Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on Cyber Security

THE WHITE HOUSE 

Office of the Press Secretary

___________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release

FACT SHEET 

Cyber Security of Industrial Control and Plant Systems at Nuclear Facilities

Nuclear facilities deploy a myriad of technologies and digital assets as an essential component of well-balanced safety, security and safeguards programs.  The use of digital technologies has greatly improved the efficiency and effectiveness of  industrial control systems, but it is crucial that these systems are able to withstand malicious attacks or accidental damage.  On-going efforts to mitigate the vulnerabilities of information management systems need to extend to industrial control systems.  

The United Kingdom has sponsored a Gift Basket on Cyber Security of Industrial Control and Plant Systems and Nuclear Facilities to increase attention in this area.  As called for in this statement, the United States will participate in the two international workshops on this topic and highlight the findings at the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) International Conference on Nuclear Security in December 2016.  The United States will also continue to work with willing partners to develop and implement policies that address the dynamic and global nature of the cyber threat, so as to enable risk informed decisions about how to protect strategic national assets.  This will include a joint U.S.-UK civil nuclear exercise, building on the successful Resilient Shield exercise held last November between the and U.S. and UK financial sectors, designed to test government and industry response to cybersecurity threats.

These efforts complement our efforts to promote broad international affirmation of voluntary norms of responsible state behavior in peacetime, including that states should not conduct or knowingly support online activity that intentionally damages critical infrastructure or otherwise impairs the use of critical infrastructure to provide services to the public.

Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on Maritime Supply Chain Security

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

___________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                       

FACT SHEET

Securing the Maritime Supply Chain

Countering the threat of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological material requires coordination across agencies a multi-layered defense that includes detection systems at seaports around the world.  In the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit Joint Statement on Enhancing the Security of the Maritime Supply Chain, participating Summit countries committed to enhance measures to permanently remove nuclear and radiological materials that are out of regulatory control from the global maritime supply chain.  Signatory countries followed up on that statement by developing a set of best practices and recommendations, released at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, which will guide next steps on developing solutions to this important task.

The United States is taking a number of actions to strengthen the security of the maritime supply chain, both domestically and internationally.  Specifically, the United States has equipped its own seaports and 45 seaports around the world with radiation detection systems, taking into account risk-based and layered approaches to enhancing security, while also enabling the flow of goods through the global supply chain.  These systems were installed in close cooperation with Customs officials, Port Authorities, and local port operators.  The United States also provides technical support to international partners working to build and sustain their indigenous detection capacities.  Through implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Code, the United States assesses the effectiveness of access control, cargo control and facility monitoring measures in foreign ports on a biennial basis.   

In addition, the United States has deployed personnel to 60 seaports worldwide to work hand-in-hand with host nations to identify and inspect suspect shipments.  The United States has also benefited from public-private partnerships with key industry stakeholders under which shippers voluntarily add security measures to their existing transport process.  

Joint Statement on Countering Nuclear Smuggling

2016 Statement of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling

At the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Nuclear Security Summits, participating nations agreed on Communiqués and Work Plans that included actions aimed at thwarting the illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials. The following countries recognize that identifying nuclear smugglers, detecting and recovering nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, and prosecuting those responsible are important and effective activities to help prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear or other radioactive materials: Australia, Canada, Chile, China,  the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,  France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan,  The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, The Philippines, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom, The United States of America, INTERPOL, and the United Nations.

To follow through on these pledges, participating states are committed to working together to build and sustain national capabilities to counter the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials. These efforts may include:

1.     Designating a national team or task force to link law enforcement, intelligence, technical experts, and other relevant authorities to investigate nuclear trafficking networks and incidents;

2.     Developing plans that clearly outline individual agency roles and responsibilities when responding to incidents of material outside regulatory control;

3.     Developing a national level detection architecture as an element of a whole-of-government counter nuclear smuggling capability;

4.     Strengthening nuclear forensics capabilities to reliably analyze nuclear and other radioactive material discovered out of regulatory control;

5.     Increasing legal training for prosecutors to ensure conviction of smugglers, as appropriate;

6.     Developing laws, regulations, guidance and/or policies to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material;

7.     Strengthening bilateral, multilateral, and international information sharing and other cooperation, such as training and education, best practices exchanges, and exercises;

8.     Sharing applicable lead information through INTERPOL and acting on lead information received as an effective mechanism for identifying nuclear smuggling networks in a timely manner and to enhance cooperation;

9.     Sharing information on incidents involving nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control through the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Incident and Trafficking Database.

Joint Statement on Cyber Security

2016: Gift Basket on cyber security of industrial control and plant systems at nuclear facilities 

Subscribed by: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the United Nations.

Introduction

The States listed above commit to ensure adequate cyber security at industrial control and plant systems at nuclear facilities.  These control systems are often used within safeguards, security, and safety systems.  Increased attention in this area will assist States, nuclear operators and the supply chain to continue to strengthen the resilience of these systems, protecting them from potential malicious attack or accidental damage.

To date, work has mainly focused on mitigating the vulnerabilities of enterprise systems used to manage information and data within nuclear facilities and supply chains.  This work needs to extend to industrial control systems.

Nuclear facilities benefit from robust safety mechanisms which have been strengthened and developed over several decades.  In addition to physical, logical, and human based controls, there has been an increase in the use of information technology to form part of the safety and security aspects of plant control systems, as well as nuclear material accountancy and control.  More information on the use of information technology and the associated threats and vulnerabilities in this context is needed to inform continuous security improvements.

The Initiative

The States listed above agree, as resources permit, to participate in two international workshops on this topic in 2016.  These workshops will enable States and their nuclear sectors to share good practice in managing risks to industrial control systems in nuclear sites, as well as examine the impact of using information technology in managing safety and security aspects of plant control systems.

These workshops will focus on areas including:

• Threats and vulnerabilities, through considering case studies of recent incidents;
• Potential or known incidents which can impact on control systems, through an interactive approach;
• Technical and management challenges of managing risksto legacy systems;
• Technical and management challenges of assuring new build nuclear and supply chains
• Incident response and recovery.
• Managing public/media expectation in light of an incident.

Outcomes and Next Steps

The States listed above propose to present the findings of this work at the Ministerial segment of the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security, in Vienna in December 2016 to contribute to IAEA efforts to increase cyber security at nuclear facilities, building on the IAEA International Conference on Computer Security in a Nuclear World held in June 2015. 

Joint Statement on Maritime Supply Chain Security

2016 Nuclear Security Summit

Maritime Supply Chain Security Joint Statement 

Over the past decade, many countries have deployed radiation detection systems at their seaports as a key component of their national approach to combating nuclear and radiological smuggling.  These systems have detected numerous nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control (MORC) - some that pose security risks and others that just pose risks to public health and safety, or are of regulatory concern(e.g. contaminated goods and orphan sources).  Due to the complexity of the maritime system and the many stakeholders involved, it is clear that national, regional and international coordination in both the public and private sector is needed to secure this vector and enable the permanent removal of these materials from the maritime supply chain. 

With this in mind, 15 countries, nine international organizations, three terminal operators, and several academic representatives participated in a workshop from 16-18 November 2015, co-sponsored by the United States and the United Kingdom, focused on promoting radiation detection in the maritime supply chain and developing enhanced measures to permanently remove materials found out of regulatory control.  This workshop was in fulfillment of a commitment made at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in a joint statement on maritime supply chain security.  Workshop participants acknowledged that detection systems are an important tool in a nation’s approach to locating and securing MORC and identified a set of best practices and recommendations. 

Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Georgia, Israel, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States endorse the following best practices and recommendations identified at the November 2015 workshop.

Best Practices

Nations with detection programs have agreed to continue to share technical advice, lessons learned and best practices with one another and with those nations seeking to implement and sustain detection systems.  Specific examples of best practices include:

1. Plan for long-term sustainability of systems early in the process of developing and deploying radiation detection programs; 
2. Establish a comprehensive "end-to-end" regulatory framework that provides the necessary framework and authorities to all stakeholders involved in the detection, notification and response to materials found out of regulatory control;
3. Implement and institutionalize regular training and adaptive exercises that address evolving threats, operational challenges and security strategies of detection systems to verify that roles and responsibilities are clearly understood and that all relevant stakeholders maintain a state of readiness;
4. Take appropriate national-level measures at the material’s origin, in accordance with the IAEA Code of Conduct on Radioactive Sources, to ensure that radiological materials are controlled at the point of origin and prevented from entering the maritime supply chain.
5. Take appropriate measures to ensure that detected nuclear other radioactive materials are placed back under control in either the country responsible for the detection eventor the country of material origin, as appropriate; and
6. Report incidents involving MORC to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) in a timely manner and seek other formal and informal mechanisms to share information on detections, trends, and challenges in addressing MORC with regional and international partners.

Recommendations:

1. Seek opportunities and mechanisms to enhance communication between public and private stakeholders regarding the responsibilities and obligations associated with the removal of MORC from the maritime supply chain and to ensure feedback mechanisms for all parties in the ultimate resolution of MORC cases, as appropriate;Develop technical and operational solutions to reduce alarms from innocent, naturally occurring radioactive material (“NORM”) to protect commerce and to focus resources on detecting materials of concern;
2. Request that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continue to study technical and operational issues related to detection operations through cooperative research projects and other mechanisms as appropriate;
3. Request that INTERPOL continue and enhance current efforts to ensure that threat information flows from law enforcement to front line officers (i.e. Customs and Border Protection) involved in detection operations;
4. Request that the World Customs Organization (WCO) expand its efforts to deploy a common communication platform between customs organisations, which could be leveraged to facilitate timely information sharing in member states on detections, trends and challenges in addressing MORC; and
5. Investigate whether the WCO or other appropriate organisations could expand their efforts to facilitate information sharing that goes beyond customs organisations to regulators or other applicable organisations in order to allow all those organisations involved in the detection and removal of MORC to share timely information, ensure that material is permanently removed from the supply chain and correctly disposed of. 

The United States and the United Kingdom will document and share these and other best practices and recommendations with the international community. 

Joint Statement on Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness and Response

Joint Statement on Supporting Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism

Preparedness and Response Capabilities 

Subscribed by Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the United Nations and INTERPOL.

A nuclear terror event anywhere in the world would have devastating human, environmental, economic, and political consequences. Building on the Summit’s nuclear terrorism prevention and nuclear and radiological material security accomplishments and efforts, wethe Parties to this statement recognize the need for ensuring adequate nuclear emergency preparedness and response capabilities.  Such capabilities contribute tofurther reducing not onlythe risks posed by nuclear or radiological terrorism (hereafter, “nuclear terrorism”), but also the risks posed by other malicious activities or accidents involving nuclear or radiological materials and facilities.Ensuring preparedness in National capabilities to counter and respond to nuclear terror acts is a critical task for all Nations, as exemplified by the Scenario-Based Policy Discussions successfully completed by participating nations as part ofthe 2016 Summit.  Nuclear terrorism preparedness requires a range of activities to establish,enhance, sustain, and exercise the capabilities necessary to counter and respond to nuclear terror incidents. Nuclear terrorism response requires a range of technical, operational, and communications capabilities toprovide coordination and resolution of the incident, as well as mitigatingits consequences.

Consistent with the Nuclear Security Summit goal of reducing the threat posed by nuclear terrorism and furthering the 2014 Hague Summit Communique pledge to “maintain effective emergency preparedness, response, and mitigation capabilities,”we the parties to this statementrecognize that ensuring adequate nuclear terrorismpreparedness and response capabilities complements international nuclear security efforts.  We also recognize that adequate nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities contribute to strengthening the interface between nuclear safety and security, and serve as a potential deterrent to attack.

Nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities include the following capabilities:

• National policies and plans:Establish and maintainadequate National response plans and policies regarding preparedness, response, and mitigation of incidents and threats of nuclear terrorism, including guidance forlocalplanning in responding to such threats and incidents.
• Technical expertise and capabilities:Identify, confirm, assess, and respond to nuclear terror incidentsand threats, including radiological characterization and assessments to inform protective actions, emergency medical training and response support, and decontamination tools and training.
• Public communications and education: Develop and maintainstrategic communications and effective public messaging providing not only public safety awareness and emergency readiness in the event of a nuclear terror incident but also mechanisms and procedures for ensuring prompt dissemination of public safety information to potentially affected communities.
• Sustainment of capabilities:  Sustain necessary capabilities through continuing education, training, and exercises involving National and local officials and multinational partners charged with nuclear terrorism preparedness, response, or associated decision-making.
• International coordination and assistance mechanisms: Per the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and other relevant international legal instruments, and considering multilateral mechanisms and initiatives such as offered by the United Nations (UN), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), INTERPOL, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,establish mechanisms for requesting and/or providing (as appropriate):
  • Nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capacity building, 
  • As required, post-event mutualassistance offered by the State Partiesof the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency,
  • Government-to-Government coordination and communication in the event of nuclear terrorism.

Recognizing that an act of nuclear terrorism anywhere in the world would have global impacts affecting all Nations, wethe parties to this statement affirm ourwillingnessto cooperate to strengthen National and international nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities.  We agree on the following commitments in support of this objective:

• Ensure adequate National nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities at home.  We the parties to this statement reaffirm our National commitment to establish and maintain the National-level capabilities required for nuclear terrorism preparedness and response.We also commit to conductcomprehensivenuclear terrorism preparedness and response drills, incorporating roles and responsibilities at the National and local levels to foster strong interagency cooperation across law enforcement, medical, technical/scientific, and policy agencies.  We commit to strengthen our National interagency coordination, cooperation, and information-sharing mechanisms needed in this regard, to support whole-of-government crisis response.
• Support sharing relevant resources, expertise, and good practices, in order to strengthen global nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities, including relevant post-event mutual assistance.  Consistent with our respectiveinternational legal obligations,we the parties to this statementagree in principle to support--at the bilateral level, upon request--relevant expertise, training, or other related resources supporting nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilitieswith interested states, as well as offer relevant post-event mutual assistanceincluding through the IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET). We recognize that requests for bilateral assistance must be evaluated by the States involved on a case by case basis and would be subject to availability of resources, legal considerations, and other concerns.  However, we the parties to this statement recognize the importance of supporting nuclear terrorismpreparedness and response capacities and thus encourage bilateral and multilateral dialogue and coordination on how best to assure adequate global preparedness and response capabilities.As such, we also commit to making available relevant expertise or experience via international and multilateral effortsas the UN, IAEA, INTERPOL, GICNT, and the GP.  National Points of Contact will be provided, in addition to IAEA, INTERPOL, GICNT, and GP points of contact,to support the coordination and evaluation of requests and offers of assistance.
• Support for international best practice guidance on preparedness and resilience objectives and the specific capabilities needed to meet them, as published by the organizations listed above,including the IAEA Nuclear Security Series 15 - Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, the IAEA Safety Series GSR Part 7 on Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism’s Fundamentals for Establishing and Maintaining a Nuclear Security Response Framework ,which build on the aforementioned core competencies We the parties to this statement recognize these documents as an excellent foundation for States wishing to establish or sustain baseline nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities, and actively support the broadest possible international application and use of these documents.
• Share lessons learned from real world incidents (i.e., nuclear and radiological incidents, materials out of regulatory control, significant all hazards-related emergency response efforts, etc.) that have implications for or applications to nuclear terrorism preparedness, response, and mitigation, in order to incorporate this experience into Preparedness and Response capabilities nationally and internationally.
• Encourage and support National and State/local-level full field and table-top exercises aimed at ensuring nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities.  As appropriate, participating countries to the exercises will encourage reciprocal, bilateral observation of National and transborder exercises, with a view towards sharing good practices in sustaining preparedness and response capabilities, while ensuring confidentiality of sensitive information.We the parties to this statementcommit, as far as resources permit, to host, observe, or support the development and implementation of radiological emergency management exercises (REMEX) under the GICNT’s Response and Mitigation Working Group.  REMEXs emphasize the importance of international cooperation in preparedness and resilience by providing the opportunity for two or more governments to collaboratively exercise response capabilities for nuclear terrorism with bilateral or multilateral scenarios.  REMEXs also provide a venue for sharing the good practices and lessons learned from other national and State/local-level exercises encouraged under this gift basket.  

Joint Statement on Nuclear Training and Support Centres

Joint statement on

Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres / Centres of Excellence 

Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, Vietnam, INTERPOL and the United Nations

Italy hosted the 2014 Gift Basket on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres/Centres of Excellence (NSSC/CoE) following the 2012 Gift Basket hosted by the United States.  The 2014 Gift Basket attracted a large number of co-sponsoring Summit participants promoting the importance of nuclear security training and support centres, and the value of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres Network (NSSC Network) in strengthening international and regional cooperation and collaboration.  Now that the IAEA NSSC Network is maturing and a number of nuclear security training and support centers are being established, these centres can play an increasingly important and active role in promoting nuclear security.  These centres help meet domestic nuclear security needs, and can also provide an important platform for sharing resources and meeting needs on a regional basis, thus strengthening and sustaining the global nuclear security architecture.

In support of the IAEA NSSC Network and nuclear security training and support centre sustainability, the participants to the 2016 Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres / Centres of Excellence Gift Basket intend, within available resources, to support the following activities.

Strengthening of the IAEA NSSC Network

•    Nuclear security training and support centres not yet a member of the IAEA NSSC Network commit to join the Network and make every effort to take part in the IAEA NSSC Network activities, including meetings.

Establishment of regional networks

•    Building upon the establishment of the Asia Regional Network through the IAEA NSSC Network, establish additional networks with nuclear security training and support centres in the same region and mechanisms of regional coordination to promote best practices, exchange training experiences, share curricula and other activities on a regional basis. 

•    In collaboration with the IAEA NSSC network, share experiences in training with centres outside their region.

Strengthening nuclear security training and technical support programmes

•    Improve the quality of training by conducting peer review exchanges with other nuclear security training and support centres and by making use of the IAEA NSSC Network as a mechanism to promote peer-review exchanges.

•    Use IAEA material/guidance as a mechanism to achieve consistency in the technical content of the training programmes on nuclear security and participate in IAEA Train-the-Trainer activities to build a network of instructors qualified to deliver IAEA training course materials. 

•    Organize and be active participants in the development and running of nuclear and radiological security scenarios and exercises.

•    Share experiences and nuclear security training with other training centres and centres of excellence, as appropriate, as well as lessons learned through the IAEA NSSC network and IAEA Nuclear Security Information Portal (NUSEC).

•    Use IAEA material/guidance to support training programmes in key technical topics such as nuclear security culture, nuclear material accounting and control, computer security, transportation security, and insider threat mitigation. 

•    As appropriate, consider certification of nuclear security training and support centre training programmes, as per ISO 29990 and/or utilize applicable ISO best practices to support continuous improvement.
  
•    Collaborate with the Global Partnership’s Centre of Excellence Sub-working Group to implement this Gift Basket as noted in the Global Partnership Nuclear Security Summit Action Plan.

Sustainability

•    Focus attention on and build mechanisms to ensure the sustainability of nuclear security training and support centres, including developing business plans and e-learning tools, conducting needs analysis and regular evaluation of effectiveness, and identifying required financial, administrative and human resources.

•    Provide training, technical and scientific support to competent authorities to strengthen long-term sustainability of domestic nuclear and radiological security regimes. 

•    Broaden and strengthen international cooperation with the United Nations, especially United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540-related efforts, with INTERPOL, the Global Partnership, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and others.

Cooperation

•    Collaborate with educational institutions that teach nuclear security subjects to include nuclear security culture. Continue, improve, and expand the NSSC Network’s collaboration with the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN).

•    Cooperate in the area of research and development with national and international institutes to promote scientific advancements in nuclear security and continuous engagement of the scientific communities.

•    Engage industry and civil society through constant dialogue on the importance of nuclear security.

•    Promote public confidence in nuclear and radiological security.

National Progress Report: United States of America

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, the United States has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by…

…Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

• The United States provided updates on security of military material and measures to secure other nuclear materials through United Nations National Security Council (UNSCR) 1540 reporting processes on March 23, 2016.
• The United States assessed and verified through inspection activities that operating nuclear power plants are implementing cyber security regulatory requirements in accordance with their cyber security plans.  In addition, the program is designed to identify lessons learned throughout the process and implement improvements as needed.*
• The United States is conducting rulemaking for civilian fuel cycle as well as research and test reactor security, to translate case-by-case exceptions into a generically applicable rule.  Activities have begun to incorporate the material attractiveness concept into rulemaking to make graded security regulations more informed by risk.
• The United States has worked to mitigate the risks associated with malicious insiders at nuclear facilities and is helping develop or enhance human reliability programs in 24 countries.
• The United States hosted the following P-3, expert-level security information exchanges:

1.       In 2014, to discuss an “enterprise approach” to vulnerability assessments and including peer review of the Y-12 Security Complex vulnerability assessment.*

2.       In 2014, on transportation security best practices, held at Sandia National Laboratory.*

3.       In 2015, to discuss security challenges with unmanned aerial vehicles at nuclear sites and exchanging best practices and lessons learned.* 

• The United States conducted more than 300 nuclear and radiological security workshops and 12 weapons of mass destruction (WMD) counterterrorism tabletop exercises with key international partners, strengthening nuclear security culture and enhancing capabilities related to physical protection, insider threat, transportation security, guard and response force activities, emergency response, crisis coordination, and computer security.*
• Consistent with the 2014 Gift Basket on Radiological Security, operators/managers of 82% of buildings containing Category 1 sources have volunteered to institute additional best practices published by the NRC.*
• United States instituted a Memorandum of Understanding among U.S. agencies to enhance cooperation on radioactive materials transportation security.
• The United States has recovered over 51,000 U.S.-origin sources (over 1.1 million curies) domestically, including 12,958 sources since March, 2014, and repatriated over 2,900 (over 63,000 curies) U.S.-origin sources, including 367 sources since March, 2014. *
• Working with our international partners, the United States has enhanced radiological security at 115 buildings in 34 countries since March 2014.*
• The United States is conducting a “lessons learned” project for drills based on hostile action to share with stakeholders and make publically available to facilitate enhancing nuclear power plant emergency response in the unlikely event of a hostile action.*
• The United States is conducting an assessment of the effectiveness of physical security requirements for radioactive materials which includes an internal and external review, baselining against international standards, and outreach to stakeholders.*
• The United States will provide international partners specialized training for radiation emergency responder operations for nuclear security at major public events and support partners operations during events. *

…Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

• The United States disposed of five metric tons of weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) domestically, bringing the total to more than 150 metric tons of material surplus to the U.S. nuclear weapons program that has been dispositioned.*
• The United States has decreased its national inventory of HEU from 740.7 metric tons in 1996 to 585.6 metric tons in 2013, a decrease of more than 20%. 
• The United States, working with other countries, removed or confirmed the disposition of more than 250 kilograms of nuclear material, resulting in three additional countries becoming HEU-free.  This was enabled by the use of modified casks for unique fuel designs.*The United States supported the downblending of 780 kg of excess weapons-usable non-U.S. HEU.*
• Consistent with its national security requirements and in recognition of the international benefits to minimizing the use of HEU globally, the United States continues to investigate the viability of using low enriched uranium (LEU) in naval reactor cores.  The United States concluded that the potential exists to develop an advanced fuel system that could increase uranium loading beyond what is practical today while meeting the rigorous performance requirements for naval reactors. 
• The United States ensures that inventories of HEU allocated for use in manufacturing naval reactor cores are based on clearly defined U.S. Navy requirements.
• The United States established a pilot production line for high-density LEU fuel to support the conversion of the remaining high performance research reactors in the United States and abroad from the use of HEU fuel.
• The United States makes LEU available, through lease contracts, for irradiation for the domestic production of Mo-99 for medical uses.*
• The United States remains fully committed to the U.S.-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, and to meeting its obligation to verifiably dispose of no less than 34 metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium under the agreement, and to cooperate with Russia in these undertakings.
• The United States participates in experts’ group exchanges to explore HEU minimization efforts and plutonium management.*
• The United States, in partnership with France, established an International Ad Hoc Working Group on Alternatives to High-Activity Radiological Sources.
• The United States will demonstrate commercial capability to produce the medical isotope molybdenum-99 in the United States using non-HEU technologies in 2016.
• The United States will continue to develop initiatives for reducing the number of vulnerable high activity radioactive sources through continued research and development on non-radioisotopic alternative technologies, international workshops and collaboration, and direct site engagement.*
• In an effort to promote permanent risk reduction, the United States will partner with industry to replace 34 cesium-137 blood irradiators with non-radioisotopic alternative technologies by 2020.
• Consistent with legislation, the United States will consider initiating a program of work to develop LEU fuel for use in naval reactor cores.

…Countering Nuclear Smuggling

• The United States supports the expansion and acceleration of international capabilities to arrest nuclear smugglers, seize illicit nuclear material, investigate illicit nuclear trafficking, and effectively prosecute perpetrators.
• The United States’ Nuclear Forensics Public Affairs Guide is available as a model of how to organize and coordinate national efforts to communicate nuclear forensics information with the public in an effective and timely manner.
• The United States’ National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program continued to transfer knowledge to the next generation and sustain nuclear expertise, facilitating the hiring of an additional 17 Ph.D. scientists into the nuclear forensics workforce and exceeding the program goal with a total of 41 new scientists added since 2008. 
• The United States strengthened its domestic nuclear detection architecture by training over 7,500 state and local first responders and law enforcement officials in nuclear detection operations and conducting over 300 exercises, assessments, and deployments to enhance federal, state, local and tribal agencies' readiness to combat nuclear terrorism.*
• The United States has executed over 120 comprehensive evaluations and demonstrations of new technologies to enhance capabilities to detect and identify nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control.
• The United States developed a library of technical guides on installing, operating, and maintaining radiation detection systems. 
• Since March 2014, the United States provided 58 reports on domestic detection events involving material outside of regulatory control to the IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database program.
• The United States worked bilaterally through Countering Nuclear Smuggling Joint Action Plans with 14 international partners to strengthen capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear and radioactive material smuggling.*
• The United States strengthened the capability of partners in 55 key countries by conducting over 310 training courses, workshops, and field training exercises in radiation detection system operation and response since March 2014.*
• The United States worked bilaterally with 45 countries to assess and implement improvements in the operation of radiation detection systems deployed to counter nuclear smuggling.*
• The United States equipped 49 fixed sites worldwide with radiation detection systems, deployed 44 mobile and man-portable radiation detection systems to 24 countries, and transitioned another 106 radiation detection systems to partner country responsibility since the end of March 2014.  The United States also enhanced the capability of seven partners to deter, detect, and interdict attempts to traffic WMD and related materials across unstable or threatened land borders by providing equipment, training, and sustainment capabilities.  *
• The United States equipped eight additional international partners with radiation detection systems, which can be deployed in mobile, boat or aerial platforms to search, locate, identify and/or characterize nuclear material.*
• The United States strengthened the maritime domain awareness capabilities of five partners to prevent the proliferation of WMD materials through and near their national waters through provision of equipment, training, command and control centers, and vessel sustainment facilities.
• The United States conducted 17 training courses with key international partners, designed to strengthen global capabilities for identifying, characterizing, interdicting and responding to incidents involving nuclear or radiological material which bolsters nations’ overall response capabilities and contribute to the integration of nuclear safety and nuclear security.*
• The United States has developed six new Certified Reference Materials, along with the UK, France and Sweden, for use by the international community to support accurate and legally defensible forensic analyses of nuclear and other radioactive materials.  Eleven additional reference materials are currently in progress.*
• The United States facilitated a second multilateral exercise on national nuclear forensics libraries with more than 186 experts from 28 countries and three international organizations (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), INTERPOL, and European Commission).*
• The United States will provide assistance to countries contending with a threat of nuclear terrorism and encourages such requests.* 
• The United States will accept and process official queries of its National Nuclear Forensics Library through its National Point-of-Contact to determine whether nuclear or other radioactive material outside of regulatory control may have originated in the U.S.*
• The United States plans to initiate work in North Africa to reduce the threat of non-state actor acquisition or proliferation of WMD and related materials across unstable borders.*
• The United States will develop and implement an expert testimony training program for nuclear forensic scientists to develop good practices for how to describe nuclear forensics conclusions in judicial proceedings and convey highly technical results to a non-technical audience.*
• The United States will convene a third multilateral exercise on national nuclear forensics libraries.*

…Supporting Multilateral Instruments

• The United States deposited instruments of ratification for the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM/A) on July 31, 2015 and International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism on September 30, 2015.
• The United States deposited instruments of ratification for the 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation on August 28, 2015. 
• The United States is carrying out joint R&D with Sweden on the characterization of top priority Certified Reference Materials.*
• The United States will provide an updated report to the IAEA, in accordance with Article 14.1 of the CPPNM/A, within two months after its entry into force.

…Collaborating with International Organizations

• The United States contributed an additional $17.5M to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund in 2014 and $13M in 2015 and expects to provide similar support in 2016 and beyond.*
• The United States collaborated with the IAEA in conducting 12 training courses designed to strengthen global capabilities for identifying, characterizing, interdicting and responding to incidents involving nuclear or radiological material; medical management of radiation injuries; and managing the consequences resulting from a release of such material.*
• The United States provided continued support, review, and participation toward the development and revision of IAEA Nuclear Security Series guidance documents to include active participation in the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance Committee. *
• The United States provides financial, technical and human resources to the IAEA’s efforts relating to nuclear material accounting and control, mitigation of insider threats, cyber security, physical protection, transportation security, nuclear security culture, securing nuclear materials out of regulatory control, sustainability of nuclear security system, identifying unique technical solutions to nuclear forensics issues, and developing non-isotopic technologies to radiological sources.
• The United States, through the IAEA Contact Experts’ Group, collaborated with international partners on secure shipments of four highly enriched spent nuclear submarine cores within Russia for more secure storage or down blending.
• The United States is supporting the strengthening of the IAEA Division of Nuclear Security through development of eLearning modules to expand and sustain nuclear security training efforts.*
• The United States funds international organizations that contribute to the objectives of the Nuclear Security Summit, including Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540, INTERPOL, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), Global Partnership, UNODC, UNODA, and other relevant organizations and initiatives.
• The United States supports the 1540 Committee’s effort to increase global implementation of the resolution through submitting a report on U.S. Effective Practices on UNSCR 1540 Implementation in 2014, continuing to strengthen its measures to implement the resolution, as described in its 2015 submission of an updated matrix of all U.S. actions to implement fully UNSCR 1540, and integrating UNSCR 1540 into U.S. assistance programs and its work with international organizations.* 
• The United States has continued to provide both funding and the provision of subject matter experts to support INTERPOL’s Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit and its events, noting its central role in providing investigative support and coordinating law enforcement aspects of addressing criminal and terrorist offences involving nuclear or other radioactive materials. 
• The United States continued to co-chair the GICNT with Russia, which builds partner capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to acts of nuclear terrorism.
• The United States continued to collaborate with partners under the Global Partnership on projects and other activities for securing nuclear and radiological materials, contributing to the objectives of the Nuclear Security Summit.
• The United States will continue to provide technical, financial, and subject matter expert support to the IAEA and other international organizations, including activities supporting the Action Plans endorsed at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit.
• The United States will continue to partner with states on nuclear security training courses, engage Centers of Excellence and Nuclear Security Support Centers, support cyber security efforts and training as it relates to nuclear security, and work to exchange and develop best practices related to the physical protection of high activity radioactive sources, as well as assist other than high income countries to upgrade physical protection systems at facilities with materials of concern.*

…Partnering with External Stakeholders

• The United States supported World Institute for Nuclear Security-led best practices workshops on security exercises on insider threat identification and mitigation, effective integration of cyber security and physical protection, and nuclear material control and accountancy.*
• The United States supported development of World Institute for Nuclear Security guides on Developing a Security Strategy for Armed Response, Crisis Management and Decision Making, National-Level Material Accounting and Tracking, Managing Internal Threats, Security Exercises, Security of IT and IC Systems at Nuclear Facilities, and Data Analytics for Nuclear Security.*
• The United States worked with international manufacturers of high-activity sealed source devices to perform voluntary assessments of the vulnerability to source theft.*
• The United States shares information bilaterally on actual nuclear forensic investigations and publishes the results of new techniques and methodologies applicable to nuclear forensic science.*