Fact Sheet: Update on Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation (INFCIRC 869)

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THE WHITE HOUSE 

Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release                        

FACT SHEET

Update on INFCIRC 869

On October 9, 2014, the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, on behalf of its Government and 34 other countries (full list below), conveyed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Secretariat the “Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation” from the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and requested that it be circulated to all IAEA Member States.  The subscribing states pledged to take specific steps, including implementing key IAEA nuclear security guidance, accepting voluntary peer reviews, and committing that those responsible for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.  The Dutch note verbale  encouraged all States to meet the intent of these essential elements of a nuclear security regime and to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the principles therein.  The IAEA has circulated the 2014 Joint Statement as INFCIRC/869, to which all IAEA Member States could ascribe.

On November 13, 2015, Jordan pledged its commitment to the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, as contained in INFCIRC/869.  Jordan is the 36th IAEA member state to subscribe to the statement, and the first to do so outside the Summit process.

The United States continues to encourage all IAEA member states to indicate their commitment to implement the provisions of INFCIRC/869, noting that such public commitments provide public assurances that nuclear materials are effectively secured and underscore support for the IAEA and its nuclear security efforts.

Full List of Subscribers

Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Vietnam.

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Joint Statement on Countering Nuclear Smuggling

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2016 Statement of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling

At the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Nuclear Security Summits, participating nations agreed on Communiqués and Work Plans that included actions aimed at thwarting the illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials. The following countries recognize that identifying nuclear smugglers, detecting and recovering nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, and prosecuting those responsible are important and effective activities to help prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear or other radioactive materials: Australia, Canada, Chile, China,  the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,  France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan,  The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, The Philippines, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom, The United States of America, INTERPOL, and the United Nations.

To follow through on these pledges, participating states are committed to working together to build and sustain national capabilities to counter the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials. These efforts may include:

1.     Designating a national team or task force to link law enforcement, intelligence, technical experts, and other relevant authorities to investigate nuclear trafficking networks and incidents;

2.     Developing plans that clearly outline individual agency roles and responsibilities when responding to incidents of material outside regulatory control;

3.     Developing a national level detection architecture as an element of a whole-of-government counter nuclear smuggling capability;

4.     Strengthening nuclear forensics capabilities to reliably analyze nuclear and other radioactive material discovered out of regulatory control;

5.     Increasing legal training for prosecutors to ensure conviction of smugglers, as appropriate;

6.     Developing laws, regulations, guidance and/or policies to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material;

7.     Strengthening bilateral, multilateral, and international information sharing and other cooperation, such as training and education, best practices exchanges, and exercises;

8.     Sharing applicable lead information through INTERPOL and acting on lead information received as an effective mechanism for identifying nuclear smuggling networks in a timely manner and to enhance cooperation;

9.     Sharing information on incidents involving nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control through the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Incident and Trafficking Database.

 

Joint Statement on Cyber Security

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2016: Gift Basket on cyber security of industrial control and plant systems at nuclear facilities 

Subscribed by: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the United Nations.

Introduction

The States listed above commit to ensure adequate cyber security at industrial control and plant systems at nuclear facilities.  These control systems are often used within safeguards, security, and safety systems.  Increased attention in this area will assist States, nuclear operators and the supply chain to continue to strengthen the resilience of these systems, protecting them from potential malicious attack or accidental damage.

To date, work has mainly focused on mitigating the vulnerabilities of enterprise systems used to manage information and data within nuclear facilities and supply chains.  This work needs to extend to industrial control systems.

Nuclear facilities benefit from robust safety mechanisms which have been strengthened and developed over several decades.  In addition to physical, logical, and human based controls, there has been an increase in the use of information technology to form part of the safety and security aspects of plant control systems, as well as nuclear material accountancy and control.  More information on the use of information technology and the associated threats and vulnerabilities in this context is needed to inform continuous security improvements.

The Initiative

The States listed above agree, as resources permit, to participate in two international workshops on this topic in 2016.  These workshops will enable States and their nuclear sectors to share good practice in managing risks to industrial control systems in nuclear sites, as well as examine the impact of using information technology in managing safety and security aspects of plant control systems.

These workshops will focus on areas including:

  • Threats and vulnerabilities, through considering case studies of recent incidents;
  • Potential or known incidents which can impact on control systems, through an interactive approach;
  • Technical and management challenges of managing risksto legacy systems;
  • Technical and management challenges of assuring new build nuclear and supply chains
  • Incident response and recovery.
  • Managing public/media expectation in light of an incident.

Outcomes and Next Steps

The States listed above propose to present the findings of this work at the Ministerial segment of the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security, in Vienna in December 2016 to contribute to IAEA efforts to increase cyber security at nuclear facilities, building on the IAEA International Conference on Computer Security in a Nuclear World held in June 2015. 

Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004)

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Joint Statement on

Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Recognizing that United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 (hereinafter “1540 Committee”) are key parts of the international legal architecture for States to prevent and combat nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the full implementation of UNSCR 1540 is a long-term endeavour that requires both political and technical action at national, sub-regional, regional and international levels.

Recalling the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and Work Plan, the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, and the follow-up Resolutions of UNSCR 1540, particularly UNSCR 1977 (2011), which underscored the important role of UNSCR 1540 in strengthening global nuclear security and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the 1540 Committee will be completing  its second Comprehensive Review in 2016 on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540, as set forth by UNSCR 1977 (2011). This Review provides an opportunity for the 1540 Committee to take stock of national and international progress in implementing UNSCR 1540 since the previous Comprehensive Review in 2009, and to put forward key findings and recommendations that will contribute to more effective implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Welcoming the contributions of States for updating and submitting reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 with the view of the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Reaffirming our commitment to the Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 delivered at the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit.

Noting that since the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, co-signatories have advanced national efforts to further the implementation of UNSCR 1540 by providing support for the 1540 Committee’s main areas of work, including, inter alia: monitoring implementation of the Resolution; providing capacity building assistance at the technical level to requesting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations; preparing and submitting UNSCR 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; organizing or supporting regional and sub-regional training seminars, exercises and initiatives; convening workshops to help facilitate the implementation of UNSCR 1540 into national legislation; conducting outreach to stakeholders in industry, civil society and academia; and strengthening cooperation with regional organizations such as the African Union, ASEAN, the Caribbean Community, and the European Union.

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We, the Governments of Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, with the support of the United Nations, the European Union and INTERPOL, reaffirm our commitment to the full and universal implementation of UNSCR 1540, including the implementation of obligations to enhance the security of nuclear materials worldwide in line with the objectives of the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and institutional Action Plans. We reiterate our support for the activities of the 1540 Committee and the Group of Experts. We also reaffirm our commitment to fully implement UNSCR 1540 in our respective States, in areas where we have not already done so, and further undertake to:

1.       Work with and provide information to the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts for the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

2.       Consider providing additional support and assistance in fulfilling the Action Plan in support of the United Nations, particularly actions aimed at facilitating national and regional implementation of UNSCR 1540 and its nuclear security obligations, with a view to helping requesting States to fully implement UNSCR 1540 by 2021, as referenced in the UNSC Presidential Statement of 7 May 2014;

3.       Encourage states to submit reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 on a regular basis, and focussing outreach on states yet to submit a first report to the 1540 Committee;

4.       Advocate for international, regional, and sub-regional organizations that have not yet done so to designate a Point of Contact (PoC) or coordinator on the implementation of UNSCR 1540 in order to facilitate regional approaches to assisting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations and enhance coordination for their UNSCR 1540 implementation efforts;

5.       Consider providing funding, where feasible, to organizations requesting for supporting their PoCs or coordinators for the implementation UNSCR 1540;

6.       Enhance coordination through outreach events with a wide range of domestic stakeholders such as industry, parliamentarians, civil society and academia, and develop appropriate ways to inform these stakeholders of their obligations pursuant to domestic laws relating to the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

7.       Consider organizing joint exercises at the national, regional or international levels that demonstrate ways of reinforcing national and regional capacities and international cooperation for better implementation of UNSCR 1540, and encourage the participation of relevant international organizations and initiatives;

8.       Advocate for the 1540 Committee to continue to strengthen cooperation with other relevant international organizations and initiatives, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, other United Nations entities, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership), as well as regional and sub-regional organizations in promoting the implementation of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit institutional Action Plans;

9.       Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to enhance their cooperation with other relevant entities in the United Nations system, such as the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)- and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), including through strengthening the legal framework to prohibit illicit activities, export controls, border security, and other measures that support obligations under UNSCR 1540, and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate through joint country visits to monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

10.    Consider further enhancing the cooperation between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UNSCR 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts on strengthening nuclear security, through opportunities such as: enhancing complementarity and reducing duplication, including by using Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSP) to inform voluntary 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; coordinating with the IAEA’s International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) on outreach to academia relevant to implementing UNSCR 1540 and the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC) Network on outreach to nuclear security training centers; exploring establishing a liaison between the 1540 Committee and the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security;

11.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue collaborative efforts and interactions with INTERPOL regarding assistance requests and training opportunities;

12.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue to participate in GICNT exercises, workshops and events that focus on building and enhancing nuclear forensics, detection and response capabilities;

13.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to develop strong UNSCR 1540 assistance requests that are sufficiently detailed to support responses from potential assistance providers, including through the Global Partnership. In this context, consideration should be given to strengthening the 1540 Committee’s “match-making” mechanism and coordination with assistance providers, including at the regional level, through the Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540;

14.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to address new and emerging WMD threats relevant to the obligations and recommendations of the resolution; and

15.    Advocate for increased contributions, where feasible, to the UN Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities dedicated to supporting UNSCR 1540 implementation and the work of the 1540 Committee.

Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security Architecture

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JOINT STATEMENT ON SUSTAINING ACTION TO

STRENGTHEN GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

The Nuclear Security Summit process has led to significant achievements in nuclear security at national, regional, and global levels; but the work of building a strengthened, sustained, and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture – consisting of legal instruments, international organizations and initiatives, internationally accepted guidance, and best practices – requires continuous attention.

We need sustained action and ambition on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit to address continuing and evolving nuclear security challenges, with the objectives of advancing implementation of nuclear security commitments and building a strengthened, sustainable and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture.

The Governments of Argentina, Armenia, ­­­­­Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Republic of Korea, Romania, Poland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, and the following international organizations: INTERPOL and United Nations, aiming to facilitate cooperation and sustain activity on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, commit to:

  • Establish a Nuclear Security Contact Group; and
  • Designate an appropriately authorized and informed senior official or officials to participate in the Contact Group.

The Contact Group is tasked with:

  • Convening annually on the margins of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and, as may be useful, in connection with other related meetings;
  • Discussing a broad range of nuclear security-related issues, including identifying emerging trends that may require more focused attention;
  • Promoting and assessing implementation of nuclear security commitments, including those made during the Nuclear Security Summit process, reflected in the four Nuclear Security Summit Communiqués, the 2010 Washington Work Plan, the 2016 Action Plans, national commitments and associated joint statements, and gift baskets;
  • Developing and maintaining linkages to nongovernmental experts and nuclear industry; and,
  • Determining any additional steps that may be appropriate to support these goals.

The Contact Group may also consider and make recommendations to their respective leaders on convening any future Nuclear Security Summits.

We welcome the participation of all countries that subscribe to the goals set out in this Joint Statement and wish to contribute to the work of the Contact Group.

National Statement: Ukraine

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NSS 2016 Statement on the Threats posed by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and Nuclear Militarization of Crimea to Safety and Security of Nuclear Sites and Material of Ukraine 

Ukraine confirms its firm adherence to the NSS community goals and principles. We remain fully committed to implementing further joint efforts to promote stable and strong international nuclear security system.

Ukraine, which abandoned its nuclear arsenal in 1994, has been always devoted to finding peaceful solutions to the existing security threats and challenges supporting the international efforts aimed at achieving the universal disarmament goals. In 1994 Ukraine signed Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances with Regard to Ukraine’s Joining the NPT as a Non-nuclear State. Since 2014 the Memorandum has been meanly violated with impunity by one of its guarantors and thus became senseless for the other parties to this document.

In 2010, at the first Nuclear Security Summit Ukraine took another cornerstone decision – to remove its stocks of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and responsibly and timely implemented its obligations by the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. In this regard, we are grateful to our U.S. partners who fully supported us in this endeavor and provided the relevant technical assistance. We also highly appreciate the assistance of the United States in completion of the construction of Neutron Facility in Ukraine.

During the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, we appealed to the NSS community to apply pressure on the Russian Federation (then a member of this forum) and persuade it to withdraw its armed forces from the territory of Ukraine, namely the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. We were insisting that Russia’s behavior constituted a real threat to the nuclear security, particularly to the Ukrainian research nuclear facilities in Crimea.

Unfortunately, the Russian Federation did not only stop its illegal actions in Crimea, but moved further by sending its troops to Donetsk and Luhansk regions and fueling terrorist actions against Ukraine.

Undermining the UN-based security system by violating the UN Charter and provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), breaching the IAEA Safeguards’ application regime, providing shelter to criminals wanted by Interpol and supporting terrorists, the Russian Federation eventually took logical decision to leave NSS process.

This fact is a real evidence that the NSS goals and principles to be onwards implemented in the framework of UN, IAEA, GP, Interpol and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) as well as commitments taken by all of us in 2010, 2012 and 2014 are not recognized by the Russian Federation any more.

On this background the Russian Federation is declaring its rights to deploy nuclear weapons on the Ukrainian territory, namely in Crimea. Russian occupants are thoroughly restoring soviet-era nuclear storage facilities and have already deployed at the occupied territories of Ukraine the means of nuclear weapons delivery, like warships and combat aircraft. To facilitate this activity Russia is likely to install uranium enrichment facilities, organize production of dual use materials and apply technologies linked to the nuclear weapons on the peninsula.

The occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and ongoing Russian aggression in the east of Ukraine have left without due control of the Ukrainian national regulator LEU research reactor in Sevastopol, 2 nuclear repositories and more than 1200 radionuclide sources in Crimea, as well as 277 in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, 65 and 53 sites using the sources of ionizing radiation respectively.

In such circumstances we cannot exclude the illicit trafficking and malicious use of these sources and could even tackle the threats posed by eventual smuggling of HEU to and from the occupied Ukraine's Crimea.

For example, in July 2015 the Security Service of Ukraine discovered that Luhansk-based terrorists sold out a number of sources of ionizing radiation from the occupied coal mine in Luhansk region, which was lately found in the populated area in Donetsk region.

As a result of the Russian aggression, Ukraine cannot resume control over more than 400 kilometers of its border. These sections of the border can be used by traffickers to illegally transfer to Ukraine and further to Europe radiation sources from Russia. The recent reports of the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies demonstrate that this is a real scenario. Just recently, in March 2016, the Security Service of Ukraine intercepted in Zaporizhia region three sources of ionized radiation, which, allegedly, arrived to Ukraine through the uncontrolled sections of the Ukraine-Russia border.

In this regard, we underscore the need for continued efforts by the NSS participating states to strengthen nuclear security to prevent terrorists, criminals and all other illegal armed groups from acquiring nuclear and other radioactive material, especially when such material is placed at risk by conflict or unrest.

We count on the firm support of the international community in ensuring territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders with a view to stop nuclear proliferation and mitigate threats emerging from the Russian aggression.

Ukraine welcomes the unequivocal decision of the IAEA to apply safeguards to all nuclear sites and material on the whole territory of Ukraine, including those located on the occupied territories, in conformity with the international law and relevant agreements between Ukraine and the Agency.

Ukraine fully supports the Action Plans for UN, IAEA, INTERPOL, Global Partnership and GICNT aimed at advancement of the principles and goals of nuclear security summits beyond 2016. The guidelines for the States and international organizations embedded in these documents should mitigate the consequences and roots of weakened nuclear safety and security architecture at the conflict areas. 

National Progress Report: Ukraine

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Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Ukraine has strengthened nuclear security implementation and contributed to building up the global nuclear security architecture by:                                           

Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security                   

As part of the comprehensive action plan on improving physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation, strengthening security of nuclear and radioactive materials on nuclear and radiation hazardous objects is a constant process.

Organization and implementation of measures for physical protection of the Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs) is being carried out under real threats caused by the Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine and deterioration of social and political situation in the country. In these conditions, to ensure stable operation of nuclear power facilities, significant efforts are directed at strengthening physical protection, defense and practical training focused on anti-terrorism and anti-sabotage measures at nuclear power plants. Systematic monitoring of crisis situations and development of new approaches to protect nuclear facilities are underway.

Taking into account unstable military and political situation in the east of Ukraine, in order to prevent provocations, mass disorders, incidents with unpredictable consequences, illegal actions towards nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation, in January, 2014 the state system of physical protection of Ukraine was switched to a high alert regime.

Acts of inter-agency committees on protection of nuclear material, facilities, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation have been revised and reapproved by competent authorities of Ukraine. According to their provisions, protection of all nuclear power plants in Ukraine has been significantly strengthened.

New Plans of coordination in case of sabotage and relevant Action Plans in case of crisis situation were developed and introduced at all Ukrainian NPPs. All-round automated data control systems of engineering and technical means of physical protection have been placed in operation.

Vulnerability assessment studies of all Ukrainian NPPs have already been completed.

Physical protection of Ukraine's nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation is organized according to the current legislation in this area. In order to verify its conformity with the legislation, in 2014 -2015 regular state inspections were carried out at all nuclear power plants, research facilities, radioactive waste management facilities and entities that use category I sources of ionizing radiation in their work.

However, due to the inability to safely perform their duties by state inspectors in Crimea and certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in 2014 only 3 inspections of the systems of physical protection of radioactive waste management facilities were carried out.

Within the framework of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, in order to enhance security of sources of ionizing radiation, in 2015 physical protection systems were examined at the following facilities:

  • Vinnytsia regional oncology center;
  • Zhytomyr regional oncology center;
  • Kyiv regional oncology center;
  • Chernihiv regional oncology center;
  • Cherkasy regional oncology center;
  • Kirovohrad regional oncology center.

Systems of physical protection of radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation were installed and put into operation at radioactive waste management facilities.

On August 27, 2015 "New design basis threat to nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation in Ukraine" was approved by a Presidential Decree.

Project proposals on modernization of systems of physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear waste management facilities, announced in 2014-2015 during the G7 Global Partnership meetings, have been incorporated into Integrated Nuclear Security Support National Plan (INSSP) of Ukraine for 2016-2018 and to the Action Plan on its implementation, in particular:

  • Technical re-equipment of physical protection system of South-Ukraine NPP's perimeter;
  • Technical re-equipment of physical protection system of South-Ukraine NPP's units 1-3;
  • Technical re-equipment of physical protection system of Khmelnytsky NPP (establishing main control panel);
  • Technical re-equipment of physical protection system of Rivne NPP's personnel and vehicles access control points;
  • Technical re-equipment of physical protection system of Rivne NPP's unit 3;
  • Construction of interim storage facility for long-term storage of vitrified high-level radioactive waste, returned from the Russian Federation after processing of spent nuclear fuel from Ukrainian NPPs with WWER-440 units;
  • Establishing a communication subsystem of physical protection system of Zaporizhia NPP;
  • Technical re-equipment of physical protection system of Zaporizhia NPP;
  • Establishing automated complexes of physical protection system of radioactive waste processing of Zaportizhia NPP;
  • Technical re-equipment of physical protection system of Kmelnytsky NPP's unit 1;
  • Strengthening physical protection system of specialized radioactive waste management enterprises of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation;
  • Liquidation of radioactive inheritance of the former Soviet Union at specialized radioactive waste management enterprises of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation;
  • Improving capabilities of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation for ensuring nuclear and radiation safety of spent radiation sources.

Currently, after taking into account comments and recommendations of the IAEA experts, in February 2016 the INSSP was approved.

Central long-term storage of spent sources of ionizing radiation is scheduled to be put into service in 2016.

In order to adjust national legislation on physical protection to the IAEA recommendations, in 2016 the respective Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine will be revised (On approval of the order of determination of level of physical defense of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation according to their categories).

Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Material

There are 6 repositories of radioactive waste and sources of ionizing radiation, which are kept in storage facilities, equipped in accordance with national legislation with high level security systems. However, three of these repositories are currently located on the temporarily occupied territories: 2 in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and 1 near the city of Donetsk.

During 2014-2015, competent authorities of Ukraine continued to collect spent sources of ionizing radiation, transferring them to specialized radioactive waste management enterprises of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation. Activities in this area have been carried out in close cooperation with the donor states (USA, Great Britain, Germany, France), the European Union, the IAEA and NATO.

On June 17, 2015 the Implementing agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the NATO Support Agency on disposal of radioactive waste, accumulated in the result of carrying out military programs of the former USSR in Ukraine, was ratified. According to this Agreement, the disposal of nuclear waste repositories is to be conducted at the enterprises of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation with NATO financial assistance.

Countering Nuclear Smuggling

Ukraine continues to strengthen radiation control system at its State Border. During 2010-2015 in the framework of the projects of international technical assistance, Ukraine installed and put into operation stationary systems for radiation monitoring in more than 50 border-crossing check-points, 7 of which are located on temporary occupied territories of Crimea and certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Border Guard staff participated in more than 100 training sessions on detecting radioactive (nuclear) materials on the State Border using nuclear radiation detectors for control and reconnaissance. Five exercises were devoted to response to detection of radioactive (nuclear) material smuggling.

As part of the agreement with the IAEA, advanced training on physical protection and accounting of nuclear material was held for officials of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine at the training center for physical protection, accounting and control of nuclear material.

Regular exchange of information between the border agencies of neighboring countries is ensured by the border guard executives in order to counter smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials and timely respond to the threat of nuclear terrorism.

As part of the "Identifying and preventing nuclear smuggling" international technical assistance project, in 2015 five obsolete Russian-made stationary systems for radiation detection were upgraded, two new TSA-type American-made modern stationary systems were put into operation, TSA stationary equipment was supplied for installation in 4 border-crossing check-points on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border.

Preparatory phase of installing new stationary systems for radiation monitoring in 6 border-crossing check-points on the Ukrainian-Belarusian border is underway. Competent authorities of Ukraine are working actively at the establishment of automated system for exchange of information on cases of stationary systems triggering. Such system will be a potential platform for inter-agency information and telecommunication system to register facts of detection and intents of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials through the territory of Ukraine and across its State Border.

National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine elaborated a draft Concept of the State program of development of nuclear forensics in Ukraine for the years 2014-2020. An agreement was reached to create a regional network of nuclear forensics expertise for the GUAM countries using the funds of the EU technical assistance. Research expert organizations of Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova started working on this project in 2015. Its objective is to create a network of nuclear forensics laboratories in the GUAM region, including the expansion of basic technical and information capabilities of national expert laboratories in each participating country, and creating a basis for mutual support and cooperation in this area of esearch.

Within the framework of TACIS and Instrument for stability (IfS) the Institute for Nuclear Research of Ukraine received a mobile laboratory for the on-site actions in response to illicit trafficking incidents. It also received the Element 2 precision mass spectrometer with inductively coupled plasma (ICP-MS) for multi-element analyses at trace levels in nuclear material and environmental samples. Such improvements increased greatly the technical expertise capabilities of the Institute.

Supporting Multilateral Instruments and Cooperating with International Organizations

Ukraine continues to fulfill its obligations within the framework of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) according to approved plans, namely, the Statement on Principles of Combating Nuclear Terrorism and the Action Plan on improvement of capabilities of state-parties to the Initiative to achieve positive results based on multilateral cooperation.

Ukraine confirmed to the IAEA Secretariat its readiness to provide interested countries with consulting assistance in elaboration of laws and regulations on physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste, other sources of ionizing radiation, and to organize experts training in this field.

Partnering with External Stakeholders

With financial support of the US Government and in cooperation with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Ukraine is working on creation of a scientific and methodological basis for determining attributes of uranium-bearing materials of different origin and development of nuclear forensics library data and materials to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency and validity of conclusions of nuclear forensic expertise.

Within the framework of the Agreement on Nuclear Safety and respective Memorandum of Understanding Ukraine jointly with the United States designed and completed construction of the Neutron source based on subcritical assembly driven by linear electron accelerator (Neutron Source Facility). Currently pre-commissioning works, individual and complex tests are underway at the Facility.

Since 2014 the following joint projects aimed at strengthening capabilities in the area of etection of nuclear and radioactive materials have been carried out:

  • Detecting and countering nuclear smuggling (US Department of Energy);
  • WMD non-proliferation initiative: assistance to the State Border Service of Ukraine (US Defense Threat Reduction Agency);
  • Technical assistance to strengthen Ukraine's export control system and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (US State Department);
  • Increasing the capabilities of the border guard services of Ukraine and Moldova to detect chemical, biological, nuclear and radioactive materials (European Commission).

Following the agreement of the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, the trilateral Swedish-Norwegian-Ukrainian Initiative was successfully established. In 2014-2015 seven projects were implemented within the Initiative, namely:

1.  Safety requirements for new types of nuclear fuel. Project support was provided to the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) to develop requirements for safe implementation of new types of nuclear fuel. These requirements were included in regulations related to safe management of fuel. The project was successfully completed in November, 2015. The regulations are currently under consideration of the Ukrainian authorities.

2. Tools for probability safety assessment. Online surveillance systems that enable assessment of safety risks related to operation of nuclear power plants are being introduced in Ukraine in the framework of this project. Safety assessment software was delivered to the SNRIU and the South Ukrainian nuclear power plant, followed by personnel training. Such systems will be installed at other Ukrainian NPPs as appropriate.

3. Safety enhancements at Rivne nuclear power plant. Modernization of safety systems of Rivne nuclear power plant is an element of a Package program on safety enhancement of all NPP's units of Ukraine. Realization of this project will enable detection of the NPP's malfunctions at an early stage and to take timely actions to prevent accidents.

4. Safety requirements for damaged nuclear fuel. The primary objective is to develop regulatory requirements for management of damaged nuclear fuel. The project is in the development phase with implementation date set for 2016.

5.  Modernization of radioactive source register. Upon review of the national source register of Ukraine it was determined that the system required upgrades to meet current regulations and to further improve control of radioactive sources. Assistance on upgrading the system was provided to the authorities that maintain and support the existing national source register. Further development of the database will include applying a web-based system.

6. Security upgrades at Khmelnytsky nuclear power plant. The project's main goal is to strengthen and upgrade physical protection system of Khmelnytsky NPP. Foreign experts visited this nuclear power plant to assess the volume and value of necessary works. The implementation of the project will begin in 2016.

7.  The 13th Ukrainian conference on nuclear security will be organized at Khmelnytsky NPP in October 2016. All national stakeholders responsible for nuclear and radiological security will participate in the event to share their experience and expertise.

Issues of concern

Russian military aggression in eastern Ukraine and its attempt of illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea pose new threats to the national system of nuclear and radiation security and resulted in loss of regulatory control in those areas.

The following sources and facilities remain without regulatory control in the Eastern Ukraine:

  • 1200 radionuclide sources of ionizing radiation (category 1-5);
  • 65 entities that use sources of ionizing radiation (including eight that have high-level radiation sources of category 1 with activity of more than 1000 Ci);
  • Donetsk specialized radioactive waste management enterprise of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation;
  • 1 repository of radioactive waste and sources of ionizing radiation near Donetsk chemical plant;
  • Radiation sources in two coal mining facilities of Donbas, which combine 15 coal mines (142 radiation sources, with the maximum activity of a single source of 2.35×1011 Bq).

The following sources and facilities are located on the territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol:

  • Research reactor of the Sevastopol National University of Nuclear Energy and Industry: DR-100 research reactor, DR-100 (critical assembly) physical test bench, subcritical uranium water assembly, about 3488 kg of depleted uranium;
  • 277 radionuclide sources of ionizing radiation;
  • 53 entities that use radionuclide sources of ionizing radiation, six of them use category 1 and 2 radiation sources according to the level of potential hazard (medicine, shipbuilding) in which over 1200 kg of depleted uranium is used as biological shielding;
  •  2 nuclear waste repositories.

Due to external aggression, Ukraine lost regulatory control on the territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, as well as communication with the Crimean State Inspectorate. Property of the Crimean State Inspectorate was seized by illegal authorities and handed over to the so-called Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea – a regional branch of the Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service of Russia (Rostekhnadzor).

Companies on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea lost the possibility to transfer radioactive waste (spent sources of ionizing radiation) for storage to the Odessa State Specialized Interregional Plant.

At present Ukraine cannot guarantee physical protection of the abovementioned research reactor, nuclear material and sources of ionizing radiation on the territory of Crimea, city of Sevastopol and certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Given the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea by the Russian Federation and ongoing anti-terrorist operation in eastern Ukraine, any damage to radiation-hazardous objects located on those territories may lead to dire consequences not only for Ukraine but for many European nations as well. Thus, we consider that the issue of establishing international control over nuclear facilities that can be seized or damaged as a result of military actions, requires immediate international attention.

Joint Statement on UNSCR 1540

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In Larger Security: A Comprehensive Approach to Nuclear Security

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Statement on Nuclear Information Security (UK)→

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Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation

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2012 NSS Deliverable - Global Partnership

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