Fact Sheet on Joint Statement on High-Density Fuel Development
/THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
________________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release
FACT SHEET
High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources (HASS) Gift Basket
Radioactive sources are used in medical, research and industrial applications in public facilities worldwide. High-activity sealed radioactive sources (HASS) present a security concern because of their potential use in a radiological dispersal device (dirty bomb) or a radiological exposure device. In recognition of these concerns, the Joint Statement on Strengthening the Security of High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources aims to advance existing efforts to prevent the theft of these sources by supporting their replacement with technologies that do not use radioactive sources, increasing cooperation among source supplier and recipient States, and assessing the international framework on HASS, especially regarding the management of sources that are no longer in use.
The United States supports the aims of this gift basket, which was sponsored by France. The United States seeks to prevent high-activity radiological materials from being used in acts of terrorism by partnering with businesses, hospitals, industries, international organizations, andregulatory agencies in more than 85 countries. The United States provides security technologies, expertise, training, source recovery, and non-radioactive-source based replacement strategies. In addition, the United States has helped establish an international research effort on non-isotopic alternative technologies and partners with industry to share information and best practices on adoption.
The United States also supports efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to strengthen the international framework for radiological security by promoting the development of additional guidance regarding the security and management of radioactive sources. The United States has also partnered with global suppliers of radioactive sources to discuss issues related to imports and exports of sources.
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Fact Sheet on Joint Statement on the Security of High Activity Radioactive Sources
/THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
________________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release
FACT SHEET
High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources (HASS) Gift Basket
Radioactive sources are used in medical, research and industrial applications in public facilities worldwide. High-activity sealed radioactive sources (HASS) present a security concern because of their potential use in a radiological dispersal device (dirty bomb) or a radiological exposure device. In recognition of these concerns, the Joint Statement on Strengthening the Security of High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources aims to advance existing efforts to prevent the theft of these sources by supporting their replacement with technologies that do not use radioactive sources, increasing cooperation among source supplier and recipient States, and assessing the international framework on HASS, especially regarding the management of sources that are no longer in use.
The United States supports the aims of this gift basket, which was sponsored by France. The United States seeks to prevent high-activity radiological materials from being used in acts of terrorism by partnering with businesses, hospitals, industries, international organizations, andregulatory agencies in more than 85 countries. The United States provides security technologies, expertise, training, source recovery, and non-radioactive-source based replacement strategies. In addition, the United States has helped establish an international research effort on non-isotopic alternative technologies and partners with industry to share information and best practices on adoption.
The United States also supports efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to strengthen the international framework for radiological security by promoting the development of additional guidance regarding the security and management of radioactive sources. The United States has also partnered with global suppliers of radioactive sources to discuss issues related to imports and exports of sources.
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Fact Sheet: Downblending in Argentina
/THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release
FACT SHEET
Eliminating All Highly Enriched Uranium from Argentina
The United States and Argentina have collaborated for years to eliminate Argentina’s stocks of highly enriched uranium (HEU). Since this cooperative effort began, over 40 kilograms of HEU have been removed from Argentina. Before the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, approximately 4 kilograms of HEU remained that was not eligible to be returned to the United States because of its form and composition. Argentina was able to eliminate all of its HEU because it converted its medical isotope production to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) targets in 2002 and converted its last reactor from HEU to LEU fuel in 2008.
At the 2016 Summit, Argentina announced the successful disposition of Argentina’s remaining HEU. The U.S. Department of Energy and Argentina’s National Atomic Energy Commission cooperated to down-blend and dispose this material in Argentina.
Having completed this down-blending project, Argentina — and the entire Latin America and Caribbean region — is now considered free of HEU, which is understood to mean that no country has more than 1 kilogram of HEU.
Fact Sheet: Downblending in Indonesia
/THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
________________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release
FACT SHEET
Eliminating All Highly Enriched Uranium from Indonesia
At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, the United States and Indonesia announced that all fresh (unirradiated) highly enriched uranium (HEU) has been downblended to low enriched uranium (LEU). The two countries intend to continue their joint effort to eliminate all remaining HEU in Indonesia by September 2016, in furtherance of President Obama and President Jokowi’s October 2015 joint statement. The HEU is residual material from medical isotope production.
Upon completion of these efforts, Indonesia will be the 30th country plus Taiwan to be declared HEU-free, defined as less than 1 kilogram of HEU remaining. This is a particularly significant achievement, because all of Southeast Asia will be free of HEU.
Indonesia is one of only a handful of countries that produce the medical isotope molybdenum-99 (Mo-99), which is used for diagnostic medical imaging. Through cooperative efforts with the U.S. Department of Energy and the International Atomic Energy Agency, Indonesia ceased using HEU to produce Mo-99 in 2010. Indonesia is committed to continuing to provide this much-needed medical isotope and plans to restart production using LEU in 2016.
Fact Sheet: EC-US 2016 Counter Nuclear Smuggling Workshop
/US-EC Cooperation to Strengthen International Capacities to Counter Nuclear Smuggling
The European Commission and the United States of America are cooperating to prevent terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear or other radioactive materials. Despite significant international achievement in strengthening the security of these materials at facilities of origin, seizures of weapons-grade nuclear material in Moldova (2011) and Georgia (2003, 2006, 2010) suggest these materials continue to be trafficked by transnational criminals. Furthermore, analysis produced by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) show that nuclear and radioactive materials continue to be encountered out of regulatory control in all regions of the world.
Recognizing the need for strengthened international cooperation to counter nuclear smuggling, the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the United States Department of State co-hosted the “2016 Counter Nuclear Smuggling (CNS) Workshop” at the JRC Institute for Transuranium Elements, in Karlsruhe, Germany. Eighty experts from 30 countries and international organizations, including the IAEA, INTERPOL, and the United Nations, shared best practices and lessons learned in leveraging investigative and technical capabilities to counter smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive material. The workshop advanced the commitments made at the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Nuclear Security Summits and included demonstrations of CNS capabilities outlined in the 2012, 2014 and 2016 ‘Statements of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling.'
Through a series of informational presentations as well as exercises and demonstrations, the workshop addressed state of the art approaches and technical challenges associated with detection, response, nuclear forensic analysis and law enforcement investigation of nuclear smuggling incidents. Workshop participants concluded that close inter-agency cooperation at the national level and international information sharing enable an optimized use of investigative and technical capabilities to effectively counter nuclear smuggling acts, detect nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control, and analyze seized material to understand its origin and history as well as potential linkages with other seizures.
The March 2016 CNS Workshop marked a significant step in collaborative efforts to strengthen international capabilities to prevent nuclear and radioactive materials from falling into the hands of terrorists and other malicious actors.
Fact Sheet: EU-US Exchange
/U.S.-Euratom Understanding on Highly Enriched Uranium Exchange
The United States and the European Commission share a commitment to minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian applications.
At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the European Commission’s Euratom Supply Agency (ESA) announced the details of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) outlining the principles of an HEU Exchange. This understanding notes the mutual support for converting European research reactors and isotope production facilities to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and targets, where technically and economically feasible, while also acknowledging that HEU will be required during the transition period to conduct research and to produce medical isotopes. The MOU outlines that, in exchange for U.S.-origin HEU supplied to research reactors and isotope production facilities in Euratom Member States, Euratom – in addition to meeting other U.S. legal requirements - will identify unirradiated, excess HEU that can be down-blended to LEU either in Euratom Member State facilities or in the United States, and will make efforts to return any such acceptable material to the United States. The quantity of this excess material is to be greater than the quantity of HEU that eligible civilian facilities in Euratom Member States expect to receive from the United States in the future, prior to their conversion to LEU. This agreement is a key component of the U.S. policy of net reduction of U.S.-origin fissile material located in other countries.
The HEU Exchange Understanding involves contributions and participation from the United States, ESA, the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands. These countries have now mutually identified the relevant materials and share a common view on the efforts and contributions that will be required by each of them to implement this exchange, so as to achieve the intended HEU minimization objective.
Fact Sheet: EU-US ITRAP+10
/Summary Report on the ITRAP+10 Test Campaign
The importance of nuclear security cannot be overstated. The European Union and the United States of America, in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), share the international responsibility to develop and promote systems and measures for the prevention of, detection of, and response to nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control. Implementing effective capabilities to deter and detect unauthorized movement of nuclear and other radioactive materials both at borders and within a State’s interior enhances efforts to better combat nuclear terrorism. Often, these capabilities necessitate the use of technical instruments and sensors that can detect, identify and/or validate the presence of nuclear or other radioactive materials so that they may be interdicted. In recognition of this international responsibility and necessary capabilities, and as part of the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit Key Topic of Combatting Illicit Trafficking, the European Union and the United States of America present the Illicit Trafficking Radiation Assessment Program (ITRAP+10) test campaign summary report.
Initiated by the European Union and the United States of America, the ITRAP+10 test campaign evaluated the performance of commercially available radiation detection equipment against consensus standards. To ensure the review of commercial equipment would be relevant to the global commons, the European Commission and the United States agreed to collaborate on the conduct of the ITRAP+10 test campaign and share in the design of the tests, their execution, and the analysis of the data. Using both the American National Standards Institute/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and the International Electrotechnical published consensus standards, the partners tested nine different classes of radiation detection instruments. The results of the test campaign provide an independent assessment of radiation detection instruments that are presently available on the market, or soon will be.
The summary report is available to the international community and includes an overview of the ITRAP+10 test program, a summary of test results across the nine classes of instruments with scientific and technical data, and information about the manufacturers of the instruments tested.
The testing processes as well as the test results obtained during ITRAP+10 helped experts revise both the requirements and test methods described in the standards and increased the capabilities of the testing laboratories. The performance results have also enabled manufacturers to improve their products and facilitate users’ understanding of the performance and limitations of the currently available radiation detection instruments. The European Union and the United States of America areconfident that this international cooperation among them and the IAEA to document detection instrument capabilities will emphasize the importance of technical means (detection instruments) as a facilitator for detection in the context of a national-level Nuclear Security Detection Architecture, exemplify proper usage and deployment, promote new research and development efforts, and assist international partners to ensure resources are deployed in an efficient manner.
Fact Sheet: Feasibility of Low Enriched Uranium Fuel in Naval Reactor Plants
/United States Navy submarines and aircraft carriers are powered by reactors that use highly enriched uranium in order to meet demanding performance requirements. However, consistent with its national security requirements and in recognition of the nonproliferation benefits to minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium globally, the United States values investigations into the viability of using low-enriched uranium in its naval reactors.
Read MoreFact Sheet: HEU Minimization Activities since March 2014
/THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
________________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release
FACT SHEET
Highly Enriched Uranium Minimization Activities since March 2014
Minimization of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian applications is a priority for the Nuclear Security Summit process. Eliminating all HEU from facilities or countries decreases the number of potential targets for terrorists, criminals, and other unauthorized actors to obtain this material. Minimization efforts include HEU reactor conversions and shut-downs, nuclear material removals, technology substitution, and down-blending. Each of these activities represents permanent threat reduction by preventing sensitive nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands.
Through the Nuclear Security Summit process, the international community has made considerable progress in this area. Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, the United States has supported the conversion of HEU reactors in Russia, Jamaica, China, and Kazakhstan. The United States also confirmed the shutdown of four HEU reactors: two in Russia, one in Uzbekistan, and one in Switzerland.
Once facilities are converted and HEU is no longer required, the material can be removed. Since March 2014, the United States removed or confirmed disposition of approximately 450 kilograms of HEU from 10 countries (Poland, Kazakhstan, Canada, Switzerland, Jamaica, Uzbekistan, Austria, Germany, Japan, and Argentina). As a result of these efforts, three additional countries are now considered free of HEU (Switzerland, Uzbekistan, and Argentina), defined as having less than one kilogram of HEU on their territory. In total, 29 countries plus Taiwan are now HEU-free after eliminating their HEU.
Fact Sheet: International Atomic Energy Agency Low Enriched Uranium Bank
/THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
________________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release
FACT SHEET
International Atomic Energy Agency Low Enriched Uranium Bank
The low enriched uranium (LEU) bank will provide a dependable source of LEU to fuel peaceful nuclear power reactors for qualifying member countries of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in case of disruptions to the open market or other existing supply arrangements for such fuel. When operational, the LEU bank will provide countries interested in nuclear energy with an alternative to acquiring a domestic uranium enrichment capability. As President Obama noted in his April 5, 2009 speech in Prague, the LEU bank is a crucial means of ensuring “that countries can access peaceful power without increasing the risks of proliferation.”
In September 2006, the Nuclear Threat Initiative announced it would donate $50 million to the IAEA to create an LEU bank, if its grant were matched by $100 million in donations from other sources. This condition was met in 2009 with contributions from the United States Government, the European Union, Kuwait, Norway, and the United Arab Emirates. In December 2010, the IAEA Board of Governors approved establishment of the LEU bank under IAEA auspices. Additional financial support was provided by the World Nuclear Transport Institute, and Kazakhstan, which also offered to host the LEU Bank.
On August 27, 2015, IAEA Director General Yukia Amano and Kazakhstan Foreign Minister Erlan Idrissov signed an agreement for the bank to be hosted at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant. When fully operational, the LEU bank will provide a physical reserve of up to 90 metric tons of LEU, which could be used to make enough nuclear fuel to power a large city for three years.
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Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on Certified Training
/THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
________________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release
FACT SHEET
Certified Training for Nuclear Security Management
The challenges associated with managing nuclear and other radiological materials are varied and complex, and it is essential that states to their utmost to maintain security over such materials. Effective security relies upon the competence of management and personnel who are responsible for this work. Therefore, it is crucial that managers and personnel responsible for nuclear security continuously maintain and improve their skills. Much progress has been made in this area since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, particularly with the development of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Information Circular 869 and with the establishment of the World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS) Academy Nuclear Security Management Certification Program.
The WINS Academy is a comprehensive training program for nuclear security professionals, with modules that cover a wide variety of disciplines. Upon successful completion, students become Certified Nuclear Security Professionals. Certification is valid for three years, after which time recertification is required. The program is designed to develop a network of certified professional who are affecting meaningful and sustainable changes to nuclear security worldwide.
In support of this issue, Canada has sponsored the Gift Basket on Certified Training for Nuclear Security Management. As a signatory to this Gift Basket, the United States commits to further support the WINS Academy, including through the provision of advocacy, peer review support, contributions, or by other means as necessary, and to promote cooperative efforts between the WINS Academy and the IAEA. The United States has supported WINS through federal grants and works with the both IAEA and directly with partner countries to provide a wide variety of training to personnel responsible for securing nuclear and radiological materials.
Fact Sheet: Countering Nuclear Smuggling and U.S. Activities
/The White House
For Immediate Release
Countering nuclear smuggling is a multi-faceted challenge that requires close cooperation among law enforcement, intelligence and technical government agencies. Working together, these agencies need to be able to detect and locate illicit nuclear materials, investigate and disrupt material smuggling incidents and deny smugglers the freedom of movement. Moreover, as this issue is transnational by nature, governments need strong regional partnerships to help put loose nuclear and radioactive material back under regulatory control.
The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit has highlighted this important topic through a series of Gift Baskets that detail commitments made to strengthen necessary capabilities to address the threat of nuclear smuggling. Those Gift Baskets include Counter Nuclear Smuggling (Jordan), Nuclear Detection Architecture (Finland), Forenics in Nuclear Security (Australia), and Maritime Supply Chain Security (United Kingdom). In the last few months, INTERPOL hosted law enforcement officials from more than 110 countries to build awareness and capaicity to combat smuggling of nuclear materials and the European Union hosted 28 countries to share best practices on investigative and technical capabilities to interdict material outside of regulatory control. In sum, these statements and activities demonstrate the resolve of a wide range of nations to prevent nuclear material from falling into the hands of terrorists, criminals, and other unauthorized actors.
The United States leverages expertise from across the federal government to ensure its readiness to investigate nuclear smugglers, detect and recover nuclear and radiological material out of regulatory control, and arrest and prosecute criminals involved. State, local, and tribal governments, as well as the private sector, are also engaged in this effort. Each possesses unique and complementary personnel, equipment, capabilities, and legal authorities to respond quickly and effectively to nuclear smuggling incidents.
The United States Department of State continues to work with international partners to strengthen their counter nuclear smuggling capabilities, through joint action plans with 14 countries and an expanded slate of workshops and exercises. The Department of Energy supports these engagements by partnering with nearly 50 countries to provide a broad spectrum of capacity-building, including in radiation detection and nuclear forensics equipment and training. The Federal Bureau of Investigation also offers briefings and exercises on integrating law enforcement and investigative techniques with radiation detection technology. The Department of Defense works with partners to strengthen border security and close off transnational smuggling routes through the provision of equipment and training. Finally, the United States works closely with INTERPOL and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to strengthen information-sharing mechanisms for governments to alert the international community to incidents involving nuclear or radioactive materials and the individuals involved.
Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on Countering Nuclear Smuggling
/THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
___________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release
FACT SHEET
Statement of Activity and Cooperation
to Counter Nuclear Smuggling
The acquisition of nuclear or radioactive materials by a terrorist, criminal, or other unauthorized actors poses a serious threat to international security. Previous seizures of smuggled nuclear materials underscore the need for strengthened international efforts to investigate and disrupt nuclear smuggling networks to prevent the illegal transfer of nuclear and radioactive materials out of regulatory control.
By signing on to the Jordan-sponsored Statement of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling, the United States government commits to further enhancing its capabilities to counter nuclear smuggling. Domestically, U.S. government agencies coordinate actively so that they are fully prepared to investigate nuclear smuggling networks, detect and recover nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control, and arrest and prosecute the criminals involved. Each agency possesses unique and complementary personnel, equipment, capabilities, and legal authorities to respond quickly and effectively to a radiological or nuclear smuggling incident. Federal agencies also work closely with state, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector.
Recognizing the transnational nature of nuclear smuggling, the United States pledges to expand our cooperation with international partners. The United States provides assistance with broad spectrum of capacity-building support, to include equipment, training and other technical support.
Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on Cyber Security
/THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
___________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release
FACT SHEET
Cyber Security of Industrial Control and Plant Systems at Nuclear Facilities
Nuclear facilities deploy a myriad of technologies and digital assets as an essential component of well-balanced safety, security and safeguards programs. The use of digital technologies has greatly improved the efficiency and effectiveness of industrial control systems, but it is crucial that these systems are able to withstand malicious attacks or accidental damage. On-going efforts to mitigate the vulnerabilities of information management systems need to extend to industrial control systems.
The United Kingdom has sponsored a Gift Basket on Cyber Security of Industrial Control and Plant Systems and Nuclear Facilities to increase attention in this area. As called for in this statement, the United States will participate in the two international workshops on this topic and highlight the findings at the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) International Conference on Nuclear Security in December 2016. The United States will also continue to work with willing partners to develop and implement policies that address the dynamic and global nature of the cyber threat, so as to enable risk informed decisions about how to protect strategic national assets. This will include a joint U.S.-UK civil nuclear exercise, building on the successful Resilient Shield exercise held last November between the and U.S. and UK financial sectors, designed to test government and industry response to cybersecurity threats.
These efforts complement our efforts to promote broad international affirmation of voluntary norms of responsible state behavior in peacetime, including that states should not conduct or knowingly support online activity that intentionally damages critical infrastructure or otherwise impairs the use of critical infrastructure to provide services to the public.
Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security
/THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
________________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release
FACT SHEET
Forensics in Nuclear Security
The continued occurrence of transnational attempts to smuggle nuclear and other radioactive materials underscores the need for strong international efforts to deter potential perpetrators, investigate and disrupt smuggling networks, and improve nuclear security. The advancement of international nuclear forensics cooperation will strengthen global capabilities to counter illicit trafficking by: 1) helping partner nations identify the origin and pathway associated with interdicted material; 2) enabling improved safeguards and physical protection measures at the place of theft or diversion to prevent future losses; and 3) supporting criminal prosecution.
To underscore the importance of nuclear forensics asa key component of nuclear security, Australia has sponsored a Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security. Building upon the Joint Statement from 2014, which raised awareness about nuclear forensics capabilities, current commitments included in this Joint Statement highlight the importance of practical implementation and sustainment of such capabilities.
As a signatory to this statement, the United States will foster practical implementation and sustainment of nuclear forensics capabilities in several key areas. To further cultivate expertise, the U.S. will develop and implement an expert testimony training program for nuclear forensic scientists to establish practices for how to describe nuclear forensics conclusions in judicial proceedings. The United States offers training curriculum to assist the inclusion of nuclear forensics capabilities in national response frameworks. The United States seeks engagement opportunities with international partners to discuss nuclear forensics assistance pertaining to a nuclear security event. Engagement with partners on nuclear forensics both bilaterally and with international organizations is a top priority.
Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on Maritime Supply Chain Security
/THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
___________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release
FACT SHEET
Securing the Maritime Supply Chain
Countering the threat of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological material requires coordination across agencies a multi-layered defense that includes detection systems at seaports around the world. In the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit Joint Statement on Enhancing the Security of the Maritime Supply Chain, participating Summit countries committed to enhance measures to permanently remove nuclear and radiological materials that are out of regulatory control from the global maritime supply chain. Signatory countries followed up on that statement by developing a set of best practices and recommendations, released at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, which will guide next steps on developing solutions to this important task.
The United States is taking a number of actions to strengthen the security of the maritime supply chain, both domestically and internationally. Specifically, the United States has equipped its own seaports and 45 seaports around the world with radiation detection systems, taking into account risk-based and layered approaches to enhancing security, while also enabling the flow of goods through the global supply chain. These systems were installed in close cooperation with Customs officials, Port Authorities, and local port operators. The United States also provides technical support to international partners working to build and sustain their indigenous detection capacities. Through implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Code, the United States assesses the effectiveness of access control, cargo control and facility monitoring measures in foreign ports on a biennial basis.
In addition, the United States has deployed personnel to 60 seaports worldwide to work hand-in-hand with host nations to identify and inspect suspect shipments. The United States has also benefited from public-private partnerships with key industry stakeholders under which shippers voluntarily add security measures to their existing transport process.
Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on National Nuclear Detection Architecture
/THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
________________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release
FACT SHEET
NATIONAL-LEVEL NUCLEAR SECURITY DETECTION ARCHITECTURE
Effectively coordinating domestic capabilities to counter nuclear smuggling requires a national-level approach for the prevention, detection and response to nuclear materials out of regulatory control. A national-level nuclear detection architecture provides such a framework to integrate a comprehensive set of technical and non-technical detection capabilities, and the associated resources and infrastructure to improve a nation’s ability to detect nuclear and radiological threats.
In support of this objective, Finland has sponsored a Joint Statement on National Nuclear Detection Architectures to underscore that a national-level architecture is a necessary component for nuclear security and that countries commit to leveraging available resources for improving such architectures over time.
As a signatory to this Statement, the United States will seek to improve international awareness and understanding of the importance of a national-level nuclear detection architecture. The United States will also advocate for and support the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct periodic review workshops to share best practices, challenges, mitigation strategies, and long-term sustainability approaches that may be common to all participating nations.
Based on a risk-informed approach, the U.S. continues to strengthen its nuclear detection architecture through layered, defense-in-depth detection countermeasures that balance border security with enhanced detection countermeasures for interior law enforcement.
Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness and Response
/THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
___________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release
FACT SHEET
Joint Statement on Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness and Response Capabilities
A nuclear terrorism event anywhere in the world would have devastating human, environmental, economic, and political consequences. Building on the nuclear and radiological material security accomplishments achieved through the Nuclear Security Summit process, the Joint Statement on Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness and Response Capabilities highlights the need for enhanced capabilities to further reduce the risks posed by nuclear terrorism. Nuclear terrorism preparedness requires a range of activities to establish, sustain, and exercise the capabilities necessary to counter and respond to nuclear terror incidents. Nuclear terrorism response requires a range of technical, operational, and communications capabilities to provide coordination and resolution of the incident, as well as to mitigate its consequences.
Under this Joint Statement, the United States will promote adequate national nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities at home, including by conducting domestic exercises and drills. The United States will also strengthen national interagency coordination and information-sharing.
Internationally, the United States will share relevant resources, expertise, and good practices to strengthen global nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities. Key actions include conducting nuclear incident preparedness and response exercises with international partners; granting access to plume modelling capabilities and 24/7 remote support for first responders; and participating in bilateral nuclear incident preparedness and response assistance and technical exchanges.
Additionally, the United States will support the development of Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) exercises on preparedness and response in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Americas over the next two years. We will organize a national team composed of interagency experts to participate in and support these efforts to promote regional cooperation in nuclear preparedness and response.
The United States will also promote international best practice guidance and support the International Atomic Energy’s (IAEA) new Emergency Preparedness and Response Standards Committee; share lessons learned from real world incidents through IAEA, GICNT, and in bilateral fora when appropriate; and encourage reciprocal, bilateral observation of national and international exercises as appropriate.
Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004)
/THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
______________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release
FACT SHEET
UN Security Council Resolution 1540
UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, adopted unanimously in 2004 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, establishes legally binding obligations on all States to develop and enforce appropriate and effective measures against the proliferation of nuclear weapons or material, their means of delivery and related materials. The resolution also created a UN Security Council subsidiary body, the 1540 Committee, to monitor and foster implementation of the resolution.
The Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540, sponsored by Canada, Republic of Korea and Spain, recognizes the resolution and the 1540 Committee as key players in the international legal and institutional infrastructure for strengthening global nuclear security and combating nuclear terrorism. In addition, the Joint Statement identifies ways to support the long-term efforts required to implement the resolution and the work of the 1540 Committee. The Joint Statement further emphasizes the importance of the Second Comprehensive Review of the resolution by the 1540 Committee, now underway, in helping States achieve full implementation of the resolution by 2021, including the implementation of obligations to enhance the security of nuclear materials worldwide.
As part of its commitment to the Joint Statement, the United States pledges to continued support of the resolution and the 1540 Committee, robust participation in the Second Comprehensive Review of the resolution, and the submission of regular reporting on domestic implementation of the resolution. To further meet its obligations and commitments, the United States maintains a wide range of assistance programs and outreach efforts to help others implement their UNSCR 1540 obligations.
UNSCR 1540 and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism constitute key parts of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit’s Action Plan in support of the UN, in which the United States and other Summit participating States commit to further stregthen the global nuclear security architecture by working to enhance the capacity of States to implement their UNSCR 1540 obligations. As part of this Action Plan, the United States and other Summit participants pledge to increase our efforts to enhance national implementation, coordination and cooperation, assistance, and outreach under the umbrella of UNSCR 1540. Furthermore, the United States reaffirms its commitment to full implementation of the resolution as part of the Summit’s Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540.
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