Fact Sheet: Update on Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation (INFCIRC 869)


Office of the Press Secretary


For Immediate Release                        


Update on INFCIRC 869

On October 9, 2014, the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, on behalf of its Government and 34 other countries (full list below), conveyed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Secretariat the “Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation” from the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and requested that it be circulated to all IAEA Member States.  The subscribing states pledged to take specific steps, including implementing key IAEA nuclear security guidance, accepting voluntary peer reviews, and committing that those responsible for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.  The Dutch note verbale  encouraged all States to meet the intent of these essential elements of a nuclear security regime and to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the principles therein.  The IAEA has circulated the 2014 Joint Statement as INFCIRC/869, to which all IAEA Member States could ascribe.

On November 13, 2015, Jordan pledged its commitment to the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, as contained in INFCIRC/869.  Jordan is the 36th IAEA member state to subscribe to the statement, and the first to do so outside the Summit process.

The United States continues to encourage all IAEA member states to indicate their commitment to implement the provisions of INFCIRC/869, noting that such public commitments provide public assurances that nuclear materials are effectively secured and underscore support for the IAEA and its nuclear security efforts.

Full List of Subscribers

Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Vietnam.


Joint Statement on Countering Nuclear Smuggling

2016 Statement of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling

At the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Nuclear Security Summits, participating nations agreed on Communiqués and Work Plans that included actions aimed at thwarting the illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials. The following countries recognize that identifying nuclear smugglers, detecting and recovering nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, and prosecuting those responsible are important and effective activities to help prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear or other radioactive materials: Australia, Canada, Chile, China,  the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,  France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan,  The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, The Philippines, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom, The United States of America, INTERPOL, and the United Nations.

To follow through on these pledges, participating states are committed to working together to build and sustain national capabilities to counter the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials. These efforts may include:

1.     Designating a national team or task force to link law enforcement, intelligence, technical experts, and other relevant authorities to investigate nuclear trafficking networks and incidents;

2.     Developing plans that clearly outline individual agency roles and responsibilities when responding to incidents of material outside regulatory control;

3.     Developing a national level detection architecture as an element of a whole-of-government counter nuclear smuggling capability;

4.     Strengthening nuclear forensics capabilities to reliably analyze nuclear and other radioactive material discovered out of regulatory control;

5.     Increasing legal training for prosecutors to ensure conviction of smugglers, as appropriate;

6.     Developing laws, regulations, guidance and/or policies to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material;

7.     Strengthening bilateral, multilateral, and international information sharing and other cooperation, such as training and education, best practices exchanges, and exercises;

8.     Sharing applicable lead information through INTERPOL and acting on lead information received as an effective mechanism for identifying nuclear smuggling networks in a timely manner and to enhance cooperation;

9.     Sharing information on incidents involving nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control through the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Incident and Trafficking Database.


Joint Statement on Cyber Security

2016: Gift Basket on cyber security of industrial control and plant systems at nuclear facilities 

Subscribed by: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the United Nations.


The States listed above commit to ensure adequate cyber security at industrial control and plant systems at nuclear facilities.  These control systems are often used within safeguards, security, and safety systems.  Increased attention in this area will assist States, nuclear operators and the supply chain to continue to strengthen the resilience of these systems, protecting them from potential malicious attack or accidental damage.

To date, work has mainly focused on mitigating the vulnerabilities of enterprise systems used to manage information and data within nuclear facilities and supply chains.  This work needs to extend to industrial control systems.

Nuclear facilities benefit from robust safety mechanisms which have been strengthened and developed over several decades.  In addition to physical, logical, and human based controls, there has been an increase in the use of information technology to form part of the safety and security aspects of plant control systems, as well as nuclear material accountancy and control.  More information on the use of information technology and the associated threats and vulnerabilities in this context is needed to inform continuous security improvements.

The Initiative

The States listed above agree, as resources permit, to participate in two international workshops on this topic in 2016.  These workshops will enable States and their nuclear sectors to share good practice in managing risks to industrial control systems in nuclear sites, as well as examine the impact of using information technology in managing safety and security aspects of plant control systems.

These workshops will focus on areas including:

  • Threats and vulnerabilities, through considering case studies of recent incidents;
  • Potential or known incidents which can impact on control systems, through an interactive approach;
  • Technical and management challenges of managing risksto legacy systems;
  • Technical and management challenges of assuring new build nuclear and supply chains
  • Incident response and recovery.
  • Managing public/media expectation in light of an incident.

Outcomes and Next Steps

The States listed above propose to present the findings of this work at the Ministerial segment of the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security, in Vienna in December 2016 to contribute to IAEA efforts to increase cyber security at nuclear facilities, building on the IAEA International Conference on Computer Security in a Nuclear World held in June 2015. 

Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004)

Joint Statement on

Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Recognizing that United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 (hereinafter “1540 Committee”) are key parts of the international legal architecture for States to prevent and combat nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the full implementation of UNSCR 1540 is a long-term endeavour that requires both political and technical action at national, sub-regional, regional and international levels.

Recalling the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and Work Plan, the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, and the follow-up Resolutions of UNSCR 1540, particularly UNSCR 1977 (2011), which underscored the important role of UNSCR 1540 in strengthening global nuclear security and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the 1540 Committee will be completing  its second Comprehensive Review in 2016 on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540, as set forth by UNSCR 1977 (2011). This Review provides an opportunity for the 1540 Committee to take stock of national and international progress in implementing UNSCR 1540 since the previous Comprehensive Review in 2009, and to put forward key findings and recommendations that will contribute to more effective implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Welcoming the contributions of States for updating and submitting reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 with the view of the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Reaffirming our commitment to the Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 delivered at the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit.

Noting that since the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, co-signatories have advanced national efforts to further the implementation of UNSCR 1540 by providing support for the 1540 Committee’s main areas of work, including, inter alia: monitoring implementation of the Resolution; providing capacity building assistance at the technical level to requesting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations; preparing and submitting UNSCR 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; organizing or supporting regional and sub-regional training seminars, exercises and initiatives; convening workshops to help facilitate the implementation of UNSCR 1540 into national legislation; conducting outreach to stakeholders in industry, civil society and academia; and strengthening cooperation with regional organizations such as the African Union, ASEAN, the Caribbean Community, and the European Union.

*  *  *

We, the Governments of Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, with the support of the United Nations, the European Union and INTERPOL, reaffirm our commitment to the full and universal implementation of UNSCR 1540, including the implementation of obligations to enhance the security of nuclear materials worldwide in line with the objectives of the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and institutional Action Plans. We reiterate our support for the activities of the 1540 Committee and the Group of Experts. We also reaffirm our commitment to fully implement UNSCR 1540 in our respective States, in areas where we have not already done so, and further undertake to:

1.       Work with and provide information to the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts for the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

2.       Consider providing additional support and assistance in fulfilling the Action Plan in support of the United Nations, particularly actions aimed at facilitating national and regional implementation of UNSCR 1540 and its nuclear security obligations, with a view to helping requesting States to fully implement UNSCR 1540 by 2021, as referenced in the UNSC Presidential Statement of 7 May 2014;

3.       Encourage states to submit reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 on a regular basis, and focussing outreach on states yet to submit a first report to the 1540 Committee;

4.       Advocate for international, regional, and sub-regional organizations that have not yet done so to designate a Point of Contact (PoC) or coordinator on the implementation of UNSCR 1540 in order to facilitate regional approaches to assisting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations and enhance coordination for their UNSCR 1540 implementation efforts;

5.       Consider providing funding, where feasible, to organizations requesting for supporting their PoCs or coordinators for the implementation UNSCR 1540;

6.       Enhance coordination through outreach events with a wide range of domestic stakeholders such as industry, parliamentarians, civil society and academia, and develop appropriate ways to inform these stakeholders of their obligations pursuant to domestic laws relating to the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

7.       Consider organizing joint exercises at the national, regional or international levels that demonstrate ways of reinforcing national and regional capacities and international cooperation for better implementation of UNSCR 1540, and encourage the participation of relevant international organizations and initiatives;

8.       Advocate for the 1540 Committee to continue to strengthen cooperation with other relevant international organizations and initiatives, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, other United Nations entities, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership), as well as regional and sub-regional organizations in promoting the implementation of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit institutional Action Plans;

9.       Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to enhance their cooperation with other relevant entities in the United Nations system, such as the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)- and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), including through strengthening the legal framework to prohibit illicit activities, export controls, border security, and other measures that support obligations under UNSCR 1540, and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate through joint country visits to monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

10.    Consider further enhancing the cooperation between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UNSCR 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts on strengthening nuclear security, through opportunities such as: enhancing complementarity and reducing duplication, including by using Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSP) to inform voluntary 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; coordinating with the IAEA’s International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) on outreach to academia relevant to implementing UNSCR 1540 and the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC) Network on outreach to nuclear security training centers; exploring establishing a liaison between the 1540 Committee and the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security;

11.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue collaborative efforts and interactions with INTERPOL regarding assistance requests and training opportunities;

12.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue to participate in GICNT exercises, workshops and events that focus on building and enhancing nuclear forensics, detection and response capabilities;

13.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to develop strong UNSCR 1540 assistance requests that are sufficiently detailed to support responses from potential assistance providers, including through the Global Partnership. In this context, consideration should be given to strengthening the 1540 Committee’s “match-making” mechanism and coordination with assistance providers, including at the regional level, through the Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540;

14.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to address new and emerging WMD threats relevant to the obligations and recommendations of the resolution; and

15.    Advocate for increased contributions, where feasible, to the UN Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities dedicated to supporting UNSCR 1540 implementation and the work of the 1540 Committee.

National Statement: Turkey




(Washington, 31 March-1 April 2016)

Mr. President,

Distinguished Heads of State and Government,

Esteemed Participants,

I salute you all with most heartfelt feelings and deepest regards.

I thank President Obama for hosting the fourth Nuclear Security Summit in Washington.

I wish that this Summit, which is being held at a time when critical developments on a global scale are taking place, will contribute to the strengthening of peace, serenity and security in the world.

Today, we hold this Summit immediately in the aftermath of the days when we once again witnessed the bloody face of terrorism in Ankara, Istanbul and Brussels where innocent people were brutally slaughtered.

We have to admit that our world is less secure than it was earlier because of terrorism.

Looking back at terrorist acts and emergence of new terrorist groups in the two year period since the last Hague Summit, we see that the international community has been unable to demonstrate the desired level of success in fighting terrorism.

As a country that has been fighting the PKK separatist terrorist organisation for the last 30 years and that has lost 40 thousand of its citizens who fell victim to terrorist acts, we are aware of the magnitude of the problem we are confronted with.

We feel in our heart the pain of all those who have lost their lives in acts of terror, from Paris to Beirut, from Tunisia to Nigeria and from Burkina Faso to Somalia, to Libya.

We can counter the globalising threat of terror only by increasing global solidarity and cooperation.

I once again wish to reiterate our long repeated calls upon all countries.

Despite the differences in their ideologies and identities, PKK, PYD, YPG, DAESH, DHKP-C, Al Qaeda, Al Shebab or Boko Haram are all dens of evil sharing the same methods, aims and objectives.

Let us take a common stance against these dens of evil who are enemies of all humanity.

Let us not allow the bloody acts of these organisations to be exploited by marginal circles to the benefit of their blind ideologies such as Islamophobia, racism, xenophobia and anti-migrationism.

Mr. President,

Distinguished Participants,

A world free from nuclear weapons continues to be our common objective.

Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime is thus a collective responsibility for us all.

Nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear terrorism remain to be among the most serious and real threats to global security. 

Strengthening security entails ensuring physical protection of all nuclear facilities and material as well as countering the threat of terrorism.

These challenges must be addressed in a collective and organized manner. 

Only effective nuclear security measures can prevent such material from falling into the hands of terrorists and other unauthorized actors.

We, therefore, support a broad approach to security through a partnership network.

It is with this understanding that Turkey has taken an active part in the Nuclear Security Summit process since its inception. 

Distinguished participants,

The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process began in 2010 with a call for a “new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years”.

The first three summits have achieved notable results, from reaffirming the goal of securing weapons-usable nuclear material worldwide, to reiterating the responsibility of states to secure nuclear material as well as through promoting their adherence to relevant conventions and various global initiatives.

These Summits have facilitated the efforts in safeguarding vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive material and enabled actions designed to make the world a safer place.

Thanks to additional measures and increased awareness, the potential for the acquisition of nuclear material by terrorist groups and non-state actors has been greatly reduced, even if the risk of nuclear terrorism cannot be ruled out in total.

However, more work is still needed to build an effective global nuclear security system in order to secure all weapons-usable nuclear material.

High-level political attention on nuclear security must be preserved to guide and expedite the ongoing work toward building such a system and improving nuclear security.

Additional ratifications by more States of legally binding instruments such as the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) would further strengthen the security regime.

I would like to seize this opportunity to underline once again our commitment to this goal, as Turkey already finalized the process of ratification of the 2005 Amendment and deposited its instrument of ratification to the IAEA on 8 July 2015.

Distinguished Participants,

We are going through a period where energy supply security has become more important than ever.

Turkey is determined to carry on its nuclear energy projects in order to increase and diversify its energy supplies.

We believe that construction of new nuclear power plants with the most advanced technology that ensure their safety and the highest standards of security, will contribute to Turkey’s sustainable growth by providing significant portion of its energy needs.

We have always supported the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy by all States in compliance with international obligations.

Measures that we are taking to ensure nuclear security should in no way hinder international cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Access to nuclear technology, equipment and material for peaceful purposes should be available to all countries.

With this understanding, back in 2010, in an effort to resolve the Iran nuclear issue, Turkey and Brazil signed with Iran the Tehran Declaration.

It should be recalled that this Declaration proposed a deal that contained elements not too different from those achieved with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

As a country that has strongly supported this process from the outset, we welcome the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as of 16 January this year.

As reflected in the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, it is the fundamental responsibility of the states to maintain effective security of all nuclear material, which also includes those used in nuclear weapons, and of the nuclear facilities under their control.

As leaders, we bear the primary responsibility to ensure public confidence in the safety and security of all aspects of our nuclear programs.    

Mr. President,

Distinguished Participants,

We appreciate the IAEA’s central role and competence in strengthening the international nuclear security framework.

The IAEA plays a key role on issues related to nuclear security by assisting member states in developing and implementing nuclear security programs.

We support the work of the Agency in promoting “nuclear security culture” at national levels.

A sustainable nuclear security culture is crucial for the management of activities involving nuclear or other radioactive material.  

We should strive to provide the Agency with the political support and financial resources it needs to continue to effectively discharge its duties.

As has been done until today, Turkey will continue to cooperate with the Agency and lend the necessary support.

Honourable Participants,

Allow me to conclude my remarks by underlining that for a better future, nations should rely on the reconciling and practical effects of cooperation and dialogue rather than a potentially deterrent impact of nuclear arms.

Global peace and security can be achieved only through common vision, mutual trust and common sense.

This requires a strengthened global nuclear security architecture that is comprehensive and based on international standards, which can also lead to reductions in stocks of weapons-usable nuclear material.

It is our hope and wish that the 2016 Washington Summit will result in a legacy that will sustain past accomplishments and establish a more effective structure.

I wish the Summit to lead to better days for our countries.

Thank you.

National Progress Report: Turkey


i) Turkey has been a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) since 1985 and has also ratified its 2005 Amendment. The instrument of ratification was deposited with the IAEA on 8 July 2015.

Already before the ratification of the Amendment, the national regulation on the physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear material had been revised by taking into account its provisions.

The revised regulation, broadening the scope of physical protection measures in Turkey, governing the measures that should be taken to safeguard nuclear facilities and nuclear material from sabotage and theft during handling, use, storage or transport, was published in the Official Gazette and entered into force on 22 May 2012.          

Based on lessons learned and experience accumulated during its implementation, work on new updates to this regulation is underway and is expected to be completed by the end of 2016.

ii) Turkey is among the initial signatories of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). Already before the 2012 Seoul Summit, the Turkish Grand National Assembly had ratified ICSANT. Turkey has been party to this Convention since its instrument of ratification was deposited on 24 September 2012.

iii)   An amendment has been proposed recently by the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority to adapt the relevant provisions of the Turkish Penal Code in accordance with Turkey's international undertakings in this domain and in light of global developments. Interagency consultations on the draft amendment is underway.


i)  Turkey continues to update its nuclear legislation and practices in line with the IAEA's latest safety and security standards and guidance, including Nuclear Security Series documents, in particular the Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5).

ii)  In accordance with the mentioned national legislation, a “Design Basis Threat” (DBT) document was prepared.

Based on the DBT document, a Physical Protection Program has been prepared for the research facilities at the Çekmece Nuclear Research and Training Centre and the research facilities of Istanbul Technical University. The draft is currently being examined by the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority.

iii) Training activities concerning the inspection and physical protection of the nuclear facilities and nuclear material and accounting of nuclear material and controls are being conducted inside and outside of the facilities regularly, on a yearly basis.

iv)  Turkey has also concluded both the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA. The broader conclusion obtained from the Agency in 2012, confirming that all nuclear material in the country have remained in peaceful activities, is testimony to the high standards that Turkey's system of accounting and control of nuclear material has reached.


i)  Turkey participates in and contributes to the work undertaken by the IAEA for the preparation or review of its “Nuclear Security Series” documents.

ii) Turkey also actively participates in the courses and technical meetings organized by the IAEA on nuclear safety.

Within this context, Turkey has contributed to technical meetings such as “Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threats at Nuclear Facilities”, “Enhancing Nuclear Security for Research Reactors and Associated Facilities” and “Computer Security”.

A national workshop on the “Nuclear Security Plan” was organized in Ankara on 2-6 March 2015 with the support of the Integrated Support Centre for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security, subordinate to the Japanese Atomic Energy Agency.

iii)  Turkey maintains close dialogue with the IAEA on the development of the country's nuclear infrastructure. In this context, Turkey will receive International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) consultancy from the IAEA in October 2016. A preparatory meeting with the IPPAS Mission was held on 13-14 January 2016.


i)  Turkey fully supports the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and supports the work of the 1540 Committee. Government experts from Turkey have actively participated in a number of regional and international outreach and training events on matters relevant to the implementation of the Resolution.

In line with its commitment to the implementation of the Resolution, Turkey is considering submitting an updated version of its national 1540 matrix in the coming period, to reflect partial updates in its legislation.

ii) Turkey regards multilateral counter-proliferation initiatives as important voluntary cooperative mechanisms, complementing the existing international instruments and export control regimes. Turkey contributes to the work of initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative among others, on the basis of potential added value that the specific activity or Turkish participation may bring about. Based on this approach, Turkey has continued to observe, host or participate in selective activities of such initiatives in support of broader nuclear security and counter-terrorism efforts.


Having returned the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel used in the 5 MW research reactor at the Çekmece Nuclear Research and Training Centre to the US, Turkey continues to discourage the use of HEU and plutonium and encourage the development and use of low enriched uranium alternatives.


i) Ankara Nuclear Research and Training Centre (ANAEM) was established in August 2010 in order to conduct national and international training, including on radiation protection, radiation safety, nuclear power, nuclear safety, nuclear security and nuclear applications. ANAEM's main duty is to meet the qualified manpower needs of the industry as well as those of the public sector. ANAEM is also responsible for public information activities. Becoming an innovative and productive research and training centre meeting high international standards in this field, is also among the objectives of ANAEM.

ii) Turkey also regularly participates in the meetings of the “International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres” as an observer and supports its activities.


i)   In addition to adhering to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, Turkey has formally notified the IAEA of its support for the Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

ii)  Turkey hosted a training course titled “Training Course on Nuclear Security Detection Architecture” which was held in Istanbul on 12-16 October 2015.


Turkey continues to work closely with its industry to identify the nuclear security requirements and to develop necessary legal and practical infrastructure for its current and future nuclear facilities, particularly in the context of its planned nuclear power plant projects.