Fact Sheet: Update on Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation (INFCIRC 869)

THE WHITE HOUSE 

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                        

FACT SHEET

Update on INFCIRC 869

On October 9, 2014, the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, on behalf of its Government and 34 other countries (full list below), conveyed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Secretariat the “Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation” from the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and requested that it be circulated to all IAEA Member States.  The subscribing states pledged to take specific steps, including implementing key IAEA nuclear security guidance, accepting voluntary peer reviews, and committing that those responsible for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.  The Dutch note verbale  encouraged all States to meet the intent of these essential elements of a nuclear security regime and to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the principles therein.  The IAEA has circulated the 2014 Joint Statement as INFCIRC/869, to which all IAEA Member States could ascribe.

On November 13, 2015, Jordan pledged its commitment to the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, as contained in INFCIRC/869.  Jordan is the 36th IAEA member state to subscribe to the statement, and the first to do so outside the Summit process.

The United States continues to encourage all IAEA member states to indicate their commitment to implement the provisions of INFCIRC/869, noting that such public commitments provide public assurances that nuclear materials are effectively secured and underscore support for the IAEA and its nuclear security efforts.

Full List of Subscribers

Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Vietnam.

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Joint Statement on Countering Nuclear Smuggling

2016 Statement of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling

At the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Nuclear Security Summits, participating nations agreed on Communiqués and Work Plans that included actions aimed at thwarting the illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials. The following countries recognize that identifying nuclear smugglers, detecting and recovering nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, and prosecuting those responsible are important and effective activities to help prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear or other radioactive materials: Australia, Canada, Chile, China,  the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,  France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan,  The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, The Philippines, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom, The United States of America, INTERPOL, and the United Nations.

To follow through on these pledges, participating states are committed to working together to build and sustain national capabilities to counter the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials. These efforts may include:

1.     Designating a national team or task force to link law enforcement, intelligence, technical experts, and other relevant authorities to investigate nuclear trafficking networks and incidents;

2.     Developing plans that clearly outline individual agency roles and responsibilities when responding to incidents of material outside regulatory control;

3.     Developing a national level detection architecture as an element of a whole-of-government counter nuclear smuggling capability;

4.     Strengthening nuclear forensics capabilities to reliably analyze nuclear and other radioactive material discovered out of regulatory control;

5.     Increasing legal training for prosecutors to ensure conviction of smugglers, as appropriate;

6.     Developing laws, regulations, guidance and/or policies to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material;

7.     Strengthening bilateral, multilateral, and international information sharing and other cooperation, such as training and education, best practices exchanges, and exercises;

8.     Sharing applicable lead information through INTERPOL and acting on lead information received as an effective mechanism for identifying nuclear smuggling networks in a timely manner and to enhance cooperation;

9.     Sharing information on incidents involving nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control through the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Incident and Trafficking Database.

Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security

JOINT STATEMENT in the context of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit

Forensics in Nuclear Security                                                                     

Applying science to investigate the illicit use of nuclear or other radioactive material is a crucial element of nuclear security.  Nuclear forensic science assists in determining the provenance of materials encountered out of regulatory control by focusing on the questions that would be asked by regulatory authorities or law enforcement investigators.

This gift basket records the intent of 30 countries[1] to advance nuclear forensics as a key element of effective nuclear security. This may be accomplished by incorporating nuclear forensics as an important element of a nation’s coordinated response, cultivating and sustaining expertise in the fundamental scientific disciplines; and advocating for and supporting international efforts where the implementation of both traditional and nuclear forensic capabilities may be enhanced through sharing.

The Forensics in Nuclear Security Gift Basket presented at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit raised awareness about good practices employed by practitioners, developed education and training curricula, and advanced international collaboration through a common lexicon and knowledge platform.  Continued effort is needed to strengthen and sustain national nuclear forensic capabilities through their inclusion in national response plans and communicating what nuclear forensics can provide to stakeholders.

Recognizing that practical implementation and sustainment of nuclear forensic capabilities are an enduring component of nuclear security, States that subscribe to this Joint Statement commit to one or more of the following elements: 

• Develop and sustain expertise through actions such as cross-disciplinary training of traditional forensic and nuclear scientists, transferring knowledge to the next generation of practitioners, cultivating attractive career paths, and facilitating participation in international training including, but not limited to, those offered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), or the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). 
• Promote employment of existing national nuclear science capabilities to support nuclear forensics.
• Evaluate and adapt existing national response frameworks to incorporate the effective use of nuclear forensic capabilities.
• Advance and mature nuclear forensic expertise in other countries through efforts such as providing instruction at or hosting international courses or conferences, publishing techniques in peer-reviewed scholarly journals, or serving as leaders in relevant international groups.

[1] The following countries are signatories to this Joint Statement: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, ROK, Thailand, UK and USA. The following organization also supports this Joint Statement: INTERPOL]

Joint Statement on National Nuclear Detection Architecture

Nuclear Security Summit 2016

Statement on National Nuclear Detection Architectures

Introduction

This gift basket records the intent of Finland, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Morocco, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam and INTERPOL to demonstrate their commitment to develop national-level nuclear detection architectures and strengthen regional efforts as an effective capability in combating illicit trafficking and malevolent use of nuclear and other radioactive materials. An integral part of this commitment is international cooperation to promote key architecture elements and principles as well as to address common challenges and mitigation strategies.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a central role in nuclear security worldwide, including in the field of nuclear detection and cooperation.  Other international fora support international cooperation on nuclear detection, most notably, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).  Similarly, the Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction assists in providing practical assistance on nuclear and radiological security, upon state’s requests, and so supports the work of the IAEA.

IAEA

Through its Nuclear Security Programme, the IAEA supports States in their efforts to establish, maintain and sustain an effective nuclear security detection architecture. The IAEA has adopted a comprehensive approach to nuclear security and has elaborated guidance of major importance[1].  These publications aim at advocating the development and improvement of a nuclear security detection architecture that integrates comprehensive detection capabilities and measures and associated resources to improve a nation’s ability to detect nuclear and radiological threats.  

GICNT

Nuclear detection is a core nuclear security objective for the GICNT. GICNT activities bring critical added value to nuclear detection work through identifying cross-cutting issues, suggesting new solutions and promoting inter-disciplinary and inter-agency cooperation.

Good practices related to nuclear detection are shared, collected and developed under the auspices of the GICNT. They can contribute to producing, assessing and updating IAEA publications.  Frequent scenario-based discussions, table-top exercises and field exercises of the GICNT enhance expertise and skills of members of the global nuclear security community.

Commitments

On the occasion of the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, we the parties to this Statement reaffirm our commitment to improving further our national detection architectures with the goal to combat illicit trafficking and to prevent malicious acts.

We commit ourselves to efficient use of available nuclear detection resources as well as to avoiding duplication of work between IAEA, GICNT and other relevant bodies.

We further reaffirm our commitment to the IAEA’s recommendations, giving particular attention to the following principles:

• An effective nuclear security detection architecture should be derived from a comprehensive, integrated detection strategy prepared by the State; 
• The national nuclear security detection architecture should take into consideration that individual organizations’ roles in the fieldof detection are unambiguously clear;
• Nuclear security culture is an effective tool that can strengthen the efficiency of the nuclear security detection systems; 
•  Implementation should account for and integrate border and interior detection capabilities.

We reaffirm, also, our determination to maintain our contributions to the development of the IAEA’s guidance document in the field of detection.

To promote and improve international awareness and understanding of the importance of a national-level nuclear detection architecture, we also advocate and support the work of the IAEA’speriodic review workshops during which participating nations can share good practices and lessons learned and discuss challenges, mitigation strategies, and long-term sustainability approaches.  The IAEA will conduct the first such workshop in Seam Reap, Cambodia in April 2016. 

GICNT Partners joining to this Statement reaffirm their commitment to actively participate and contribute to nuclear detection work that takes place in the Global Initiative. 

[1] As a critical part of this approach, the IAEA published Nuclear Security Series No. 21; Implementing Guide on Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for the Detection of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control. 

Joint Statement on Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness and Response

Joint Statement on Supporting Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism

Preparedness and Response Capabilities 

Subscribed by Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the United Nations and INTERPOL.

A nuclear terror event anywhere in the world would have devastating human, environmental, economic, and political consequences. Building on the Summit’s nuclear terrorism prevention and nuclear and radiological material security accomplishments and efforts, wethe Parties to this statement recognize the need for ensuring adequate nuclear emergency preparedness and response capabilities.  Such capabilities contribute tofurther reducing not onlythe risks posed by nuclear or radiological terrorism (hereafter, “nuclear terrorism”), but also the risks posed by other malicious activities or accidents involving nuclear or radiological materials and facilities.Ensuring preparedness in National capabilities to counter and respond to nuclear terror acts is a critical task for all Nations, as exemplified by the Scenario-Based Policy Discussions successfully completed by participating nations as part ofthe 2016 Summit.  Nuclear terrorism preparedness requires a range of activities to establish,enhance, sustain, and exercise the capabilities necessary to counter and respond to nuclear terror incidents. Nuclear terrorism response requires a range of technical, operational, and communications capabilities toprovide coordination and resolution of the incident, as well as mitigatingits consequences.

Consistent with the Nuclear Security Summit goal of reducing the threat posed by nuclear terrorism and furthering the 2014 Hague Summit Communique pledge to “maintain effective emergency preparedness, response, and mitigation capabilities,”we the parties to this statementrecognize that ensuring adequate nuclear terrorismpreparedness and response capabilities complements international nuclear security efforts.  We also recognize that adequate nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities contribute to strengthening the interface between nuclear safety and security, and serve as a potential deterrent to attack.

Nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities include the following capabilities:

• National policies and plans:Establish and maintainadequate National response plans and policies regarding preparedness, response, and mitigation of incidents and threats of nuclear terrorism, including guidance forlocalplanning in responding to such threats and incidents.
• Technical expertise and capabilities:Identify, confirm, assess, and respond to nuclear terror incidentsand threats, including radiological characterization and assessments to inform protective actions, emergency medical training and response support, and decontamination tools and training.
• Public communications and education: Develop and maintainstrategic communications and effective public messaging providing not only public safety awareness and emergency readiness in the event of a nuclear terror incident but also mechanisms and procedures for ensuring prompt dissemination of public safety information to potentially affected communities.
• Sustainment of capabilities:  Sustain necessary capabilities through continuing education, training, and exercises involving National and local officials and multinational partners charged with nuclear terrorism preparedness, response, or associated decision-making.
• International coordination and assistance mechanisms: Per the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and other relevant international legal instruments, and considering multilateral mechanisms and initiatives such as offered by the United Nations (UN), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), INTERPOL, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,establish mechanisms for requesting and/or providing (as appropriate):
  • Nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capacity building, 
  • As required, post-event mutualassistance offered by the State Partiesof the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency,
  • Government-to-Government coordination and communication in the event of nuclear terrorism.

Recognizing that an act of nuclear terrorism anywhere in the world would have global impacts affecting all Nations, wethe parties to this statement affirm ourwillingnessto cooperate to strengthen National and international nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities.  We agree on the following commitments in support of this objective:

• Ensure adequate National nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities at home.  We the parties to this statement reaffirm our National commitment to establish and maintain the National-level capabilities required for nuclear terrorism preparedness and response.We also commit to conductcomprehensivenuclear terrorism preparedness and response drills, incorporating roles and responsibilities at the National and local levels to foster strong interagency cooperation across law enforcement, medical, technical/scientific, and policy agencies.  We commit to strengthen our National interagency coordination, cooperation, and information-sharing mechanisms needed in this regard, to support whole-of-government crisis response.
• Support sharing relevant resources, expertise, and good practices, in order to strengthen global nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities, including relevant post-event mutual assistance.  Consistent with our respectiveinternational legal obligations,we the parties to this statementagree in principle to support--at the bilateral level, upon request--relevant expertise, training, or other related resources supporting nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilitieswith interested states, as well as offer relevant post-event mutual assistanceincluding through the IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET). We recognize that requests for bilateral assistance must be evaluated by the States involved on a case by case basis and would be subject to availability of resources, legal considerations, and other concerns.  However, we the parties to this statement recognize the importance of supporting nuclear terrorismpreparedness and response capacities and thus encourage bilateral and multilateral dialogue and coordination on how best to assure adequate global preparedness and response capabilities.As such, we also commit to making available relevant expertise or experience via international and multilateral effortsas the UN, IAEA, INTERPOL, GICNT, and the GP.  National Points of Contact will be provided, in addition to IAEA, INTERPOL, GICNT, and GP points of contact,to support the coordination and evaluation of requests and offers of assistance.
• Support for international best practice guidance on preparedness and resilience objectives and the specific capabilities needed to meet them, as published by the organizations listed above,including the IAEA Nuclear Security Series 15 - Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, the IAEA Safety Series GSR Part 7 on Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism’s Fundamentals for Establishing and Maintaining a Nuclear Security Response Framework ,which build on the aforementioned core competencies We the parties to this statement recognize these documents as an excellent foundation for States wishing to establish or sustain baseline nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities, and actively support the broadest possible international application and use of these documents.
• Share lessons learned from real world incidents (i.e., nuclear and radiological incidents, materials out of regulatory control, significant all hazards-related emergency response efforts, etc.) that have implications for or applications to nuclear terrorism preparedness, response, and mitigation, in order to incorporate this experience into Preparedness and Response capabilities nationally and internationally.
• Encourage and support National and State/local-level full field and table-top exercises aimed at ensuring nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities.  As appropriate, participating countries to the exercises will encourage reciprocal, bilateral observation of National and transborder exercises, with a view towards sharing good practices in sustaining preparedness and response capabilities, while ensuring confidentiality of sensitive information.We the parties to this statementcommit, as far as resources permit, to host, observe, or support the development and implementation of radiological emergency management exercises (REMEX) under the GICNT’s Response and Mitigation Working Group.  REMEXs emphasize the importance of international cooperation in preparedness and resilience by providing the opportunity for two or more governments to collaboratively exercise response capabilities for nuclear terrorism with bilateral or multilateral scenarios.  REMEXs also provide a venue for sharing the good practices and lessons learned from other national and State/local-level exercises encouraged under this gift basket.  

Joint Statement on Nuclear Training and Support Centres

Joint statement on

Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres / Centres of Excellence 

Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, Vietnam, INTERPOL and the United Nations

Italy hosted the 2014 Gift Basket on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres/Centres of Excellence (NSSC/CoE) following the 2012 Gift Basket hosted by the United States.  The 2014 Gift Basket attracted a large number of co-sponsoring Summit participants promoting the importance of nuclear security training and support centres, and the value of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres Network (NSSC Network) in strengthening international and regional cooperation and collaboration.  Now that the IAEA NSSC Network is maturing and a number of nuclear security training and support centers are being established, these centres can play an increasingly important and active role in promoting nuclear security.  These centres help meet domestic nuclear security needs, and can also provide an important platform for sharing resources and meeting needs on a regional basis, thus strengthening and sustaining the global nuclear security architecture.

In support of the IAEA NSSC Network and nuclear security training and support centre sustainability, the participants to the 2016 Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres / Centres of Excellence Gift Basket intend, within available resources, to support the following activities.

Strengthening of the IAEA NSSC Network

•    Nuclear security training and support centres not yet a member of the IAEA NSSC Network commit to join the Network and make every effort to take part in the IAEA NSSC Network activities, including meetings.

Establishment of regional networks

•    Building upon the establishment of the Asia Regional Network through the IAEA NSSC Network, establish additional networks with nuclear security training and support centres in the same region and mechanisms of regional coordination to promote best practices, exchange training experiences, share curricula and other activities on a regional basis. 

•    In collaboration with the IAEA NSSC network, share experiences in training with centres outside their region.

Strengthening nuclear security training and technical support programmes

•    Improve the quality of training by conducting peer review exchanges with other nuclear security training and support centres and by making use of the IAEA NSSC Network as a mechanism to promote peer-review exchanges.

•    Use IAEA material/guidance as a mechanism to achieve consistency in the technical content of the training programmes on nuclear security and participate in IAEA Train-the-Trainer activities to build a network of instructors qualified to deliver IAEA training course materials. 

•    Organize and be active participants in the development and running of nuclear and radiological security scenarios and exercises.

•    Share experiences and nuclear security training with other training centres and centres of excellence, as appropriate, as well as lessons learned through the IAEA NSSC network and IAEA Nuclear Security Information Portal (NUSEC).

•    Use IAEA material/guidance to support training programmes in key technical topics such as nuclear security culture, nuclear material accounting and control, computer security, transportation security, and insider threat mitigation. 

•    As appropriate, consider certification of nuclear security training and support centre training programmes, as per ISO 29990 and/or utilize applicable ISO best practices to support continuous improvement.
  
•    Collaborate with the Global Partnership’s Centre of Excellence Sub-working Group to implement this Gift Basket as noted in the Global Partnership Nuclear Security Summit Action Plan.

Sustainability

•    Focus attention on and build mechanisms to ensure the sustainability of nuclear security training and support centres, including developing business plans and e-learning tools, conducting needs analysis and regular evaluation of effectiveness, and identifying required financial, administrative and human resources.

•    Provide training, technical and scientific support to competent authorities to strengthen long-term sustainability of domestic nuclear and radiological security regimes. 

•    Broaden and strengthen international cooperation with the United Nations, especially United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540-related efforts, with INTERPOL, the Global Partnership, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and others.

Cooperation

•    Collaborate with educational institutions that teach nuclear security subjects to include nuclear security culture. Continue, improve, and expand the NSSC Network’s collaboration with the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN).

•    Cooperate in the area of research and development with national and international institutes to promote scientific advancements in nuclear security and continuous engagement of the scientific communities.

•    Engage industry and civil society through constant dialogue on the importance of nuclear security.

•    Promote public confidence in nuclear and radiological security.

Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004)

Joint Statement on

Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Recognizing that United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 (hereinafter “1540 Committee”) are key parts of the international legal architecture for States to prevent and combat nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the full implementation of UNSCR 1540 is a long-term endeavour that requires both political and technical action at national, sub-regional, regional and international levels.

Recalling the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and Work Plan, the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, and the follow-up Resolutions of UNSCR 1540, particularly UNSCR 1977 (2011), which underscored the important role of UNSCR 1540 in strengthening global nuclear security and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the 1540 Committee will be completing  its second Comprehensive Review in 2016 on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540, as set forth by UNSCR 1977 (2011). This Review provides an opportunity for the 1540 Committee to take stock of national and international progress in implementing UNSCR 1540 since the previous Comprehensive Review in 2009, and to put forward key findings and recommendations that will contribute to more effective implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Welcoming the contributions of States for updating and submitting reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 with the view of the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Reaffirming our commitment to the Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 delivered at the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit.

Noting that since the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, co-signatories have advanced national efforts to further the implementation of UNSCR 1540 by providing support for the 1540 Committee’s main areas of work, including, inter alia: monitoring implementation of the Resolution; providing capacity building assistance at the technical level to requesting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations; preparing and submitting UNSCR 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; organizing or supporting regional and sub-regional training seminars, exercises and initiatives; convening workshops to help facilitate the implementation of UNSCR 1540 into national legislation; conducting outreach to stakeholders in industry, civil society and academia; and strengthening cooperation with regional organizations such as the African Union, ASEAN, the Caribbean Community, and the European Union.

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We, the Governments of Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, with the support of the United Nations, the European Union and INTERPOL, reaffirm our commitment to the full and universal implementation of UNSCR 1540, including the implementation of obligations to enhance the security of nuclear materials worldwide in line with the objectives of the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and institutional Action Plans. We reiterate our support for the activities of the 1540 Committee and the Group of Experts. We also reaffirm our commitment to fully implement UNSCR 1540 in our respective States, in areas where we have not already done so, and further undertake to:

1.       Work with and provide information to the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts for the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

2.       Consider providing additional support and assistance in fulfilling the Action Plan in support of the United Nations, particularly actions aimed at facilitating national and regional implementation of UNSCR 1540 and its nuclear security obligations, with a view to helping requesting States to fully implement UNSCR 1540 by 2021, as referenced in the UNSC Presidential Statement of 7 May 2014;

3.       Encourage states to submit reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 on a regular basis, and focussing outreach on states yet to submit a first report to the 1540 Committee;

4.       Advocate for international, regional, and sub-regional organizations that have not yet done so to designate a Point of Contact (PoC) or coordinator on the implementation of UNSCR 1540 in order to facilitate regional approaches to assisting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations and enhance coordination for their UNSCR 1540 implementation efforts;

5.       Consider providing funding, where feasible, to organizations requesting for supporting their PoCs or coordinators for the implementation UNSCR 1540;

6.       Enhance coordination through outreach events with a wide range of domestic stakeholders such as industry, parliamentarians, civil society and academia, and develop appropriate ways to inform these stakeholders of their obligations pursuant to domestic laws relating to the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

7.       Consider organizing joint exercises at the national, regional or international levels that demonstrate ways of reinforcing national and regional capacities and international cooperation for better implementation of UNSCR 1540, and encourage the participation of relevant international organizations and initiatives;

8.       Advocate for the 1540 Committee to continue to strengthen cooperation with other relevant international organizations and initiatives, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, other United Nations entities, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership), as well as regional and sub-regional organizations in promoting the implementation of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit institutional Action Plans;

9.       Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to enhance their cooperation with other relevant entities in the United Nations system, such as the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)- and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), including through strengthening the legal framework to prohibit illicit activities, export controls, border security, and other measures that support obligations under UNSCR 1540, and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate through joint country visits to monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

10.    Consider further enhancing the cooperation between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UNSCR 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts on strengthening nuclear security, through opportunities such as: enhancing complementarity and reducing duplication, including by using Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSP) to inform voluntary 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; coordinating with the IAEA’s International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) on outreach to academia relevant to implementing UNSCR 1540 and the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC) Network on outreach to nuclear security training centers; exploring establishing a liaison between the 1540 Committee and the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security;

11.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue collaborative efforts and interactions with INTERPOL regarding assistance requests and training opportunities;

12.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue to participate in GICNT exercises, workshops and events that focus on building and enhancing nuclear forensics, detection and response capabilities;

13.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to develop strong UNSCR 1540 assistance requests that are sufficiently detailed to support responses from potential assistance providers, including through the Global Partnership. In this context, consideration should be given to strengthening the 1540 Committee’s “match-making” mechanism and coordination with assistance providers, including at the regional level, through the Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540;

14.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to address new and emerging WMD threats relevant to the obligations and recommendations of the resolution; and

15.    Advocate for increased contributions, where feasible, to the UN Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities dedicated to supporting UNSCR 1540 implementation and the work of the 1540 Committee.

Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security Architecture

JOINT STATEMENT ON SUSTAINING ACTION TO

STRENGTHEN GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

The Nuclear Security Summit process has led to significant achievements in nuclear security at national, regional, and global levels; but the work of building a strengthened, sustained, and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture – consisting of legal instruments, international organizations and initiatives, internationally accepted guidance, and best practices – requires continuous attention.

We need sustained action and ambition on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit to address continuing and evolving nuclear security challenges, with the objectives of advancing implementation of nuclear security commitments and building a strengthened, sustainable and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture.

The Governments of Argentina, Armenia, ­­­­­Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Republic of Korea, Romania, Poland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, and the following international organizations: INTERPOL and United Nations, aiming to facilitate cooperation and sustain activity on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, commit to:

• Establish a Nuclear Security Contact Group; and
• Designate an appropriately authorized and informed senior official or officials to participate in the Contact Group.

The Contact Group is tasked with:

• Convening annually on the margins of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and, as may be useful, in connection with other related meetings;
• Discussing a broad range of nuclear security-related issues, including identifying emerging trends that may require more focused attention;
• Promoting and assessing implementation of nuclear security commitments, including those made during the Nuclear Security Summit process, reflected in the four Nuclear Security Summit Communiqués, the 2010 Washington Work Plan, the 2016 Action Plans, national commitments and associated joint statements, and gift baskets;
• Developing and maintaining linkages to nongovernmental experts and nuclear industry; and,
• Determining any additional steps that may be appropriate to support these goals.

The Contact Group may also consider and make recommendations to their respective leaders on convening any future Nuclear Security Summits.

We welcome the participation of all countries that subscribe to the goals set out in this Joint Statement and wish to contribute to the work of the Contact Group.

National Statement: Morocco

Kingdom of Morocco

4th Nuclear Security Summit

  National Statement

« National, International and Institutional Actions to enhance Nuclear Security » 

Washington, March 31st- April 1st, 2016

Mr. Chair,

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen

The Kingdom of Morocco expresses it thanks to the United States of America for hosting the fourth Nuclear Security Summit in Washington DC.

Today more than ever the potential use of nuclear arms or nuclear components has become a real threat to international peace and security. This threat is no longer theoretical or hypothetical, but is a reality.

There are many indications that point to the fact that terrorists have attempted or will attempt to acquire nuclear materials. Such a scenario is terrifying.

The use of radioactive materials to build even the toughest traditional nuclear bomb will have tragic human, economic, and environmental consequences.

The use of radioactive materials to build even tough nuclear traditional bomb will have human, economical and environmental tragic consequences.

Mr. Chair,

Six years after the first Washington Summit held in 2010, we meet today to assess the various common efforts made in the field of nuclear security, in accordance with the “Washington Action Plan” and all issued Summit communiqués.

The Kingdom of Morocco has taken several concrete measures to implement this action plan into its national strategy to combat terrorism, a strategy that is also in accordance with the guidelines of His Majesty the King Mohammed VI. These guidelines call for a proactive and multidimensional approach to combat terrorism and extremism through national measures that will contribute to strengthening of the international nuclear security arsenal.

At the national level, Morocco adopted the following national measures:

1.    Strengthening the legal framework relating to nuclear safety and security through the adoption of law 142-12 on nuclear and radiological safety and security, on September18th, 2014;

2. Submission on July 28th, 2015 to the UNSC committee established through Resolution 1540 of a national report. The report outlines the new approach that implements all of the provisions as called for by UNSC resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1977 (2011);

3.   Adhesion to all international conventions aimed at strengthening nuclear security and safety. Morocco ratified on October 18th, 2015, the Amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM);

4.  Set-up of « the Moroccan Agency for Safety and Security in Nuclear and Radiological Fields ».

As for the various diversified contributions that Morocco has made to strengthening the international nuclear security regime, the following actions were undertaken;

1. An exemplary cooperation between Morocco and Spain has allowed both countries to elaborated an action plan in support of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) to be endorsed during this Summit;

2.  The “Gate to Africa” exercise was co-organized by the Kingdoms of Morocco and Spain to evaluate the capacity of both countries to cooperate jointly in a simulation response exercise. This exercise scenario involves a terrorist act during the transportation of radioactive materials from the port of Algeciras in southern Spain to the port of Tangier-Med in northern Morocco. The outcomes and recommendations of “Gate to Africa” will be shared and presented during this Summit and during the IAEA meeting;

3.  Morocco has also elaborated, since its chairmanship of the GICNT working group on the response and mitigation in 2011, a document on “Fundamentals for establishing and maintaining a nuclear security response framework: A GICNT practice guide.” that was endorsed, by acclamation, during the political meeting of the GICNT, held in Helsinki (June 2015).

4.     This document was based on the results of the Morocco-Spain joint exercise “Remex 2013” held in Madrid (April 2013) and the international exercise “Convex3” named “Bab al Maghrib,” organized in Rabat, in cooperation with the IAEA, on November 27th-28th, 2013;

5.     The nuclear security center of excellence has collaborated with the IAEA and the US Department of Energy in Rabat to organize several training sessions for experts from across Africa and the Middle East, for the sake to promote the nuclear security culture.

Mr. Chair,

The contribution of the Kingdom of Morocco to the strengthening of the international nuclear security system reflects Morocco’s continued commitment to the international efforts undertaken in this regard in full alignment with the vision of His Majesty King Mohammed VI, and his continued call for the reinforcement of multilateral actions through a full respect of the right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the provisions of non-proliferation regime.

National Statement: Morocco (French)

4ème Sommet sur la Sécurité Nucléaire

 Déclaration du Royaume du Maroc 

Sur :

« Les actions nationales, internationales et institutionnelles pour renforcer la sécurité nucléaire » 

  Washington, 31 Mars- 1er Avril 2016

Monsieur le Président,

Excellences, Mesdames et Messieurs,

Permettez-moi tout d’abord d’exprimer les remerciements du Royaume du Maroc aux Etats Unis d’Amérique, d’avoir abrité les travaux du 4ème Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire.

L’usage potentiel d’armes ou de composants nucléaires constitue la plus grave menace actuelle pour la paix et la sécurité internationales. Une telle menace n’est ni abstraite, ni théorique.

Tout porte à croire que des groupes terroristes ont tenté ou tenterons d’acquérir des matières nucléaires. Un tel scenario est terrifiant. L’utilisation de matières radioactives pour la fabrication d’une bombe nucléaire, même rudimentaire, pourrait avoir des conséquences humaines, économiques et environnementales catastrophiques.

Voilà pourquoi la coopération internationale est essentielle pour prévenir ce type de menace.

Monsieur le Président,

Six ans après la tenue du 1er Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire à Washington en 2010, nous nous réunissons aujourd’hui pour procéder à une évaluation des efforts conjoints déployés en matière de Sécurité nucléaire, dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre du « Plan d’action de Washington » et les communiqués  des Sommets antérieurs.

Dans ce cadre, je voudrais rappeler que le Royaume du Maroc a pris plusieurs mesures concrètes pour la mise en œuvre de ce plan d’action, dans le cadre de la stratégie nationale de lutte contre le terrorisme en application des Hautes Orientations de Sa Majesté le Roi Mohammed VI. Ces Orientations qui insistent sur l’importance d’une approche proactive et multidimensionnelle, à travers des mesures nationales et des contributions au renforcement du système international de Sécurité Nucléaire.

Parmi les principales mesures nationales prises par le Maroc, on peut citer :

• Le renforcement de l’arsenal juridique dans le domaine de la sureté et la sécurité nucléaire, par l’adoption de la loi 142.12 du 18 septembre 2014, relative à la sûreté et la sécurité nucléaire et radiologique ;
• La soumission par le Royaume du Maroc, le 28 juillet 2015, de son rapport national devant le comité 1540 du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, sur la base d’une nouvelle approche consistant en la mise en œuvre de toutes les dispositions de la résolution 1540 (2004) et 1977 (2011);
• La poursuite des efforts visant l’adhésion à toutes les conventions relatives à la sûreté et la sécurité nucléaires, à travers le dépôt, le 18 octobre 2015, des instruments de ratification du protocole de 2005, amendant la convention sur la protection physique des matières nucléaires ;
• La création de l’Agence marocaine de sûreté et de sécurité nucléaire et radiologique comme autorité nationale.

S’agissant de la contribution du Royaume au renforcement du système international de la sûreté nucléaire, celle-ci est riche et diversifiée. Elle s’articule principalement autour des axes suivants :

• Une coopération exemplaire avec des partenaires régionaux et internationaux. En effet, le Maroc et l’Espagne ont par exemple élaboré un plan d’action devant être adopté lors de nos travaux, relatif à l’appui du Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire aux objectifs de l’Initiative globale pour la lutte contre le terrorisme nucléaire. 
• L’organisation de l’exercice « Gate To Africa », en octobre 2015, en partenariat avec l’Espagne, à travers lequel les deux pays ont testé leur capacité de coordination, par la simulation d’une riposte à un acte terroriste lors du transport d’une source radioactive du port d’Algésiras au Sud de l’Espagne au port Tanger-Med au Nord du Maroc. Les résultats et les recommandations de cet exercice seront présentés lors des travaux de ce Sommet.
• Le Maroc a également préparé, lors de son mandat depuis 2011, en tant que président du Groupe de travail pour la réponse et la gestion des risques radiologiques de l’Initiative globale de lutte contre le terrorisme nucléaire, un document relatif aux « fondements de l’établissement et le maintien d’un cadre de riposte et de réponse nucléaire » adopté à, l’unanimité, lors de la réunion politique de l’Initiative globale pour la lutte contre le terrorisme nucléaire, tenue à Helsinki en juin 2015.
• Ce document constitue un protocole de bonnes pratiques « pour une réponse préparatoire en cas de risques suite à des incidents radiologiques nucléaires ». Il est basé sur les résultats de l’exercice « REMEX 2013 », organisé dans le cadre de ladite initiative durant le mois d’avril 2013, ainsi que de l’exercice international « Convex3 » intitulé « Bab Al Maghrib », organisé conjointement avec l’Agence Internationale de l’Energie Atomique, en novembre 2013.
• L’organisation par le Centre d’Excellence pour la Sûreté nucléaire, à Rabat de plusieurs sessions de formation au profit des experts africains et du Monde arabe, dans le cadre de la mise à niveau des ressources humaines et la promotion de la culture de Sureté nucléaire, en coopération avec l’Agence Internationale de l’Energie Atomique et le Département américain de l’Energie.

Monsieur le Président,

La participation du Royaume du Maroc au renforcement du système international de la sécurité nucléaire reflète son engagement constant visant à contribuer aux efforts internationaux déployés dans ce contexte et ce, conformément à la vision de Sa Majesté leRoi Mohammed VI, qui prône le renforcement de l’action multilatérale à travers la préservation d’un équilibreentre le droit à l’usage pacifique de l’énergie nucléaire à des fins de développement et le strict respect des engagements en matière de non-prolifération des armes nucléaires.

National Statement: Morocco (Arabic)

المملكة المغربية

قمة الأمن النووي الرابعة

البيان الوطني

حول

الإجراءات الوطنية، الدولية والمؤسساتية لتعزيز الأمن النووي

واشنطن، 31 مارس - 1 ابريل 2016

السيد الرئيس،

أصحاب الفخامة و المعالي و السعادة،

تتقدم المملكة المغربية بشكرها الخالص إلى الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية على استضافتها الكريمة لأشغال مؤتمر القمة الرابعة للأمن.

الاستعمال المحتمل لأسلحة أو مكونات نووية يمثل حاليا أخطر التهديدات على الأمن والسلم الدوليين.

مثل هذه التهديدات ليست بالوهمية أو غير محتملة. هناك الكثير من الأدلة تثبت على أن جماعات إرهابية حاولت ولازالت تحاول استقطاب مواد نووية. هذا الاحتمال جد مرعب.

في هذا السياق ان استعمال مواد اشعاعية لصناعة قنبلة نووية ولو تقليدية قد يكون له تداعيات انسانية اقتصادية ومناخية غير مسبوقة.

لهذا فالتنسيق على المستوى الدولي بات من الضروري من أجل استباق هذا النوع من التهديدات.

 السيد الرئيس،

بعد ستة سنوات من قمة واشنطن الأولى (2010) نجتمع اليوم مجددا بعاصمة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية لتقييم مجهوداتنا المشتركة في مجال الأمن النووي تفعيلا "لخطة عمل واشنطن" وبيانات القمم السابقة.

وفي هذا الإطار، تود المملكة المغربية، بان تذكر أنها اتخذت عدة تدابير عملية لتفعيل هذه الخطة ضمن الاستراتيجية الوطنية للوقاية ومكافحة الإرهاب، تنفيذا للتوجيهات السامية لجلالة الملك محمد السادس، التي تؤكد على المقاربة الاستباقية المتعددة الأبعاد، وذلك عبر المثابرة في اتخاذ تدابير وطنية وإسهامات لتعزيز المنظومة الدولية الأمن النووي.   

ومن بين التدابير الوطنية الأساسية المتخذة:

• تعزيز الترسانة القانونية في مجال الأمن والأمان النوويين، من خلال اعتماد القانون 12ـ142، في 18 شتنبر2014، والمتعلق بالأمن والسلامة في المجالين النووي والإشعاعي.
• تقديم المملكة المغربية، في 28 يوليوز 2015، لتقريرها الوطني أمام لجنة القرار 1540، وفق إجراءات تعتمد مقاربة جديدة ترتكز على تفعيل كل بنود قراري مجلس الأمن 1540 (2004) و1977 (2011).
• استكمال الانضمام إلى كافة الاتفاقيات الدولية المعنية بتعزيز الأمن والأمان النوويين، وذلك بإيداع وثائق المصادقة، يوم 18 أكتوبر 2015، على البرتوكول 2005 المعدل لاتفاقية الحماية المادية للمواد النووية.
• إنشاء الوكالة المغربية للأمن والسلامة في المجالين النووي والإشعاعي، وهي بمثابة سلطة وطنية.

أما فيما يتعلق بإسهامات المملكة في تعزيز المنظومة الدولية للأمن النووي: فهي غنية ومتنوعة وتدور حول المحاور التالية:

• تنسيق نموذجي مع شركاء اقليميين ودوليين. في هذا السياق تكلف المغرب إلى جانب اسبانيا بصياغة خطة العمل، المزمع اعتمادها خلال هذه القمة، والتي تتعلق بدعم قمة الأمن النووي لأهداف المبادرة الشاملة لمكافحة الإرهاب النووي.
• تم تنظيم تمرين "بوابة لأفريقيا"، شهر أكتوبر 2015، بشراكة ما بين المملكتين المغربية والاسبانية، والذي تم بواسطته اختبار مدى جاهزية البلدين وقدرتهما على التنسيق، من خلال محاكاة رد على عمل إرهابي أثناء نقل مصدر مشع من ميناء الجزيرة الخضراء بجنوب اسبانيا إلى ميناء طنجة-المتوسط بشمال المغرب، سوف يتم تقديم نتائجه وتوصيات خلال أشغال هذه القمة.
• كما أعد المغرب منذ توليه سنة 2011 رئاسة فريق العمل للاستجابة وإدارة حالات الطوارئ الإشعاعية للمبادرة الشاملة لمكافحة الإرهاب النووي، وثيقة بشأن "أسس إنشاء والحفاظ على إطار الرد والاستجابة" والتي اعتمدت، بالإجماع، خلال الاجتماع السياسي للمبادرة الشاملة لمكافحة الإرهاب النووي، المنعقد بهلسنكي في يونيو 2015. هذه الوثيقة تشكل بروتوكول للممارسات الفضلى "للاستجابة التحضيرية في حالة للطوارئ إثر حوادث إشعاعية نووية «، كما ترتكز على أساس نتائج تمرين «2013 REMEX»، المنظم في إطار المبادرة خلال شهر ابريل 2013، والتمرين الدولي «Convex3» المسمى " باب المغرب"، المنظم مع الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية خلال شهر نوفمبر 2013.
• نظم مركز الامتياز للأمن النووي بالرباط، في إطار تنمية الموارد البشرية وتعزيز ثقافة الأمن النووي، بتعاون مع الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية ووزارة الطاقة الأمريكية، العديد من الدورات التدريبية، لفائدة اطر من إفريقيا والشرق الأوسط.

السيد الرئيس،

إن مشاركة المملكة المغربية في تعزيز المنظومة الدولية للأمن النووي ليعكس التزامها الثابت للإسهام في الجهود الدولية المبذولة في هذا السياق انسجاما مع رؤية جلالة الملك محمد السادس القائمة على تقوية العمل المتعدد الأطراف كإطار مناسب وفعال لتنسيق الجهود على المستوى الدولي من خلال ضمان حق تطوير واستعمال الطاقة النووية لأغراض التنمية والتزامات حظر انتشار الأسلحة النووية.  

وشكرا لكم.

National Progress Report: Morocco

Since the 3rd Nuclear Security Summit (The Hague 2014), the Kingdom of Morocco has undertaken the following actions, in line with its commitments, to implement the Action Plan adopted at the1st Nuclear Security Summit (Washington 2010):

Supporting Multilateral Instruments on Nuclear Security:

Morocco continues to support the international instruments aiming at enhancing global efforts for nuclear security:

• Morocco chaired, in 2005, the 6th Committee of the UN General Assembly and played a significant role in facilitating the consensus for the adoption of the Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). Morocco has been party to this important instrument, since February 23rd, 2010.
• Morocco has been party to the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement between Morocco and IAEA, since April 21st, 2011. Morocco continues to fully comply with the IAEA’s inspection reports, and positively considers their recommendations.
• Morocco updated and submitted, on July 28th, 2015, its last report to the UNSC resolution 1540 (2004) and subsequent resolutions, pursuant to its obligations to implement the resolution 1540.
• Morocco ratified, on October 18th, 2015, the Amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM), adopted in Vienna on July 8th, 2005.
• Morocco promulgated, on August 22nd, 2014, the Act 142-12 on nuclear and radiological safety, security and for safeguards. This law aims at harmonizing the national legal arsenal with the relevant provisions of the international conventions on nuclear law.
• The Decree on the establishment of the” Moroccan Agency on Nuclear and Radiological Safety and Security” (Moroccan Regulatory Body) was published on October 26th, 2015.
• The Director of the “Moroccan Agency on Nuclear and Radiological Safety and Security” was appointed at the last Council of Ministers, held in Lâayoune, on February 6th, 2016. He is responsible for setting up this new National Regulatory Authority and implementing the law provisions.

Supporting International Initiatives on Nuclear Security:

As a founding member of the Global Initiative for Combating Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), Morocco continues to implement its statement of principles and terms of reference as amended at the 6th GICNT Plenary Meeting (Abu-Dhabi-UAE, June 2010):

• Morocco has chaired, since June 15th – 16th, 2011, one of the GICNT three working groups, “the Response and Mitigation Working Group (RMWG)”. The main focus of the RMWG is to examine best practices related to crises or emergencies involving radiological or nuclear terrorist threats or incidents.
• Morocco organized the Mid-year IAG meeting, in Rabat, on February, 17th-19th, 2015, to facilitate the adoption of the Response and Mitigation Fundamentals Document entitled “Fundamentals for Establishing and Maintaining a Nuclear Security Response Framework: A GICNT Best Practices Guide”.
• Morocco submitted at the 9th GICNT meeting held in Helsinki, on June 16th–18th, 2015, “the Response and Mitigation Fundamentals Document”. This document, which was endorsed by Helsinki CICNT Plenary meeting, is a collection of key considerations that a country with “limited capabilities” should consider when designing or enhancing its national nuclear and radiological emergency response system.
• Morocco organized, on January 20th- 21st, 2016, in cooperation with the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), the European Commission, and the GICNT, the final planning meeting of the Inter-Arab Nuclear Detection and Response Exercise “Falcon”, conducted, in Abu Dhabi, on February 23rd- 25th, 2016.

Contributing to the Global Efforts and the IAEA’s Activities to Strengthen the International Nuclear Security Regime:

Morocco hosted, organized and coordinated with the IAEA, several activities by adopting an integrated and global approach, aiming at strengthening the international nuclear security regime. The areas covered range from training, capacity-building and information-sharing to exercises on nuclear security (prevention, detection, forensics, response and mitigation):

• Morocco has, also, built its notification, information exchange and assistance request System with the IAEA, pursuant to the relevant dispositions of the “Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident” and “the Assistance in case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency”.
• Morocco presented the lessons learnt from the exercise ConvEx 3 named “Bab Al Maghrib” at the Competent Authority Meeting, held by the IAEA, in Vienna on May 18th, 2014, and at the International Conference on Challenges Faced by Technical and Scientific Support Organizations (TSOs) in Enhancing Nuclear Safety and Security: Strengthening Cooperation and Improving Capabilities, in Beijing on October 2014.
• Morocco and Spain organized, with this dynamic, on October 26th- 28th, 2015, in cooperation with the IAEA, a maritime transportation security exercise of radioactive material from the port of Algeciras to the port of Tangiers-Med, named “Gate to Africa”. The context of the exercise program was driven by the political instability in the Sahelo-Saharan region that requires collective efforts, on the bilateral and regional levels, due to terrorism threat.
• Morocco and Spain took part, in Vienna, on February 2nd-5th, 2016, in the Consultancy Meeting on the Preparation Executive Summary and the Report from the “Gate to Africa” exercises, organized by the IAEA. In the meantime, Morocco presented the lessons learnt in the areas to be improved and to gather good practices. The latter’s will be submitted as      a summary executive exercise to be shared with IAEA members, and as an input to Washington NSS (2016).

Promoting Nuclear Security Culture:

Morocco attaches the highest priority to human resources development and to the promotion of a nuclear security culture, through nuclear security education and training by establishing nuclear security support centers and international nuclear security education network:

• Morocco updated in 2015 with IAEA its Integrated Nuclear Security and Support Plan (INSSP) for the period 2016-2017.  This plan considers the main actions to be conducted to support nuclear security enhancement. The INSSP covers legal and regulatory framework, prevention, detection, response and human resources development. 
• Morocco continues to organize and host, at the premises of the National Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC), training activities on nuclear security to disseminate knowledge and information, as well as to promote international standards on nuclear security for representatives of African and MENA region countries.
• Morocco organized, in the framework of its Nuclear Security Support Center, several training activities at the national and regional levels. In 2014-2015, the National Training and Support Center of the National Center of Energy Sciences and Nuclear Techniques (CNESTEN) conducted 15 training events (9 national and 6 regional) for 380 participants on various topics related to nuclear security: detection architecture, radioactive sources physical protection, sources security transportation, emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security information management, nuclear forensics, borders control. These trainings were organized, in cooperation with the IAEA, the USA and the Arab Atomic Energy Agency.
• Morocco (General Directorate for Civil Protection – DGPC) has been hosting, since 2013, a Regional Center of Excellence CBRN for the African countries of the Atlantic coast to share best practices, to enhance collaboration at the regional and sub-regional levels, with the following objectives:
  • To reduce the risk of illicit nuclear trafficking;
  • To raise awareness on chemical, Biological, Radiological and nuclear materials
  • To reinforce capacity building on the use of personal equipments for detection of ionizing rays.
• Morocco equipped its customs-controlled borders and exit-entry points with devices detecting and identifying nuclear and radioactive materials.
• Morocco’s National Center for Radiation Protection (NCRP), organized many trainings, in cooperation with the General Directorate for National Security (DGSN) and the Radiological Security Office (ORS) of the US Department of Energy.

Statement on Enhancing Radiological Security

Statement on Enhancing Radiological Security

Joint Statement on the Contributions of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) to Enhancing Nuclear Security; Office of the Spokesperson; Washington, DC

Joint Statement on the Contributions of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) to Enhancing Nuclear Security

Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security→

JOINT STATEMENT in the context of the Nuclear Security Summit 2014 Forensics in Nuclear Security

Joint Statement on UNSCR 1540

Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540

Joint Statement on the National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security

Joint Statement on the National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security

Statement on Nuclear Information Security (UK)→

Statement on Nuclear Information Security: Progress update

Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres - Centres of Excellence→

Joint statement on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres / Centres of Excellence for the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit Submitted by Italy

Joint Statement on the Contributions of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) To Enhancing Nuclear Security

Joint Statement on the Contributions of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) to Enhancing Nuclear Security