Joint Statement on Certified Training

Joint Statement on

Certified Training for Nuclear Security Management

2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Introduction

Gathered in Washington D.C. on the occasion of the fourth Nuclear Security Summit, the leaders of Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States welcome the progress that has been made by states to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the essential elements of nuclear security guidance, particularly in the area of ensuring that management and personnel with accountability for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.   

At the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, thirty five states sponsored a Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation.  The aim of this Joint Statement was for Subscribing States, at their own discretion, to meet the intent of the essential elements of a nuclear security regime and to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the principles therein. The Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation was subsequently published by the IAEA in 2014 as INFCIRC/869 and is open for any IAEA Member State to support.

One of the four key commitments outlined in the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation is for Subscribing States to “Ensure that management and personnel with accountability for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.” The challenges associated with managing nuclear and other radiological materials are complex, and it is essential that States ensure that such materials remain secure. The Joint Statement outlines two ways in which States can support the training of effective and competent managers of those materials and related facilities:

• Maintaining and continuously improving domestic or regional training through education, certification and/or qualification activities; and
• Supporting or participating in the development of World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) best practice guides and training activities.

In support of the commitments in the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States, together with a number of corporations and foundations, joined together to establish the WINS Academy, the world’s first structured professional development and certification program for nuclear security managers. The first training module of the WINS Academy was launched at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.

Since its launch at the 2014 Summit, and with support from Nuclear Security Summit participating States, corporations and foundations, the WINS Academy has developed a robust international nuclear security certification program.  The training program is designed to develop a network of certified professionals who are implementing meaningful and sustainable changes to security culture and best practices worldwide. To date, 560 participants from 75 countries have registered in the WINS Academy certification program.   

Next Steps

In support of the commitments in INFCIRC/869, and acknowledging the international recognition of the need for nuclear security training, education, certification and/or qualification activities, this gift basket records the intent of Canada, Finland, Hungary, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States to undertake to further support the WINS Academy in its efforts to expand its international certification program, including through the provision of advocacy, peer review support, contributions, or by other means as necessary.  

The States listed above also recognize and undertake to promote cooperative efforts between the WINS Academy and the IAEA, including: WINS cooperation with the IAEA Nuclear Security Support Centre (NSSC) Working Group on Best Practices, whose 2014-2015 Action Plan includes the development of a program to collect lessons learned case studies from NSSC members; and WINS Academy cooperation with the IAEA’s International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN), which has helped academics connect and collaborate with WINS to help develop blended courses leading to joint certification.

We welcome other States, supported by industry and civil society, to provide a tangible commitment in support of the WINS Academy and certified professional development for nuclear security. Together we can help to ensure that nuclear and other radioactive materials remain secure under the management of demonstrably competent professionals.

Joint Statement on Countering Nuclear Smuggling

2016 Statement of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling

At the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Nuclear Security Summits, participating nations agreed on Communiqués and Work Plans that included actions aimed at thwarting the illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials. The following countries recognize that identifying nuclear smugglers, detecting and recovering nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, and prosecuting those responsible are important and effective activities to help prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear or other radioactive materials: Australia, Canada, Chile, China,  the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,  France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan,  The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, The Philippines, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom, The United States of America, INTERPOL, and the United Nations.

To follow through on these pledges, participating states are committed to working together to build and sustain national capabilities to counter the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials. These efforts may include:

1.     Designating a national team or task force to link law enforcement, intelligence, technical experts, and other relevant authorities to investigate nuclear trafficking networks and incidents;

2.     Developing plans that clearly outline individual agency roles and responsibilities when responding to incidents of material outside regulatory control;

3.     Developing a national level detection architecture as an element of a whole-of-government counter nuclear smuggling capability;

4.     Strengthening nuclear forensics capabilities to reliably analyze nuclear and other radioactive material discovered out of regulatory control;

5.     Increasing legal training for prosecutors to ensure conviction of smugglers, as appropriate;

6.     Developing laws, regulations, guidance and/or policies to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material;

7.     Strengthening bilateral, multilateral, and international information sharing and other cooperation, such as training and education, best practices exchanges, and exercises;

8.     Sharing applicable lead information through INTERPOL and acting on lead information received as an effective mechanism for identifying nuclear smuggling networks in a timely manner and to enhance cooperation;

9.     Sharing information on incidents involving nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control through the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Incident and Trafficking Database.

Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security

JOINT STATEMENT in the context of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit

Forensics in Nuclear Security                                                                     

Applying science to investigate the illicit use of nuclear or other radioactive material is a crucial element of nuclear security.  Nuclear forensic science assists in determining the provenance of materials encountered out of regulatory control by focusing on the questions that would be asked by regulatory authorities or law enforcement investigators.

This gift basket records the intent of 30 countries[1] to advance nuclear forensics as a key element of effective nuclear security. This may be accomplished by incorporating nuclear forensics as an important element of a nation’s coordinated response, cultivating and sustaining expertise in the fundamental scientific disciplines; and advocating for and supporting international efforts where the implementation of both traditional and nuclear forensic capabilities may be enhanced through sharing.

The Forensics in Nuclear Security Gift Basket presented at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit raised awareness about good practices employed by practitioners, developed education and training curricula, and advanced international collaboration through a common lexicon and knowledge platform.  Continued effort is needed to strengthen and sustain national nuclear forensic capabilities through their inclusion in national response plans and communicating what nuclear forensics can provide to stakeholders.

Recognizing that practical implementation and sustainment of nuclear forensic capabilities are an enduring component of nuclear security, States that subscribe to this Joint Statement commit to one or more of the following elements: 

• Develop and sustain expertise through actions such as cross-disciplinary training of traditional forensic and nuclear scientists, transferring knowledge to the next generation of practitioners, cultivating attractive career paths, and facilitating participation in international training including, but not limited to, those offered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), or the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). 
• Promote employment of existing national nuclear science capabilities to support nuclear forensics.
• Evaluate and adapt existing national response frameworks to incorporate the effective use of nuclear forensic capabilities.
• Advance and mature nuclear forensic expertise in other countries through efforts such as providing instruction at or hosting international courses or conferences, publishing techniques in peer-reviewed scholarly journals, or serving as leaders in relevant international groups.

[1] The following countries are signatories to this Joint Statement: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, ROK, Thailand, UK and USA. The following organization also supports this Joint Statement: INTERPOL]

Joint Statement on Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness and Response

Joint Statement on Supporting Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism

Preparedness and Response Capabilities 

Subscribed by Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the United Nations and INTERPOL.

A nuclear terror event anywhere in the world would have devastating human, environmental, economic, and political consequences. Building on the Summit’s nuclear terrorism prevention and nuclear and radiological material security accomplishments and efforts, wethe Parties to this statement recognize the need for ensuring adequate nuclear emergency preparedness and response capabilities.  Such capabilities contribute tofurther reducing not onlythe risks posed by nuclear or radiological terrorism (hereafter, “nuclear terrorism”), but also the risks posed by other malicious activities or accidents involving nuclear or radiological materials and facilities.Ensuring preparedness in National capabilities to counter and respond to nuclear terror acts is a critical task for all Nations, as exemplified by the Scenario-Based Policy Discussions successfully completed by participating nations as part ofthe 2016 Summit.  Nuclear terrorism preparedness requires a range of activities to establish,enhance, sustain, and exercise the capabilities necessary to counter and respond to nuclear terror incidents. Nuclear terrorism response requires a range of technical, operational, and communications capabilities toprovide coordination and resolution of the incident, as well as mitigatingits consequences.

Consistent with the Nuclear Security Summit goal of reducing the threat posed by nuclear terrorism and furthering the 2014 Hague Summit Communique pledge to “maintain effective emergency preparedness, response, and mitigation capabilities,”we the parties to this statementrecognize that ensuring adequate nuclear terrorismpreparedness and response capabilities complements international nuclear security efforts.  We also recognize that adequate nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities contribute to strengthening the interface between nuclear safety and security, and serve as a potential deterrent to attack.

Nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities include the following capabilities:

• National policies and plans:Establish and maintainadequate National response plans and policies regarding preparedness, response, and mitigation of incidents and threats of nuclear terrorism, including guidance forlocalplanning in responding to such threats and incidents.
• Technical expertise and capabilities:Identify, confirm, assess, and respond to nuclear terror incidentsand threats, including radiological characterization and assessments to inform protective actions, emergency medical training and response support, and decontamination tools and training.
• Public communications and education: Develop and maintainstrategic communications and effective public messaging providing not only public safety awareness and emergency readiness in the event of a nuclear terror incident but also mechanisms and procedures for ensuring prompt dissemination of public safety information to potentially affected communities.
• Sustainment of capabilities:  Sustain necessary capabilities through continuing education, training, and exercises involving National and local officials and multinational partners charged with nuclear terrorism preparedness, response, or associated decision-making.
• International coordination and assistance mechanisms: Per the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and other relevant international legal instruments, and considering multilateral mechanisms and initiatives such as offered by the United Nations (UN), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), INTERPOL, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,establish mechanisms for requesting and/or providing (as appropriate):
  • Nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capacity building, 
  • As required, post-event mutualassistance offered by the State Partiesof the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency,
  • Government-to-Government coordination and communication in the event of nuclear terrorism.

Recognizing that an act of nuclear terrorism anywhere in the world would have global impacts affecting all Nations, wethe parties to this statement affirm ourwillingnessto cooperate to strengthen National and international nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities.  We agree on the following commitments in support of this objective:

• Ensure adequate National nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities at home.  We the parties to this statement reaffirm our National commitment to establish and maintain the National-level capabilities required for nuclear terrorism preparedness and response.We also commit to conductcomprehensivenuclear terrorism preparedness and response drills, incorporating roles and responsibilities at the National and local levels to foster strong interagency cooperation across law enforcement, medical, technical/scientific, and policy agencies.  We commit to strengthen our National interagency coordination, cooperation, and information-sharing mechanisms needed in this regard, to support whole-of-government crisis response.
• Support sharing relevant resources, expertise, and good practices, in order to strengthen global nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities, including relevant post-event mutual assistance.  Consistent with our respectiveinternational legal obligations,we the parties to this statementagree in principle to support--at the bilateral level, upon request--relevant expertise, training, or other related resources supporting nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilitieswith interested states, as well as offer relevant post-event mutual assistanceincluding through the IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET). We recognize that requests for bilateral assistance must be evaluated by the States involved on a case by case basis and would be subject to availability of resources, legal considerations, and other concerns.  However, we the parties to this statement recognize the importance of supporting nuclear terrorismpreparedness and response capacities and thus encourage bilateral and multilateral dialogue and coordination on how best to assure adequate global preparedness and response capabilities.As such, we also commit to making available relevant expertise or experience via international and multilateral effortsas the UN, IAEA, INTERPOL, GICNT, and the GP.  National Points of Contact will be provided, in addition to IAEA, INTERPOL, GICNT, and GP points of contact,to support the coordination and evaluation of requests and offers of assistance.
• Support for international best practice guidance on preparedness and resilience objectives and the specific capabilities needed to meet them, as published by the organizations listed above,including the IAEA Nuclear Security Series 15 - Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, the IAEA Safety Series GSR Part 7 on Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism’s Fundamentals for Establishing and Maintaining a Nuclear Security Response Framework ,which build on the aforementioned core competencies We the parties to this statement recognize these documents as an excellent foundation for States wishing to establish or sustain baseline nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities, and actively support the broadest possible international application and use of these documents.
• Share lessons learned from real world incidents (i.e., nuclear and radiological incidents, materials out of regulatory control, significant all hazards-related emergency response efforts, etc.) that have implications for or applications to nuclear terrorism preparedness, response, and mitigation, in order to incorporate this experience into Preparedness and Response capabilities nationally and internationally.
• Encourage and support National and State/local-level full field and table-top exercises aimed at ensuring nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities.  As appropriate, participating countries to the exercises will encourage reciprocal, bilateral observation of National and transborder exercises, with a view towards sharing good practices in sustaining preparedness and response capabilities, while ensuring confidentiality of sensitive information.We the parties to this statementcommit, as far as resources permit, to host, observe, or support the development and implementation of radiological emergency management exercises (REMEX) under the GICNT’s Response and Mitigation Working Group.  REMEXs emphasize the importance of international cooperation in preparedness and resilience by providing the opportunity for two or more governments to collaboratively exercise response capabilities for nuclear terrorism with bilateral or multilateral scenarios.  REMEXs also provide a venue for sharing the good practices and lessons learned from other national and State/local-level exercises encouraged under this gift basket.  

Joint Statement on Nuclear Training and Support Centres

Joint statement on

Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres / Centres of Excellence 

Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, Vietnam, INTERPOL and the United Nations

Italy hosted the 2014 Gift Basket on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres/Centres of Excellence (NSSC/CoE) following the 2012 Gift Basket hosted by the United States.  The 2014 Gift Basket attracted a large number of co-sponsoring Summit participants promoting the importance of nuclear security training and support centres, and the value of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres Network (NSSC Network) in strengthening international and regional cooperation and collaboration.  Now that the IAEA NSSC Network is maturing and a number of nuclear security training and support centers are being established, these centres can play an increasingly important and active role in promoting nuclear security.  These centres help meet domestic nuclear security needs, and can also provide an important platform for sharing resources and meeting needs on a regional basis, thus strengthening and sustaining the global nuclear security architecture.

In support of the IAEA NSSC Network and nuclear security training and support centre sustainability, the participants to the 2016 Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres / Centres of Excellence Gift Basket intend, within available resources, to support the following activities.

Strengthening of the IAEA NSSC Network

•    Nuclear security training and support centres not yet a member of the IAEA NSSC Network commit to join the Network and make every effort to take part in the IAEA NSSC Network activities, including meetings.

Establishment of regional networks

•    Building upon the establishment of the Asia Regional Network through the IAEA NSSC Network, establish additional networks with nuclear security training and support centres in the same region and mechanisms of regional coordination to promote best practices, exchange training experiences, share curricula and other activities on a regional basis. 

•    In collaboration with the IAEA NSSC network, share experiences in training with centres outside their region.

Strengthening nuclear security training and technical support programmes

•    Improve the quality of training by conducting peer review exchanges with other nuclear security training and support centres and by making use of the IAEA NSSC Network as a mechanism to promote peer-review exchanges.

•    Use IAEA material/guidance as a mechanism to achieve consistency in the technical content of the training programmes on nuclear security and participate in IAEA Train-the-Trainer activities to build a network of instructors qualified to deliver IAEA training course materials. 

•    Organize and be active participants in the development and running of nuclear and radiological security scenarios and exercises.

•    Share experiences and nuclear security training with other training centres and centres of excellence, as appropriate, as well as lessons learned through the IAEA NSSC network and IAEA Nuclear Security Information Portal (NUSEC).

•    Use IAEA material/guidance to support training programmes in key technical topics such as nuclear security culture, nuclear material accounting and control, computer security, transportation security, and insider threat mitigation. 

•    As appropriate, consider certification of nuclear security training and support centre training programmes, as per ISO 29990 and/or utilize applicable ISO best practices to support continuous improvement.
  
•    Collaborate with the Global Partnership’s Centre of Excellence Sub-working Group to implement this Gift Basket as noted in the Global Partnership Nuclear Security Summit Action Plan.

Sustainability

•    Focus attention on and build mechanisms to ensure the sustainability of nuclear security training and support centres, including developing business plans and e-learning tools, conducting needs analysis and regular evaluation of effectiveness, and identifying required financial, administrative and human resources.

•    Provide training, technical and scientific support to competent authorities to strengthen long-term sustainability of domestic nuclear and radiological security regimes. 

•    Broaden and strengthen international cooperation with the United Nations, especially United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540-related efforts, with INTERPOL, the Global Partnership, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and others.

Cooperation

•    Collaborate with educational institutions that teach nuclear security subjects to include nuclear security culture. Continue, improve, and expand the NSSC Network’s collaboration with the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN).

•    Cooperate in the area of research and development with national and international institutes to promote scientific advancements in nuclear security and continuous engagement of the scientific communities.

•    Engage industry and civil society through constant dialogue on the importance of nuclear security.

•    Promote public confidence in nuclear and radiological security.

Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security Architecture

JOINT STATEMENT ON SUSTAINING ACTION TO

STRENGTHEN GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

The Nuclear Security Summit process has led to significant achievements in nuclear security at national, regional, and global levels; but the work of building a strengthened, sustained, and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture – consisting of legal instruments, international organizations and initiatives, internationally accepted guidance, and best practices – requires continuous attention.

We need sustained action and ambition on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit to address continuing and evolving nuclear security challenges, with the objectives of advancing implementation of nuclear security commitments and building a strengthened, sustainable and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture.

The Governments of Argentina, Armenia, ­­­­­Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Republic of Korea, Romania, Poland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, and the following international organizations: INTERPOL and United Nations, aiming to facilitate cooperation and sustain activity on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, commit to:

• Establish a Nuclear Security Contact Group; and
• Designate an appropriately authorized and informed senior official or officials to participate in the Contact Group.

The Contact Group is tasked with:

• Convening annually on the margins of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and, as may be useful, in connection with other related meetings;
• Discussing a broad range of nuclear security-related issues, including identifying emerging trends that may require more focused attention;
• Promoting and assessing implementation of nuclear security commitments, including those made during the Nuclear Security Summit process, reflected in the four Nuclear Security Summit Communiqués, the 2010 Washington Work Plan, the 2016 Action Plans, national commitments and associated joint statements, and gift baskets;
• Developing and maintaining linkages to nongovernmental experts and nuclear industry; and,
• Determining any additional steps that may be appropriate to support these goals.

The Contact Group may also consider and make recommendations to their respective leaders on convening any future Nuclear Security Summits.

We welcome the participation of all countries that subscribe to the goals set out in this Joint Statement and wish to contribute to the work of the Contact Group.

National Statement: Thailand

Thailand’s National Statement

2016 Nuclear Security Summit

Thailand attaches importance to the promotion of nuclear security, which has to be undertaken in parallel at the national, regional and international levels.  In fact, nuclear security issue is interlinked and should be carried out with other closely related matters, which are safety and safeguards.

Indeed, the issue of nuclear security is closer to us than we think. If a nuclear incident occurs, its impact is widespread and indiscriminate. The collaborative network within and across national borders is necessary to contain the consequences. That is why we are here today to renew and reaffirm our political commitment.

Thailand believes that it is a fundamental responsibility of states to maintain effective security of nuclear and other radioactive materials as well as nuclear facilities under their control, including military ones. Therefore, at the national level, the Royal Thai Government takes action seriously as nuclear technology is widely used in various peaceful applications in Thailand, so it is a priority to ensure nuclear security in all types of public and private facilities, where nuclear and radioactive materials are used -- hospitals, factories, research laboratories, and nuclear waste disposal facilities. Attention has to be given also to the security of transportation, importation, and exportation of nuclear and radioactive materials.

In terms of national legal frameworks, relevant regulations pertaining to exportation and importation of dual-use goods have been updated. The amended Customs Act has empowered Customs officials to inspect, search and confiscate suspected merchandise in transit or transshipment. In addition, the amended Nuclear Energy Act is now under consideration of the National Legislative Assembly. This Act has been amended to cover all relevant dimensions of peaceful use of nuclear energy, as well as impose penalties on those who violate any provision of this Act. Once the Nuclear Energy Act is enforced, Thailand will be able to ratify a number of international instruments, including the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM). As a state party to these conventions, Thailand will be able to do more under her international obligations to further enhance nuclear security.

Our efforts include an establishment of a national coordinating mechanism, the Sub-Committee on Coordinating for Prevention and Solution of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2013. This mechanism helps strengthen the coordination and collaboration among all relevant government agencies concerned, both at national and local levels, in efficiently and effectively fulfilling Thailand’s obligations and commitments. At present, a whole-of-government Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) is being drafted to ensure efficient and integrated implementation and coordination in cases of interdiction of suspected merchandise entering or passing through Thailand by sea, land and air. Several outreach and awareness-raising activities and programmes, including visits to ports and border checkpoints, have also been conducted throughout the countries, particularly frontline officers in the border areas prone to risks of illicit entry of persons or goods with ill intention, which could be used for malicious purposes.

As people are at the centre of nuclear security, it is therefore crucial to continuously develop and further enhance the capabilities of relevant agencies and their staff to be able to strictly comply with international standards and requirements, in order to ensure effective nuclear security. It is also necessary to raise the awareness of the general public as nuclear security is an issue very close to our daily lives and should not be overlooked in order to reduce potential risks from ignorance or negligence. Thus, Thailand gives importance to reach out and raise awareness among various target groups, including industrialists, entrepreneurs, healthcare personnel, exporters and importers, law enforcement agencies, academia, and civil society. Nuclear security should always remain in the public interest as minor issues can cause major consequences. If nuclear waste has not been properly disposed of, radiation will be harmful to health, food and water sources, and the environment.  Moreover, the impacts of radiation will be long-term, making it hard to determine the extent of damage, as well as how to contain and mitigate the detrimental consequences.

States also need to build up global nuclear security culture in nuclear facilities both at national and international levels. This will alert all stakeholders of potential risks which could arise at anytime, anywhere and in any form -- insider threats, outside trespassers, or through cyber space. Therefore, clear codes of conduct, stringent preventive and effective response measures must be in place. Building up nuclear security culture will reduce risks from nuclear threats and protect everyone in a systematic and sustainable manner.  

At the regional level, freer flow of people and goods in a borderless world, especially within the ASEAN Community, has increased the number of tourists as well as the volume of imports and exports passing through the borders. The Thai authorities concerned have boosted up their capacities in response to the changing environment by upgrading their systems and equipment, and training of staff. These efforts have helped improve the screening process and reduce risk of ill-intentioned entry and transit through Thailand and smuggling of illegal items, thereby contributing to the prevention and countering of unnecessary tragic incidents. 

Beyond national borders, regional cooperation is very important to Thailand as regional countries are our “neighbours”. It is thus necessary to keep our community harmonious as well as well integrated and coordinated. For ASEAN, Thailand initiated the setting up of the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy, or ASEANTOM, which was welcomed by the ASEAN Leaders in 2011 and has been functioning since 2012. It is a collaborative network of nuclear regulatory bodies and relevant agencies to share information, experiences, and best practices, as well as to discuss issues relevant to nuclear safety, security and safeguard. It is a confidence building measure within the region. ASEANTOM is complementary to other existing mechanisms, such as the Asian Nuclear Safety Networks (ANSN) and the ASEAN Nuclear Energy Cooperation Sub-Sector Network (NEC-SSN).  These mechanisms represent work in the 3 pillars of nuclear safety, security, and safeguard for peaceful use which have to be carried out in parallel, in order to ensure sustainability. Thailand stands ready to cooperate and implement our obligations in all 3 pillars, including nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It is our hope that all participating States, International Organisations and Initiatives also give equally emphasis on all 3 S-pillars.

At the international level, global efforts will certainly help strengthen efforts at the national and regional levels, through sharing of accurate, reliable and timely information and intelligence for preventive actions, as well as capacity building and technology transfer from more advanced countries to those which may be faced with implementation challenges, in order to achieve truly robust nuclear security at the global level. In this regard,     Thailand has cooperated with the IAEA in hosting regional meetings, seminars and training for capacity building in nuclear related matters for countries in the region.  Thailand has also established a Master’s degree program on nuclear security education -- the only one in the ASEAN region -- and receives on a regular basis, students from the region and beyond.

Cooperation at all levels is important in order to reduce potential risks and mitigate potential damage as the impact of nuclear accident or sabotage will be widespread and indiscriminate. States also need to be vigilant and cooperate more closely to prevent cybercrime and terrorism. 

All efforts undertaken by Thailand under various international frameworks have so far been complementary, and the Nuclear Security Summit has played an important role in bridging all the elements of nuclear security and further strengthening those frameworks in a comprehensive manner. The Nuclear Security Summit also helps promote international cooperation in this field in a sustainable manner through various collaborative measures set out in the 5 action plans, in line with the mandates of UN, IAEA and INTERPOL, as well as other international initiatives. These international organisations and initiatives will play significant roles to our efforts and help strengthen our national capacities.

When all countries join hands together and sustain our efforts to fulfill our obligations, promote international cooperation at all levels, and work with relevant international organisations, our world will be a safer and more secure place for all.

Joint Statement on Certified Training

Joint Statement on Certified Training for Nuclear Security Management
2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Introduction

Gathered in Washington D.C. on the occasion of the fourth Nuclear Security Summit, the leaders of Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States welcome the progress that has been made by states to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the essential elements of nuclear security guidance, particularly in the area of ensuring that management and personnel with accountability for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.   

At the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, thirty five states sponsored a Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation.  The aim of this Joint Statement was for Subscribing States, at their own discretion, to meet the intent of the essential elements of a nuclear security regime and to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the principles therein. The Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation was subsequently published by the IAEA in 2014 as INFCIRC/869 and is open for any IAEA Member State to support.

One of the four key commitments outlined in the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation is for Subscribing States to “Ensure that management and personnel with accountability for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.” The challenges associated with managing nuclear and other radiological materials are complex, and it is essential that States ensure that such materials remain secure. The Joint Statement outlines two ways in which States can support the training of effective and competent managers of those materials and related facilities:

• Maintaining and continuously improving domestic or regional training through education, certification and/or qualification activities; and
• Supporting or participating in the development of World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) best practice guides and training activities.

In support of the commitments in the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States, together with a number of corporations and foundations, joined together to establish the WINS Academy, the world’s first structured professional development and certification program for nuclear security managers. The first training module of the WINS Academy was launched at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.

Since its launch at the 2014 Summit, and with support from Nuclear Security Summit participating States, corporations and foundations, the WINS Academy has developed a robust international nuclear security certification program.  The training program is designed to develop a network of certified professionals who are implementing meaningful and sustainable changes to security culture and best practices worldwide. To date, 560 participants from 75 countries have registered in the WINS Academy certification program.   

Next Steps

In support of the commitments in INFCIRC/869, and acknowledging the international recognition of the need for nuclear security training, education, certification and/or qualification activities, this gift basket records the intent of Canada, Finland, Hungary, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States to undertake to further support the WINS Academy in its efforts to expand its international certification program, including through the provision of advocacy, peer review support, contributions, or by other means as necessary.  

The States listed above also recognize and undertake to promote cooperative efforts between the WINS Academy and the IAEA, including: WINS cooperation with the IAEA Nuclear Security Support Centre (NSSC) Working Group on Best Practices, whose 2014-2015 Action Plan includes the development of a program to collect lessons learned case studies from NSSC members; and WINS Academy cooperation with the IAEA’s International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN), which has helped academics connect and collaborate with WINS to help develop blended courses leading to joint certification.

We welcome other States, supported by industry and civil society, to provide a tangible commitment in support of the WINS Academy and certified professional development for nuclear security. Together we can help to ensure that nuclear and other radioactive materials remain secure under the management of demonstrably competent professionals.

National Progress Report: Thailand

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Thailand has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by:

1. Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

• Human resources development: Training courses for national security officers has been conducted annually, since 2005. Each year there are approximately 60 participants from various agencies, such as Customs Department, Border Patrol Police, Port Authority of Thailand, Central Institute of Forensic Science, and National Intelligence Agency. The purpose is to enhance capabilities of the authorities concerned in their implementation of the UNSC Resolution 1540 as well as other relevant measures or standards in order to strengthen national nuclear and radioactive security infrastructure.
• The Office of Atoms for Peace, as the national coordinating agency for all nuclear-related matters, as well as other competent agencies, including the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, and the Ministry of Public Health, in collaboration with IAEA under technical cooperation projects, have been, for over 20 years, organizing regional workshops and seminars on various issues related to peaceful application of nuclear technology, for participants from Thailand and other countries in the region. Government officials from relevant agencies have also attended international workshops and seminars on various topics related to nuclear security. Thailand has also established a Master’s degree program on nuclear security education -- the only one in the ASEAN region -- and receives on a regular basis, students from the region and beyond. All these efforts contribute to building up capacity of Thailand and beyond.
• Capacity building and drill exercise: Thailand attaches importance to awareness raising and capacity building among government officials and the general public on the potential risks of nuclear incidents and response measures.  Training and drill exerciseshave been organized annually, since 2009, for frontline officers working with nuclear and radioactive materials or who may be faced with related incidents, as well as local officers and people who live in the surrounding areas of nuclear facilities in case of emergency situations. The relevant authorities in nuclear technology also conducted national emergency exercises (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical: NBC) since 2010 in compliance with the National Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Plan.
• Rules and Regulations: Thailand continues to strengthen the national infrastructure for regulating the security of nuclear and radioactive materials. In early 2016, the revised regulation on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, as well as the draft Act on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, in line with the IAEA’s INFCIRC 225/Revision 5 - Nuclear Security Series No. 13, have been submitted to the Atomic Energy for Peace Commission for consideration. Once approved, they will become national guidelines for relevant agencies to further enhance nuclear security.
• Environmental impact: Thailand is also committed to improving the national environmental radiation monitoring capabilities by expanding the Early Warning Environmental Stations to 17 ambient and 3 underwater Gamma Radiation Monitoring Stations.
• Regional cooperation: Thailand hosted the second formal meeting of ASEANTOM [1] during 25-27 August 2014 in Chiang Mai, Thailand. The meeting reviewed the activities conducted during the past year, since its establishment in 2013, and discussed further activities under the work plan for 2015-2016. These activities include a number of regional workshops and training courses on emergency preparedness and response, as well as on nuclear security culture and management. In addition, ASEANTOM has also been working to set up an environmental radiation monitoring network in order to provide a platform for sharing environmental radiation monitoring activities and data. To complement such effort, the Office of Atoms for Peace organised a Technical Meeting for ASEANTOM on Environmental Radiation Network during 25-27 August 2015 in Phuket.
• International cooperation: Thailand is committed to continuously enhancing the capacity of relevant agencies in nuclear safety and security, including through international cooperation. The Global Threat Reduction Programme (DNN RSP), supported by the United States Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA), has been implemented since 2008 and is still ongoing today. The Programme has upgraded the Physical Protection System (PPS) at the nuclear facilities under the control of Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology, including Co-60 Irradiators and waste storage facility. Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology is also working with Canada’s Nuclear and Radiological Security Department (NRS) under the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), on the upgrading of the PPS of the Thai Research Reactor and the waste storage facility under G-8 Global Partnership Programme against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. The upgrading is due to start in 2016.
• Awareness raising and outreach activities: As radioactive materials have many peaceful applications in our daily lives, the Office of Atoms for Peace, as national focal point, has been conducting several awareness raising and outreach activities for the general public through various means, such as radiation security manual, TV programmes and You Tube, radio and printed materials, social media, and news briefing and other public forums.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand also targeted young audience by organizing Youth Public Speaking Contest on the occasion of International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 10 September 2014, in collaboration with the Embassies of Mexico and Cuba in Bangkok. The contest was well received and many university students participated.  They were well prepared and educated on the issue and delivered impressive speeches with great ideas.

 2. Minimising Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials

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3. Countering Nuclear Smuggling

• National mechanism: In order to strengthen efforts in countering nuclear smuggling, Thailand has improved coordination among relevant agencies working on matters relating to non-proliferation, in line with the UNSC Resolution 1540 and other international frameworks such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). In 2013, the National Security Council of Thailand, as the focal point on this issue, established a Sub-Committee on Coordinating for Prevention and Solution of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction as national coordinating mechanism. This body has conducted several outreach and awareness-raising activities among relevant agencies by organising site visits to border checkpoints around Thailand. Briefing sessions have also been provided to local government officials to inform them of Thailand’s obligations and commitments as well as to enhance coordination and cooperation among relevant local offices in implementation of such obligations. The Sub-Committee also visited ports and points of entry to assess preparedness and understanding about non-proliferation among working officials on the ground. The whole-of-government Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) is being drafted to ensure efficient implementation and smooth coordination for cases of interdiction in various WMD-related scenarios.  It is expected that this SOP will become operational by the end of this year.
• Rules and regulations on export controls: As part of the obligations under the UNSC Resolution 1540, Thailand’s amended Customs Act has entered into force in March 2015, establishing principles for transit and transshipment in line with international standards. The amended law also empowers Customs officials to inspect, search and confiscate suspected merchandise in transit or transshipment without requiring a warrant. At the same time, Thailand’s dual-use items (DUI) regime has also been revitalised and strengthened.  In October 2015, the Ministry of Commerce issued a ministerial announcement on Export Control for Dual-Use Goods requiring permissions for export of items under the updated DUI list, which is similar to the one being used by the European Union.  Thailand has also put in place more effective tracking and management of dual-use items with the application of an IT system, known as the e-TMD system.
• Capacity building: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand invited experts from relevant Sanctions Committees to speak at a workshop held in Bangkok during 25-26 August 2014. The purpose was to enhance understanding of Thai agencies concerned on the obligations under the UNSC resolutions related to non-proliferation of WMD and how to ensure full and effective implementation of diverse measures.  Officials and experts from agencies concerned also participated in various exercises hosted by other states and international organisations.

4. Supporting Multilateral Instruments

• Rules and regulations: The Royal Thai Government is moving ahead with amendments of domestic laws so as to provide appropriate legal basis to fulfill our international obligations. The amendment of the Nuclear Energy Act has been approved by the Cabinet and is now under consideration of the National Legislative Assembly. Once it is enacted, it will enable Thailand to accede to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment, as well as the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). Thailand is also in the process of considering accession to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 as well as the 2005 SUA Protocols.

5. Collaborating with International Organisations

• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): In February 2016, the Office of Atoms for Peace, as national coordinator on atomic energy, in collaboration with IAEA, organised a regional workshop on Nuclear Forensics and Bio-dosimeter, aimed at building national capacities of ASEANTOM Member States and strengthening regional cooperation in these fields.     

Through ASEANTOM, Thailand will work with IAEA under the Technical Cooperation (TC) project on “Regional Cooperation Project Concept in South East Asia to Support Regional Environmental Radioactivity Database and Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response”, with funding support from IAEA.  The objectives are to develop and implement emergency preparedness and response arrangements, both at the national and regional levels, in order to protect the people and the environment, in case of a severe nuclear and radiological incident. The project duration is four years, commencing in 2016.

• Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT): The Office of Atoms for Peace participates in Joint Working Group Meeting and Mid-Year Implementation and Assessment Group Meeting annually since 2011.
• European Union: The Office of Atoms for Peace has been working with the European Commission Joint Research Centre (EC JRC), in collaboration with IAEA and the United States Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration under the Project on Border Monitoring Activities in Thailand.  The Project is aimed at strengthening national capability in countering illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials, through capacity building of personnel and provision of equipment to the Thai authorities concerned, including Customs Department, Port Authority of Thailand, Airport Authority of Thailand, Thailand Post, Royal Thai Police, and Bureau of Immigration. The Office of Atoms for Peace, together with Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology, have also continued its collaboration efforts with EU CBRN projects, including the integrated national security system for nuclear and radioactive materials, Network of Excellence for Nuclear Forensics in Southeast Asia, and a course on Regional Human Resource Development for Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards Management under Chulalongkorn University’s Masters Programme on nuclear non-proliferation.
• Australia Group: Apart from nuclear safety and security, Thailand is committed to her obligations under the BWC and the CWC, as these bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins as well as chemical agents should also be secured in order to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands.  Therefore, Thailand has also worked with other partners, such as the Australia Group, to strengthen the implementation in this regard.  On 23 November 2015, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand and the Australian Group organised a briefing for relevant government agencies on the harmonization of national export licensing measures and developments in the Australia Group, including updates on the control lists.  

6. Partnering with External Stakeholders

• Regional and international cooperation: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, in collaboration with Norway’s International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI), organised “9th Regional Roundtable on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons and the Prospects for a Ban Treaty” during 26-27 March 2015 in Bangkok. This forum brought together key individuals from the Asia-Pacific region, including government officials, academic and civil society actors, in order to share thoughts and ideas on how the humanitarian initiative could be taken forward. The forum was aimed at raising awareness of humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, as well as seeking appropriate measures to promote transparency and reduce risks associated with nuclear weapons.  Thailand is of the view that efforts on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including enhancing nuclear security, are mutually reinforcing and therefore, aims to contribute to all efforts in a comprehensive manner.

[1] The ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy, or ASEANTOM, was established in 2013 at the initiation of Thailand. ASEANTOM has been designated as an Annex-1 sectoral body under the ASEAN Political-Security Community. ASEANTOM provides an official framework to facilitate cooperation among the nuclear regulatory bodies of ASEAN Member States in order to promote nuclear safety, security and safeguard in the region, as well as serves as the key point of contact with IAEA to promote cooperation in these areas, including capacity building for the benefits of all member states.

2014 Progress Report Thailand

2014 Progress Report Thailand

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2012 Progress Report Thailand

2012 Progress Report Thailand

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Multinational Statement on Nuclear Information Security

2010 National Statement of Thailand

2010 National Statement of Thailand