April 06, 2016

Fact Sheet: Update on Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation (INFCIRC 869)

April 06, 2016/ NSS

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release

FACT SHEET

Update on INFCIRC 869

On October 9, 2014, the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, on behalf of its Government and 34 other countries (full list below), conveyed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Secretariat the “Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation” from the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and requested that it be circulated to all IAEA Member States. The subscribing states pledged to take specific steps, including implementing key IAEA nuclear security guidance, accepting voluntary peer reviews, and committing that those responsible for nuclear security are demonstrably competent. The Dutch note verbale encouraged all States to meet the intent of these essential elements of a nuclear security regime and to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the principles therein. The IAEA has circulated the 2014 Joint Statement as INFCIRC/869, to which all IAEA Member States could ascribe.

On November 13, 2015, Jordan pledged its commitment to the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, as contained in INFCIRC/869. Jordan is the 36th IAEA member state to subscribe to the statement, and the first to do so outside the Summit process.

The United States continues to encourage all IAEA member states to indicate their commitment to implement the provisions of INFCIRC/869, noting that such public commitments provide public assurances that nuclear materials are effectively secured and underscore support for the IAEA and its nuclear security efforts.

Full List of Subscribers

Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Vietnam.

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April 05, 2016

Joint Statement on Certified Training

April 05, 2016/ NSS

Joint Statement on

Certified Training for Nuclear Security Management

2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Introduction

Gathered in Washington D.C. on the occasion of the fourth Nuclear Security Summit, the leaders of Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States welcome the progress that has been made by states to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the essential elements of nuclear security guidance, particularly in the area of ensuring that management and personnel with accountability for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.

At the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, thirty five states sponsored a Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation. The aim of this Joint Statement was for Subscribing States, at their own discretion, to meet the intent of the essential elements of a nuclear security regime and to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the principles therein. The Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation was subsequently published by the IAEA in 2014 as INFCIRC/869 and is open for any IAEA Member State to support.

One of the four key commitments outlined in the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation is for Subscribing States to “Ensure that management and personnel with accountability for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.” The challenges associated with managing nuclear and other radiological materials are complex, and it is essential that States ensure that such materials remain secure. The Joint Statement outlines two ways in which States can support the training of effective and competent managers of those materials and related facilities:

Maintaining and continuously improving domestic or regional training through education, certification and/or qualification activities; and
Supporting or participating in the development of World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) best practice guides and training activities.

In support of the commitments in the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States, together with a number of corporations and foundations, joined together to establish the WINS Academy, the world’s first structured professional development and certification program for nuclear security managers. The first training module of the WINS Academy was launched at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.

Since its launch at the 2014 Summit, and with support from Nuclear Security Summit participating States, corporations and foundations, the WINS Academy has developed a robust international nuclear security certification program. The training program is designed to develop a network of certified professionals who are implementing meaningful and sustainable changes to security culture and best practices worldwide. To date, 560 participants from 75 countries have registered in the WINS Academy certification program.

Next Steps

In support of the commitments in INFCIRC/869, and acknowledging the international recognition of the need for nuclear security training, education, certification and/or qualification activities, this gift basket records the intent of Canada, Finland, Hungary, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States to undertake to further support the WINS Academy in its efforts to expand its international certification program, including through the provision of advocacy, peer review support, contributions, or by other means as necessary.

The States listed above also recognize and undertake to promote cooperative efforts between the WINS Academy and the IAEA, including: WINS cooperation with the IAEA Nuclear Security Support Centre (NSSC) Working Group on Best Practices, whose 2014-2015 Action Plan includes the development of a program to collect lessons learned case studies from NSSC members; and WINS Academy cooperation with the IAEA’s International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN), which has helped academics connect and collaborate with WINS to help develop blended courses leading to joint certification.

We welcome other States, supported by industry and civil society, to provide a tangible commitment in support of the WINS Academy and certified professional development for nuclear security. Together we can help to ensure that nuclear and other radioactive materials remain secure under the management of demonstrably competent professionals.

April 05, 2016

Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security

April 05, 2016/ NSS

JOINT STATEMENT in the context of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit

Forensics in Nuclear Security

Applying science to investigate the illicit use of nuclear or other radioactive material is a crucial element of nuclear security. Nuclear forensic science assists in determining the provenance of materials encountered out of regulatory control by focusing on the questions that would be asked by regulatory authorities or law enforcement investigators.

This gift basket records the intent of 30 countries[1] to advance nuclear forensics as a key element of effective nuclear security. This may be accomplished by incorporating nuclear forensics as an important element of a nation’s coordinated response, cultivating and sustaining expertise in the fundamental scientific disciplines; and advocating for and supporting international efforts where the implementation of both traditional and nuclear forensic capabilities may be enhanced through sharing.

The Forensics in Nuclear Security Gift Basket presented at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit raised awareness about good practices employed by practitioners, developed education and training curricula, and advanced international collaboration through a common lexicon and knowledge platform. Continued effort is needed to strengthen and sustain national nuclear forensic capabilities through their inclusion in national response plans and communicating what nuclear forensics can provide to stakeholders.

Recognizing that practical implementation and sustainment of nuclear forensic capabilities are an enduring component of nuclear security, States that subscribe to this Joint Statement commit to one or more of the following elements:

Develop and sustain expertise through actions such as cross-disciplinary training of traditional forensic and nuclear scientists, transferring knowledge to the next generation of practitioners, cultivating attractive career paths, and facilitating participation in international training including, but not limited to, those offered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), or the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).
Promote employment of existing national nuclear science capabilities to support nuclear forensics.
Evaluate and adapt existing national response frameworks to incorporate the effective use of nuclear forensic capabilities.
Advance and mature nuclear forensic expertise in other countries through efforts such as providing instruction at or hosting international courses or conferences, publishing techniques in peer-reviewed scholarly journals, or serving as leaders in relevant international groups.

[1] The following countries are signatories to this Joint Statement: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, ROK, Thailand, UK and USA. The following organization also supports this Joint Statement: INTERPOL]

April 05, 2016

Joint Statement on In Larger Security: A Comprehensive Approach to Nuclear Security

April 05, 2016/ NSS

1. The need for a more encompassing view of various global nuclear challenges was the focus
of the Joint Statement “In larger security: a comprehensive approach to nuclear security",
issued at the 2014 Hague Summit. We believe the core message of that Joint Statement is still
valid and more urgent than ever.

April 05, 2016

Joint Statement on Maritime Supply Chain Security

April 05, 2016/ NSS

2016 Nuclear Security Summit

Maritime Supply Chain Security Joint Statement

Over the past decade, many countries have deployed radiation detection systems at their seaports as a key component of their national approach to combating nuclear and radiological smuggling. These systems have detected numerous nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control (MORC) - some that pose security risks and others that just pose risks to public health and safety, or are of regulatory concern(e.g. contaminated goods and orphan sources). Due to the complexity of the maritime system and the many stakeholders involved, it is clear that national, regional and international coordination in both the public and private sector is needed to secure this vector and enable the permanent removal of these materials from the maritime supply chain.

With this in mind, 15 countries, nine international organizations, three terminal operators, and several academic representatives participated in a workshop from 16-18 November 2015, co-sponsored by the United States and the United Kingdom, focused on promoting radiation detection in the maritime supply chain and developing enhanced measures to permanently remove materials found out of regulatory control. This workshop was in fulfillment of a commitment made at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in a joint statement on maritime supply chain security. Workshop participants acknowledged that detection systems are an important tool in a nation’s approach to locating and securing MORC and identified a set of best practices and recommendations.

Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Georgia, Israel, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States endorse the following best practices and recommendations identified at the November 2015 workshop.

Best Practices

Nations with detection programs have agreed to continue to share technical advice, lessons learned and best practices with one another and with those nations seeking to implement and sustain detection systems. Specific examples of best practices include:

Plan for long-term sustainability of systems early in the process of developing and deploying radiation detection programs;
Establish a comprehensive "end-to-end" regulatory framework that provides the necessary framework and authorities to all stakeholders involved in the detection, notification and response to materials found out of regulatory control;
Implement and institutionalize regular training and adaptive exercises that address evolving threats, operational challenges and security strategies of detection systems to verify that roles and responsibilities are clearly understood and that all relevant stakeholders maintain a state of readiness;
Take appropriate national-level measures at the material’s origin, in accordance with the IAEA Code of Conduct on Radioactive Sources, to ensure that radiological materials are controlled at the point of origin and prevented from entering the maritime supply chain.
Take appropriate measures to ensure that detected nuclear other radioactive materials are placed back under control in either the country responsible for the detection eventor the country of material origin, as appropriate; and
Report incidents involving MORC to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) in a timely manner and seek other formal and informal mechanisms to share information on detections, trends, and challenges in addressing MORC with regional and international partners.

Recommendations:

Seek opportunities and mechanisms to enhance communication between public and private stakeholders regarding the responsibilities and obligations associated with the removal of MORC from the maritime supply chain and to ensure feedback mechanisms for all parties in the ultimate resolution of MORC cases, as appropriate;Develop technical and operational solutions to reduce alarms from innocent, naturally occurring radioactive material (“NORM”) to protect commerce and to focus resources on detecting materials of concern;
Request that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continue to study technical and operational issues related to detection operations through cooperative research projects and other mechanisms as appropriate;
Request that INTERPOL continue and enhance current efforts to ensure that threat information flows from law enforcement to front line officers (i.e. Customs and Border Protection) involved in detection operations;
Request that the World Customs Organization (WCO) expand its efforts to deploy a common communication platform between customs organisations, which could be leveraged to facilitate timely information sharing in member states on detections, trends and challenges in addressing MORC; and
Investigate whether the WCO or other appropriate organisations could expand their efforts to facilitate information sharing that goes beyond customs organisations to regulators or other applicable organisations in order to allow all those organisations involved in the detection and removal of MORC to share timely information, ensure that material is permanently removed from the supply chain and correctly disposed of.

The United States and the United Kingdom will document and share these and other best practices and recommendations with the international community.

April 05, 2016

Joint Statement on National Nuclear Detection Architecture

April 05, 2016/ NSS

Nuclear Security Summit 2016

Statement on National Nuclear Detection Architectures

Introduction

This gift basket records the intent of Finland, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Morocco, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam and INTERPOL to demonstrate their commitment to develop national-level nuclear detection architectures and strengthen regional efforts as an effective capability in combating illicit trafficking and malevolent use of nuclear and other radioactive materials. An integral part of this commitment is international cooperation to promote key architecture elements and principles as well as to address common challenges and mitigation strategies.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a central role in nuclear security worldwide, including in the field of nuclear detection and cooperation. Other international fora support international cooperation on nuclear detection, most notably, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). Similarly, the Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction assists in providing practical assistance on nuclear and radiological security, upon state’s requests, and so supports the work of the IAEA.

IAEA

Through its Nuclear Security Programme, the IAEA supports States in their efforts to establish, maintain and sustain an effective nuclear security detection architecture. The IAEA has adopted a comprehensive approach to nuclear security and has elaborated guidance of major importance[1]. These publications aim at advocating the development and improvement of a nuclear security detection architecture that integrates comprehensive detection capabilities and measures and associated resources to improve a nation’s ability to detect nuclear and radiological threats.

GICNT

Nuclear detection is a core nuclear security objective for the GICNT. GICNT activities bring critical added value to nuclear detection work through identifying cross-cutting issues, suggesting new solutions and promoting inter-disciplinary and inter-agency cooperation.

Good practices related to nuclear detection are shared, collected and developed under the auspices of the GICNT. They can contribute to producing, assessing and updating IAEA publications. Frequent scenario-based discussions, table-top exercises and field exercises of the GICNT enhance expertise and skills of members of the global nuclear security community.

Commitments

On the occasion of the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, we the parties to this Statement reaffirm our commitment to improving further our national detection architectures with the goal to combat illicit trafficking and to prevent malicious acts.

We commit ourselves to efficient use of available nuclear detection resources as well as to avoiding duplication of work between IAEA, GICNT and other relevant bodies.

We further reaffirm our commitment to the IAEA’s recommendations, giving particular attention to the following principles:

An effective nuclear security detection architecture should be derived from a comprehensive, integrated detection strategy prepared by the State;
The national nuclear security detection architecture should take into consideration that individual organizations’ roles in the fieldof detection are unambiguously clear;
Nuclear security culture is an effective tool that can strengthen the efficiency of the nuclear security detection systems;
Implementation should account for and integrate border and interior detection capabilities.

We reaffirm, also, our determination to maintain our contributions to the development of the IAEA’s guidance document in the field of detection.

To promote and improve international awareness and understanding of the importance of a national-level nuclear detection architecture, we also advocate and support the work of the IAEA’speriodic review workshops during which participating nations can share good practices and lessons learned and discuss challenges, mitigation strategies, and long-term sustainability approaches. The IAEA will conduct the first such workshop in Seam Reap, Cambodia in April 2016.

GICNT Partners joining to this Statement reaffirm their commitment to actively participate and contribute to nuclear detection work that takes place in the Global Initiative.

[1] As a critical part of this approach, the IAEA published Nuclear Security Series No. 21; Implementing Guide on Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for the Detection of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control.

April 05, 2016

Joint Statement on Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness and Response

April 05, 2016/ NSS

Joint Statement on Supporting Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism

Preparedness and Response Capabilities

Subscribed by Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the United Nations and INTERPOL.

A nuclear terror event anywhere in the world would have devastating human, environmental, economic, and political consequences. Building on the Summit’s nuclear terrorism prevention and nuclear and radiological material security accomplishments and efforts, wethe Parties to this statement recognize the need for ensuring adequate nuclear emergency preparedness and response capabilities. Such capabilities contribute tofurther reducing not onlythe risks posed by nuclear or radiological terrorism (hereafter, “nuclear terrorism”), but also the risks posed by other malicious activities or accidents involving nuclear or radiological materials and facilities.Ensuring preparedness in National capabilities to counter and respond to nuclear terror acts is a critical task for all Nations, as exemplified by the Scenario-Based Policy Discussions successfully completed by participating nations as part ofthe 2016 Summit. Nuclear terrorism preparedness requires a range of activities to establish,enhance, sustain, and exercise the capabilities necessary to counter and respond to nuclear terror incidents. Nuclear terrorism response requires a range of technical, operational, and communications capabilities toprovide coordination and resolution of the incident, as well as mitigatingits consequences.

Consistent with the Nuclear Security Summit goal of reducing the threat posed by nuclear terrorism and furthering the 2014 Hague Summit Communique pledge to “maintain effective emergency preparedness, response, and mitigation capabilities,”we the parties to this statementrecognize that ensuring adequate nuclear terrorismpreparedness and response capabilities complements international nuclear security efforts. We also recognize that adequate nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities contribute to strengthening the interface between nuclear safety and security, and serve as a potential deterrent to attack.

Nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities include the following capabilities:

National policies and plans:Establish and maintainadequate National response plans and policies regarding preparedness, response, and mitigation of incidents and threats of nuclear terrorism, including guidance forlocalplanning in responding to such threats and incidents.
Technical expertise and capabilities:Identify, confirm, assess, and respond to nuclear terror incidentsand threats, including radiological characterization and assessments to inform protective actions, emergency medical training and response support, and decontamination tools and training.
Public communications and education: Develop and maintainstrategic communications and effective public messaging providing not only public safety awareness and emergency readiness in the event of a nuclear terror incident but also mechanisms and procedures for ensuring prompt dissemination of public safety information to potentially affected communities.
Sustainment of capabilities: Sustain necessary capabilities through continuing education, training, and exercises involving National and local officials and multinational partners charged with nuclear terrorism preparedness, response, or associated decision-making.
International coordination and assistance mechanisms: Per the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and other relevant international legal instruments, and considering multilateral mechanisms and initiatives such as offered by the United Nations (UN), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), INTERPOL, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,establish mechanisms for requesting and/or providing (as appropriate):
- Nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capacity building,
- As required, post-event mutualassistance offered by the State Partiesof the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency,
- Government-to-Government coordination and communication in the event of nuclear terrorism.

Recognizing that an act of nuclear terrorism anywhere in the world would have global impacts affecting all Nations, wethe parties to this statement affirm ourwillingnessto cooperate to strengthen National and international nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities. We agree on the following commitments in support of this objective:

Ensure adequate National nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities at home. We the parties to this statement reaffirm our National commitment to establish and maintain the National-level capabilities required for nuclear terrorism preparedness and response.We also commit to conductcomprehensivenuclear terrorism preparedness and response drills, incorporating roles and responsibilities at the National and local levels to foster strong interagency cooperation across law enforcement, medical, technical/scientific, and policy agencies. We commit to strengthen our National interagency coordination, cooperation, and information-sharing mechanisms needed in this regard, to support whole-of-government crisis response.
Support sharing relevant resources, expertise, and good practices, in order to strengthen global nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities, including relevant post-event mutual assistance. Consistent with our respectiveinternational legal obligations,we the parties to this statementagree in principle to support--at the bilateral level, upon request--relevant expertise, training, or other related resources supporting nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilitieswith interested states, as well as offer relevant post-event mutual assistanceincluding through the IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET). We recognize that requests for bilateral assistance must be evaluated by the States involved on a case by case basis and would be subject to availability of resources, legal considerations, and other concerns. However, we the parties to this statement recognize the importance of supporting nuclear terrorismpreparedness and response capacities and thus encourage bilateral and multilateral dialogue and coordination on how best to assure adequate global preparedness and response capabilities.As such, we also commit to making available relevant expertise or experience via international and multilateral effortsas the UN, IAEA, INTERPOL, GICNT, and the GP. National Points of Contact will be provided, in addition to IAEA, INTERPOL, GICNT, and GP points of contact,to support the coordination and evaluation of requests and offers of assistance.
Support for international best practice guidance on preparedness and resilience objectives and the specific capabilities needed to meet them, as published by the organizations listed above,including the IAEA Nuclear Security Series 15 - Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, the IAEA Safety Series GSR Part 7 on Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism’s Fundamentals for Establishing and Maintaining a Nuclear Security Response Framework ,which build on the aforementioned core competencies We the parties to this statement recognize these documents as an excellent foundation for States wishing to establish or sustain baseline nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities, and actively support the broadest possible international application and use of these documents.
Share lessons learned from real world incidents (i.e., nuclear and radiological incidents, materials out of regulatory control, significant all hazards-related emergency response efforts, etc.) that have implications for or applications to nuclear terrorism preparedness, response, and mitigation, in order to incorporate this experience into Preparedness and Response capabilities nationally and internationally.
Encourage and support National and State/local-level full field and table-top exercises aimed at ensuring nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities. As appropriate, participating countries to the exercises will encourage reciprocal, bilateral observation of National and transborder exercises, with a view towards sharing good practices in sustaining preparedness and response capabilities, while ensuring confidentiality of sensitive information.We the parties to this statementcommit, as far as resources permit, to host, observe, or support the development and implementation of radiological emergency management exercises (REMEX) under the GICNT’s Response and Mitigation Working Group. REMEXs emphasize the importance of international cooperation in preparedness and resilience by providing the opportunity for two or more governments to collaboratively exercise response capabilities for nuclear terrorism with bilateral or multilateral scenarios. REMEXs also provide a venue for sharing the good practices and lessons learned from other national and State/local-level exercises encouraged under this gift basket.

April 05, 2016

Joint Statement on Nuclear Training and Support Centres

April 05, 2016/ NSS

Joint statement on

Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres / Centres of Excellence

Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, Vietnam, INTERPOL and the United Nations

Italy hosted the 2014 Gift Basket on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres/Centres of Excellence (NSSC/CoE) following the 2012 Gift Basket hosted by the United States. The 2014 Gift Basket attracted a large number of co-sponsoring Summit participants promoting the importance of nuclear security training and support centres, and the value of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres Network (NSSC Network) in strengthening international and regional cooperation and collaboration. Now that the IAEA NSSC Network is maturing and a number of nuclear security training and support centers are being established, these centres can play an increasingly important and active role in promoting nuclear security. These centres help meet domestic nuclear security needs, and can also provide an important platform for sharing resources and meeting needs on a regional basis, thus strengthening and sustaining the global nuclear security architecture.

In support of the IAEA NSSC Network and nuclear security training and support centre sustainability, the participants to the 2016 Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres / Centres of Excellence Gift Basket intend, within available resources, to support the following activities.

Strengthening of the IAEA NSSC Network

• Nuclear security training and support centres not yet a member of the IAEA NSSC Network commit to join the Network and make every effort to take part in the IAEA NSSC Network activities, including meetings.

Establishment of regional networks

• Building upon the establishment of the Asia Regional Network through the IAEA NSSC Network, establish additional networks with nuclear security training and support centres in the same region and mechanisms of regional coordination to promote best practices, exchange training experiences, share curricula and other activities on a regional basis.

• In collaboration with the IAEA NSSC network, share experiences in training with centres outside their region.

Strengthening nuclear security training and technical support programmes

• Improve the quality of training by conducting peer review exchanges with other nuclear security training and support centres and by making use of the IAEA NSSC Network as a mechanism to promote peer-review exchanges.

• Use IAEA material/guidance as a mechanism to achieve consistency in the technical content of the training programmes on nuclear security and participate in IAEA Train-the-Trainer activities to build a network of instructors qualified to deliver IAEA training course materials.

• Organize and be active participants in the development and running of nuclear and radiological security scenarios and exercises.

• Share experiences and nuclear security training with other training centres and centres of excellence, as appropriate, as well as lessons learned through the IAEA NSSC network and IAEA Nuclear Security Information Portal (NUSEC).

• Use IAEA material/guidance to support training programmes in key technical topics such as nuclear security culture, nuclear material accounting and control, computer security, transportation security, and insider threat mitigation.

•   As appropriate, consider certification of nuclear security training and support centre training programmes, as per ISO 29990 and/or utilize applicable ISO best practices to support continuous improvement.

•   Collaborate with the Global Partnership’s Centre of Excellence Sub-working Group to implement this Gift Basket as noted in the Global Partnership Nuclear Security Summit Action Plan.

Sustainability

• Focus attention on and build mechanisms to ensure the sustainability of nuclear security training and support centres, including developing business plans and e-learning tools, conducting needs analysis and regular evaluation of effectiveness, and identifying required financial, administrative and human resources.

• Provide training, technical and scientific support to competent authorities to strengthen long-term sustainability of domestic nuclear and radiological security regimes.

• Broaden and strengthen international cooperation with the United Nations, especially United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540-related efforts, with INTERPOL, the Global Partnership, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and others.

Cooperation

• Collaborate with educational institutions that teach nuclear security subjects to include nuclear security culture. Continue, improve, and expand the NSSC Network’s collaboration with the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN).

• Cooperate in the area of research and development with national and international institutes to promote scientific advancements in nuclear security and continuous engagement of the scientific communities.

• Engage industry and civil society through constant dialogue on the importance of nuclear security.

• Promote public confidence in nuclear and radiological security.

April 05, 2016

Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004)

April 05, 2016/ NSS

Joint Statement on

Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Recognizing that United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 (hereinafter “1540 Committee”) are key parts of the international legal architecture for States to prevent and combat nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the full implementation of UNSCR 1540 is a long-term endeavour that requires both political and technical action at national, sub-regional, regional and international levels.

Recalling the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and Work Plan, the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, and the follow-up Resolutions of UNSCR 1540, particularly UNSCR 1977 (2011), which underscored the important role of UNSCR 1540 in strengthening global nuclear security and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the 1540 Committee will be completing its second Comprehensive Review in 2016 on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540, as set forth by UNSCR 1977 (2011). This Review provides an opportunity for the 1540 Committee to take stock of national and international progress in implementing UNSCR 1540 since the previous Comprehensive Review in 2009, and to put forward key findings and recommendations that will contribute to more effective implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Welcoming the contributions of States for updating and submitting reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 with the view of the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Reaffirming our commitment to the Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 delivered at the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit.

Noting that since the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, co-signatories have advanced national efforts to further the implementation of UNSCR 1540 by providing support for the 1540 Committee’s main areas of work, including, inter alia: monitoring implementation of the Resolution; providing capacity building assistance at the technical level to requesting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations; preparing and submitting UNSCR 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; organizing or supporting regional and sub-regional training seminars, exercises and initiatives; convening workshops to help facilitate the implementation of UNSCR 1540 into national legislation; conducting outreach to stakeholders in industry, civil society and academia; and strengthening cooperation with regional organizations such as the African Union, ASEAN, the Caribbean Community, and the European Union.

* * *

We, the Governments of Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, with the support of the United Nations, the European Union and INTERPOL, reaffirm our commitment to the full and universal implementation of UNSCR 1540, including the implementation of obligations to enhance the security of nuclear materials worldwide in line with the objectives of the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and institutional Action Plans. We reiterate our support for the activities of the 1540 Committee and the Group of Experts. We also reaffirm our commitment to fully implement UNSCR 1540 in our respective States, in areas where we have not already done so, and further undertake to:

1. Work with and provide information to the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts for the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

2. Consider providing additional support and assistance in fulfilling the Action Plan in support of the United Nations, particularly actions aimed at facilitating national and regional implementation of UNSCR 1540 and its nuclear security obligations, with a view to helping requesting States to fully implement UNSCR 1540 by 2021, as referenced in the UNSC Presidential Statement of 7 May 2014;

3. Encourage states to submit reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 on a regular basis, and focussing outreach on states yet to submit a first report to the 1540 Committee;

4. Advocate for international, regional, and sub-regional organizations that have not yet done so to designate a Point of Contact (PoC) or coordinator on the implementation of UNSCR 1540 in order to facilitate regional approaches to assisting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations and enhance coordination for their UNSCR 1540 implementation efforts;

5. Consider providing funding, where feasible, to organizations requesting for supporting their PoCs or coordinators for the implementation UNSCR 1540;

6. Enhance coordination through outreach events with a wide range of domestic stakeholders such as industry, parliamentarians, civil society and academia, and develop appropriate ways to inform these stakeholders of their obligations pursuant to domestic laws relating to the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

7. Consider organizing joint exercises at the national, regional or international levels that demonstrate ways of reinforcing national and regional capacities and international cooperation for better implementation of UNSCR 1540, and encourage the participation of relevant international organizations and initiatives;

8. Advocate for the 1540 Committee to continue to strengthen cooperation with other relevant international organizations and initiatives, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, other United Nations entities, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership), as well as regional and sub-regional organizations in promoting the implementation of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit institutional Action Plans;

9. Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to enhance their cooperation with other relevant entities in the United Nations system, such as the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)- and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), including through strengthening the legal framework to prohibit illicit activities, export controls, border security, and other measures that support obligations under UNSCR 1540, and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate through joint country visits to monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

10. Consider further enhancing the cooperation between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UNSCR 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts on strengthening nuclear security, through opportunities such as: enhancing complementarity and reducing duplication, including by using Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSP) to inform voluntary 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; coordinating with the IAEA’s International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) on outreach to academia relevant to implementing UNSCR 1540 and the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC) Network on outreach to nuclear security training centers; exploring establishing a liaison between the 1540 Committee and the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security;

11. Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue collaborative efforts and interactions with INTERPOL regarding assistance requests and training opportunities;

12. Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue to participate in GICNT exercises, workshops and events that focus on building and enhancing nuclear forensics, detection and response capabilities;

13. Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to develop strong UNSCR 1540 assistance requests that are sufficiently detailed to support responses from potential assistance providers, including through the Global Partnership. In this context, consideration should be given to strengthening the 1540 Committee’s “match-making” mechanism and coordination with assistance providers, including at the regional level, through the Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540;

14. Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to address new and emerging WMD threats relevant to the obligations and recommendations of the resolution; and

15. Advocate for increased contributions, where feasible, to the UN Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities dedicated to supporting UNSCR 1540 implementation and the work of the 1540 Committee.

April 05, 2016

Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security Architecture

April 05, 2016/ NSS

JOINT STATEMENT ON SUSTAINING ACTION TO

STRENGTHEN GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

The Nuclear Security Summit process has led to significant achievements in nuclear security at national, regional, and global levels; but the work of building a strengthened, sustained, and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture – consisting of legal instruments, international organizations and initiatives, internationally accepted guidance, and best practices – requires continuous attention.

We need sustained action and ambition on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit to address continuing and evolving nuclear security challenges, with the objectives of advancing implementation of nuclear security commitments and building a strengthened, sustainable and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture.

The Governments of Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Republic of Korea, Romania, Poland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, and the following international organizations: INTERPOL and United Nations, aiming to facilitate cooperation and sustain activity on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, commit to:

Establish a Nuclear Security Contact Group; and
Designate an appropriately authorized and informed senior official or officials to participate in the Contact Group.

The Contact Group is tasked with:

Convening annually on the margins of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and, as may be useful, in connection with other related meetings;
Discussing a broad range of nuclear security-related issues, including identifying emerging trends that may require more focused attention;
Promoting and assessing implementation of nuclear security commitments, including those made during the Nuclear Security Summit process, reflected in the four Nuclear Security Summit Communiqués, the 2010 Washington Work Plan, the 2016 Action Plans, national commitments and associated joint statements, and gift baskets;
Developing and maintaining linkages to nongovernmental experts and nuclear industry; and,
Determining any additional steps that may be appropriate to support these goals.

The Contact Group may also consider and make recommendations to their respective leaders on convening any future Nuclear Security Summits.

We welcome the participation of all countries that subscribe to the goals set out in this Joint Statement and wish to contribute to the work of the Contact Group.

April 01, 2016

Joint Statement on Certified Training

April 01, 2016/ NSS

Joint Statement on Certified Training for Nuclear Security Management
2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Introduction

Maintaining and continuously improving domestic or regional training through education, certification and/or qualification activities; and
Supporting or participating in the development of World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) best practice guides and training activities.

Next Steps

March 31, 2016

National Progress Report: Mexico

March 31, 2016/ NSS

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Mexico has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by…

1. SUPPORT FOR CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL (CPPNM) AND INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM (ICSANT)

The Government of Mexico deposited with the IAEA its instrument of accession to the CPPNM on April 4, 1988 and deposited its instruments of ratification of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) on 1° August 2012.
Mexico deposited its instruments of ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and entered into force on 9 July 2007.

2. STRENGTHENED NATIONAL NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL MATERIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

Mexico’s government development, implementation and maintenance of a system of physical protection of radioactive and nuclear materials and nuclear facilities on the recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency in its document entitled: Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC / 225 / Revision 5).
The Government of Mexico has accepted the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, which is the basis for the establishment of the regulation on this issue.
Furthermore, Mexico actively participated in the IAEA technical meeting on the formulation of guidelines for the import and export of nuclear and radiological sources.
In March 2014 the Federal Penal Code was modified to establish the crimes and penalties for terrorist acts, sabotage, theft, attacks on means of communication or international terrorism, those who use radioactive material, nuclear material, nuclear fuel, radioactive mineral, radiation source or instruments that emit radiation in order to carry out acts against goods or services, whether public or private, or against the physical integrity of persons that produce alarm, fear or terror in the population or a group or sector, for acting against national security.
In 2016 the publication of Regulation transport of radioactive and nuclear materials is expected.

3. CONTRIBUTION TO THE IAEA’S NUCLEAR SECURITY-RELATED ACTIVITIES

Mexico, actively contributes to the development of the Nuclear Security Series, most recently by participating in the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee.
Mexico conducted with the cooperation of the IAEA National Training Course on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials in transport.
Mexico has received International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions in all its nuclear facilities.
Mexico has received the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) missions to review the general status of measures that protect against nuclear terrorism and identify ways to improve a broad spectrum of nuclear security activities. The recommendations provide a platform for preparation of a country-specific Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) for future implementation, through IAEA programme and bilateral assistance.
Mexico participated in the meeting of contact points of the CPPNM, held at the headquarters of the IAEA in December 2015, recognizing the commitments based on the Convention and its amendments.

4. SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY-RELATED INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES

Mexico participates in the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. In May 2013, Mexico hosted the 8th Plenary Session of Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) which took place in Mexico City, and cooperates with the 1540 Committee.
From the 25th to the 28th of February 2014, the Government of Mexico in coordination with the GICNT Nuclear Detection Working Group (NDWG) hosted a Workshop and Field Training Exercise in the Port of Manzanillo, Colima.

5. CONTRIBUTION TO MINIMIZATION OF HEU

Mexico, in collaboration with US, Canada and IAEA, converted, in 2012, the HEU fuel of the nuclear research reactor “Triga MARK III”, to use LEU fuel. The reactor intends to use only LEU targets for the production of medical and research radioisotopes.

6. BILATERAL COOPERATION

Mexico since 2011 cooperates with the US to improve the security of medical, industrial and research facilities where radioactive category I and II sources is improved. This includes physical security infrastructure and training. In this process, more than 150 facilities have participated.
With the Governments of Canada and USA, Mexico has signed an agreement to monitor radiation sources from its origin to its final destination, which includes transportation sources category I. These agreements are operational currently.
Likewise, with cooperation to Canada, took place in 2013 a regional workshop for Central America on the safety of radiation sources in medical facilities.
With the cooperation of the US, Mexico has improved infrastructure mega-ports to import and export 80% of goods by sea.
Additionally, with the US, Mexico has created an inter-governmental cooperation for the training of specialists in export controls and the identification of sensitive materials, which has resulted in trainers of trainers. In 2015 specialists from different institutions participated in training courses for specialists from Panama and Colombia.

7. FULFILLMENT OF RESOLUTION 1540 (2004) OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

In 2012, Mexico began the process of joining the four export control regimes. By March 2014, Mexico is a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Australia Group (AG). It has the legislation and the process for granting permits to export products subject to control under these schemes. Mexico joined to WA in January 2012, and accepted on NSG in September 2012. Additionally, August 12th, Mexico was admitted as a fully-fledge Member State to AG.
Within the export control process, Mexico created an Export Controls Committee, determining the export of special materials, taking into account the final use and destination.

8. RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF INDUSTRY IN PROMOTING AND EXCHANGING BEST PRACTICES AS APPROPRIATE, INCLUDING THE PROMOTION OF BEST PRACTICES GUIDES RELATED TO NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURE AND NUCLEAR SECURITY INFORMATION

Mexico is promoting into industry (nuclear power owner), and other institutions in the government the nuclear security culture, in order to have the response to an attack involving nuclear or radiological material.