Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004)

THE WHITE HOUSE 

Office of the Press Secretary

______________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                        

FACT SHEET

UN Security Council Resolution 1540

UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, adopted unanimously in 2004 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, establishes legally binding obligations on all States to develop and enforce appropriate and effective measures against the proliferation of nuclear weapons or material, their means of delivery and related materials.  The resolution also created a UN Security Council subsidiary body, the 1540 Committee, to monitor and foster implementation of the resolution.

The Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540, sponsored by Canada, Republic of Korea and Spain, recognizes the resolution and the 1540 Committee as key players in the international legal and institutional infrastructure for strengthening global nuclear security and combating nuclear terrorism.  In addition, the Joint Statement identifies ways to support the long-term efforts required to implement the resolution and the work of the 1540 Committee.  The Joint Statement further emphasizes the importance of the Second Comprehensive Review of the resolution by the 1540 Committee, now underway, in helping States achieve full implementation of the resolution by 2021, including the implementation of obligations to enhance the security of nuclear materials worldwide.

As part of its commitment to the Joint Statement, the United States pledges to continued support of the resolution and the 1540 Committee, robust participation in the Second Comprehensive Review of the resolution, and the submission of regular reporting on domestic implementation of the resolution. To further meet its obligations and commitments, the United States maintains a wide range of assistance programs and outreach efforts to help others implement their UNSCR 1540 obligations.

UNSCR 1540 and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism constitute key parts of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit’s Action Plan in support of the UN, in which the United States and other Summit participating States commit to further stregthen the global nuclear security architecture by working to enhance the capacity of States to implement their UNSCR 1540 obligations.  As part of this Action Plan, the United States and other Summit participants pledge to increase our efforts to enhance national implementation, coordination and cooperation, assistance, and outreach under the umbrella of UNSCR 1540.  Furthermore, the United States reaffirms its commitment to full implementation of the resolution as part of the Summit’s Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540. 

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Fact Sheet: Update on Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation (INFCIRC 869)

THE WHITE HOUSE 

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                        

FACT SHEET

Update on INFCIRC 869

On October 9, 2014, the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, on behalf of its Government and 34 other countries (full list below), conveyed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Secretariat the “Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation” from the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and requested that it be circulated to all IAEA Member States.  The subscribing states pledged to take specific steps, including implementing key IAEA nuclear security guidance, accepting voluntary peer reviews, and committing that those responsible for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.  The Dutch note verbale  encouraged all States to meet the intent of these essential elements of a nuclear security regime and to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the principles therein.  The IAEA has circulated the 2014 Joint Statement as INFCIRC/869, to which all IAEA Member States could ascribe.

On November 13, 2015, Jordan pledged its commitment to the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, as contained in INFCIRC/869.  Jordan is the 36th IAEA member state to subscribe to the statement, and the first to do so outside the Summit process.

The United States continues to encourage all IAEA member states to indicate their commitment to implement the provisions of INFCIRC/869, noting that such public commitments provide public assurances that nuclear materials are effectively secured and underscore support for the IAEA and its nuclear security efforts.

Full List of Subscribers

Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Vietnam.

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Joint Statement on Countering Nuclear Smuggling

2016 Statement of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling

At the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Nuclear Security Summits, participating nations agreed on Communiqués and Work Plans that included actions aimed at thwarting the illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials. The following countries recognize that identifying nuclear smugglers, detecting and recovering nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, and prosecuting those responsible are important and effective activities to help prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear or other radioactive materials: Australia, Canada, Chile, China,  the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,  France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan,  The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, The Philippines, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom, The United States of America, INTERPOL, and the United Nations.

To follow through on these pledges, participating states are committed to working together to build and sustain national capabilities to counter the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials. These efforts may include:

1.     Designating a national team or task force to link law enforcement, intelligence, technical experts, and other relevant authorities to investigate nuclear trafficking networks and incidents;

2.     Developing plans that clearly outline individual agency roles and responsibilities when responding to incidents of material outside regulatory control;

3.     Developing a national level detection architecture as an element of a whole-of-government counter nuclear smuggling capability;

4.     Strengthening nuclear forensics capabilities to reliably analyze nuclear and other radioactive material discovered out of regulatory control;

5.     Increasing legal training for prosecutors to ensure conviction of smugglers, as appropriate;

6.     Developing laws, regulations, guidance and/or policies to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material;

7.     Strengthening bilateral, multilateral, and international information sharing and other cooperation, such as training and education, best practices exchanges, and exercises;

8.     Sharing applicable lead information through INTERPOL and acting on lead information received as an effective mechanism for identifying nuclear smuggling networks in a timely manner and to enhance cooperation;

9.     Sharing information on incidents involving nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control through the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Incident and Trafficking Database.

Joint Statement on Cyber Security

2016: Gift Basket on cyber security of industrial control and plant systems at nuclear facilities 

Subscribed by: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the United Nations.

Introduction

The States listed above commit to ensure adequate cyber security at industrial control and plant systems at nuclear facilities.  These control systems are often used within safeguards, security, and safety systems.  Increased attention in this area will assist States, nuclear operators and the supply chain to continue to strengthen the resilience of these systems, protecting them from potential malicious attack or accidental damage.

To date, work has mainly focused on mitigating the vulnerabilities of enterprise systems used to manage information and data within nuclear facilities and supply chains.  This work needs to extend to industrial control systems.

Nuclear facilities benefit from robust safety mechanisms which have been strengthened and developed over several decades.  In addition to physical, logical, and human based controls, there has been an increase in the use of information technology to form part of the safety and security aspects of plant control systems, as well as nuclear material accountancy and control.  More information on the use of information technology and the associated threats and vulnerabilities in this context is needed to inform continuous security improvements.

The Initiative

The States listed above agree, as resources permit, to participate in two international workshops on this topic in 2016.  These workshops will enable States and their nuclear sectors to share good practice in managing risks to industrial control systems in nuclear sites, as well as examine the impact of using information technology in managing safety and security aspects of plant control systems.

These workshops will focus on areas including:

• Threats and vulnerabilities, through considering case studies of recent incidents;
• Potential or known incidents which can impact on control systems, through an interactive approach;
• Technical and management challenges of managing risksto legacy systems;
• Technical and management challenges of assuring new build nuclear and supply chains
• Incident response and recovery.
• Managing public/media expectation in light of an incident.

Outcomes and Next Steps

The States listed above propose to present the findings of this work at the Ministerial segment of the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security, in Vienna in December 2016 to contribute to IAEA efforts to increase cyber security at nuclear facilities, building on the IAEA International Conference on Computer Security in a Nuclear World held in June 2015. 

Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security

JOINT STATEMENT in the context of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit

Forensics in Nuclear Security                                                                     

Applying science to investigate the illicit use of nuclear or other radioactive material is a crucial element of nuclear security.  Nuclear forensic science assists in determining the provenance of materials encountered out of regulatory control by focusing on the questions that would be asked by regulatory authorities or law enforcement investigators.

This gift basket records the intent of 30 countries[1] to advance nuclear forensics as a key element of effective nuclear security. This may be accomplished by incorporating nuclear forensics as an important element of a nation’s coordinated response, cultivating and sustaining expertise in the fundamental scientific disciplines; and advocating for and supporting international efforts where the implementation of both traditional and nuclear forensic capabilities may be enhanced through sharing.

The Forensics in Nuclear Security Gift Basket presented at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit raised awareness about good practices employed by practitioners, developed education and training curricula, and advanced international collaboration through a common lexicon and knowledge platform.  Continued effort is needed to strengthen and sustain national nuclear forensic capabilities through their inclusion in national response plans and communicating what nuclear forensics can provide to stakeholders.

Recognizing that practical implementation and sustainment of nuclear forensic capabilities are an enduring component of nuclear security, States that subscribe to this Joint Statement commit to one or more of the following elements: 

• Develop and sustain expertise through actions such as cross-disciplinary training of traditional forensic and nuclear scientists, transferring knowledge to the next generation of practitioners, cultivating attractive career paths, and facilitating participation in international training including, but not limited to, those offered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), or the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). 
• Promote employment of existing national nuclear science capabilities to support nuclear forensics.
• Evaluate and adapt existing national response frameworks to incorporate the effective use of nuclear forensic capabilities.
• Advance and mature nuclear forensic expertise in other countries through efforts such as providing instruction at or hosting international courses or conferences, publishing techniques in peer-reviewed scholarly journals, or serving as leaders in relevant international groups.

[1] The following countries are signatories to this Joint Statement: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, ROK, Thailand, UK and USA. The following organization also supports this Joint Statement: INTERPOL]

Joint Statement on Maritime Supply Chain Security

2016 Nuclear Security Summit

Maritime Supply Chain Security Joint Statement 

Over the past decade, many countries have deployed radiation detection systems at their seaports as a key component of their national approach to combating nuclear and radiological smuggling.  These systems have detected numerous nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control (MORC) - some that pose security risks and others that just pose risks to public health and safety, or are of regulatory concern(e.g. contaminated goods and orphan sources).  Due to the complexity of the maritime system and the many stakeholders involved, it is clear that national, regional and international coordination in both the public and private sector is needed to secure this vector and enable the permanent removal of these materials from the maritime supply chain. 

With this in mind, 15 countries, nine international organizations, three terminal operators, and several academic representatives participated in a workshop from 16-18 November 2015, co-sponsored by the United States and the United Kingdom, focused on promoting radiation detection in the maritime supply chain and developing enhanced measures to permanently remove materials found out of regulatory control.  This workshop was in fulfillment of a commitment made at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in a joint statement on maritime supply chain security.  Workshop participants acknowledged that detection systems are an important tool in a nation’s approach to locating and securing MORC and identified a set of best practices and recommendations. 

Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Georgia, Israel, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States endorse the following best practices and recommendations identified at the November 2015 workshop.

Best Practices

Nations with detection programs have agreed to continue to share technical advice, lessons learned and best practices with one another and with those nations seeking to implement and sustain detection systems.  Specific examples of best practices include:

1. Plan for long-term sustainability of systems early in the process of developing and deploying radiation detection programs; 
2. Establish a comprehensive "end-to-end" regulatory framework that provides the necessary framework and authorities to all stakeholders involved in the detection, notification and response to materials found out of regulatory control;
3. Implement and institutionalize regular training and adaptive exercises that address evolving threats, operational challenges and security strategies of detection systems to verify that roles and responsibilities are clearly understood and that all relevant stakeholders maintain a state of readiness;
4. Take appropriate national-level measures at the material’s origin, in accordance with the IAEA Code of Conduct on Radioactive Sources, to ensure that radiological materials are controlled at the point of origin and prevented from entering the maritime supply chain.
5. Take appropriate measures to ensure that detected nuclear other radioactive materials are placed back under control in either the country responsible for the detection eventor the country of material origin, as appropriate; and
6. Report incidents involving MORC to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) in a timely manner and seek other formal and informal mechanisms to share information on detections, trends, and challenges in addressing MORC with regional and international partners.

Recommendations:

1. Seek opportunities and mechanisms to enhance communication between public and private stakeholders regarding the responsibilities and obligations associated with the removal of MORC from the maritime supply chain and to ensure feedback mechanisms for all parties in the ultimate resolution of MORC cases, as appropriate;Develop technical and operational solutions to reduce alarms from innocent, naturally occurring radioactive material (“NORM”) to protect commerce and to focus resources on detecting materials of concern;
2. Request that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continue to study technical and operational issues related to detection operations through cooperative research projects and other mechanisms as appropriate;
3. Request that INTERPOL continue and enhance current efforts to ensure that threat information flows from law enforcement to front line officers (i.e. Customs and Border Protection) involved in detection operations;
4. Request that the World Customs Organization (WCO) expand its efforts to deploy a common communication platform between customs organisations, which could be leveraged to facilitate timely information sharing in member states on detections, trends and challenges in addressing MORC; and
5. Investigate whether the WCO or other appropriate organisations could expand their efforts to facilitate information sharing that goes beyond customs organisations to regulators or other applicable organisations in order to allow all those organisations involved in the detection and removal of MORC to share timely information, ensure that material is permanently removed from the supply chain and correctly disposed of. 

The United States and the United Kingdom will document and share these and other best practices and recommendations with the international community. 

Joint Statement on National Nuclear Detection Architecture

Nuclear Security Summit 2016

Statement on National Nuclear Detection Architectures

Introduction

This gift basket records the intent of Finland, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Morocco, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam and INTERPOL to demonstrate their commitment to develop national-level nuclear detection architectures and strengthen regional efforts as an effective capability in combating illicit trafficking and malevolent use of nuclear and other radioactive materials. An integral part of this commitment is international cooperation to promote key architecture elements and principles as well as to address common challenges and mitigation strategies.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a central role in nuclear security worldwide, including in the field of nuclear detection and cooperation.  Other international fora support international cooperation on nuclear detection, most notably, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).  Similarly, the Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction assists in providing practical assistance on nuclear and radiological security, upon state’s requests, and so supports the work of the IAEA.

IAEA

Through its Nuclear Security Programme, the IAEA supports States in their efforts to establish, maintain and sustain an effective nuclear security detection architecture. The IAEA has adopted a comprehensive approach to nuclear security and has elaborated guidance of major importance[1].  These publications aim at advocating the development and improvement of a nuclear security detection architecture that integrates comprehensive detection capabilities and measures and associated resources to improve a nation’s ability to detect nuclear and radiological threats.  

GICNT

Nuclear detection is a core nuclear security objective for the GICNT. GICNT activities bring critical added value to nuclear detection work through identifying cross-cutting issues, suggesting new solutions and promoting inter-disciplinary and inter-agency cooperation.

Good practices related to nuclear detection are shared, collected and developed under the auspices of the GICNT. They can contribute to producing, assessing and updating IAEA publications.  Frequent scenario-based discussions, table-top exercises and field exercises of the GICNT enhance expertise and skills of members of the global nuclear security community.

Commitments

On the occasion of the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, we the parties to this Statement reaffirm our commitment to improving further our national detection architectures with the goal to combat illicit trafficking and to prevent malicious acts.

We commit ourselves to efficient use of available nuclear detection resources as well as to avoiding duplication of work between IAEA, GICNT and other relevant bodies.

We further reaffirm our commitment to the IAEA’s recommendations, giving particular attention to the following principles:

• An effective nuclear security detection architecture should be derived from a comprehensive, integrated detection strategy prepared by the State; 
• The national nuclear security detection architecture should take into consideration that individual organizations’ roles in the fieldof detection are unambiguously clear;
• Nuclear security culture is an effective tool that can strengthen the efficiency of the nuclear security detection systems; 
•  Implementation should account for and integrate border and interior detection capabilities.

We reaffirm, also, our determination to maintain our contributions to the development of the IAEA’s guidance document in the field of detection.

To promote and improve international awareness and understanding of the importance of a national-level nuclear detection architecture, we also advocate and support the work of the IAEA’speriodic review workshops during which participating nations can share good practices and lessons learned and discuss challenges, mitigation strategies, and long-term sustainability approaches.  The IAEA will conduct the first such workshop in Seam Reap, Cambodia in April 2016. 

GICNT Partners joining to this Statement reaffirm their commitment to actively participate and contribute to nuclear detection work that takes place in the Global Initiative. 

[1] As a critical part of this approach, the IAEA published Nuclear Security Series No. 21; Implementing Guide on Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for the Detection of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control. 

Joint Statement on Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness and Response

Joint Statement on Supporting Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism

Preparedness and Response Capabilities 

Subscribed by Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the United Nations and INTERPOL.

A nuclear terror event anywhere in the world would have devastating human, environmental, economic, and political consequences. Building on the Summit’s nuclear terrorism prevention and nuclear and radiological material security accomplishments and efforts, wethe Parties to this statement recognize the need for ensuring adequate nuclear emergency preparedness and response capabilities.  Such capabilities contribute tofurther reducing not onlythe risks posed by nuclear or radiological terrorism (hereafter, “nuclear terrorism”), but also the risks posed by other malicious activities or accidents involving nuclear or radiological materials and facilities.Ensuring preparedness in National capabilities to counter and respond to nuclear terror acts is a critical task for all Nations, as exemplified by the Scenario-Based Policy Discussions successfully completed by participating nations as part ofthe 2016 Summit.  Nuclear terrorism preparedness requires a range of activities to establish,enhance, sustain, and exercise the capabilities necessary to counter and respond to nuclear terror incidents. Nuclear terrorism response requires a range of technical, operational, and communications capabilities toprovide coordination and resolution of the incident, as well as mitigatingits consequences.

Consistent with the Nuclear Security Summit goal of reducing the threat posed by nuclear terrorism and furthering the 2014 Hague Summit Communique pledge to “maintain effective emergency preparedness, response, and mitigation capabilities,”we the parties to this statementrecognize that ensuring adequate nuclear terrorismpreparedness and response capabilities complements international nuclear security efforts.  We also recognize that adequate nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities contribute to strengthening the interface between nuclear safety and security, and serve as a potential deterrent to attack.

Nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities include the following capabilities:

• National policies and plans:Establish and maintainadequate National response plans and policies regarding preparedness, response, and mitigation of incidents and threats of nuclear terrorism, including guidance forlocalplanning in responding to such threats and incidents.
• Technical expertise and capabilities:Identify, confirm, assess, and respond to nuclear terror incidentsand threats, including radiological characterization and assessments to inform protective actions, emergency medical training and response support, and decontamination tools and training.
• Public communications and education: Develop and maintainstrategic communications and effective public messaging providing not only public safety awareness and emergency readiness in the event of a nuclear terror incident but also mechanisms and procedures for ensuring prompt dissemination of public safety information to potentially affected communities.
• Sustainment of capabilities:  Sustain necessary capabilities through continuing education, training, and exercises involving National and local officials and multinational partners charged with nuclear terrorism preparedness, response, or associated decision-making.
• International coordination and assistance mechanisms: Per the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and other relevant international legal instruments, and considering multilateral mechanisms and initiatives such as offered by the United Nations (UN), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), INTERPOL, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,establish mechanisms for requesting and/or providing (as appropriate):
  • Nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capacity building, 
  • As required, post-event mutualassistance offered by the State Partiesof the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency,
  • Government-to-Government coordination and communication in the event of nuclear terrorism.

Recognizing that an act of nuclear terrorism anywhere in the world would have global impacts affecting all Nations, wethe parties to this statement affirm ourwillingnessto cooperate to strengthen National and international nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities.  We agree on the following commitments in support of this objective:

• Ensure adequate National nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities at home.  We the parties to this statement reaffirm our National commitment to establish and maintain the National-level capabilities required for nuclear terrorism preparedness and response.We also commit to conductcomprehensivenuclear terrorism preparedness and response drills, incorporating roles and responsibilities at the National and local levels to foster strong interagency cooperation across law enforcement, medical, technical/scientific, and policy agencies.  We commit to strengthen our National interagency coordination, cooperation, and information-sharing mechanisms needed in this regard, to support whole-of-government crisis response.
• Support sharing relevant resources, expertise, and good practices, in order to strengthen global nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities, including relevant post-event mutual assistance.  Consistent with our respectiveinternational legal obligations,we the parties to this statementagree in principle to support--at the bilateral level, upon request--relevant expertise, training, or other related resources supporting nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilitieswith interested states, as well as offer relevant post-event mutual assistanceincluding through the IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET). We recognize that requests for bilateral assistance must be evaluated by the States involved on a case by case basis and would be subject to availability of resources, legal considerations, and other concerns.  However, we the parties to this statement recognize the importance of supporting nuclear terrorismpreparedness and response capacities and thus encourage bilateral and multilateral dialogue and coordination on how best to assure adequate global preparedness and response capabilities.As such, we also commit to making available relevant expertise or experience via international and multilateral effortsas the UN, IAEA, INTERPOL, GICNT, and the GP.  National Points of Contact will be provided, in addition to IAEA, INTERPOL, GICNT, and GP points of contact,to support the coordination and evaluation of requests and offers of assistance.
• Support for international best practice guidance on preparedness and resilience objectives and the specific capabilities needed to meet them, as published by the organizations listed above,including the IAEA Nuclear Security Series 15 - Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, the IAEA Safety Series GSR Part 7 on Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism’s Fundamentals for Establishing and Maintaining a Nuclear Security Response Framework ,which build on the aforementioned core competencies We the parties to this statement recognize these documents as an excellent foundation for States wishing to establish or sustain baseline nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities, and actively support the broadest possible international application and use of these documents.
• Share lessons learned from real world incidents (i.e., nuclear and radiological incidents, materials out of regulatory control, significant all hazards-related emergency response efforts, etc.) that have implications for or applications to nuclear terrorism preparedness, response, and mitigation, in order to incorporate this experience into Preparedness and Response capabilities nationally and internationally.
• Encourage and support National and State/local-level full field and table-top exercises aimed at ensuring nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities.  As appropriate, participating countries to the exercises will encourage reciprocal, bilateral observation of National and transborder exercises, with a view towards sharing good practices in sustaining preparedness and response capabilities, while ensuring confidentiality of sensitive information.We the parties to this statementcommit, as far as resources permit, to host, observe, or support the development and implementation of radiological emergency management exercises (REMEX) under the GICNT’s Response and Mitigation Working Group.  REMEXs emphasize the importance of international cooperation in preparedness and resilience by providing the opportunity for two or more governments to collaboratively exercise response capabilities for nuclear terrorism with bilateral or multilateral scenarios.  REMEXs also provide a venue for sharing the good practices and lessons learned from other national and State/local-level exercises encouraged under this gift basket.  

Joint Statement on Nuclear Training and Support Centres

Joint statement on

Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres / Centres of Excellence 

Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, Vietnam, INTERPOL and the United Nations

Italy hosted the 2014 Gift Basket on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres/Centres of Excellence (NSSC/CoE) following the 2012 Gift Basket hosted by the United States.  The 2014 Gift Basket attracted a large number of co-sponsoring Summit participants promoting the importance of nuclear security training and support centres, and the value of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres Network (NSSC Network) in strengthening international and regional cooperation and collaboration.  Now that the IAEA NSSC Network is maturing and a number of nuclear security training and support centers are being established, these centres can play an increasingly important and active role in promoting nuclear security.  These centres help meet domestic nuclear security needs, and can also provide an important platform for sharing resources and meeting needs on a regional basis, thus strengthening and sustaining the global nuclear security architecture.

In support of the IAEA NSSC Network and nuclear security training and support centre sustainability, the participants to the 2016 Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres / Centres of Excellence Gift Basket intend, within available resources, to support the following activities.

Strengthening of the IAEA NSSC Network

•    Nuclear security training and support centres not yet a member of the IAEA NSSC Network commit to join the Network and make every effort to take part in the IAEA NSSC Network activities, including meetings.

Establishment of regional networks

•    Building upon the establishment of the Asia Regional Network through the IAEA NSSC Network, establish additional networks with nuclear security training and support centres in the same region and mechanisms of regional coordination to promote best practices, exchange training experiences, share curricula and other activities on a regional basis. 

•    In collaboration with the IAEA NSSC network, share experiences in training with centres outside their region.

Strengthening nuclear security training and technical support programmes

•    Improve the quality of training by conducting peer review exchanges with other nuclear security training and support centres and by making use of the IAEA NSSC Network as a mechanism to promote peer-review exchanges.

•    Use IAEA material/guidance as a mechanism to achieve consistency in the technical content of the training programmes on nuclear security and participate in IAEA Train-the-Trainer activities to build a network of instructors qualified to deliver IAEA training course materials. 

•    Organize and be active participants in the development and running of nuclear and radiological security scenarios and exercises.

•    Share experiences and nuclear security training with other training centres and centres of excellence, as appropriate, as well as lessons learned through the IAEA NSSC network and IAEA Nuclear Security Information Portal (NUSEC).

•    Use IAEA material/guidance to support training programmes in key technical topics such as nuclear security culture, nuclear material accounting and control, computer security, transportation security, and insider threat mitigation. 

•    As appropriate, consider certification of nuclear security training and support centre training programmes, as per ISO 29990 and/or utilize applicable ISO best practices to support continuous improvement.
  
•    Collaborate with the Global Partnership’s Centre of Excellence Sub-working Group to implement this Gift Basket as noted in the Global Partnership Nuclear Security Summit Action Plan.

Sustainability

•    Focus attention on and build mechanisms to ensure the sustainability of nuclear security training and support centres, including developing business plans and e-learning tools, conducting needs analysis and regular evaluation of effectiveness, and identifying required financial, administrative and human resources.

•    Provide training, technical and scientific support to competent authorities to strengthen long-term sustainability of domestic nuclear and radiological security regimes. 

•    Broaden and strengthen international cooperation with the United Nations, especially United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540-related efforts, with INTERPOL, the Global Partnership, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and others.

Cooperation

•    Collaborate with educational institutions that teach nuclear security subjects to include nuclear security culture. Continue, improve, and expand the NSSC Network’s collaboration with the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN).

•    Cooperate in the area of research and development with national and international institutes to promote scientific advancements in nuclear security and continuous engagement of the scientific communities.

•    Engage industry and civil society through constant dialogue on the importance of nuclear security.

•    Promote public confidence in nuclear and radiological security.

Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004)

Joint Statement on

Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Recognizing that United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 (hereinafter “1540 Committee”) are key parts of the international legal architecture for States to prevent and combat nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the full implementation of UNSCR 1540 is a long-term endeavour that requires both political and technical action at national, sub-regional, regional and international levels.

Recalling the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and Work Plan, the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, and the follow-up Resolutions of UNSCR 1540, particularly UNSCR 1977 (2011), which underscored the important role of UNSCR 1540 in strengthening global nuclear security and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the 1540 Committee will be completing  its second Comprehensive Review in 2016 on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540, as set forth by UNSCR 1977 (2011). This Review provides an opportunity for the 1540 Committee to take stock of national and international progress in implementing UNSCR 1540 since the previous Comprehensive Review in 2009, and to put forward key findings and recommendations that will contribute to more effective implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Welcoming the contributions of States for updating and submitting reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 with the view of the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Reaffirming our commitment to the Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 delivered at the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit.

Noting that since the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, co-signatories have advanced national efforts to further the implementation of UNSCR 1540 by providing support for the 1540 Committee’s main areas of work, including, inter alia: monitoring implementation of the Resolution; providing capacity building assistance at the technical level to requesting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations; preparing and submitting UNSCR 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; organizing or supporting regional and sub-regional training seminars, exercises and initiatives; convening workshops to help facilitate the implementation of UNSCR 1540 into national legislation; conducting outreach to stakeholders in industry, civil society and academia; and strengthening cooperation with regional organizations such as the African Union, ASEAN, the Caribbean Community, and the European Union.

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We, the Governments of Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, with the support of the United Nations, the European Union and INTERPOL, reaffirm our commitment to the full and universal implementation of UNSCR 1540, including the implementation of obligations to enhance the security of nuclear materials worldwide in line with the objectives of the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and institutional Action Plans. We reiterate our support for the activities of the 1540 Committee and the Group of Experts. We also reaffirm our commitment to fully implement UNSCR 1540 in our respective States, in areas where we have not already done so, and further undertake to:

1.       Work with and provide information to the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts for the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

2.       Consider providing additional support and assistance in fulfilling the Action Plan in support of the United Nations, particularly actions aimed at facilitating national and regional implementation of UNSCR 1540 and its nuclear security obligations, with a view to helping requesting States to fully implement UNSCR 1540 by 2021, as referenced in the UNSC Presidential Statement of 7 May 2014;

3.       Encourage states to submit reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 on a regular basis, and focussing outreach on states yet to submit a first report to the 1540 Committee;

4.       Advocate for international, regional, and sub-regional organizations that have not yet done so to designate a Point of Contact (PoC) or coordinator on the implementation of UNSCR 1540 in order to facilitate regional approaches to assisting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations and enhance coordination for their UNSCR 1540 implementation efforts;

5.       Consider providing funding, where feasible, to organizations requesting for supporting their PoCs or coordinators for the implementation UNSCR 1540;

6.       Enhance coordination through outreach events with a wide range of domestic stakeholders such as industry, parliamentarians, civil society and academia, and develop appropriate ways to inform these stakeholders of their obligations pursuant to domestic laws relating to the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

7.       Consider organizing joint exercises at the national, regional or international levels that demonstrate ways of reinforcing national and regional capacities and international cooperation for better implementation of UNSCR 1540, and encourage the participation of relevant international organizations and initiatives;

8.       Advocate for the 1540 Committee to continue to strengthen cooperation with other relevant international organizations and initiatives, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, other United Nations entities, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership), as well as regional and sub-regional organizations in promoting the implementation of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit institutional Action Plans;

9.       Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to enhance their cooperation with other relevant entities in the United Nations system, such as the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)- and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), including through strengthening the legal framework to prohibit illicit activities, export controls, border security, and other measures that support obligations under UNSCR 1540, and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate through joint country visits to monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

10.    Consider further enhancing the cooperation between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UNSCR 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts on strengthening nuclear security, through opportunities such as: enhancing complementarity and reducing duplication, including by using Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSP) to inform voluntary 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; coordinating with the IAEA’s International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) on outreach to academia relevant to implementing UNSCR 1540 and the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC) Network on outreach to nuclear security training centers; exploring establishing a liaison between the 1540 Committee and the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security;

11.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue collaborative efforts and interactions with INTERPOL regarding assistance requests and training opportunities;

12.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue to participate in GICNT exercises, workshops and events that focus on building and enhancing nuclear forensics, detection and response capabilities;

13.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to develop strong UNSCR 1540 assistance requests that are sufficiently detailed to support responses from potential assistance providers, including through the Global Partnership. In this context, consideration should be given to strengthening the 1540 Committee’s “match-making” mechanism and coordination with assistance providers, including at the regional level, through the Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540;

14.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to address new and emerging WMD threats relevant to the obligations and recommendations of the resolution; and

15.    Advocate for increased contributions, where feasible, to the UN Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities dedicated to supporting UNSCR 1540 implementation and the work of the 1540 Committee.

Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security Architecture

JOINT STATEMENT ON SUSTAINING ACTION TO

STRENGTHEN GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

The Nuclear Security Summit process has led to significant achievements in nuclear security at national, regional, and global levels; but the work of building a strengthened, sustained, and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture – consisting of legal instruments, international organizations and initiatives, internationally accepted guidance, and best practices – requires continuous attention.

We need sustained action and ambition on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit to address continuing and evolving nuclear security challenges, with the objectives of advancing implementation of nuclear security commitments and building a strengthened, sustainable and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture.

The Governments of Argentina, Armenia, ­­­­­Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Republic of Korea, Romania, Poland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, and the following international organizations: INTERPOL and United Nations, aiming to facilitate cooperation and sustain activity on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, commit to:

• Establish a Nuclear Security Contact Group; and
• Designate an appropriately authorized and informed senior official or officials to participate in the Contact Group.

The Contact Group is tasked with:

• Convening annually on the margins of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and, as may be useful, in connection with other related meetings;
• Discussing a broad range of nuclear security-related issues, including identifying emerging trends that may require more focused attention;
• Promoting and assessing implementation of nuclear security commitments, including those made during the Nuclear Security Summit process, reflected in the four Nuclear Security Summit Communiqués, the 2010 Washington Work Plan, the 2016 Action Plans, national commitments and associated joint statements, and gift baskets;
• Developing and maintaining linkages to nongovernmental experts and nuclear industry; and,
• Determining any additional steps that may be appropriate to support these goals.

The Contact Group may also consider and make recommendations to their respective leaders on convening any future Nuclear Security Summits.

We welcome the participation of all countries that subscribe to the goals set out in this Joint Statement and wish to contribute to the work of the Contact Group.

National Statement: Spain

STATEMENT OF SPAIN AT THE NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT 2016 

The Nuclear Security Summit process started in 2010 and represents a landmark in the international community’s efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism. For the first time, a multilateral initiative is addressing new security threats with a preventive approach, in order to avoid terrorist attacks going beyond the conventional forms of terrorism. Moreover, this is an ambitious initiative in which national security capabilities and international cooperation reinforce each other.  Spain, with decades of counterterrorist experience and a wide-ranging nuclear infrastructure, has been from the very outset an active participant in the Summit process.

Throughout all these years, it has become increasingly clear that there is a need for a coherent and effective global nuclear security architecture, based on integrating the efforts and synergies coming from the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, INTERPOL, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Global Partnership. As a result of this collective effort five different Action Plans have been submitted to support these multilateral organizations and initiatives to be endorsed by the participating Governments at this Washington Summit.

The Government of Spain would like to take advantage of this opportunity to reaffirm its national and international commitments in priority areas for our national security and for that of other friendly nations.

-          Firstly, we must continue our efforts to foster in Spain a culture of nuclear security, including training activities in cooperation with our law enforcement agencies, the industry and academia. Spain also stands ready to share this experience with other countries. 

• Secondly, we will reinforce our national forensic analysis capabilities on nuclear issues of our State Security Forces.
• Thirdly, we will focus our efforts on developing cybersecurity capabilities, particularly for nuclear facilities, within the framework of the National Cybersecurity Plan.
• The fourth priority area for Spain is nuclear security in maritime transport, including security management at Spanish ports. To this end we will carry out exercises focused on strategic areas, in accordance with the objectives of our Plan on National Maritime Security.
• It is also important to raise awareness, at every level, on the security of radioactive sources, which are very widely used in hospitals and industry across Spain. In addition to promoting the entry into force of the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (1987) and the implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005), the Government of Spain believes that the implementation and promotion of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Code of Conduct in this area, both at national and international levels, is an issue of vital importance for security, given the high number of these sources in use, and the special nature of management, decommissioning and storage processes.

The Spanish Government attaches great importance to a pragmatic approach in all these areas, which will require conducting practical exercises, both at national level and in cooperation with other countries.

The threat of nuclear terrorism requires a global response. This is why international efforts are so important. In this sense, Spain considers vital our cooperation with the United Nations, the IAEA, and INTERPOL, and we highly value the contribution of other initiatives in this area, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the Global Partnership, which offer adequate and flexible frameworks for international cooperation through a pragmatic approach.

In the recent years, the international community has made important steps against the threat of nuclear terrorism, including the Nuclear Security Summit process.

Spain attaches great importance to Security Council Resolution 1540, and chairs in 2015-16 the 1540 Committee that monitors and promotes the implementation of this resolution. Spain encourages all States to participate in a constructive manner in the 1540 Comprehensive Review to take place this year in order to urgently strengthen the capacity of the international community to face such a threat to international peace and security.

At international level, Spain works within a privileged cooperation framework with the European Union, Latin-American and Mediterranean countries. In recent years, this policy has borne fruits such as the progress made with Morocco through a bilateral Action Plan, launched in collaboration with the IAEA, including noteworthy results as the Gate to Africa exercise in October 2015 on the security of transport of radioactive sources.

Spain and Morocco have made substantial joint progress on combating the risk of nuclear terrorism.  With the Gate to Africa exercise, we have improved law enforcement coordination and response capabilities when addressing a radiological emergency caused by a terrorist attack. Sixty-four observers from the IAEA Member States and representatives from seven international organizations took part in this exercise, which constituted a major contribution to strengthening the international nuclear security system.

This bilateral relationship between Morocco and Spain has set an international standard that will be promoted as a model at other international fora, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the IAEA.

Fortunately, the world has not yet experienced the impact of nuclear terrorism. However, we know that the threat exists. As members of our Governments, it is our duty to protect our citizens, doing everything in our reach to prevent terrorist attacks with unpredictable consequences—and, should they occur, to stand ready to respond effectively to defend the victims and enforce the law.

National Progress Report: Spain

I. INTRODUCTION

At The Hague Summit 2014, the Spanish Government pledged to carry out a series of measures that would contribute to improving Global Nuclear Security. These are: (1) Promoting the entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM); (2) Developing a National Plan for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540; (3) Fostering a nuclear security culture on a national scale; (4) Joining the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

In order to strengthen specific technical areas of nuclear security, Spain supported the following Gift Baskets: (1) the National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security; (2) Strengthening the nuclear security implementation; (3) Forensics in Nuclear security; (4) Enhancing the security of the maritime supply chain; (5) Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres/Centres of Excellence.

This report focuses on the measures adopted for legal and regulatory development; for developing technical, human and operational capabilities to ensure the security of nuclear and radioactive material and facilities; and for strengthening international bilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation.

II. LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: National Implementation and Support for the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and UN Security Council Resolution 1540

1)     In 2007 Spain ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Since then Spain has been integrating the provisions of this Convention into its national legal system and has been working for the international promotion of the entry into force of this Amendment.

2)      Since The Hague Summit, Spain has made remarkable progress in adapting its legal and regulatory framework to the international instruments and regulations. More specifically, in September 2015 Spain approved a new National Security Act (Ley 36/2015 of 28 de September) which defines the national security system, assigns responsibilities to the different departments of the Government, and organizes the management of prevention and response to national threats.

Furthermore, Spain has amended and updated its regulations for the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities (RD 1308/2011) through a new Royal Decree 1086/2015 of 4 December, with the aim of: (1) Incorporating the new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommendations; (2) Adapting it to the new threats, including cyber and insider threats; (3) Improving law enforcement forces response; (4) Incorporating the basic elements of the new 2013 national cyber-security strategy; (5) Taking into account experience and lessons learned since the ratification in 2007 of the Amendment to the Convention (CPPNM).

In order to foster the entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the 1987 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Spain’s embassies with representation in 37 States have carried out demarches aimed at accelerating their ratification process of this Amendment.

3)      The Spanish “National Security Council” approved the National Action Plan for Compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on 24 April 2015. The 1540 Action Plan establishes appropriate measures for the full implementation of Resolution 1540 and those of nuclear security in particular. In addition, from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2016, Spain is chairing the 1540 Committee of the UN Security Council. In 2016 Spain will lead the “Global Review” for a full and universal implementation of Resolution 1540.

III. DEVELOPING NATIONAL CAPABILITIES: National Security and Security of Nuclear and Radioactive Material and Facilities

1. Security of Material and Facilities

Spain has made substantial progress on the security of its nuclear material and facilities: (1) The Physical Protection Plans for nuclear facilities have been amended, incorporating protection criteria specified in the national Regulations on Protection of Critical Infrastructures (Act 8/2014 and RD 704/2011); (2) A new protection model has been developed for the comprehensive protection of nuclear facilities by Security Forces; (3) Insider Trustworthiness programmes have been developed for monitoring personnel at nuclear facilities; (4) Criteria have been included for protecting data and computerized control systems in the physical protection plans.

Regarding the security of transportation of nuclear and other radioactive materials, the Spanish Nuclear Regulatory Authority (Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear, CSN) continues to develop technical standards on transport security. In this regard, the Ministry of the Interior organized in 2015 a national exercise on security in land transportation of spent fuel from nuclear power plants.

As regards the security of radioactive sources, the CSN is drawing up the technical standards on the requirements for the physical protection of sources in categories 1, 2 and 3, as well as the practices to guarantee the physical protection of those in categories 4 and 5. Spain continues to provide support to other States for them to strengthen security measures for their radioactive sources. Spain also chairs the open-ended international Working Group on developing international guidance for the security of disused radioactive sources, to complement the provisions of the “Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources”.

The Spanish Nuclear regulatory Authority (CSN), together with the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, is organizing the “Second International Regulators Conference on Nuclear Security” which will take place in Madrid in May 2016.

2. Developing Nuclear Detection and Nuclear Forensic Techniques

Spain continued developing its national nuclear detection architecture. Spain’s current detection capabilities make it possible to carry out radiological monitoring on more than 80% of the national maritime cargo containers. Progress continues on the development and implementation of the national plan for nuclear radiation detection in cross-border areas. In addition, with the participation of the Ministry of Defence, a National Maritime Security Strategy has been adopted. A Spanish delegation participated in the international Nuclear Security Summit Maritime Security Workshop organized by the United Kingdom and the United States in November 2015. The international experts agreed on the need to review the duties of customs agents and to develop comprehensive nuclear security systems in port facilities.

Spain’s National Nuclear Forensics Task Force, led by the Ministry of the Interior, is now working towards establishing a technical-operational procedure which will integrate all the technical areas and operational groups involved in Nuclear Forensics, including prevention, detection and respond to nuclear security events.

3. Promoting a Nuclear Security Culture: Technological and Human Capacity-Building

Spanish institutions regularly organize, in cooperation with the IAEA, national and international courses on nuclear security. As part of these activities, Spain organized, together with the IAEA, an International Workshop on Nuclear Security Culture in Madrid from 29 February to 4 March 2016. Seventy international experts from 40 countries convened in Madrid to work, together with Spanish experts, with the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Culture Model for nuclear facilities.

As part of national efforts to promote security culture and to develop know-how and technologies relating to nuclear security, Spain’s National Centre for Energy, Environmental and Technological Research (CIEMAT) has signed specific agreements with the European Commission’s Research Centres seeking to promote human and technological capacity-building in the physical protection of nuclear and radioactive material and associated facilities. In this context, CIEMAT has established joint training programmes with national Law Enforcement Forces and the Army.

In order to promote nuclear security in Spanish industry, it is worth noting that the Spanish Nuclear Society, a non-profit association of professionals and institutions, held its annual meetings in the autumn of 2014 and 2015. These meetings include the participation of representatives from the nuclear industry and academia and, increasingly, presentations on nuclear security.

IV. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: International Coordination, Cooperation with International Organizations and Initiatives, Multilateral and Bilateral Relations

1. Support for the Nuclear Security Summits Process

Spain has been very present and active in the Nuclear Security Summits process. In Washington Spain will support the official Communiqué and the five institutional Action Plans. Spain, together with Morocco, has led and successfully concluded the preparation of the Action Plan supporting the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). Spain, together with Canada and the Republic of Korea, has prepared and submitted to the Summit a “Joint Statement” for improving the implementation of Resolution 1540.

2. Support for the IAEA’s Nuclear Security-Related Activities

Spain has made a contribution to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund. Spanish experts participate in nuclear security-related activities organized by the IAEA. Spain is a permanent member of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Standards Committee and it is represented on the Organizing Committee for the Second International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Security to be held in Vienna in late 2016. Spain contributes actively to the development and implementation of the IAEA’s technical programme and it is an active member of the Illicit Trafficking Database. During this period, Spain has contributed with technical experts to the improvement and implementation of International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions.

3. Contribution to Other International Nuclear Security-Related Initiatives: The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and The G7 Global Partnership

In 2014, 2015 and 2016, Spain continued to play a key role in the GICNT. During these years, Spain has insisted on the need to prioritize practical activities, such as technical workshops and exercises on realistic security scenarios. At the Plenary Meeting held in Helsinki in 2015, Spain presented its strategic proposals for the Initiative’s future: (1) Review, in light of the rapid evolution of terrorist threats, the Initiative’s priorities and technical working plans on the basis of its eight principles; (2) Promote technological development and scientific knowledge, among the Initiative’s members, with regard to combating nuclear terrorism.

In compliance with the commitment it undertook at the latest Nuclear Security Summit, in 2014 Spain joined the G7 Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

4. Bilateral Cooperation

Spain has continued to work with the international community to prevent and improve response to security incidents related to nuclear and radioactive material and facilities. Particularly relevant here is the cooperation with Morocco. Spain and Morocco have made substantial joint progress on combating nuclear terrorism and establishing a system to enable enhanced protection of nuclear and radioactive material and their associated facilities. As part of this joint effort, Spain and Morocco organized in Madrid, from 27 to 19 October 2015, and in collaboration with the IAEA, a joint exercise called Gate to Africa, on security in the transportation of radioactive sources. Sixty-four observers from the IAEA Member States and representatives from seven international organizations took part in the Gate to Africa exercise, which constituted a major contribution to strengthening the international nuclear security system.

This bilateral relationship between Morocco and Spain, established during the past eight years, has set an international standard that will be promoted as a model at the GICNT and the IAEA.

2014 Progress Report Spain

2014 Progress Report Spain

Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres - Centres of Excellence→

Joint statement on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres / Centres of Excellence for the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit Submitted by Italy

Maritime Supply Chain Security: Enhancing the Security of the Maritime Supply Chain

Enhancing the Security of the Maritime Supply Chain

Joint Statement on the National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security

Joint Statement on the National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security

Joint Statement on UNSCR 1540

Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540

Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation

Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation

Statement on Nuclear Information Security (UK)→

Statement on Nuclear Information Security: Progress update