Fact Sheet: HEU Minimization Activities since March 2014

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                         

FACT SHEET

Highly Enriched Uranium Minimization Activities since March 2014

Minimization of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian applications is a priority for the Nuclear Security Summit process.  Eliminating all HEU from facilities or countries decreases the number of potential targets for terrorists, criminals, and other unauthorized actors to obtain this material.  Minimization efforts include HEU reactor conversions and shut-downs, nuclear material removals, technology substitution, and down-blending.  Each of these activities represents permanent threat reduction by preventing sensitive nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands.

Through the Nuclear Security Summit process, the international community has made considerable progress in this area.  Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, the United States has supported the conversion of HEU reactors in Russia, Jamaica, China, and Kazakhstan.  The United States also confirmed the shutdown of four HEU reactors: two in Russia, one in Uzbekistan, and one in Switzerland.

Once facilities are converted and HEU is no longer required, the material can be removed.  Since March 2014, the United States removed or confirmed disposition of approximately 450 kilograms of HEU from 10 countries (Poland, Kazakhstan, Canada, Switzerland, Jamaica, Uzbekistan, Austria, Germany, Japan, and Argentina).  As a result of these efforts, three additional countries are now considered free of HEU (Switzerland, Uzbekistan, and Argentina), defined as having less than one kilogram of HEU on their territory.  In total, 29 countries plus Taiwan are now HEU-free after eliminating their HEU.

Fact Sheet: Update on Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation (INFCIRC 869)

THE WHITE HOUSE 

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                        

FACT SHEET

Update on INFCIRC 869

On October 9, 2014, the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, on behalf of its Government and 34 other countries (full list below), conveyed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Secretariat the “Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation” from the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and requested that it be circulated to all IAEA Member States.  The subscribing states pledged to take specific steps, including implementing key IAEA nuclear security guidance, accepting voluntary peer reviews, and committing that those responsible for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.  The Dutch note verbale  encouraged all States to meet the intent of these essential elements of a nuclear security regime and to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the principles therein.  The IAEA has circulated the 2014 Joint Statement as INFCIRC/869, to which all IAEA Member States could ascribe.

On November 13, 2015, Jordan pledged its commitment to the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, as contained in INFCIRC/869.  Jordan is the 36th IAEA member state to subscribe to the statement, and the first to do so outside the Summit process.

The United States continues to encourage all IAEA member states to indicate their commitment to implement the provisions of INFCIRC/869, noting that such public commitments provide public assurances that nuclear materials are effectively secured and underscore support for the IAEA and its nuclear security efforts.

Full List of Subscribers

Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Vietnam.

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Joint Statement on Countering Nuclear Smuggling

2016 Statement of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling

At the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Nuclear Security Summits, participating nations agreed on Communiqués and Work Plans that included actions aimed at thwarting the illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials. The following countries recognize that identifying nuclear smugglers, detecting and recovering nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, and prosecuting those responsible are important and effective activities to help prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear or other radioactive materials: Australia, Canada, Chile, China,  the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,  France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan,  The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, The Philippines, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom, The United States of America, INTERPOL, and the United Nations.

To follow through on these pledges, participating states are committed to working together to build and sustain national capabilities to counter the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials. These efforts may include:

1.     Designating a national team or task force to link law enforcement, intelligence, technical experts, and other relevant authorities to investigate nuclear trafficking networks and incidents;

2.     Developing plans that clearly outline individual agency roles and responsibilities when responding to incidents of material outside regulatory control;

3.     Developing a national level detection architecture as an element of a whole-of-government counter nuclear smuggling capability;

4.     Strengthening nuclear forensics capabilities to reliably analyze nuclear and other radioactive material discovered out of regulatory control;

5.     Increasing legal training for prosecutors to ensure conviction of smugglers, as appropriate;

6.     Developing laws, regulations, guidance and/or policies to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material;

7.     Strengthening bilateral, multilateral, and international information sharing and other cooperation, such as training and education, best practices exchanges, and exercises;

8.     Sharing applicable lead information through INTERPOL and acting on lead information received as an effective mechanism for identifying nuclear smuggling networks in a timely manner and to enhance cooperation;

9.     Sharing information on incidents involving nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control through the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Incident and Trafficking Database.

 

Joint Statement on Cyber Security

2016: Gift Basket on cyber security of industrial control and plant systems at nuclear facilities 

Subscribed by: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the United Nations.

Introduction

The States listed above commit to ensure adequate cyber security at industrial control and plant systems at nuclear facilities.  These control systems are often used within safeguards, security, and safety systems.  Increased attention in this area will assist States, nuclear operators and the supply chain to continue to strengthen the resilience of these systems, protecting them from potential malicious attack or accidental damage.

To date, work has mainly focused on mitigating the vulnerabilities of enterprise systems used to manage information and data within nuclear facilities and supply chains.  This work needs to extend to industrial control systems.

Nuclear facilities benefit from robust safety mechanisms which have been strengthened and developed over several decades.  In addition to physical, logical, and human based controls, there has been an increase in the use of information technology to form part of the safety and security aspects of plant control systems, as well as nuclear material accountancy and control.  More information on the use of information technology and the associated threats and vulnerabilities in this context is needed to inform continuous security improvements.

The Initiative

The States listed above agree, as resources permit, to participate in two international workshops on this topic in 2016.  These workshops will enable States and their nuclear sectors to share good practice in managing risks to industrial control systems in nuclear sites, as well as examine the impact of using information technology in managing safety and security aspects of plant control systems.

These workshops will focus on areas including:

  • Threats and vulnerabilities, through considering case studies of recent incidents;
  • Potential or known incidents which can impact on control systems, through an interactive approach;
  • Technical and management challenges of managing risksto legacy systems;
  • Technical and management challenges of assuring new build nuclear and supply chains
  • Incident response and recovery.
  • Managing public/media expectation in light of an incident.

Outcomes and Next Steps

The States listed above propose to present the findings of this work at the Ministerial segment of the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security, in Vienna in December 2016 to contribute to IAEA efforts to increase cyber security at nuclear facilities, building on the IAEA International Conference on Computer Security in a Nuclear World held in June 2015. 

Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004)

Joint Statement on

Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Recognizing that United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 (hereinafter “1540 Committee”) are key parts of the international legal architecture for States to prevent and combat nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the full implementation of UNSCR 1540 is a long-term endeavour that requires both political and technical action at national, sub-regional, regional and international levels.

Recalling the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and Work Plan, the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, and the follow-up Resolutions of UNSCR 1540, particularly UNSCR 1977 (2011), which underscored the important role of UNSCR 1540 in strengthening global nuclear security and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the 1540 Committee will be completing  its second Comprehensive Review in 2016 on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540, as set forth by UNSCR 1977 (2011). This Review provides an opportunity for the 1540 Committee to take stock of national and international progress in implementing UNSCR 1540 since the previous Comprehensive Review in 2009, and to put forward key findings and recommendations that will contribute to more effective implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Welcoming the contributions of States for updating and submitting reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 with the view of the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Reaffirming our commitment to the Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 delivered at the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit.

Noting that since the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, co-signatories have advanced national efforts to further the implementation of UNSCR 1540 by providing support for the 1540 Committee’s main areas of work, including, inter alia: monitoring implementation of the Resolution; providing capacity building assistance at the technical level to requesting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations; preparing and submitting UNSCR 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; organizing or supporting regional and sub-regional training seminars, exercises and initiatives; convening workshops to help facilitate the implementation of UNSCR 1540 into national legislation; conducting outreach to stakeholders in industry, civil society and academia; and strengthening cooperation with regional organizations such as the African Union, ASEAN, the Caribbean Community, and the European Union.

*  *  *

We, the Governments of Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, with the support of the United Nations, the European Union and INTERPOL, reaffirm our commitment to the full and universal implementation of UNSCR 1540, including the implementation of obligations to enhance the security of nuclear materials worldwide in line with the objectives of the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and institutional Action Plans. We reiterate our support for the activities of the 1540 Committee and the Group of Experts. We also reaffirm our commitment to fully implement UNSCR 1540 in our respective States, in areas where we have not already done so, and further undertake to:

1.       Work with and provide information to the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts for the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

2.       Consider providing additional support and assistance in fulfilling the Action Plan in support of the United Nations, particularly actions aimed at facilitating national and regional implementation of UNSCR 1540 and its nuclear security obligations, with a view to helping requesting States to fully implement UNSCR 1540 by 2021, as referenced in the UNSC Presidential Statement of 7 May 2014;

3.       Encourage states to submit reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 on a regular basis, and focussing outreach on states yet to submit a first report to the 1540 Committee;

4.       Advocate for international, regional, and sub-regional organizations that have not yet done so to designate a Point of Contact (PoC) or coordinator on the implementation of UNSCR 1540 in order to facilitate regional approaches to assisting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations and enhance coordination for their UNSCR 1540 implementation efforts;

5.       Consider providing funding, where feasible, to organizations requesting for supporting their PoCs or coordinators for the implementation UNSCR 1540;

6.       Enhance coordination through outreach events with a wide range of domestic stakeholders such as industry, parliamentarians, civil society and academia, and develop appropriate ways to inform these stakeholders of their obligations pursuant to domestic laws relating to the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

7.       Consider organizing joint exercises at the national, regional or international levels that demonstrate ways of reinforcing national and regional capacities and international cooperation for better implementation of UNSCR 1540, and encourage the participation of relevant international organizations and initiatives;

8.       Advocate for the 1540 Committee to continue to strengthen cooperation with other relevant international organizations and initiatives, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, other United Nations entities, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership), as well as regional and sub-regional organizations in promoting the implementation of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit institutional Action Plans;

9.       Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to enhance their cooperation with other relevant entities in the United Nations system, such as the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)- and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), including through strengthening the legal framework to prohibit illicit activities, export controls, border security, and other measures that support obligations under UNSCR 1540, and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate through joint country visits to monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

10.    Consider further enhancing the cooperation between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UNSCR 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts on strengthening nuclear security, through opportunities such as: enhancing complementarity and reducing duplication, including by using Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSP) to inform voluntary 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; coordinating with the IAEA’s International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) on outreach to academia relevant to implementing UNSCR 1540 and the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC) Network on outreach to nuclear security training centers; exploring establishing a liaison between the 1540 Committee and the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security;

11.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue collaborative efforts and interactions with INTERPOL regarding assistance requests and training opportunities;

12.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue to participate in GICNT exercises, workshops and events that focus on building and enhancing nuclear forensics, detection and response capabilities;

13.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to develop strong UNSCR 1540 assistance requests that are sufficiently detailed to support responses from potential assistance providers, including through the Global Partnership. In this context, consideration should be given to strengthening the 1540 Committee’s “match-making” mechanism and coordination with assistance providers, including at the regional level, through the Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540;

14.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to address new and emerging WMD threats relevant to the obligations and recommendations of the resolution; and

15.    Advocate for increased contributions, where feasible, to the UN Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities dedicated to supporting UNSCR 1540 implementation and the work of the 1540 Committee.

Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security Architecture

JOINT STATEMENT ON SUSTAINING ACTION TO

STRENGTHEN GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

The Nuclear Security Summit process has led to significant achievements in nuclear security at national, regional, and global levels; but the work of building a strengthened, sustained, and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture – consisting of legal instruments, international organizations and initiatives, internationally accepted guidance, and best practices – requires continuous attention.

We need sustained action and ambition on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit to address continuing and evolving nuclear security challenges, with the objectives of advancing implementation of nuclear security commitments and building a strengthened, sustainable and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture.

The Governments of Argentina, Armenia, ­­­­­Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Republic of Korea, Romania, Poland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, and the following international organizations: INTERPOL and United Nations, aiming to facilitate cooperation and sustain activity on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, commit to:

  • Establish a Nuclear Security Contact Group; and
  • Designate an appropriately authorized and informed senior official or officials to participate in the Contact Group.

The Contact Group is tasked with:

  • Convening annually on the margins of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and, as may be useful, in connection with other related meetings;
  • Discussing a broad range of nuclear security-related issues, including identifying emerging trends that may require more focused attention;
  • Promoting and assessing implementation of nuclear security commitments, including those made during the Nuclear Security Summit process, reflected in the four Nuclear Security Summit Communiqués, the 2010 Washington Work Plan, the 2016 Action Plans, national commitments and associated joint statements, and gift baskets;
  • Developing and maintaining linkages to nongovernmental experts and nuclear industry; and,
  • Determining any additional steps that may be appropriate to support these goals.

The Contact Group may also consider and make recommendations to their respective leaders on convening any future Nuclear Security Summits.

We welcome the participation of all countries that subscribe to the goals set out in this Joint Statement and wish to contribute to the work of the Contact Group.

National Progress Report: Poland

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Poland has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by:

1.      Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

All the nuclear and radiological materials are subject to strict and continuous control. To fulfill its international obligations related to nuclear materials, Poland runs the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC), which significantly enhances the security of nuclear materials. Additionally, a register of radioactive sources is kept. The radioactive sources register contains data on more than 23,000 sources including spent sealed radioactive sources, information concerning their movement as well as related documents. In the years 2002-2015 the physical protection systems for a high active radioactive sources possessed by over 80 medical, research and other institutions were upgraded under the GTRI program.

In an effort to optimize the security of nuclear facilities in Poland, a special task-force group for developing proposals to strengthen the anti-terrorist security of the nuclear research reactor “Maria” in Świerk was established as a part of the Inter-ministerial Team for Terrorist Threats. The group formulated a number of recommendations aimed at improving the nuclear security of the reactor.

Moreover, the National Anti-terrorist Program has been adopted by the Government of Poland on 9 December 2014.  Its priorities include – among others – objectives related to strengthening nuclear security against terrorist threats.

On 17-20 November 2015, “Patrol 2015”, an intensive operational exercise was conducted at the nuclear research reactor “Maria” facility in Świerk. It was organized by Europol, in cooperation with IAEA and with support of the Polish Police and the National Centre for the Nuclear Research. The overall goal was to improve preparedness of the CBRN experts and first responders to effectively react to incidents and emergencies involving radiological and nuclear materials. The scenario of the exercise included a terrorist attack against the facility.

2.      Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

Under the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), Poland is about to complete the process of removing highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from the nuclear research reactor “Maria” in Świerk.

In August 2014 the last HEU fuel element was unloaded from “Maria’s” core. From now on, it operates on LEU fuel solely. In September 2014, 44 SNF elements containing 10,4 kg of HEU were shipped to the radioactive waste disposal site, located in the Russian Federation. The last shipment (51 SNF elements containing 12,1 kg of HEU) is due to be completed in the second half of 2016.     

Measures strengthening security of the Różan radioactive waste disposal site have been also recently applied. Process of selection of the new waste disposal site (due to total filling of the Różan capacity) will comply with the highest nuclear security standards, in accordance with IAEA recommendations.

3. Countering Nuclear Smuggling

In cooperation with the US Department of Energy, Polish Border Guard continued process of improving its counter-smuggling capabilities with regard to nuclear materials. A number of relevant trainings and exercises was conducted. Technical infrastructure of border-crossing points was also subject for improvement.

Poland will continue cooperation with external partners in strengthening national responses to the nuclear and radioactive smuggling. In this context, we welcome the initiative of Sweden to organize a conference in 2016 to discuss implementation of NSS commitments and objectives in the wider Black Sea region.

4.      Supporting Multilateral Instruments

Poland already ratified all relevant international nuclear security conventions and is a member of international initiatives and mechanisms aimed at strengthening nuclear security and preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear materials.

We will continue to support universal application of all relevant international instruments.

5.      Collaborating with International Organizations

Poland has committed itself to ensuring that the highest nuclear security standards are observed in the development of its peaceful nuclear power program. At the request of the Government of Poland, an international team of senior safety experts met with representatives of the National Atomic Energy Agency (PAA) in 2013 to conduct an Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission. The purpose of the mission was to examine Poland’s regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety, and its effectiveness. Based on the IRRS evaluation against the IAEA safety standards, the review team identified good practices as well as offered several recommendations and suggestions to be addressed by the PAA. As the result, the action plan has been developed and the recommendations of the mission are being implemented. In order to verify the process of implementation Poland will host IRRS follow-up mission in 2017.

After hosting the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) Workshop and Preparatory Meeting in 2015, the IPPAS Mission was conducted in Poland in February 2016. The recommendations and suggestions received from the Mission will strengthen national nuclear security regime.

In order to assure better compliance with the IAEA guidelines and recommendations, a national workshop on Design Basis Threat (DBT) implementation was held in Warsaw in September 2013. As a result of discussion conducted during the workshop, the series of high-level and working-level meetings of all interested Polish institutions were held and led to draft an amendment to the national security legal framework. It is foreseen that updated regulation related to the DBT will enter into force in 2017. Among the options suggested by the IAEA, approach of a single DBT covering all threats and potential targets in country has been chosen.

In the aftermath of IAEA’s Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) mission, hosted by Poland in March 2013, Poland prepared the National Action Plan to implement relevant recommendations and suggestions. This Plan has been approved and signed by the Minister of Economy in April 2014. It confirmed i.e. the Polish Nuclear Power Program to contain all necessary provisions on nuclear security. In May 2014, the IAEA representatives visited Poland to elaborate the Integrated Work Plan for INIR conclusions. The next INIR mission (so-called Follow-up mission) will take place in June 2016, with the aim to assess the level of compliance with the INIR mission recommendations and suggestions. At the same time it will look at Phase 2 of the development of the Polish nuclear power Program (using the “Milestone approach”) following the announcement of the technology tender by the investor/operator (“PGE EJ1 Ltd.”) at that time.

In addition, in October 2015 Council of Ministers adopted the National Plan for Management of Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel.