Joint Statement on Countering Nuclear Smuggling

2016 Statement of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling

At the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Nuclear Security Summits, participating nations agreed on Communiqués and Work Plans that included actions aimed at thwarting the illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials. The following countries recognize that identifying nuclear smugglers, detecting and recovering nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, and prosecuting those responsible are important and effective activities to help prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear or other radioactive materials: Australia, Canada, Chile, China,  the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,  France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan,  The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, The Philippines, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom, The United States of America, INTERPOL, and the United Nations.

To follow through on these pledges, participating states are committed to working together to build and sustain national capabilities to counter the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials. These efforts may include:

1.     Designating a national team or task force to link law enforcement, intelligence, technical experts, and other relevant authorities to investigate nuclear trafficking networks and incidents;

2.     Developing plans that clearly outline individual agency roles and responsibilities when responding to incidents of material outside regulatory control;

3.     Developing a national level detection architecture as an element of a whole-of-government counter nuclear smuggling capability;

4.     Strengthening nuclear forensics capabilities to reliably analyze nuclear and other radioactive material discovered out of regulatory control;

5.     Increasing legal training for prosecutors to ensure conviction of smugglers, as appropriate;

6.     Developing laws, regulations, guidance and/or policies to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material;

7.     Strengthening bilateral, multilateral, and international information sharing and other cooperation, such as training and education, best practices exchanges, and exercises;

8.     Sharing applicable lead information through INTERPOL and acting on lead information received as an effective mechanism for identifying nuclear smuggling networks in a timely manner and to enhance cooperation;

9.     Sharing information on incidents involving nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control through the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Incident and Trafficking Database.


Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security

JOINT STATEMENT in the context of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit

Forensics in Nuclear Security                                                                     

Applying science to investigate the illicit use of nuclear or other radioactive material is a crucial element of nuclear security.  Nuclear forensic science assists in determining the provenance of materials encountered out of regulatory control by focusing on the questions that would be asked by regulatory authorities or law enforcement investigators.

This gift basket records the intent of 30 countries[1] to advance nuclear forensics as a key element of effective nuclear security. This may be accomplished by incorporating nuclear forensics as an important element of a nation’s coordinated response, cultivating and sustaining expertise in the fundamental scientific disciplines; and advocating for and supporting international efforts where the implementation of both traditional and nuclear forensic capabilities may be enhanced through sharing.

The Forensics in Nuclear Security Gift Basket presented at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit raised awareness about good practices employed by practitioners, developed education and training curricula, and advanced international collaboration through a common lexicon and knowledge platform.  Continued effort is needed to strengthen and sustain national nuclear forensic capabilities through their inclusion in national response plans and communicating what nuclear forensics can provide to stakeholders.

Recognizing that practical implementation and sustainment of nuclear forensic capabilities are an enduring component of nuclear security, States that subscribe to this Joint Statement commit to one or more of the following elements: 

  • Develop and sustain expertise through actions such as cross-disciplinary training of traditional forensic and nuclear scientists, transferring knowledge to the next generation of practitioners, cultivating attractive career paths, and facilitating participation in international training including, but not limited to, those offered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), or the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). 
  • Promote employment of existing national nuclear science capabilities to support nuclear forensics.
  • Evaluate and adapt existing national response frameworks to incorporate the effective use of nuclear forensic capabilities.
  • Advance and mature nuclear forensic expertise in other countries through efforts such as providing instruction at or hosting international courses or conferences, publishing techniques in peer-reviewed scholarly journals, or serving as leaders in relevant international groups.

[1] The following countries are signatories to this Joint Statement: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, ROK, Thailand, UK and USA. The following organization also supports this Joint Statement: INTERPOL]

Joint Statement on In Larger Security: A Comprehensive Approach to Nuclear Security

1. The need for a more encompassing view of various global nuclear challenges was the focus
of the Joint Statement “In larger security: a comprehensive approach to nuclear security",
issued at the 2014 Hague Summit. We believe the core message of that Joint Statement is still
valid and more urgent than ever.

Read More

Joint Statement on National Nuclear Detection Architecture

Nuclear Security Summit 2016

Statement on National Nuclear Detection Architectures


This gift basket records the intent of Finland, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Morocco, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam and INTERPOL to demonstrate their commitment to develop national-level nuclear detection architectures and strengthen regional efforts as an effective capability in combating illicit trafficking and malevolent use of nuclear and other radioactive materials. An integral part of this commitment is international cooperation to promote key architecture elements and principles as well as to address common challenges and mitigation strategies.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a central role in nuclear security worldwide, including in the field of nuclear detection and cooperation.  Other international fora support international cooperation on nuclear detection, most notably, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).  Similarly, the Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction assists in providing practical assistance on nuclear and radiological security, upon state’s requests, and so supports the work of the IAEA.


Through its Nuclear Security Programme, the IAEA supports States in their efforts to establish, maintain and sustain an effective nuclear security detection architecture. The IAEA has adopted a comprehensive approach to nuclear security and has elaborated guidance of major importance[1].  These publications aim at advocating the development and improvement of a nuclear security detection architecture that integrates comprehensive detection capabilities and measures and associated resources to improve a nation’s ability to detect nuclear and radiological threats.  


Nuclear detection is a core nuclear security objective for the GICNT. GICNT activities bring critical added value to nuclear detection work through identifying cross-cutting issues, suggesting new solutions and promoting inter-disciplinary and inter-agency cooperation.

Good practices related to nuclear detection are shared, collected and developed under the auspices of the GICNT. They can contribute to producing, assessing and updating IAEA publications.  Frequent scenario-based discussions, table-top exercises and field exercises of the GICNT enhance expertise and skills of members of the global nuclear security community.


On the occasion of the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, we the parties to this Statement reaffirm our commitment to improving further our national detection architectures with the goal to combat illicit trafficking and to prevent malicious acts.

We commit ourselves to efficient use of available nuclear detection resources as well as to avoiding duplication of work between IAEA, GICNT and other relevant bodies.

We further reaffirm our commitment to the IAEA’s recommendations, giving particular attention to the following principles:

  • An effective nuclear security detection architecture should be derived from a comprehensive, integrated detection strategy prepared by the State; 
  • The national nuclear security detection architecture should take into consideration that individual organizations’ roles in the fieldof detection are unambiguously clear;
  • Nuclear security culture is an effective tool that can strengthen the efficiency of the nuclear security detection systems; 
  •  Implementation should account for and integrate border and interior detection capabilities.

We reaffirm, also, our determination to maintain our contributions to the development of the IAEA’s guidance document in the field of detection.

To promote and improve international awareness and understanding of the importance of a national-level nuclear detection architecture, we also advocate and support the work of the IAEA’speriodic review workshops during which participating nations can share good practices and lessons learned and discuss challenges, mitigation strategies, and long-term sustainability approaches.  The IAEA will conduct the first such workshop in Seam Reap, Cambodia in April 2016. 

GICNT Partners joining to this Statement reaffirm their commitment to actively participate and contribute to nuclear detection work that takes place in the Global Initiative. 

[1] As a critical part of this approach, the IAEA published Nuclear Security Series No. 21; Implementing Guide on Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for the Detection of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control

Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004)

Joint Statement on

Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Recognizing that United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 (hereinafter “1540 Committee”) are key parts of the international legal architecture for States to prevent and combat nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the full implementation of UNSCR 1540 is a long-term endeavour that requires both political and technical action at national, sub-regional, regional and international levels.

Recalling the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and Work Plan, the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, and the follow-up Resolutions of UNSCR 1540, particularly UNSCR 1977 (2011), which underscored the important role of UNSCR 1540 in strengthening global nuclear security and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the 1540 Committee will be completing  its second Comprehensive Review in 2016 on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540, as set forth by UNSCR 1977 (2011). This Review provides an opportunity for the 1540 Committee to take stock of national and international progress in implementing UNSCR 1540 since the previous Comprehensive Review in 2009, and to put forward key findings and recommendations that will contribute to more effective implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Welcoming the contributions of States for updating and submitting reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 with the view of the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Reaffirming our commitment to the Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 delivered at the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit.

Noting that since the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, co-signatories have advanced national efforts to further the implementation of UNSCR 1540 by providing support for the 1540 Committee’s main areas of work, including, inter alia: monitoring implementation of the Resolution; providing capacity building assistance at the technical level to requesting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations; preparing and submitting UNSCR 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; organizing or supporting regional and sub-regional training seminars, exercises and initiatives; convening workshops to help facilitate the implementation of UNSCR 1540 into national legislation; conducting outreach to stakeholders in industry, civil society and academia; and strengthening cooperation with regional organizations such as the African Union, ASEAN, the Caribbean Community, and the European Union.

*  *  *

We, the Governments of Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, with the support of the United Nations, the European Union and INTERPOL, reaffirm our commitment to the full and universal implementation of UNSCR 1540, including the implementation of obligations to enhance the security of nuclear materials worldwide in line with the objectives of the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and institutional Action Plans. We reiterate our support for the activities of the 1540 Committee and the Group of Experts. We also reaffirm our commitment to fully implement UNSCR 1540 in our respective States, in areas where we have not already done so, and further undertake to:

1.       Work with and provide information to the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts for the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

2.       Consider providing additional support and assistance in fulfilling the Action Plan in support of the United Nations, particularly actions aimed at facilitating national and regional implementation of UNSCR 1540 and its nuclear security obligations, with a view to helping requesting States to fully implement UNSCR 1540 by 2021, as referenced in the UNSC Presidential Statement of 7 May 2014;

3.       Encourage states to submit reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 on a regular basis, and focussing outreach on states yet to submit a first report to the 1540 Committee;

4.       Advocate for international, regional, and sub-regional organizations that have not yet done so to designate a Point of Contact (PoC) or coordinator on the implementation of UNSCR 1540 in order to facilitate regional approaches to assisting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations and enhance coordination for their UNSCR 1540 implementation efforts;

5.       Consider providing funding, where feasible, to organizations requesting for supporting their PoCs or coordinators for the implementation UNSCR 1540;

6.       Enhance coordination through outreach events with a wide range of domestic stakeholders such as industry, parliamentarians, civil society and academia, and develop appropriate ways to inform these stakeholders of their obligations pursuant to domestic laws relating to the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

7.       Consider organizing joint exercises at the national, regional or international levels that demonstrate ways of reinforcing national and regional capacities and international cooperation for better implementation of UNSCR 1540, and encourage the participation of relevant international organizations and initiatives;

8.       Advocate for the 1540 Committee to continue to strengthen cooperation with other relevant international organizations and initiatives, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, other United Nations entities, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership), as well as regional and sub-regional organizations in promoting the implementation of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit institutional Action Plans;

9.       Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to enhance their cooperation with other relevant entities in the United Nations system, such as the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)- and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), including through strengthening the legal framework to prohibit illicit activities, export controls, border security, and other measures that support obligations under UNSCR 1540, and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate through joint country visits to monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

10.    Consider further enhancing the cooperation between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UNSCR 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts on strengthening nuclear security, through opportunities such as: enhancing complementarity and reducing duplication, including by using Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSP) to inform voluntary 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; coordinating with the IAEA’s International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) on outreach to academia relevant to implementing UNSCR 1540 and the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC) Network on outreach to nuclear security training centers; exploring establishing a liaison between the 1540 Committee and the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security;

11.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue collaborative efforts and interactions with INTERPOL regarding assistance requests and training opportunities;

12.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue to participate in GICNT exercises, workshops and events that focus on building and enhancing nuclear forensics, detection and response capabilities;

13.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to develop strong UNSCR 1540 assistance requests that are sufficiently detailed to support responses from potential assistance providers, including through the Global Partnership. In this context, consideration should be given to strengthening the 1540 Committee’s “match-making” mechanism and coordination with assistance providers, including at the regional level, through the Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540;

14.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to address new and emerging WMD threats relevant to the obligations and recommendations of the resolution; and

15.    Advocate for increased contributions, where feasible, to the UN Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities dedicated to supporting UNSCR 1540 implementation and the work of the 1540 Committee.

Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security Architecture



The Nuclear Security Summit process has led to significant achievements in nuclear security at national, regional, and global levels; but the work of building a strengthened, sustained, and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture – consisting of legal instruments, international organizations and initiatives, internationally accepted guidance, and best practices – requires continuous attention.

We need sustained action and ambition on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit to address continuing and evolving nuclear security challenges, with the objectives of advancing implementation of nuclear security commitments and building a strengthened, sustainable and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture.

The Governments of Argentina, Armenia, ­­­­­Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Republic of Korea, Romania, Poland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, and the following international organizations: INTERPOL and United Nations, aiming to facilitate cooperation and sustain activity on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, commit to:

  • Establish a Nuclear Security Contact Group; and
  • Designate an appropriately authorized and informed senior official or officials to participate in the Contact Group.

The Contact Group is tasked with:

  • Convening annually on the margins of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and, as may be useful, in connection with other related meetings;
  • Discussing a broad range of nuclear security-related issues, including identifying emerging trends that may require more focused attention;
  • Promoting and assessing implementation of nuclear security commitments, including those made during the Nuclear Security Summit process, reflected in the four Nuclear Security Summit Communiqués, the 2010 Washington Work Plan, the 2016 Action Plans, national commitments and associated joint statements, and gift baskets;
  • Developing and maintaining linkages to nongovernmental experts and nuclear industry; and,
  • Determining any additional steps that may be appropriate to support these goals.

The Contact Group may also consider and make recommendations to their respective leaders on convening any future Nuclear Security Summits.

We welcome the participation of all countries that subscribe to the goals set out in this Joint Statement and wish to contribute to the work of the Contact Group.

National Statement: Singapore





Six years ago, we gathered in this same convention centre and pledged to address the threat of nuclear terrorism. We have made good progress since then, bringing us to this fourth meeting and I would like to thank President Obama for his personal commitment and his leadership which has done so much to bring us thus far.

Singapore does not have significant nuclear material or facilities but we still take our responsibilities seriously, because we like every other country can be vulnerable to the nuclear threat. We could be a place where illicit material passes through our port. We could be a target of attack and even if something happens elsewhere beyond our borders, its spill-over effects could affect Singapore’s population.

Therefore, we actively support counter-proliferation and nuclear disarmament in three ways. Firstly, as a global transhipment hub, Singapore is committed to combating illicit trafficking. Since the start of the Nuclear Security Summit process, we have tightened up our export control regime and upgraded radiation screening technology at our ports. We track every case of nuclear fuel transiting through Singapore and from time to time, we have intercepted cargo and confiscated items. In one recent case, we discovered a significant amount of thorium, a radioactive element. It had been imported into Singapore not as nuclear material, but as a contaminant of another chemical used as a coolant for printed circuit boards. Our first border laboratory – “Protective, Analytical and Assessment Facility” – will be operational by this year and it will be able to conduct radiation-nuclear detection and analysis, to interdict illicit activities at the border.

Secondly, Singapore cooperates closely and willingly with international efforts. We participate in the PSI - the Proliferation Security Initiative. We adopt Financial Action Task Force Recommendations to combat proliferation financing. We host the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation, which fosters information sharing among countries, to counter transnational threats and networks that exploit new technology. The Iranian nuclear dossier is another example. Singapore did our part and fully implemented the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and therefore, we are happy that the matter has been brought to a satisfactory outcome. There had been some expectations that we would go beyond that but as a small, open economy, dependent on the international rule of law in all cases, it would have been very difficult for us to act unilaterally, and exceed what had been mandated by the United Nations.

Thirdly, we encourage countries to reduce nuclear weapons steadily to zero so that they will never be used again, whether by accident or design. I hope this Summit will see countries committing to reduce their nuclear material stockpiles further, which can make for ready terrorist targets. We are very concerned by developments on the Korean peninsula, in particular in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The DPRK continues to develop nuclear capabilities to conduct tests and to raise tensions in North East Asia. If its neighbours respond and feel compelled to move closer to threshold status, it would gravely destabilise the whole region. I therefore urge the DPRK government to refrain from further provocations and to abide by its international obligations and I hope all countries will encourage the DPRK to restrain itself and work towards denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. I am encouraged that the recent UNSC resolution 2270 passed unanimously. All of the P5 members supported it. This sends a strong signal to the DPRK and should make a positive contribution towards a good outcome.

The recent terrorist attacks in Pakistan, Brussels, Iraq, Turkey, France, Indonesia, Egypt, Nigeria – and the list goes on – show that we are all vulnerable to terrorism and doubly so to nuclear terrorism. The ISIS’ English language magazine Dabiq published an article in the 9th issue in May last year, which highlighted a nuclear terrorism scenario where ISIS purchased a nuclear device from the black market to launch a major attack. It shows their intent, and it is a threat which countries must take seriously. Nuclear terrorism may not be the most imminent of the threats we face or the most urgent, but it is a very plausible and believable threat which can easily become a reality and if it ever happens, it would be disastrous. So we must, as an international community, continue to fight against nuclear terrorism and this series of summits, I am confident, has done a significant part to help towards that fight.

Thank you.


National Progress Report: Singapore

Singapore is firmly committed to working with the international community to strengthen the global nuclear security architecture.  We take a serious view of our international responsibilities.  In this regard, we fully comply with and implement our international obligations.  This includes the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 and other country-specific UNSCRs.  Singapore participates in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) aimed at preventing the illicit trafficking of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).  In September 2016, we are due to serve on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s Board of Governors for the fifth time.  We look forward to this opportunity to work with other Member States to enhance nuclear safety and security as an active member of the Board. 

Singapore also consistently supports various regional efforts to build capacity and strengthen collaboration in the area of nuclear security.  We participate actively at ASEAN Regional Forum Meetings and regional seminars on export controls and non-proliferation.  We also work with the European Union’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Centre of Excellence (CoE) in Southeast Asia on its projects and activities.

On the national front, Singapore is committed to playing our part in countering proliferation.  As a major transit and transhipment hub, Singapore has a robust export control system.  We subscribe to effective implementation and rigorous national legislation standards, which are regularly reviewed.  This is a reflection of our desire to maintain our position as a safe and secure trade and shipping hub, taking into account the evolving security environment. 

Following the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Singapore has consistently contributed to the enhancement of the global nuclear security architecture through the activities outlined below.

Strengthening the Security of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material

To ensure the safe and secure use of radioactive materials, Singapore has an effective licensing regime for the import, export, possession, handling, transport, use and storage of radioactive materials.  Singapore maintains a national register for radioactive materials to ensure they are properly accounted for. 

Singapore works hard to strengthen security measures in local storage sites for radioactive materials.  To this end, a working group consisting of home-front agencies and regulators was established in 2014.  This working group focuses on:

a) conducting inspections at storage sites for the security of sensitive materials, including radioactive materials;

b) assessing the adequacy of existing security measures; and

c) making recommendations to further improve security at storage sites. 

The working group has carried out site inspections at storage sites where higher risk radioactive materials are kept.  Appropriate security measures are issued to the licensees for implementation, while compliance is ensured through follow up inspections.

Singapore has also been educating and promoting awareness of nuclear security. Singapore, represented by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) of the Nanyang Technological University, became a member of the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) of the IAEA in July 2014.  As an INSEN member, RSIS aims to develop academic courses and conduct training modules in partnership with the IAEA to educate its students on nuclear security policies.

Singapore recognises the emerging cybersecurity threats and risks of cyber-attacks on critical information infrastructure.  To boost Singapore’s cybersecurity infrastructure, Singapore set up a Cyber Security Agency (CSA), which began operation on 1 April 2015.  The CSA is a high-level central agency to coordinate public- and private-sector efforts to protect national systems from increasing cyber threats.  Given the trans-boundary nature of cybersecurity threats to critical infrastructure, Singapore recognises the crucial need for like-minded countries to cooperate closely on cybersecurity initiatives, through cooperation between Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), sharing of best practices and procedures, joint training and drills as well as cybersecurity capacity building.  CSA has already established close working relationships on these areas with our ASEAN and international partners through existing ASEAN platforms as well as through the signing of MOUs.  Singapore also organised and actively participated in a workshop on cyber confidence building measures in the ASEAN region.

To support international law enforcement to counter multi-dimensional, transnational and fast-evolving security threats, Singapore hosts the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation (IGCI).  The IGCI allows INTERPOL to better disseminate real-time alerts and coordinate operational responses.  These alerts also allow member countries to be better placed to stop transnational security threats.  The IGCI’s focus on innovation enables INTERPOL to further develop advanced tools and training techniques for countries to tackle emerging threats.  Law enforcement agencies can access INTERPOL’s tools and programmes through the IGCI to better train and equip their officers to combat these threats, thereby enhancing collective regional safety and security around the world.  

Minimising Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials

Singapore has taken a number of measures to fully implement UNSCR 1540.  We participated in regional workshops on promoting the full implementation of UNSCR 1540, organised by the Philippines in July 2014 and by the Republic of Korea in October 2014.  More details of our efforts can be found in Singapore’s reports to the UNSC Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540.  Singapore submits these reports regularly, which demonstrates our commitment against the proliferation of all WMD and their delivery systems.

Countering Nuclear Smuggling

Singapore’s Immigration and Checkpoints Authority Ports Command is equipped with Radiological Portal Monitors to detect cargoes carrying radiological or nuclear consignments.  To strengthen our efforts in the area of nuclear detection and nuclear forensics, Singapore has developed its first border laboratory - “Protective, Analytical and Assessment Facility”.  The laboratory, which is expected to be operational by mid-2016, is equipped with capabilities in radiation-nuclear detection and analysis to interdict illicit activities at the border.

Singapore regularly reviews and updates our export control list to ensure that our system is in line with international practices.  This includes the four multilateral export control regimes, namely the Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement, Nuclear Suppliers Group and Australia Group.  On the domestic front, we regularly organise outreach programmes to ensure that the Singaporean business community is updated on the latest developments and requirements.  As a major financial centre and a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Singapore is committed to following up on FATF Recommendations to combat proliferation financing.

Support for Multilateral Instruments

Singapore is committed to implementing and fulfilling the obligations of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment.  To this end, several legislative amendments were made to our Radiation Protection Act.  These were passed in Parliament on 7 July 2014.  Singapore deposited the instrument of accession and acceptance to the CPPNM and its 2005 Amendment with the IAEA on 22 September 2014 and became a party to the Convention on 22 October 2014.  Since then, Singapore has implemented a licensing and monitoring regime to track maritime vessels carrying nuclear material transiting through Singapore’s seaports.  Singapore also participated in the Technical Meeting of the Points of Contact and Central Authorities of States Parties to the CPPNM in December 2015 to learn the best practices adopted by CPPNM Member States in fulfilling their obligations to the Convention. 

As part of our efforts to counter nuclear terrorism, Singapore signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) on 1 December 2006.  Following Singapore’s accession to the CPPNM and its 2005 Amendment, we are working towards the legislative framework necessary to ratify ICSANT in the upcoming months.

Singapore fully supports and endorses the IAEA’s efforts to enhance the safety and security of radioactive sources.  In this regard, Singapore is working towards following the guidance contained in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.  Singapore has been a member of the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) since 2012.  As the National Focal Point for the ITDB, Singapore’s National Environment Agency (NEA) disseminates notifications on nuclear/radiological-related incidents filed by Member States to Singapore’s Government agencies.  NEA also files local incidents to the ITDB.

Collaborating with International Organisations

Singapore is a strong supporter of the IAEA’s work in helping Member States strengthen nuclear security.  Since 2014, Singapore has been actively participating in various IAEA emergency exercises organised by the Incident and Emergency Centre.  These exercises are aimed at testing arrangements for a transnational radiological emergency, such as sending notifications on the accident and requests for international assistance.

We renewed a MOU for the Singapore-IAEA Third Country Training Programme (TCTP) in January 2015.  The Programme provides joint technical assistance to developing countries across a wide range of areas including nuclear security.  Singapore is also working with the IAEA to organise a Regional Workshop on Nuclear Law in 2016 under the Singapore-IAEA TCTP, which will cover various topics including the international nuclear legal framework for nuclear security.

Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs’ Chief Science and Technology Officer, Dr Lee Fook Kay, contributed actively as a member of the IAEA’s Emergency Preparedness and Response Expert Group.  He was also part of the organising committee for the International Conference on Global Emergency Preparedness and Response, which was held from 19 to 23 October 2015 in Austria.  At the conference, Singapore presented a paper on nuclear detection technologies entitled “Evaluation Study of High Purity Germanium based Technology in Detection of Radiation Sources at Container”.

Partnering with External Stakeholders

As a partner nation of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), Singapore works with other participating states to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism.  To enhance our national capability, Singapore attended a workshop on Public Messaging for Emergency Management in the Philippines in April 2015.

Together with China and the US, Singapore co-chaired the first three ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, which took place annually from 2009 to 2011.  We continue to support this initiative and have participated actively in subsequent ISMs every year.

Singapore was an early supporter of the European Union’s initiative to establish the CBRN CoE in Southeast Asia.  The CBRN CoE was subsequently launched in Singapore in 2009.  Since its inception in 2011, we have participated regularly in the CBRN CoE National Focal Point meetings.  Singapore also takes part in related projects, such as on biosecurity, chemical and biological waste management, and e-learning in order to enhance our domestic capabilities.  We have hosted CBRN CoE projects and activities.  These include the working session on knowledge development and transfer of best practices on chemical and biological waste management in Southeast Asia in July 2014 and the Regional Experts Meeting on Non-Proliferation Nuclear Forensics for ASEAN states in November 2014.

Through our participation at the annual Asian Export Control Seminars held in Japan, Singapore shares our experiences on reaching out to our domestic industry and working closely together to counter WMD proliferation by maintaining a robust export control regime.

Singapore participates regularly in the annual Asian Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP) meetings in Japan.  At the 12th ASTOP meeting held on 20 January 2016, Singapore gave a presentation on our efforts in non-proliferation and counter-proliferation through initiatives such as the PSI.

Singapore is a participant in the PSI and the only Southeast Asian member of the PSI’s Operational Experts Group (OEG).  We believe that PSI helps to promote more international cooperation in the global effort to combat the illicit trafficking of WMD. The exercises allow participating states to build up critical interdiction capabilities and practices.  Singapore has hosted two PSI exercises to-date, each of which was attended by approximately 2,000 participants.  We will host a third exercise in September 2016.  Singapore also participates regularly in OEG meetings as well as in policy discussions, such as the High Level Political Meetings.