection to the IAEA recommendations, in 2016 the respective Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine will be revised (On approval of the order of determination of level of physical defense of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation according to their categories).

Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Material

There are 6 repositories of radioactive waste and sources of ionizing radiation, which are kept in storage facilities, equipped in accordance with national legislation with high level security systems. However, three of these repositories are currently located on the temporarily occupied territories: 2 in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and 1 near the city of Donetsk.

During 2014-2015, competent authorities of Ukraine continued to collect spent sources of ionizing radiation, transferring them to specialized radioactive waste management enterprises of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation. Activities in this area have been carried out in close cooperation with the donor states (USA, Great Britain, Germany, France), the European Union, the IAEA and NATO.

On June 17, 2015 the Implementing agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the NATO Support Agency on disposal of radioactive waste, accumulated in the result of carrying out military programs of the former USSR in Ukraine, was ratified. According to this Agreement, the disposal of nuclear waste repositories is to be conducted at the enterprises of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation with NATO financial assistance.

Countering Nuclear Smuggling

Ukraine continues to strengthen radiation control system at its State Border. During 2010-2015 in the framework of the projects of international technical assistance, Ukraine installed and put into operation stationary systems for radiation monitoring in more than 50 border-crossing check-points, 7 of which are located on temporary occupied territories of Crimea and certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Border Guard staff participated in more than 100 training sessions on detecting radioactive (nuclear) materials on the State Border using nuclear radiation detectors for control and reconnaissance. Five exercises were devoted to response to detection of radioactive (nuclear) material smuggling.

As part of the agreement with the IAEA, advanced training on physical protection and accounting of nuclear material was held for officials of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine at the training center for physical protection, accounting and control of nuclear material.

Regular exchange of information between the border agencies of neighboring countries is ensured by the border guard executives in order to counter smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials and timely respond to the threat of nuclear terrorism.

As part of the "Identifying and preventing nuclear smuggling" international technical assistance project, in 2015 five obsolete Russian-made stationary systems for radiation detection were upgraded, two new TSA-type American-made modern stationary systems were put into operation, TSA stationary equipment was supplied for installation in 4 border-crossing check-points on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border.

Preparatory phase of installing new stationary systems for radiation monitoring in 6 border-crossing check-points on the Ukrainian-Belarusian border is underway. Competent authorities of Ukraine are working actively at the establishment of automated system for exchange of information on cases of stationary systems triggering. Such system will be a potential platform for inter-agency information and telecommunication system to register facts of detection and intents of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials through the territory of Ukraine and across its State Border.

National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine elaborated a draft Concept of the State program of development of nuclear forensics in Ukraine for the years 2014-2020. An agreement was reached to create a regional network of nuclear forensics expertise for the GUAM countries using the funds of the EU technical assistance. Research expert organizations of Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova started working on this project in 2015. Its objective is to create a network of nuclear forensics laboratories in the GUAM region, including the expansion of basic technical and information capabilities of national expert laboratories in each participating country, and creating a basis for mutual support and cooperation in this area of esearch.

Within the framework of TACIS and Instrument for stability (IfS) the Institute for Nuclear Research of Ukraine received a mobile laboratory for the on-site actions in response to illicit trafficking incidents. It also received the Element 2 precision mass spectrometer with inductively coupled plasma (ICP-MS) for multi-element analyses at trace levels in nuclear material and environmental samples. Such improvements increased greatly the technical expertise capabilities of the Institute.

Supporting Multilateral Instruments and Cooperating with International Organizations

Ukraine continues to fulfill its obligations within the framework of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) according to approved plans, namely, the Statement on Principles of Combating Nuclear Terrorism and the Action Plan on improvement of capabilities of state-parties to the Initiative to achieve positive results based on multilateral cooperation.

Ukraine confirmed to the IAEA Secretariat its readiness to provide interested countries with consulting assistance in elaboration of laws and regulations on physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste, other sources of ionizing radiation, and to organize experts training in this field.

Partnering with External Stakeholders

With financial support of the US Government and in cooperation with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Ukraine is working on creation of a scientific and methodological basis for determining attributes of uranium-bearing materials of different origin and development of nuclear forensics library data and materials to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency and validity of conclusions of nuclear forensic expertise.

Within the framework of the Agreement on Nuclear Safety and respective Memorandum of Understanding Ukraine jointly with the United States designed and completed construction of the Neutron source based on subcritical assembly driven by linear electron accelerator (Neutron Source Facility). Currently pre-commissioning works, individual and complex tests are underway at the Facility.

Since 2014 the following joint projects aimed at strengthening capabilities in the area of etection of nuclear and radioactive materials have been carried out:

  • Detecting and countering nuclear smuggling (US Department of Energy);
  • WMD non-proliferation initiative: assistance to the State Border Service of Ukraine (US Defense Threat Reduction Agency);
  • Technical assistance to strengthen Ukraine's export control system and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (US State Department);
  • Increasing the capabilities of the border guard services of Ukraine and Moldova to detect chemical, biological, nuclear and radioactive materials (European Commission).

Following the agreement of the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, the trilateral Swedish-Norwegian-Ukrainian Initiative was successfully established. In 2014-2015 seven projects were implemented within the Initiative, namely:

1.  Safety requirements for new types of nuclear fuel. Project support was provided to the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) to develop requirements for safe implementation of new types of nuclear fuel. These requirements were included in regulations related to safe management of fuel. The project was successfully completed in November, 2015. The regulations are currently under consideration of the Ukrainian authorities.

2. Tools for probability safety assessment. Online surveillance systems that enable assessment of safety risks related to operation of nuclear power plants are being introduced in Ukraine in the framework of this project. Safety assessment software was delivered to the SNRIU and the South Ukrainian nuclear power plant, followed by personnel training. Such systems will be installed at other Ukrainian NPPs as appropriate.

3. Safety enhancements at Rivne nuclear power plant. Modernization of safety systems of Rivne nuclear power plant is an element of a Package program on safety enhancement of all NPP's units of Ukraine. Realization of this project will enable detection of the NPP's malfunctions at an early stage and to take timely actions to prevent accidents.

4. Safety requirements for damaged nuclear fuel. The primary objective is to develop regulatory requirements for management of damaged nuclear fuel. The project is in the development phase with implementation date set for 2016.

5.  Modernization of radioactive source register. Upon review of the national source register of Ukraine it was determined that the system required upgrades to meet current regulations and to further improve control of radioactive sources. Assistance on upgrading the system was provided to the authorities that maintain and support the existing national source register. Further development of the database will include applying a web-based system.

6. Security upgrades at Khmelnytsky nuclear power plant. The project's main goal is to strengthen and upgrade physical protection system of Khmelnytsky NPP. Foreign experts visited this nuclear power plant to assess the volume and value of necessary works. The implementation of the project will begin in 2016.

7.  The 13th Ukrainian conference on nuclear security will be organized at Khmelnytsky NPP in October 2016. All national stakeholders responsible for nuclear and radiological security will participate in the event to share their experience and expertise.

Issues of concern

Russian military aggression in eastern Ukraine and its attempt of illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea pose new threats to the national system of nuclear and radiation security and resulted in loss of regulatory control in those areas.

The following sources and facilities remain without regulatory control in the Eastern Ukraine:

  • 1200 radionuclide sources of ionizing radiation (category 1-5);
  • 65 entities that use sources of ionizing radiation (including eight that have high-level radiation sources of category 1 with activity of more than 1000 Ci);
  • Donetsk specialized radioactive waste management enterprise of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation;
  • 1 repository of radioactive waste and sources of ionizing radiation near Donetsk chemical plant;
  • Radiation sources in two coal mining facilities of Donbas, which combine 15 coal mines (142 radiation sources, with the maximum activity of a single source of 2.35×1011 Bq).

The following sources and facilities are located on the territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol:

  • Research reactor of the Sevastopol National University of Nuclear Energy and Industry: DR-100 research reactor, DR-100 (critical assembly) physical test bench, subcritical uranium water assembly, about 3488 kg of depleted uranium;
  • 277 radionuclide sources of ionizing radiation;
  • 53 entities that use radionuclide sources of ionizing radiation, six of them use category 1 and 2 radiation sources according to the level of potential hazard (medicine, shipbuilding) in which over 1200 kg of depleted uranium is used as biological shielding;
  •  2 nuclear waste repositories.

Due to external aggression, Ukraine lost regulatory control on the territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, as well as communication with the Crimean State Inspectorate. Property of the Crimean State Inspectorate was seized by illegal authorities and handed over to the so-called Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea – a regional branch of the Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service of Russia (Rostekhnadzor).

Companies on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea lost the possibility to transfer radioactive waste (spent sources of ionizing radiation) for storage to the Odessa State Specialized Interregional Plant.

At present Ukraine cannot guarantee physical protection of the abovementioned research reactor, nuclear material and sources of ionizing radiation on the territory of Crimea, city of Sevastopol and certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Given the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea by the Russian Federation and ongoing anti-terrorist operation in eastern Ukraine, any damage to radiation-hazardous objects located on those territories may lead to dire consequences not only for Ukraine but for many European nations as well. Thus, we consider that the issue of establishing international control over nuclear facilities that can be seized or damaged as a result of military actions, requires immediate international attention.

National Progress Report: United Arab Emirates

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, the UAE has strengthened nuclear security framework and its implementation in the country while contributing to the development of global nuclear security architecture by…

…Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

The Government of the UAE has developed an effective nuclear security regime in line with the development of its peaceful nuclear power programme. UAE will host an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) Mission in 2016, which will review the physical protection system in the UAE and compare it with international guidelines and internationally recognized best practices.

Nuclear Security

UAE has endorsed the Amendment of the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). Although the amendment has not yet entered into force,  UAE regulation and regulatory guides have been developed in compliance with the Convention’s amended requirements.

The regulation for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities, issued in 2010, and its associated regulatory guides have been established in accordance with the IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications, in particular the Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities publication (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5).

Since 2014, two new regulatory guides were developed and issued in regards to the security of the transport of nuclear material and to the contingency plan required at a nuclear facility.

In 2014, UAE hosted an IAEA workshop on the security of transport of nuclear materials.

     Radiological Security

The UAE regulation for the security of radioactive sources has been developed in accordance with the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive as well as the related IAEA safety and security standards, which the Government of the UAE endorsed

After the issuance of the regulation (FANR regulation 23) in 2011, licensees managing category 1 to 3 radioactive sources in the UAE were required to implement it immediately. Since then all required nuclear security plans were reviewed and approved by the regulator, and inspections of all concerned licensees were achieved to verify the implementation and conformance with the new regulation.

Information Protection and Cyber Security

The Information Protection Program Operating Manual (IPPOM), defining the management of sensitive nuclear information in the UAE, was updated and is currently implemented by relevant entities in the nuclear sector such as Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) and Critical Infrastructure and Coastal Protection Authority (CICPA).

UAE Regulation and the associated regulatory guides are based on the IAEA publication, Protection against cyber-attack has been taken into account in various FANR regulations developed between 2009 and 2015.

The UAE hosted an IAEA national workshop on cyber security in 2014.

…Countering Nuclear Smuggling

To meet the requirements of import and export control rules, the UAE nuclear regulator, FANR has issued in 2014 an updated Regulation on the Export and Import Control of Nuclear Material, Nuclear Related Items and Nuclear Related Dual-Use Items.

The Government of the UAE is an active member in the international information sharing on the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials through its participation of the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB).

The UAE participated and supported the convening of IAEA sub-regional meeting on nuclear security information exchange and coordination in October 2015 in Kuwait. This meeting, aimed at strengthening national, regional and international capacity to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material through enhanced information cooperation.

…Supporting Multilateral Instruments

The Government of the United Arab Emirates strongly supports the universal implementation of the International Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terror (ICSANT), as well as the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment.

The UAE provided to the United Nations (UN) 1540 Committee, its national report as well as the associated matrix.

The UAE law, regulations and regulatory guides which are enforced have been established in accordance with the amended CPPNM, UAE continues to promote the entry into force of amended CPPNM at international and regional venues.

…Collaborating with International Organizations

The Government of the UAE supports the activities of the IAEA through ongoing participation at workshops, Nuclear Security Guidance Committee meetings and by providing experts to meetings regarding the development of Nuclear Security Series publications.

UAE is an active promoter and participant of the (IAEA) Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres - NSSC Network. UAE hosted a Regional Training Course on Introduction to Nuclear Forensics in Dubai in October 2015.

An Integrated master Working Plan (IWP) was signed in 2013 between the UAE and the IAEA, which aims to enhance, for the period of 2013-2017, the efficiency and effectiveness of the partnership between the UAE and the IAEA, including in the nuclear security domain.

For ensuring the sustainability of its nuclear security regime, an Integrated Security Support Plan (INSSP) for UAE was signed in August 2012 between the UAE and IAEA and continued to be implemented through 2016

The UAE has received an IAEA International SSAC Advisory Service (ISSAS) in May 2014 and an Emergency Preparedness Review (EPREV) mission in March 2015.  The ISSAS mission covers all aspects of nuclear material safeguards implementation including export control, and nuclear material accounting.

The UAE hosted in Abu Dhabi, the Inter-Arab Nuclear Detection and Response Exercise, FALCON, in February 2016, which aimed at promoting regional approaches in matters of nuclear detection and response to nuclear and other radiological threats and enhancing national and regional interagency coordination and cooperation. The exercise has been developed under the framework of the European Union (EU), Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) Centers of Excellence (CoE) Initiative by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), in partnership with the UAE, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Kingdom of Morocco, the European Commission and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).

…Partnering with External Stakeholders

With regard to bilateral agreements on nuclear security, the UAE has concluded a number of nuclear cooperation agreements in support of its civil nuclear power programme. To date, 9 bilateral agreements have been concluded. In addition, multiple MoUs have been signed between FANR, the nuclear regulator and several foreign entities. Such arrangements allowed for further cooperation in areas including nuclear security and continued to be valuable interface for cooperation and knowledge exchange in relation to nuclear security.

The UAE in cooperation with USA entities established the Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute (GNEII) in Abu Dhabi, an educational institution that provides classroom instruction and hands-on experience in nuclear energy safety, security, safeguards and non-proliferation. GNEII is associated with Khalifa University of Science Technology and Research.