Joint Statement on Countering Nuclear Smuggling

2016 Statement of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling

At the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Nuclear Security Summits, participating nations agreed on Communiqués and Work Plans that included actions aimed at thwarting the illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials. The following countries recognize that identifying nuclear smugglers, detecting and recovering nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, and prosecuting those responsible are important and effective activities to help prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear or other radioactive materials: Australia, Canada, Chile, China,  the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,  France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan,  The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, The Philippines, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom, The United States of America, INTERPOL, and the United Nations.

To follow through on these pledges, participating states are committed to working together to build and sustain national capabilities to counter the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials. These efforts may include:

1.     Designating a national team or task force to link law enforcement, intelligence, technical experts, and other relevant authorities to investigate nuclear trafficking networks and incidents;

2.     Developing plans that clearly outline individual agency roles and responsibilities when responding to incidents of material outside regulatory control;

3.     Developing a national level detection architecture as an element of a whole-of-government counter nuclear smuggling capability;

4.     Strengthening nuclear forensics capabilities to reliably analyze nuclear and other radioactive material discovered out of regulatory control;

5.     Increasing legal training for prosecutors to ensure conviction of smugglers, as appropriate;

6.     Developing laws, regulations, guidance and/or policies to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material;

7.     Strengthening bilateral, multilateral, and international information sharing and other cooperation, such as training and education, best practices exchanges, and exercises;

8.     Sharing applicable lead information through INTERPOL and acting on lead information received as an effective mechanism for identifying nuclear smuggling networks in a timely manner and to enhance cooperation;

9.     Sharing information on incidents involving nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control through the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Incident and Trafficking Database.

Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security

JOINT STATEMENT in the context of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit

Forensics in Nuclear Security                                                                     

Applying science to investigate the illicit use of nuclear or other radioactive material is a crucial element of nuclear security.  Nuclear forensic science assists in determining the provenance of materials encountered out of regulatory control by focusing on the questions that would be asked by regulatory authorities or law enforcement investigators.

This gift basket records the intent of 30 countries[1] to advance nuclear forensics as a key element of effective nuclear security. This may be accomplished by incorporating nuclear forensics as an important element of a nation’s coordinated response, cultivating and sustaining expertise in the fundamental scientific disciplines; and advocating for and supporting international efforts where the implementation of both traditional and nuclear forensic capabilities may be enhanced through sharing.

The Forensics in Nuclear Security Gift Basket presented at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit raised awareness about good practices employed by practitioners, developed education and training curricula, and advanced international collaboration through a common lexicon and knowledge platform.  Continued effort is needed to strengthen and sustain national nuclear forensic capabilities through their inclusion in national response plans and communicating what nuclear forensics can provide to stakeholders.

Recognizing that practical implementation and sustainment of nuclear forensic capabilities are an enduring component of nuclear security, States that subscribe to this Joint Statement commit to one or more of the following elements: 

• Develop and sustain expertise through actions such as cross-disciplinary training of traditional forensic and nuclear scientists, transferring knowledge to the next generation of practitioners, cultivating attractive career paths, and facilitating participation in international training including, but not limited to, those offered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), or the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). 
• Promote employment of existing national nuclear science capabilities to support nuclear forensics.
• Evaluate and adapt existing national response frameworks to incorporate the effective use of nuclear forensic capabilities.
• Advance and mature nuclear forensic expertise in other countries through efforts such as providing instruction at or hosting international courses or conferences, publishing techniques in peer-reviewed scholarly journals, or serving as leaders in relevant international groups.

[1] The following countries are signatories to this Joint Statement: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, ROK, Thailand, UK and USA. The following organization also supports this Joint Statement: INTERPOL]

Joint Statement on Nuclear Training and Support Centres

Joint statement on

Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres / Centres of Excellence 

Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, Vietnam, INTERPOL and the United Nations

Italy hosted the 2014 Gift Basket on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres/Centres of Excellence (NSSC/CoE) following the 2012 Gift Basket hosted by the United States.  The 2014 Gift Basket attracted a large number of co-sponsoring Summit participants promoting the importance of nuclear security training and support centres, and the value of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres Network (NSSC Network) in strengthening international and regional cooperation and collaboration.  Now that the IAEA NSSC Network is maturing and a number of nuclear security training and support centers are being established, these centres can play an increasingly important and active role in promoting nuclear security.  These centres help meet domestic nuclear security needs, and can also provide an important platform for sharing resources and meeting needs on a regional basis, thus strengthening and sustaining the global nuclear security architecture.

In support of the IAEA NSSC Network and nuclear security training and support centre sustainability, the participants to the 2016 Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres / Centres of Excellence Gift Basket intend, within available resources, to support the following activities.

Strengthening of the IAEA NSSC Network

•    Nuclear security training and support centres not yet a member of the IAEA NSSC Network commit to join the Network and make every effort to take part in the IAEA NSSC Network activities, including meetings.

Establishment of regional networks

•    Building upon the establishment of the Asia Regional Network through the IAEA NSSC Network, establish additional networks with nuclear security training and support centres in the same region and mechanisms of regional coordination to promote best practices, exchange training experiences, share curricula and other activities on a regional basis. 

•    In collaboration with the IAEA NSSC network, share experiences in training with centres outside their region.

Strengthening nuclear security training and technical support programmes

•    Improve the quality of training by conducting peer review exchanges with other nuclear security training and support centres and by making use of the IAEA NSSC Network as a mechanism to promote peer-review exchanges.

•    Use IAEA material/guidance as a mechanism to achieve consistency in the technical content of the training programmes on nuclear security and participate in IAEA Train-the-Trainer activities to build a network of instructors qualified to deliver IAEA training course materials. 

•    Organize and be active participants in the development and running of nuclear and radiological security scenarios and exercises.

•    Share experiences and nuclear security training with other training centres and centres of excellence, as appropriate, as well as lessons learned through the IAEA NSSC network and IAEA Nuclear Security Information Portal (NUSEC).

•    Use IAEA material/guidance to support training programmes in key technical topics such as nuclear security culture, nuclear material accounting and control, computer security, transportation security, and insider threat mitigation. 

•    As appropriate, consider certification of nuclear security training and support centre training programmes, as per ISO 29990 and/or utilize applicable ISO best practices to support continuous improvement.
  
•    Collaborate with the Global Partnership’s Centre of Excellence Sub-working Group to implement this Gift Basket as noted in the Global Partnership Nuclear Security Summit Action Plan.

Sustainability

•    Focus attention on and build mechanisms to ensure the sustainability of nuclear security training and support centres, including developing business plans and e-learning tools, conducting needs analysis and regular evaluation of effectiveness, and identifying required financial, administrative and human resources.

•    Provide training, technical and scientific support to competent authorities to strengthen long-term sustainability of domestic nuclear and radiological security regimes. 

•    Broaden and strengthen international cooperation with the United Nations, especially United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540-related efforts, with INTERPOL, the Global Partnership, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and others.

Cooperation

•    Collaborate with educational institutions that teach nuclear security subjects to include nuclear security culture. Continue, improve, and expand the NSSC Network’s collaboration with the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN).

•    Cooperate in the area of research and development with national and international institutes to promote scientific advancements in nuclear security and continuous engagement of the scientific communities.

•    Engage industry and civil society through constant dialogue on the importance of nuclear security.

•    Promote public confidence in nuclear and radiological security.

Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security Architecture

JOINT STATEMENT ON SUSTAINING ACTION TO

STRENGTHEN GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

The Nuclear Security Summit process has led to significant achievements in nuclear security at national, regional, and global levels; but the work of building a strengthened, sustained, and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture – consisting of legal instruments, international organizations and initiatives, internationally accepted guidance, and best practices – requires continuous attention.

We need sustained action and ambition on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit to address continuing and evolving nuclear security challenges, with the objectives of advancing implementation of nuclear security commitments and building a strengthened, sustainable and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture.

The Governments of Argentina, Armenia, ­­­­­Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Republic of Korea, Romania, Poland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, and the following international organizations: INTERPOL and United Nations, aiming to facilitate cooperation and sustain activity on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, commit to:

• Establish a Nuclear Security Contact Group; and
• Designate an appropriately authorized and informed senior official or officials to participate in the Contact Group.

The Contact Group is tasked with:

• Convening annually on the margins of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and, as may be useful, in connection with other related meetings;
• Discussing a broad range of nuclear security-related issues, including identifying emerging trends that may require more focused attention;
• Promoting and assessing implementation of nuclear security commitments, including those made during the Nuclear Security Summit process, reflected in the four Nuclear Security Summit Communiqués, the 2010 Washington Work Plan, the 2016 Action Plans, national commitments and associated joint statements, and gift baskets;
• Developing and maintaining linkages to nongovernmental experts and nuclear industry; and,
• Determining any additional steps that may be appropriate to support these goals.

The Contact Group may also consider and make recommendations to their respective leaders on convening any future Nuclear Security Summits.

We welcome the participation of all countries that subscribe to the goals set out in this Joint Statement and wish to contribute to the work of the Contact Group.

National Statement: Nigeria

Federal Republic of Nigeria

NATIONAL STATEMENT

Mr. President,

Excellencies,

Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,

First of all, I would like to thank President Barack OBAMA and the United States of America for the invitation to the 4th Nuclear Security Summit holding in Washington DC, from 31 March to 1 April 2016. Let me further pay special tribute to you Mr. President for your pace setting initiative and drive that have brought this process to this level. Nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to international security and preventing nuclear terrorism and all forms of terrorism around the globe is of concern to all of us.  

As we begin the 4th Nuclear Security Summit, I wish to reaffirm Nigeria’s commitment to the global fight against the threat of nuclear terrorism and other forms of terrorism in all their manifestations, and our support to multilateral efforts to advance a common approach and commitment to nuclear security at the highest level. Nigeria accords high priority to all global efforts towards ending the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including nuclear weapons. To this end, Nigeria has since the last Summit in Seoul strengthened the legal framework for fighting terrorism through the adoption in 2013 of an amendment to its Terrorism (Prevention) Act, ensuring the implementation of more robust counter-terrorism measures in the country.

In this regard, Nigeria remains committed to continue demonstrating strong support for the global nuclear security architecture. Nigeria have ratified the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM/A); and the International Convention for the Suppressions of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT); and is engaged in a process, together with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), relating to the conversion of its miniature neutron source reactor (NIRR-1)from the use of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), keeping in mind that minimizing the use of HEU remains an important goal of the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS). Nigeria is committed to the completeness of that process as soon as technically feasible.  

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Nigeria have taken a number of steps necessary for strengthening nuclear security architecture by building up its nuclear and other radioactive material security. Nigeria have developed and commenced comprehensive review and updating of the existing nuclear security regulations as well as drafting of new ones to ensure the safety and security of nuclear materials and other radioactive sources.

The Nigerian Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials Regulations; Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources Regulations; System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material; and the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities; are at various stages of completion of review and updating. With the changing nature of global and national threats, Nigeria in conjunction with relevant stakeholders is currently reviewing the Design Basis Threat (DBT) developed in 2012. This is aimed at guiding holders of nuclear and radiological materials on the appropriate physical protection systems to be put in place.

In the area of performance of Oversight, Nigeria undertakes regular security inspections of facilities to ensure that materials are secured. The inspections are regular and routine in nature and the inspectors are benefitting from requisite training. To this end, Nigeria has established a Nuclear Security Support Centre which is aimed at enhancing human capacity development in the area of nuclear security. The Centre continues to actively interact with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other relevant international organizations to develop and undertake training programmes for stakeholder organizations in 2016 and beyond. The Centre is intended to serve Nigeria and sub-Sahara Africa.

At the same time, Nigeria has developed a programme for search and secure of orphan and legacy radioactive sources. The programme has been established with the ultimate aim of identifying, securing and recovering vulnerable orphan and legacy radioactive sources in the country and to ensure that they are secured to prevent unauthorized access by terrorists and criminals. The Search and Secure programme is a yearly exercise. The latest exercise was conducted in November/December 2015 in three geopolitical zones of Nigeria, and efforts are on-going to acquire more equipment and expertise to ensure efficiency and sustainability of the programme.

The survey of Depleted Uranium (DU) which commenced in 2011 is an on ongoing programme with the latest exercise conducted in November/December, 2015. Nigeria has compiled and submitted earlier reports to the IAEA. The programme is continuing and comprehensive reports will be forwarded to the IAEA accordingly. Nigeria conducts regular inspection of the 234 legacy sources at Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited to guarantee their security pending their transfer to a temporary Radioactive Waste Management Facility, prior to the efforts in a more definitive manner to repatriate them to their country of origin. At the same time, regular inspection is conducted on the disused radioactive sources located at the Temporary Waste Management Facility. Efforts are also being made for their final repatriation to their countries of origin.

Nigeria undertakes regular inspection of NIRR-1 and supports IAEA safeguard inspection of the facility. Nigeria conducts various training and retraining programmes for its Frontline Officers from the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, Nigeria Customs Service, Nigeria Police Force, State Security Service, Nigeria Immigration Service, Federal Fire Service, Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria, Nigeria Ports Authority and the Defence Headquarters of the Nigerian Armed Forces. Frontline Officers are also nominated to attend IAEA organized training courses on Illicit trafficking/border monitoring, nuclear security, physical protection of nuclear and radiological facilities to make them respond to unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive materials.

Nigeria installed its first Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) at the Murtala Muhammed International Airport, Lagos in 2008 and put into operation in April 2009. The RPM was donated by the IAEA and meant to prevent accidental or undeclared import and export of radioactive sources as well as checking illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. Three more RPMs have since been procured and discussions are on-going with the manufacturer for the purpose of installing them at strategic ports of entry into the country. A specific airport is designated for import and export of radioactive materials. The Installation of the three portal monitors shall be completed before the end of 2016. Effort is being made to cover all points of entry into the Country. The NSSC shall give training of frontline officers a priority.

To enhance Nuclear Security, Nigeria has reinforced its cooperation with the IAEA; United States Department of State’s Partnership for Nuclear Security (PNS); and the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS); to mention a few. Nigeria actively participated in the WINS professional Certification programmes.

Nigeria is collaborating with Oak Ridge National Laboratory of the United States of America to implement a Human Reliability Programme (HRP) for the Nigerian nuclear industry. A pilot HRP programme is being developed at the Centre for Energy Research and Training, ABU Zaria, and is being facilitated by the ORNL with support from Partnership for Nuclear Security (PNS). The programme is expected to be replicated at other high risk nuclear and radiological facilities in the country.

In addition, Nigeria has signed an agreement of cooperation with the United States Department of Energy (US-DOE) Office of Radiological Security (ORS). The objectives of this cooperation are: to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive material located at civilian sites; remove and dispose excess nuclear and other radiological materials; and protect nuclear and other radiological materials from theft or sabotage. The cooperation included Physical Security upgrades of some high risk radiological facilities. Nigeria intends to strengthen its partnerships with relevant international organizations to promote capacity building, particularly in the development of the Nigerian Nuclear Security Support Centre, Physical Security Upgrades and HRP Implementation.

Thank you very much.

National Progress Report: Nigeria

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Nigeria has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the nuclear security architecture by:

Strengthening Nuclear and other Radioactive Material Security

Development and Review of Regulations

Nigeria has commenced a comprehensive review and updating of the existing Nuclear Security Regulations as well as drafting of new ones to ensure nuclear materials and other radioactive sources are secured. The following regulations are at various stages of review:

• Nigerian Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials Regulations
• Nigeria safety and security of radioactive sources regulation

The following regulations are at various stages of development:

• System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material
• Physical protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities

The review and development shall be completed and gazetted in the third quarter of 2016.

Design Basis Threat

With the changing nature of global and national threats, Nigeria in conjunction with relevant stakeholders is currently reviewing the Design Basis Threat (DBT). This shall be used to guide holders of nuclear and radiological materials on the appropriate physical protection systems to put in place.

The review shall be completed and appropriately communicated to operatos in the third quarter of 2016

Oversight

Nigeria Undertakes regular security inspections of facilities to ensure materials are secured.

Nigeria shall ensure inspectors get requisite training and the inspections shall be regular

Nuclear Security Support Centre

Nigeria established a Nuclear Security Support Centre which is aimed at enhancing human capacity development in the area of nuclear security.

The Centre shall actively liaise with IAEA and other International Organizations to develop and undertake training programmes for stakeholder organizations in 2016 and beyond. The Centre is intended to serve sub-Sahara Africa.

Search and Secure of Orphan and Legacy Radioactive Sources

Nigeria has developed programme for search and secure of orphan and legacy radioactive sources. The programme has been established with the ultimate aim of identifying, securing and recovering vulnerable orphan and legacy radioactive sources in the country and to ensure they are secured to prevent unauthorized access by terrorists and criminals.

The Search and Secure programme has been a yearly exercise. The latest exercise was conducted in January 2016 in three geopolitical Zones of Nigeria.

Nigeria shall acquire more equipment and expertise to ensure efficiency and sustainability of the programme.

Depleted Uranium Survey

The survey of Depleted Uranium (DU) which commenced in 2011 is on ongoing. Nigeria has compiled reports in the IAEA required reporting format and has also created a new material balance area for location outside facilities (LOF) for submission of the report  to the IAEA.

The programme shall continue and comprehensive reports sent to the IAEA

Legacy Sources at Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited

Nigeria conducts regular inspection of the 234 legacy sources at Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited to guarantee their security pending their relocation to a temporary Radioactive Waste Management Facility.

Sources shall be moved to Temporary Waste Management Facility and efforts shall be made for final repatriation to their countries of origin.

Repatriation of Other Disused Radioactive Sources

The Nigerian Government undertakes regular inspection of disused radioactive sources located at the Temporary Waste Management Facility.

Efforts shall be made for final repatriation to their countries of origin.

Minimising Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

HEU Conversion Programme for Nigeria Research Reactor 1 (NIRR-1)

The Nigeria, China and USA had a tripartite meeting in October 2011 in Abuja and agreed to develop a joint statement on cooperation to the objectives of the HEU to LEU fuel Conversion Programme for the Nigeria Research Reactor-1.

The Nigeria in collaboration with the IAEA commenced discussions on developing human capacity for the HEU fuel conversion to LEU, IAEA fellowship was secured for two Nigerian regulatory Officers at Argonne National Laboratory on core conversion studies in 2012.

Nigeria attended the 35th International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors and the Consultancy Meeting on MNSR held in Vienna, Austria in October and December 2014 respectively. The Consultancy meeting was primarily to look into Nigeria’s progress on the HEU to LEU core conversion.

Nigeria will in the second quarter of 2016  sign the Project and Supply Agreement which will allow the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) procure the LEU core and commence the design and fabrication of the cask.

Countering Nuclear Smuggling

Oversight of NIRR-1

Nigeria undertakes regular inspection of NIRR-1 and supports IAEA safeguard inspection of the facility.

Training of Frontline Officers

Nigeria conducts various training and retraining programmes for its Frontline Officers from the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, Nigeria Customs Service, Nigeria Police Force, State Security Service, Nigeria Immigration Service, Federal Fire Service, Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria, Nigeria Ports Authority and the Defence Headquarters of the Nigerian Armed Forces. Frontline Officers are also nominated to attend IAEA organized training courses on Illicit trafficking/border monitoring, nuclear security, physical protection of nuclear and radiological facilities, response to unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive materials, Advance Detection of nuclear and radioactive materials, etc.

Installation of Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs)

Nigeria installed its first Radiation Protection Monitor (RPM) at the Murtala Muhammed International Airport, Lagos in 2008 and put into operation in April 2009. The RPM was donated by the IAEA and meant to prevent accidental or undeclared import and export of radioactive sources as well as checking illicit trafficking of nuclear materials.

Three more RPMs have since been procured and discussions are on-going with the manufacturer for the purpose of installing them at strategic ports of entry into the country.

The Installation of the three portal monitors shall be completed before the end of 2016 and the NSSC shall give training of frontline officers a priority.

Supporting Multilateral Instruments

Nigeria adheres strictly to all the International Instruments that it is a signatory to. It is also reviewing its Act with a view to domesticating the instruments.

Nigeria shall ensure the passage of the Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards Bill before the end of 2016

Collaborating with International organizations

To enhance Nuclear Security Nigeria Collaborates with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), United States Department of State’s Partnership for Nuclear Security (PNS), World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) etc. Nigeria actively participated in the WINS professional Certification programmes.

Nigeria is collaborating with Oak Ridge National Laboratory of the United States of America to implement a Human Reliability Programme (HRP) for the Nigerian nuclear industry. A pilot HRP programme is being developed at the Centre for Energy Research and Training, ABU Zaria and is being facilitated by the ORNL with support from Partnership for Nuclear Security (PNS). The programme shall be replicated at other high risk nuclear and radiological facilities in the country.

Nigeria has signed an agreement of cooperation with the United States Department of Energy (US-DOE) Office of Radiological Security (ORS). The objectives of this corporation are to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive material located at civilian sites; remove and dispose excess nuclear and other radiological materials; and protect nuclear and other radiological materials from theft or sabotage. The cooperation included Physical Security upgrades of some high risk radiological facilities.

Nigeria shall partner more with the International Organizations for capacity building particularly in the development of the Nigerian Nuclear Security Support Centre, Physical security upgrades and HRP implementation.

Partnering with External Stakeholders

Nigeria partners actively with external stakeholders with similar objectives.  More partnerships are being explored and would be entered intoafter the NSS 2016 for sustainability of the NSSprocess.

The partnership shall be sustained

GIFT BASKETS

Nigeria joined the following gift baskets for the 2016 Summit:

• Mitigating Insider Threats
• Nuclear forensics
• Education and Training

2014 Progress Report Nigeria

2014 Progress Report Nigeria

2012 Progress Report Nigeria

2012 Progress Report Nigeria