Fact Sheet on Joint Statement on High-Density Fuel Development

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                       

FACT SHEET

High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources (HASS) Gift Basket

Radioactive sources are used in medical, research and industrial applications in public facilities worldwide.  High-activity sealed radioactive sources (HASS) present a security concern because of their potential use in a radiological dispersal device (dirty bomb) or a radiological exposure device.  In recognition of these concerns, the Joint Statement on Strengthening the Security of High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources aims to advance existing efforts to prevent the theft of these sources by supporting their replacement with technologies that do not use radioactive sources, increasing cooperation among source supplier and recipient States, and assessing the international framework on HASS, especially regarding the management of sources that are no longer in use. 

The United States supports the aims of this gift basket, which was sponsored by France.  The United States seeks to prevent high-activity radiological materials from being used in acts of terrorism by partnering with businesses, hospitals, industries, international organizations, andregulatory agencies in more than 85 countries.  The United States provides security technologies, expertise, training, source recovery, and non-radioactive-source based replacement strategies.  In addition, the United States has helped establish an international research effort on non-isotopic alternative technologies and partners with industry to share information and best practices on adoption.

The United States also supports efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to strengthen the international framework for radiological security by promoting the development of additional guidance regarding the security and management of radioactive sources.  The United States has also partnered with global suppliers of radioactive sources to discuss issues related to imports and exports of sources.

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Fact Sheet on Joint Statement on the Security of High Activity Radioactive Sources

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                       

FACT SHEET

High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources (HASS) Gift Basket

Radioactive sources are used in medical, research and industrial applications in public facilities worldwide.  High-activity sealed radioactive sources (HASS) present a security concern because of their potential use in a radiological dispersal device (dirty bomb) or a radiological exposure device.  In recognition of these concerns, the Joint Statement on Strengthening the Security of High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources aims to advance existing efforts to prevent the theft of these sources by supporting their replacement with technologies that do not use radioactive sources, increasing cooperation among source supplier and recipient States, and assessing the international framework on HASS, especially regarding the management of sources that are no longer in use. 

The United States supports the aims of this gift basket, which was sponsored by France.  The United States seeks to prevent high-activity radiological materials from being used in acts of terrorism by partnering with businesses, hospitals, industries, international organizations, andregulatory agencies in more than 85 countries.  The United States provides security technologies, expertise, training, source recovery, and non-radioactive-source based replacement strategies.  In addition, the United States has helped establish an international research effort on non-isotopic alternative technologies and partners with industry to share information and best practices on adoption.

The United States also supports efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to strengthen the international framework for radiological security by promoting the development of additional guidance regarding the security and management of radioactive sources.  The United States has also partnered with global suppliers of radioactive sources to discuss issues related to imports and exports of sources.

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Fact Sheet: Update on Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation (INFCIRC 869)

THE WHITE HOUSE 

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                        

FACT SHEET

Update on INFCIRC 869

On October 9, 2014, the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, on behalf of its Government and 34 other countries (full list below), conveyed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Secretariat the “Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation” from the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and requested that it be circulated to all IAEA Member States.  The subscribing states pledged to take specific steps, including implementing key IAEA nuclear security guidance, accepting voluntary peer reviews, and committing that those responsible for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.  The Dutch note verbale  encouraged all States to meet the intent of these essential elements of a nuclear security regime and to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the principles therein.  The IAEA has circulated the 2014 Joint Statement as INFCIRC/869, to which all IAEA Member States could ascribe.

On November 13, 2015, Jordan pledged its commitment to the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, as contained in INFCIRC/869.  Jordan is the 36th IAEA member state to subscribe to the statement, and the first to do so outside the Summit process.

The United States continues to encourage all IAEA member states to indicate their commitment to implement the provisions of INFCIRC/869, noting that such public commitments provide public assurances that nuclear materials are effectively secured and underscore support for the IAEA and its nuclear security efforts.

Full List of Subscribers

Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Vietnam.

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Joint Statement on Countering Nuclear Smuggling

2016 Statement of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling

At the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Nuclear Security Summits, participating nations agreed on Communiqués and Work Plans that included actions aimed at thwarting the illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials. The following countries recognize that identifying nuclear smugglers, detecting and recovering nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, and prosecuting those responsible are important and effective activities to help prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear or other radioactive materials: Australia, Canada, Chile, China,  the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,  France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan,  The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, The Philippines, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom, The United States of America, INTERPOL, and the United Nations.

To follow through on these pledges, participating states are committed to working together to build and sustain national capabilities to counter the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials. These efforts may include:

1.     Designating a national team or task force to link law enforcement, intelligence, technical experts, and other relevant authorities to investigate nuclear trafficking networks and incidents;

2.     Developing plans that clearly outline individual agency roles and responsibilities when responding to incidents of material outside regulatory control;

3.     Developing a national level detection architecture as an element of a whole-of-government counter nuclear smuggling capability;

4.     Strengthening nuclear forensics capabilities to reliably analyze nuclear and other radioactive material discovered out of regulatory control;

5.     Increasing legal training for prosecutors to ensure conviction of smugglers, as appropriate;

6.     Developing laws, regulations, guidance and/or policies to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material;

7.     Strengthening bilateral, multilateral, and international information sharing and other cooperation, such as training and education, best practices exchanges, and exercises;

8.     Sharing applicable lead information through INTERPOL and acting on lead information received as an effective mechanism for identifying nuclear smuggling networks in a timely manner and to enhance cooperation;

9.     Sharing information on incidents involving nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control through the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Incident and Trafficking Database.

Joint Statement on Cyber Security

2016: Gift Basket on cyber security of industrial control and plant systems at nuclear facilities 

Subscribed by: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the United Nations.

Introduction

The States listed above commit to ensure adequate cyber security at industrial control and plant systems at nuclear facilities.  These control systems are often used within safeguards, security, and safety systems.  Increased attention in this area will assist States, nuclear operators and the supply chain to continue to strengthen the resilience of these systems, protecting them from potential malicious attack or accidental damage.

To date, work has mainly focused on mitigating the vulnerabilities of enterprise systems used to manage information and data within nuclear facilities and supply chains.  This work needs to extend to industrial control systems.

Nuclear facilities benefit from robust safety mechanisms which have been strengthened and developed over several decades.  In addition to physical, logical, and human based controls, there has been an increase in the use of information technology to form part of the safety and security aspects of plant control systems, as well as nuclear material accountancy and control.  More information on the use of information technology and the associated threats and vulnerabilities in this context is needed to inform continuous security improvements.

The Initiative

The States listed above agree, as resources permit, to participate in two international workshops on this topic in 2016.  These workshops will enable States and their nuclear sectors to share good practice in managing risks to industrial control systems in nuclear sites, as well as examine the impact of using information technology in managing safety and security aspects of plant control systems.

These workshops will focus on areas including:

• Threats and vulnerabilities, through considering case studies of recent incidents;
• Potential or known incidents which can impact on control systems, through an interactive approach;
• Technical and management challenges of managing risksto legacy systems;
• Technical and management challenges of assuring new build nuclear and supply chains
• Incident response and recovery.
• Managing public/media expectation in light of an incident.

Outcomes and Next Steps

The States listed above propose to present the findings of this work at the Ministerial segment of the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security, in Vienna in December 2016 to contribute to IAEA efforts to increase cyber security at nuclear facilities, building on the IAEA International Conference on Computer Security in a Nuclear World held in June 2015. 

Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security

JOINT STATEMENT in the context of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit

Forensics in Nuclear Security                                                                     

Applying science to investigate the illicit use of nuclear or other radioactive material is a crucial element of nuclear security.  Nuclear forensic science assists in determining the provenance of materials encountered out of regulatory control by focusing on the questions that would be asked by regulatory authorities or law enforcement investigators.

This gift basket records the intent of 30 countries[1] to advance nuclear forensics as a key element of effective nuclear security. This may be accomplished by incorporating nuclear forensics as an important element of a nation’s coordinated response, cultivating and sustaining expertise in the fundamental scientific disciplines; and advocating for and supporting international efforts where the implementation of both traditional and nuclear forensic capabilities may be enhanced through sharing.

The Forensics in Nuclear Security Gift Basket presented at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit raised awareness about good practices employed by practitioners, developed education and training curricula, and advanced international collaboration through a common lexicon and knowledge platform.  Continued effort is needed to strengthen and sustain national nuclear forensic capabilities through their inclusion in national response plans and communicating what nuclear forensics can provide to stakeholders.

Recognizing that practical implementation and sustainment of nuclear forensic capabilities are an enduring component of nuclear security, States that subscribe to this Joint Statement commit to one or more of the following elements: 

• Develop and sustain expertise through actions such as cross-disciplinary training of traditional forensic and nuclear scientists, transferring knowledge to the next generation of practitioners, cultivating attractive career paths, and facilitating participation in international training including, but not limited to, those offered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), or the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). 
• Promote employment of existing national nuclear science capabilities to support nuclear forensics.
• Evaluate and adapt existing national response frameworks to incorporate the effective use of nuclear forensic capabilities.
• Advance and mature nuclear forensic expertise in other countries through efforts such as providing instruction at or hosting international courses or conferences, publishing techniques in peer-reviewed scholarly journals, or serving as leaders in relevant international groups.

[1] The following countries are signatories to this Joint Statement: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, ROK, Thailand, UK and USA. The following organization also supports this Joint Statement: INTERPOL]

Joint Statement on High-Density Fuel Development

To access the Joint Statement on Multilateral Cooperation on  High-Density Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Development for High-Performance Research Reactors, please click here. 

Joint Statement on National Nuclear Detection Architecture

Nuclear Security Summit 2016

Statement on National Nuclear Detection Architectures

Introduction

This gift basket records the intent of Finland, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Morocco, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam and INTERPOL to demonstrate their commitment to develop national-level nuclear detection architectures and strengthen regional efforts as an effective capability in combating illicit trafficking and malevolent use of nuclear and other radioactive materials. An integral part of this commitment is international cooperation to promote key architecture elements and principles as well as to address common challenges and mitigation strategies.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a central role in nuclear security worldwide, including in the field of nuclear detection and cooperation.  Other international fora support international cooperation on nuclear detection, most notably, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).  Similarly, the Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction assists in providing practical assistance on nuclear and radiological security, upon state’s requests, and so supports the work of the IAEA.

IAEA

Through its Nuclear Security Programme, the IAEA supports States in their efforts to establish, maintain and sustain an effective nuclear security detection architecture. The IAEA has adopted a comprehensive approach to nuclear security and has elaborated guidance of major importance[1].  These publications aim at advocating the development and improvement of a nuclear security detection architecture that integrates comprehensive detection capabilities and measures and associated resources to improve a nation’s ability to detect nuclear and radiological threats.  

GICNT

Nuclear detection is a core nuclear security objective for the GICNT. GICNT activities bring critical added value to nuclear detection work through identifying cross-cutting issues, suggesting new solutions and promoting inter-disciplinary and inter-agency cooperation.

Good practices related to nuclear detection are shared, collected and developed under the auspices of the GICNT. They can contribute to producing, assessing and updating IAEA publications.  Frequent scenario-based discussions, table-top exercises and field exercises of the GICNT enhance expertise and skills of members of the global nuclear security community.

Commitments

On the occasion of the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, we the parties to this Statement reaffirm our commitment to improving further our national detection architectures with the goal to combat illicit trafficking and to prevent malicious acts.

We commit ourselves to efficient use of available nuclear detection resources as well as to avoiding duplication of work between IAEA, GICNT and other relevant bodies.

We further reaffirm our commitment to the IAEA’s recommendations, giving particular attention to the following principles:

• An effective nuclear security detection architecture should be derived from a comprehensive, integrated detection strategy prepared by the State; 
• The national nuclear security detection architecture should take into consideration that individual organizations’ roles in the fieldof detection are unambiguously clear;
• Nuclear security culture is an effective tool that can strengthen the efficiency of the nuclear security detection systems; 
•  Implementation should account for and integrate border and interior detection capabilities.

We reaffirm, also, our determination to maintain our contributions to the development of the IAEA’s guidance document in the field of detection.

To promote and improve international awareness and understanding of the importance of a national-level nuclear detection architecture, we also advocate and support the work of the IAEA’speriodic review workshops during which participating nations can share good practices and lessons learned and discuss challenges, mitigation strategies, and long-term sustainability approaches.  The IAEA will conduct the first such workshop in Seam Reap, Cambodia in April 2016. 

GICNT Partners joining to this Statement reaffirm their commitment to actively participate and contribute to nuclear detection work that takes place in the Global Initiative. 

[1] As a critical part of this approach, the IAEA published Nuclear Security Series No. 21; Implementing Guide on Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for the Detection of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control. 

Joint Statement on Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness and Response

Joint Statement on Supporting Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism

Preparedness and Response Capabilities 

Subscribed by Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the United Nations and INTERPOL.

A nuclear terror event anywhere in the world would have devastating human, environmental, economic, and political consequences. Building on the Summit’s nuclear terrorism prevention and nuclear and radiological material security accomplishments and efforts, wethe Parties to this statement recognize the need for ensuring adequate nuclear emergency preparedness and response capabilities.  Such capabilities contribute tofurther reducing not onlythe risks posed by nuclear or radiological terrorism (hereafter, “nuclear terrorism”), but also the risks posed by other malicious activities or accidents involving nuclear or radiological materials and facilities.Ensuring preparedness in National capabilities to counter and respond to nuclear terror acts is a critical task for all Nations, as exemplified by the Scenario-Based Policy Discussions successfully completed by participating nations as part ofthe 2016 Summit.  Nuclear terrorism preparedness requires a range of activities to establish,enhance, sustain, and exercise the capabilities necessary to counter and respond to nuclear terror incidents. Nuclear terrorism response requires a range of technical, operational, and communications capabilities toprovide coordination and resolution of the incident, as well as mitigatingits consequences.

Consistent with the Nuclear Security Summit goal of reducing the threat posed by nuclear terrorism and furthering the 2014 Hague Summit Communique pledge to “maintain effective emergency preparedness, response, and mitigation capabilities,”we the parties to this statementrecognize that ensuring adequate nuclear terrorismpreparedness and response capabilities complements international nuclear security efforts.  We also recognize that adequate nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities contribute to strengthening the interface between nuclear safety and security, and serve as a potential deterrent to attack.

Nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities include the following capabilities:

• National policies and plans:Establish and maintainadequate National response plans and policies regarding preparedness, response, and mitigation of incidents and threats of nuclear terrorism, including guidance forlocalplanning in responding to such threats and incidents.
• Technical expertise and capabilities:Identify, confirm, assess, and respond to nuclear terror incidentsand threats, including radiological characterization and assessments to inform protective actions, emergency medical training and response support, and decontamination tools and training.
• Public communications and education: Develop and maintainstrategic communications and effective public messaging providing not only public safety awareness and emergency readiness in the event of a nuclear terror incident but also mechanisms and procedures for ensuring prompt dissemination of public safety information to potentially affected communities.
• Sustainment of capabilities:  Sustain necessary capabilities through continuing education, training, and exercises involving National and local officials and multinational partners charged with nuclear terrorism preparedness, response, or associated decision-making.
• International coordination and assistance mechanisms: Per the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and other relevant international legal instruments, and considering multilateral mechanisms and initiatives such as offered by the United Nations (UN), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), INTERPOL, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,establish mechanisms for requesting and/or providing (as appropriate):
  • Nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capacity building, 
  • As required, post-event mutualassistance offered by the State Partiesof the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency,
  • Government-to-Government coordination and communication in the event of nuclear terrorism.

Recognizing that an act of nuclear terrorism anywhere in the world would have global impacts affecting all Nations, wethe parties to this statement affirm ourwillingnessto cooperate to strengthen National and international nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities.  We agree on the following commitments in support of this objective:

• Ensure adequate National nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities at home.  We the parties to this statement reaffirm our National commitment to establish and maintain the National-level capabilities required for nuclear terrorism preparedness and response.We also commit to conductcomprehensivenuclear terrorism preparedness and response drills, incorporating roles and responsibilities at the National and local levels to foster strong interagency cooperation across law enforcement, medical, technical/scientific, and policy agencies.  We commit to strengthen our National interagency coordination, cooperation, and information-sharing mechanisms needed in this regard, to support whole-of-government crisis response.
• Support sharing relevant resources, expertise, and good practices, in order to strengthen global nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities, including relevant post-event mutual assistance.  Consistent with our respectiveinternational legal obligations,we the parties to this statementagree in principle to support--at the bilateral level, upon request--relevant expertise, training, or other related resources supporting nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilitieswith interested states, as well as offer relevant post-event mutual assistanceincluding through the IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET). We recognize that requests for bilateral assistance must be evaluated by the States involved on a case by case basis and would be subject to availability of resources, legal considerations, and other concerns.  However, we the parties to this statement recognize the importance of supporting nuclear terrorismpreparedness and response capacities and thus encourage bilateral and multilateral dialogue and coordination on how best to assure adequate global preparedness and response capabilities.As such, we also commit to making available relevant expertise or experience via international and multilateral effortsas the UN, IAEA, INTERPOL, GICNT, and the GP.  National Points of Contact will be provided, in addition to IAEA, INTERPOL, GICNT, and GP points of contact,to support the coordination and evaluation of requests and offers of assistance.
• Support for international best practice guidance on preparedness and resilience objectives and the specific capabilities needed to meet them, as published by the organizations listed above,including the IAEA Nuclear Security Series 15 - Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, the IAEA Safety Series GSR Part 7 on Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism’s Fundamentals for Establishing and Maintaining a Nuclear Security Response Framework ,which build on the aforementioned core competencies We the parties to this statement recognize these documents as an excellent foundation for States wishing to establish or sustain baseline nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities, and actively support the broadest possible international application and use of these documents.
• Share lessons learned from real world incidents (i.e., nuclear and radiological incidents, materials out of regulatory control, significant all hazards-related emergency response efforts, etc.) that have implications for or applications to nuclear terrorism preparedness, response, and mitigation, in order to incorporate this experience into Preparedness and Response capabilities nationally and internationally.
• Encourage and support National and State/local-level full field and table-top exercises aimed at ensuring nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities.  As appropriate, participating countries to the exercises will encourage reciprocal, bilateral observation of National and transborder exercises, with a view towards sharing good practices in sustaining preparedness and response capabilities, while ensuring confidentiality of sensitive information.We the parties to this statementcommit, as far as resources permit, to host, observe, or support the development and implementation of radiological emergency management exercises (REMEX) under the GICNT’s Response and Mitigation Working Group.  REMEXs emphasize the importance of international cooperation in preparedness and resilience by providing the opportunity for two or more governments to collaboratively exercise response capabilities for nuclear terrorism with bilateral or multilateral scenarios.  REMEXs also provide a venue for sharing the good practices and lessons learned from other national and State/local-level exercises encouraged under this gift basket.  

Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004)

Joint Statement on

Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Recognizing that United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 (hereinafter “1540 Committee”) are key parts of the international legal architecture for States to prevent and combat nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the full implementation of UNSCR 1540 is a long-term endeavour that requires both political and technical action at national, sub-regional, regional and international levels.

Recalling the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and Work Plan, the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, and the follow-up Resolutions of UNSCR 1540, particularly UNSCR 1977 (2011), which underscored the important role of UNSCR 1540 in strengthening global nuclear security and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the 1540 Committee will be completing  its second Comprehensive Review in 2016 on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540, as set forth by UNSCR 1977 (2011). This Review provides an opportunity for the 1540 Committee to take stock of national and international progress in implementing UNSCR 1540 since the previous Comprehensive Review in 2009, and to put forward key findings and recommendations that will contribute to more effective implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Welcoming the contributions of States for updating and submitting reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 with the view of the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Reaffirming our commitment to the Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 delivered at the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit.

Noting that since the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, co-signatories have advanced national efforts to further the implementation of UNSCR 1540 by providing support for the 1540 Committee’s main areas of work, including, inter alia: monitoring implementation of the Resolution; providing capacity building assistance at the technical level to requesting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations; preparing and submitting UNSCR 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; organizing or supporting regional and sub-regional training seminars, exercises and initiatives; convening workshops to help facilitate the implementation of UNSCR 1540 into national legislation; conducting outreach to stakeholders in industry, civil society and academia; and strengthening cooperation with regional organizations such as the African Union, ASEAN, the Caribbean Community, and the European Union.

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We, the Governments of Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, with the support of the United Nations, the European Union and INTERPOL, reaffirm our commitment to the full and universal implementation of UNSCR 1540, including the implementation of obligations to enhance the security of nuclear materials worldwide in line with the objectives of the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and institutional Action Plans. We reiterate our support for the activities of the 1540 Committee and the Group of Experts. We also reaffirm our commitment to fully implement UNSCR 1540 in our respective States, in areas where we have not already done so, and further undertake to:

1.       Work with and provide information to the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts for the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

2.       Consider providing additional support and assistance in fulfilling the Action Plan in support of the United Nations, particularly actions aimed at facilitating national and regional implementation of UNSCR 1540 and its nuclear security obligations, with a view to helping requesting States to fully implement UNSCR 1540 by 2021, as referenced in the UNSC Presidential Statement of 7 May 2014;

3.       Encourage states to submit reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 on a regular basis, and focussing outreach on states yet to submit a first report to the 1540 Committee;

4.       Advocate for international, regional, and sub-regional organizations that have not yet done so to designate a Point of Contact (PoC) or coordinator on the implementation of UNSCR 1540 in order to facilitate regional approaches to assisting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations and enhance coordination for their UNSCR 1540 implementation efforts;

5.       Consider providing funding, where feasible, to organizations requesting for supporting their PoCs or coordinators for the implementation UNSCR 1540;

6.       Enhance coordination through outreach events with a wide range of domestic stakeholders such as industry, parliamentarians, civil society and academia, and develop appropriate ways to inform these stakeholders of their obligations pursuant to domestic laws relating to the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

7.       Consider organizing joint exercises at the national, regional or international levels that demonstrate ways of reinforcing national and regional capacities and international cooperation for better implementation of UNSCR 1540, and encourage the participation of relevant international organizations and initiatives;

8.       Advocate for the 1540 Committee to continue to strengthen cooperation with other relevant international organizations and initiatives, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, other United Nations entities, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership), as well as regional and sub-regional organizations in promoting the implementation of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit institutional Action Plans;

9.       Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to enhance their cooperation with other relevant entities in the United Nations system, such as the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)- and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), including through strengthening the legal framework to prohibit illicit activities, export controls, border security, and other measures that support obligations under UNSCR 1540, and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate through joint country visits to monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

10.    Consider further enhancing the cooperation between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UNSCR 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts on strengthening nuclear security, through opportunities such as: enhancing complementarity and reducing duplication, including by using Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSP) to inform voluntary 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; coordinating with the IAEA’s International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) on outreach to academia relevant to implementing UNSCR 1540 and the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC) Network on outreach to nuclear security training centers; exploring establishing a liaison between the 1540 Committee and the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security;

11.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue collaborative efforts and interactions with INTERPOL regarding assistance requests and training opportunities;

12.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue to participate in GICNT exercises, workshops and events that focus on building and enhancing nuclear forensics, detection and response capabilities;

13.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to develop strong UNSCR 1540 assistance requests that are sufficiently detailed to support responses from potential assistance providers, including through the Global Partnership. In this context, consideration should be given to strengthening the 1540 Committee’s “match-making” mechanism and coordination with assistance providers, including at the regional level, through the Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540;

14.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to address new and emerging WMD threats relevant to the obligations and recommendations of the resolution; and

15.    Advocate for increased contributions, where feasible, to the UN Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities dedicated to supporting UNSCR 1540 implementation and the work of the 1540 Committee.

Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security Architecture

JOINT STATEMENT ON SUSTAINING ACTION TO

STRENGTHEN GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

The Nuclear Security Summit process has led to significant achievements in nuclear security at national, regional, and global levels; but the work of building a strengthened, sustained, and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture – consisting of legal instruments, international organizations and initiatives, internationally accepted guidance, and best practices – requires continuous attention.

We need sustained action and ambition on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit to address continuing and evolving nuclear security challenges, with the objectives of advancing implementation of nuclear security commitments and building a strengthened, sustainable and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture.

The Governments of Argentina, Armenia, ­­­­­Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Republic of Korea, Romania, Poland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, and the following international organizations: INTERPOL and United Nations, aiming to facilitate cooperation and sustain activity on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, commit to:

• Establish a Nuclear Security Contact Group; and
• Designate an appropriately authorized and informed senior official or officials to participate in the Contact Group.

The Contact Group is tasked with:

• Convening annually on the margins of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and, as may be useful, in connection with other related meetings;
• Discussing a broad range of nuclear security-related issues, including identifying emerging trends that may require more focused attention;
• Promoting and assessing implementation of nuclear security commitments, including those made during the Nuclear Security Summit process, reflected in the four Nuclear Security Summit Communiqués, the 2010 Washington Work Plan, the 2016 Action Plans, national commitments and associated joint statements, and gift baskets;
• Developing and maintaining linkages to nongovernmental experts and nuclear industry; and,
• Determining any additional steps that may be appropriate to support these goals.

The Contact Group may also consider and make recommendations to their respective leaders on convening any future Nuclear Security Summits.

We welcome the participation of all countries that subscribe to the goals set out in this Joint Statement and wish to contribute to the work of the Contact Group.

Joint Statement on the Security of High Activity Radioactive Sources

To access the Joint Statement on the Security of High Activity Radioactive Sources, click here. 

National Progress Report: France

During the third Nuclear Security Summit, held in The Hague (Netherlands) on March 24th and 25th, 2014, France made a number of commitments – especially in the field of the security of radioactive sources. Since the NSS 2014, France has been very active to fulfil these commitments and, in so doing, to continue bringing a significant contribution to the global nuclear security through its actions in all the areas covered by the Nuclear Security Summit.

1)   Reminder of the main commitments made by France during the NSS 2014

During the NSS 2014, France made the following commitment.

A/      President Hollande announced that the security of radioactive sources should become a major political priority regarding the risks associated. In this regard, he announced that France would increase its international efforts on the following three axes of work: 1) strengthening further the content and the implementation of the international framework applicable to sources, 2) promoting international exchanges on the development and spread of technologies alternative to high activity sources when technically and economically feasible, and 3) deepening further the cooperation between sources supplier States to improve further the security of disused sources once withdrawn from service.

B/      France confirmed its will to deepen its efforts to identify, secure and, if need be, repatriate French-origin disused sources currently in States with insufficient resources to manage them - consistently with the President’s announcements.

C/      Regarding the international framework on nuclear security, the French President made a number of commitments:

• Following on its ratification of the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM[1] in 2013, France announced that it would submit to the IAEA a national implementation report prior to the NSS 2016 – in accordance with CPPNM article 14.1;
• France also announced it would support a better implementation of the relevant international instruments (CPPNM, ICSANT[2] and Joint Convention[3]) and IAEA guidance related to radioactive sources (Code of conduct[4] and Supplementary Guidance especially[5]);

D/      France also announced it would request the IAEA to organize a follow-up IPPAS mission. Indeed, in 2011, France had hosted a successful IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission on its territory – at the power plant of Graveline. France intends to send its request to the IAEA for a follow up mission to be organized on its territory ideally in 2017.

E/      Since 2012, France had been involved in international effort on the minimization of civilian uses of high-enriched uranium (HEU), especially to develop, qualify and certify alternative high-density low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels for high-performances research reactors – along with the Belgium, the Republic of Korea and the United States. On the occasion of the NSS 2014, France then renewed its commitment to actively support these international efforts that should ultimately enable to convert HEU-powered facilities

F/      France also renewed its commitment to support the efforts undertaken since 2012 by the Working group on the security of nuclear transportation, chaired by Japan following of a NSS 2012 gift basket.

2)   The security of radioactive sources – the main French priorities and actions

a)   French gift basket on the security of radioactive source for the NSS 2016

Following on the commitment by the French President during the NSS 2014 in the field of radioactive sources, France prepared a gift basket submitted to the NSS 2016 with three main objectives:

• Contributing to raising the level of political awareness on this topic of concern;
• Proposing concrete measures to be considered after 2016 to raise further the global level of security of these materials; and
• Offering a platform, agreed by the largest possible number of States, to initiate substantive work after the NSS 2016 – particularly in the IAEA.

In accordance with the President’s commitments made in 2014, this gift basket focuses on the previously-described three areas of work – strengthening the content and implementation of the relevant international framework, promoting exchanges on technologies alternative to high-activity radioactive sources, and encouraging a stronger cooperation between sources supplier States to better manage disused sources and avoid them becoming orphan.

This gift basket will be open to the signature of every States participating to the NSS 2016 and France will actively promote its content in the IAEA work following on the end of the NSS process.

b)   Assistance to third States to secure radioactive sources 

Consistent with its political focus on the security of radioactive sources, France has also deepened its technical work in this field. In 2011, France signed an agreement with the IAEA to increase cooperation to identify, locate and secure French-origin high-activity radioactive sources in requesting third States with insufficient resources to store them in a safe and secure way.

This agreement strengthened the work France had been carrying out since 2000 in this field. Since then, France has been able to identify and locate hundreds of French-origin sources, out of which 20 could not be secured on site and, consequently, were repatriated to France from five requesting States in Africa and the Middle-East. France also carried out five expertise or fact-finding missions in four other countries in Latin America, Asia and the former USSR. They enabled to secure on site nearly 30 high-activity sources. A part of this work was led in the context of the G7 Global Partnership against the spread of weapons of mass destruction (G7GP) and allowed to locate and secure on site 23 radioactive sources from RTGs abandoned in the former USSR.

From 2000 to March 2016, a total of 54 high-activity radioactive sources has been either evacuated from third States to France or secured on site in the recipient States thanks to French expertise and/or assistance. Hundreds of other such sources have been secured on site following on French contributions to the construction and/or equipment of storage facilities – mainly in the former USSR. Twelve more operations are planned for the years 2016, 2017 and 2018 to repatriate a dozen of French-origin radioactive sources from four requesting States in the Middle-East and in Africa.

Besides these efforts, France contributed to G7GP efforts in Ukraine from 2005 to 2013 to the construction and equipment of a radioactive sources storage facility. This site will enable to store in a safe and secure way hundreds of sources and quantities of radioactive scrap metal abandoned throughout the country following on the collapse of the USSR.

Since 2003, France has dedicated 6.2 million dollars to such work on radioactive sources, out of which 20% (1.2 million US$) were invested in 2014-2015 only, to support the increased efforts requested by the President at the NSS 2014. This global funding was invested either directly by France (4.75 million US$; 77%) or as contributions to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund (1.43 million US$; 23%).

c)    Contribution on alternative technologies to high-activity radioactive sources

A/      Following on the President’s announcement in the NSS 2014 regarding technologies alternative to high-activity radioactive sources, France promoted exchange of political, technical, legal and economic information on such technologies through many forum. In the IAEA’s General Conferences 2014 and 2015, France proposed amendments on this topic during the debates on the draft resolution on nuclear security. France acted likewise in the 2014 United Nations General Assembly when proposing amendment on such alternative technologies in the draft resolution on the prevention of the acquisition of radioactive sources by terrorist it has been introducing every second year since 2007.

B/      France also agreed to co-chair with the United States an ad hoc working group of stakeholder States involved with technological alternatives to high-activity radioactive sources. While reminding that such a choice remains the responsibility of each State, this exercise enabled to generate technical discussions on how to spread such technologies in an economically and technically realistic fashion. This working group will be gathered once every year under American-French chairmanship in 2016 and 2017 at least. Terms of reference have been approved and an agenda for the next meeting (6th of June 2016) is currently under development. During this meeting, operators could be invited to present the lessons learned while implementing alternative technologies and the incentives and disincentives they face.

D/      These efforts came along with French national polices to minimize the use of high-activity sources when technically and economically realistic. This was especially undertaken since 2006 to progressively phase out isotopic medical gamma blood-irradiators to replace them by X-ray devices, following on an impulsion from the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN). This effort could be supported by the production of adequate non-isotopic technologies by French companies.

d)   Supporting the international framework applicable to radioactive sources

On the diplomatic ground, France also increased its involvement in favor of strengthening further the global level of security of radioactive sources.

A/      Between April and October 2015, France undertook diplomatic demarches to encourage 40 States that have not yet done so to ratify the ICSANT and the Joint Convention as well as to make a political commitment towards the Code of Conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources and its Supplementary Guidance on Import and Export (cf. results in paragraph 3.a.A below).

B/      France is also involved in the elaboration of the IAEA’s technical recommendations. Indeed, French experts took part in the working group on the elaboration of a new NSS document on the end of life of disused radioactive sources as well as guidance on the security of radioactive materials. It is also worth mentioning the contribution of the Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) to the current elaboration by the IAEA of a « Technical Guide on Security of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material in Transport ».

C/      Several French experts are involved in the revision of IAEA guidance. Indeed, experts from the ASN and the IRSN are involved in the still ongoing revision of two important documents from the Nuclear Security Series (NSS): the NSS 9 on the security of radioactive material in transport, and the NSS 11 on the security of radioactive material in use and storage and of associated facilities.

D/      In 2015, French experts from IRSN were involved as lecturers in 4 regional or international training course and one workshop organized by the IEA in different countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa on the security in the transport of radioactive material.

e)    Contribution to international events on the security of radioactive sources

In the intersession period between the NSS 2014 and 2016, France has also contributed to international workshops and seminars on the security of radioactive sources.

In April 2014, the ASN and representatives from the Ministry of Energy attended a workshop organized by the WINS regarding the security of radioactive sources used for industrial radiography and well-logging applications. During the event, a French operator specialized in non-destructive testing (NDT) introduced the work performed by operators, under the aegis of the ASN regarding the identification of technologies alternative to gamma industrial radiography.

In September 2014, the French public interest group “GIP Sources HA”[6] and WINS organized an international workshop regarding the end of life management of radioactive sources. 57 participants of 17 countries attended this 2-day workshop.

In January 2016, the ASN and the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) also took part in a workshop organized in Oslo by the United States, Norway and WINS as a follow-up on the progress made with regard to the gift basket adopted in 2014 in the field of radiological security. This was the occasion for France to explain in detail the objectives of the axes of work announced by the President in 2014 as well as of the actions undertaken since then.

In January 2016, experts from the French National Police took part in the Interpol Conference on the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials – including radioactive sources.

In March 2016, in the framework of the Regulatory Infrastructure Development Project, two French experts from ASN were involved in the conduct of the IAEA Regional Workshop on Radiation Safety Regulatory Infrastructure: Strategy for Regaining Control over Orphan Sources.

f)    Publication of a Handbook on the security of radioactive sources

In the margins of the preparation of the NSS 2016, France has prepared a document entitled “Security of high-activity radioactive sources – handbook on policies and practices”. It aims at giving a clear idea of why radioactive sources are currently used for, what are their associated risks and how to further improve their security globally. It will be circulated in the margins of the NSS 2016 and later made available in electronic format on the website of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development.

In this regard, this document should contribute to raise awareness among decision-makers, diplomats, civils servants and experts on the security of radioactive sources by providing clear and detailed overviews on 10 major topics. It could ultimately be used to implement the French-proposed gift basket on the security of radioactive sources after 2016 or to carry-out demarches toward States that have not yet done so to ratify relevant instruments or to make political commitments with regards to pertinent IAEA guidance.

3)   Supporting the universalization of the relevant international texts

a)   To combat trafficking and nuclear and radiological terrorism

From April to October 2015, France undertook indeed a round of diplomatic demarches towards 40 States that are not parties to both the ICSANT and the Joint Convention and that also made no political commitment regarding the Code of Conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources and its Supplementary Guidance on the import and export of such sources. The purpose was to encourage these States to ratify these instruments and to make political commitments towards the relevant IAEA guidance. Indeed these instruments and IAEA guidance represent the most fundamental texts applicable to the security of radioactive sources. In this regard, their universalization would represent an important step forwards to deepen further the security of these materials.

Seven States expressed their clear will to ratify the ICSANT while three of them made a similar commitment regarding the Joint Convention. However, six other States made the commitment to assess their need and interest to ratify the ICSANT and / or the Joint Convention in the coming months. Regarding the Code of Conduct and its Supplementary Guidance, three States noted they would make the political commitment to use them in their national nuclear security regime. Seven other States indicated they would assess their interest to make such a commitment in the coming months.

b)   To strengthen further the physical protection of nuclear materials

France also carried out diplomatic demarches to 107 States regarding the CPPNM in January and February 2016. These demarches targeted primarily the 65 States parties to the CPPNM that have not yet ratified the 2005 Amendment to this Convention, in order to encourage them to do so – and if possible prior to the NSS 2016 to enable its entry into force on this occasion.

These demarches further targeted 42 States that have not even ratified the CPPNM itself to encourage them to do so and, ultimately, push towards the universalization of this instrument and of its 2005 Amendment. Indeed, the CPPNM is currently the only legally-binding international instrument in the field of nuclear security – and consequently the most important document on this topic.

As of March 2016, twenty-two States made the commitment to ratify the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM and five others made a similar commitment towards both the Convention and its Amendment. Though only eight of these twenty-seven States considered themselves able to complete such a ratification before the NSS 2016, two of them completed the ratification process prior to the NSS 2016. Among the targeted States thirteen others expressed interest for the Amendment and/or for the CPPNM itself and indicated they would assess their interest and need to ratify them in the coming months. A point of significant interest was that no State but one expressed disinterest for the CPPNM and its Amendment.

c)    Other initiatives related to the CPPNM

As part of its action towards the entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM, France actively contributed to the Meeting of the Points of Contact and Central Authorities of States Parties to the CPPNM, organized by the IAEA in December 2015 to convince States that have not yet done so to ratify the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM and implement it in their domestic legislation.

4)   Reporting to international organizations

a)   To the IAEA

During the NSS 2014, France committed to prepare a report on the basis of article 14.1 of the CPPMN, as amended in 2005. This reporting exercise aims at providing the IAEA with the appropriate information on the domestic legal framework adopted to implement the provision of the CPPMN and of its 2005 Amendment. France provided such a report to the IAEA on October 23rd, 2014. This 33-pages long document provides detailed information on the French domestic nuclear security legislation that was largely upgraded between 2010 and 2014.

b)   To the United Nations

In November 2014, France engaged a comprehensive revision of its national report to the 1540 Committee. Indeed, the first French report had been published on October 28th, 2004 and later updated on August 25th, 2005 and December 14th, 2007. But, from 2007 to 2014, the French legislation regarding proliferation and nuclear security had been significantly upgraded which required an equivalent effort to update the French 1540 report in accordance. The new updated report was eventually published on August 15th, 2015. Its 44 pages now provide highly-comprehensive information on the status of the French legislation – especially in the field of nuclear security – presented in the model tables proposed by the 1540 Committee.

5)   Supporting the IAEA’s services to States and technical expertise

a)   Contribution to the NSF

France has long been an important contributor to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund (NSF). For the period comprised between 2002 and 2016 it ranks 11th donor among more than 40, with 2.83 million US$ provided to the Fund – including 1.2 million in 2014 and 2015 only. It must also be recalled that among the 38 million US$ provided to the NSF by the European Union, approximately one fifth came from French funding. The CEA and the IRSN provided other contributions directly to some IAEA technical programs or to finance IPPAS missions with a global amount, between 2010 and 2016, of 238 000 US$.

b)   Cost-free expert 

France has provided the IAEA with a cost-free expert from the IRSN since 2010, in order to help the Agency providing expertise and carrying out various services to States – including IPPAS missions. The current expert has been provided for a two-year period, from March 1st, 2014 to March 1st, 2016. It will be renewed for another two-year period. From 2010 to 2016, the provision of cost-free experts has represented an indirect contribution to the IAEA of 1 million US$.

c)    Translation of technical documents 

France has also provided secondary contribution to the IAEA’s efforts in the field of nuclear security. They consisted mostly in funding dedicated to translating into French technical guidance adopted by the Agency. Such contributions were made by the CEA and the IRSN from 2010 to 2015 and represent a total of 38 000 US$. In 2015 by EDF (the French electric operator) made a contribution to translate NST23 and NST37 (7 000 €) and was followed by the Ministry of the Environment, Energy and the Sea (MEEM) to translate NST22.

d)   French experts also contributed to various services provided by the IAEA 

Five French experts working for the Agency have been involved in IPPAS missions carried out by the Agency since 2014, including four in 2014 and one in 2015. Other experts acting on behalf of the French government (from the IRSN especially) were also active in the activities of the Agency – especially to elaborate guidance, organize training courses or workshops or delivering trainings. French experts have in particular been highly involved in the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC) and its working groups. It is also worth mentioning the organization by France of the first International Seminar on IPPAS missions in Paris, on December 4th and 5th, 2013 in cooperation with the IAEA.

e)    Contribution to technical work of the Agency 

France contributed further to other important technical activities of the IAEA in 2014 and 2015 in many fields such as:

• The improvement of security culture (i.e. consultant meeting and development of training modules aimed in particular at assisting the IAEA with the continuous development of its nuclear security culture program);
• Crisis management (i.e. consultants meeting);
• Physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities (i.e. consultant meeting on security during the lifetime of a nuclear facility, consultancy meeting on security by design);
• Security during the lifetime of a nuclear facility (i.e. consultant meeting on developing an implementing guide on the security during the different phase in the lifetime of a facility including for instance the design phase and the decommissioning phase);
• Security of materials being transported (i.e. technical meeting on physical protection of nuclear materials during transport);
• Accountability and control of materials (i.e. consultants meeting on nuclear materials control – for example, in 2015, one expert from IRSN was involved as lecturer in one regional and one international training course on Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security at Facilities, in Turkey and in China); and
• Cyber-security (i.e. consultancy meetings on developing possible future recommendation level document on cyber security; training courses including the holding in France of the first training course on conducting computer security assessment; revision of a document on computer security in nuclear facilities, consultants meetings on taking into account current or emerging cyber threats in the nuclear security planning or on the evaluation of cyber threats for nuclear facilities).

6)   Supporting other relevant international organizations or diplomatic initiatives

France supports many international initiatives in the field of nuclear security outside the IAEA.

a)   In the United Nations

A/      The 1540 report published in 2015 (cf. 3.b.B) updated significantly the information on the French legislation related to nuclear security. 

B/      France also offers assistance and expertise, through the 1540 Committee to every requesting States in the field of nuclear and radiological security. It has also participated to various seminars and workshops related to CBRN security with the same purpose.

C/      On the occasion of the Comprehensive review of the 1540 Resolution (June 2016), France will promote a better focus on the security of radioactive sources in the direction of assistance. France will also encourage providing more powers to the 1540 Committee to actively organize the matchmaking between the offers and requests of assistance and to direct more of its resources on this strategic aspect.

b)   In Interpol

A/      France contributes strengthening of Interpol’s Operation Fail Safe. This is program was initiated in 2012 to support each Member State’s efforts to gather and exchange information on individuals suspected of being involved in nuclear-related offenses (trafficking especially). This operation was initially limited to the use of Interpol’ Green Notices[7] but France support’s Interpol’s suggestion to extend it to all the categories of Notices[8] used by the organization. Following on a request from Interpol in September 2015 to every member States, France designated a national point of contact for Operation Fail Safe – the Central Section for Weapons, Explosives and Sensitive Materials (SCAEMS) of the Central Department of Judiciary Police (DCPJ).

B/      France takes part in events organized by Interpol on nuclear security, such as the Interpol Global Counter-Nuclear Smuggling Conference held in Lyon (France) on January 27th to 29th, 2016. This event enabled delegates from 120 States to exchange on the prevention of the risk of nuclear terrorism. France was involved in this Conference through the commander of the Central Interagency Detachment for Technical Intervention (DCI-IT)[9] and experts from the Division for Scientific and Technical Police (SDPTS) and the Central Direction for Judiciary Police (DCPJ).

C/      France also cooperates with Interpol at the operational and technical level in the field of nuclear security. For example, in October 2015, experts from Interpol were invited to attend a national meeting of all the French Ministries’ services involved in the combat against the CBRN threat – Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Atomic Energy Commission etc. – which was organized by the SDPTS. Experts from close partner States, like the United Kingdom, were also invited to attend this event.

D/      The French National Central Bureau for Interpol also publishes a monthly bulletin on CBRN criminality. This bulletin gathers information collected from open sources on incidents that took place during the previous month in the world and that had a CBRN dimension – theft/loss of materials or associated equipment, action against sensitive facilities, threats to commit offenses etc. This information is then circulated to every services of the State involved in combating the CBRN threat.

c)    In the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)

A/      The French delegation is active in the policy level meetings of the Initiatives, i.e. the Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG) and the Plenary Meetings. In the Helsinki Plenary meeting (June, 16th-17th, 2015) France supported a stronger focus of the GICNT’s on the risks of terrorist uses of radioactive sources as well as on the actions to repair and mitigate the consequences of a radiological attack.

B/      France is also active in the three working groups of the GICNT, as they address NSS priorities in nuclear detection, nuclear forensics and response / mitigation. France hosted the May 2014 session of the Response and Mitigation Working Group in Paris and has also contributed to the elaboration and reviewing of the Exercises, Training and Awareness Document. Within the framework of the GICNT Nuclear Forensics working group activities, France has actively participated in the elaboration and the reviewing of the “Fundamentals for Policy and Decision Maker’s Document” which has been approved during the 2012 Mid-Year IAG Meeting in February 2014 in Marrakech.

C/      France was also involved in several GICNT seminars and exercises, in the field of:

• Nuclear forensics, with exercise “Bleu Eagle”, organized by the United Kingdom in London in January 2014 as well as exercise “Radiant City” organized by the European Union in Karlsruhe in May 2015, and a thematic workshop in the United States in October 2015;
• Illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials with the exercise organized by the United States in Karlsruhe (Germany) in February 2014; and
• Detection of radioactive materials with exercise “Northern Lights”, organized by Finland in January 2015.

 d)   In the G7 Global Partnership against the spread of weapons of mass destruction (G7GP)

France has also been a contributor to the G7GP since its creation in 2002. Since then, France has dedicated more than 130 million dollars to this program, out of which 67% have been dedicated to programs related to nuclear and/or radiological security.

From 2003 to 2013, the French G7GP programs have enabled to dismantle the reactors of two abandoned submarines, to secure 900 nuclear fuel assemblies and the high-activity sources of 16 RTGs in the former USSR, as well as to upgrade nuclear fuel storage facilities in the same area.

Since 2011, the French involvement in the nuclear programs of the G7GP was reoriented on the security of high-activity radioactive sources. France dedicated about 6.2 million dollars to this topic, which enabled to secure dozens of such radioactive sources in Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle-East, as well as to provide equipment to a radioactive wastes storage facility in Ukraine – with the capacity to safely and securely dispose of more than 10 000 sources.

e)    In the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG)

France is an active contributor to the ITWG, created in 1995 following on an initiative of the G7. That group, which comprises about 40 States, is tasked to provide recommendations and expertise on nuclear forensics. France, thanks to the laboratories of the CEA, took an active part in exercise CMX-4 in late 2014 and to the analyses of the results in March 2015 in Karlsruhe (Germany). An expert of the CEA was appointed in the ITWG Executive Committee in 2015. France also hosts and maintains the ITWG web pages.

This commitment in favor of nuclear forensics will be further deepened in 2016, as France will co-organize the annual meeting of the ITWG in Lyon (June 2016) but also the preparation of exercise CMX-5 thanks to samples of materials provided by the CEA.

f)    In favor of the Centers of excellence

France continues to support and offer expertise through centers of excellence, for example in the context of the European Union Centers of Excellences on CBRN risk mitigation. One project is currently being implemented in North Africa. It focuses on nuclear security. CEA signed an agreement with the Indian Center of Excellence GCNEP which includes cooperation in training and research and development in the field of nuclear security. The concrete phase of the implementation of this Center of Excellence has started on January 3rd, 2014.

g)   At the bilateral level

France also maintains bilateral contacts with partners States in the field of nuclear security, to share information or to provide them with advice or expertise. Delegations were welcomed in Paris and on French nuclear sites in this regard, including from the Indian government-related think-tank ORF (March 2014), from the United States Government Accountability Office (January 2015), from the UAE nuclear security authorities (February 2015), Japanese security authority (September 2015), or from the Polish nuclear security authorities (December 2015).

7)   Expertise and contribution in the field of radiological detection

A/      France has proposed, over the past years, its expertise to requesting States to secure major public events from radiological risks. France will support the IAEA in its assistance to Mali concerning the security of the French / Africa Summit to be held in Bamako in January 2017, through the training of Malian first line officers to radiological security, and through the organization of adequate visits and Workshops.

B/      French companies have also been active to develop tracking technologies. This is mainly the case of the consortium of small and medium-size businesses[10] involved since July 2014 in the Nuc-Track Project, supported by the Nuclear Pole of Burgundy, the IRSN and the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS). The project aims at developing a technology to ensure an automated real-time tracking of radioactive sources in transport, to avoid any loss of control and to send alarm signals immediately in case of abnormal event.

8)   Role in the development of LEU high-density fuel for high performance research reactors

A/      During the NSS 2012, France signed with Belgium, the Republic of Korea and the United States a gift basket that initiated an international cooperation to develop high-density low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels to convert high-performance research reactors using highly-enriched uranium (HEU).

B/      France further made the commitment to minimize the civilian uses of HEU when technically and economically feasible, including for the production of medical radioisotopes. France decided to close the high performance research reactor Orphée (which is using HEU fuel) by 2019, which contributes to the minimization effort in the utilization of HEU.

C/      Following on the NSS 2012, the HERACLES program has been initiated between Belgium, France and Germany in close cooperation with the United States to develop, test and qualify uranium-molybdenum dispersion fuel. Scientific difficulties were identified in the process (excessive dilatation of the fuel) which resulted in important delays and in the impossibility to determine a deadline for qualifying an LEU fuel for research reactor. However, the HERACLES program still represents an important cooperation that will serve as a basis for new scientific works on LEU fuel development. Furthermore, many scientific lessons were drawn from the researches undertaken since 2012.

9)   Contributions to the security of international nuclear transportations

A/      During the NSS 2012, France signed a gift basket with Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom, the United States on the security of nuclear transportations. It resulted in the organization of a working group tasked to draft four guides of good practices of the four transport modes (air, road, rail, sea). Following on their adoption by the States participating to the working group on the occasion of the NSS 2016, these documents should ultimately be used in the IAEA as reference documents in the context of the elaboration of guidance on the security of transports.

B/      France was also involved, in the IAEA, in exercises related to the security of nuclear transportations. The most important was the table-top exercise organized on June 17th, 2015. It was designed to assess the communication channels between shipper (France, Japan and United Kingdom) and coastal States during an international transport of nuclear materials. This table-top exercise was unanimously regarded as successful as it enabled every participant to understand better the way communication channels in case of incident could be activated and used. This exercise was also considered as a good basis of work for future discussion in the IAEA on the security of such transportations. The Coastal and Shipping States are planning to visit to a transport ship in United Kingdom with the participants to the dialogue process by the end of 2016.

10)    Strengthened cooperation between the government and the nuclear industry

The competent authorities pursue a continuous the dialogue with the nuclear industry in particular to promote the nuclear security culture (for example by contributing to the training of the security managers of the facilities), to ensure the sharing of experience amongst operators as well as to facilitate, in particular through guidance, the understanding and implementation of new requirements (for example cybersecurity). Whenever relevant, the nuclear industry is consulted on the new laws and regulations as part of the regulatory process.

11)    Strengthening further the French national nuclear security regime

a)   Organization of an IPPAS follow-up mission 

At the NSS 2014, France had made the commitment to call the IAEA to organize a follow-up IPPAS mission, after the first such mission hosted in France in 2011. France intends to send its request to the IAEA for a follow up mission to be organized on its territory ideally in 2017. This mission will cover the areas already observed by the IPPAS mission of 2011 but it should also be extended to other topics such as cyber-security.

b)   Deepening further the French national legislation

A/      The French legislative and regulatory framework on the physical protection and control of nuclear materials, facilities and transportation has been revised in depth since 2009, through distinct successive steps. An IPPAS mission was successfully hosted in late 2011. Its conclusions stressed the robustness of the French nuclear security regime.

A law on strengthening the legal means to fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was then adopted on March 15th, 2011, in order to criminalize new acts related to infringements to nuclear security and introduce harsher sentences for such offences.

This step was followed in 2013 by the above-mentioned ratification of the ICSANT and Amendment to the CPPNM. This evolution strengthened even more the French nuclear security regime even it had already been adapted prior to both ratifications.

B/      This progressive consolidation has been continued since then, with the adoption of further pieces of legislation between 2013 and 2016. Technical regulations will be adopted to implement these new legislative provisions in the next few years:

• A law on cyber security that applies to the critical infrastructures, including nuclear facilities, was voted in late 2013 and will contribute to a reinforcement of the requirements on cyber security;
• Provisions to strengthen deterrence and improve the capacity to detect suspicious actions around nuclear sites as well as the physical protection of facilities;
• Various provisions to reinforce the regulatory oversight by the nuclear security authority.

C/      More specifically, the French legal corpus on the security of radioactive sources was complemented it 2015-2016 with the adoption of additions to the existing framework. Through the article 128 of the law n°2015-992 of August 17th, 2015 on the energetic transition for a green growth, the French Parliament has empowered the Government to adopt by legislative ordinance provisions to make more stringent the obligation for operators to take the appropriate measures to protect their radioactive sources against malicious acts and to entrust ASN, the Ministry of environment, energy and the sea (MEEM), and the Ministry of defense, in their respective areas of competence to enforce them.

A legislative ordinance n°2016-128 has then been adopted on February 10th, 2016. It establishes the legal principles and obligations that operators will have to abide by regarding the measure to protect their radioactive sources against malicious acts. The MEEM, together with ASN and the ministry of defense have been tasked, in their respective areas, to supervise, assess and control these security measures. These legislative provisions have to be complemented by regulatory texts, developed under the auspices of the MEEM and the sea and will enter into force on July 1st, 2017 at the latest.

D/      The French regulatory framework, including its Design Basis Threat (DBT) is regularly reviewed and updated to live up to the evolution of the threats.

E/      At last, the operators are to fully re-assess the physical protection of their facilities as part of the implementation of the regulation on physical protection and control of nuclear materials, facilities and transportation. If needed, they have to upgrade the means and measures for nuclear security to fulfill the regulatory requirements. The MEEM, with the support of the technical expertise from the IRSN, is tasked to assess all these security studies carried out by operators. As part of the constant enhancement of the national nuclear security regime, the various French bodies involved in nuclear security work on a day to day basis on continuous improvement of their policies, practices and interagency mutual coordination.

Acronyms used in the French Progress Report for the NSS 2016

ASN: French Nuclear Safety Authority – Autorité de sûreté nucléaire

CNRS: French National Center for Scientific Research – Centre national de la recherche scientifique. 

CEA: French Atomic Energy Commission – Commissairat à l’énergie atomique.

CPPNM: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

DCPJ: French Central Department of Judiciary Police – Direction centrale de la police judiciaire.

DCI-IT: French Central Interagency Detachment for Technical Intervention – Détachement central interministériel d’intervention technique.

G7GP: G7 Global partnership against the spread of weapons of mass destruction

GICNT: Global initiative to counter nuclear terrorism

HEU: highly enriched uranium

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency

IAG: Implementation and Assessment Group (GICNT)

ICSANT: International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

IPPAS: International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IAEA)

IRSN: French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety – Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire

 ITWG: Nuclear forensics International Technical Working Group

LEU: Low-enriched uranium

MEEM: French Ministry of Environment, Energy and the Sea – Ministère de l’environnement, de l’énergie et de la mer

NSF: Nuclear Security Fund (IAEA)

NSGC: Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (IAEA)

NSS: Nuclear Security Summit

NSS: Nuclear Security Series of documents (IAEA)

RTG: Radio-isotope thermoelectric generator 

SCAEMS: French Police Central Section for Weapons, Explosives and Sensitive Materials – Section centrale armes, explosifs et matières sensibles.

SDPTS: French Police Division for Scientific and Technical Police – Sous-direction de la police technique et scientifique 

Report elaborated by:

Ø  Ministère des affaires étrangères et du développement international (MAEDI)

Ø  Secrétariat général à la défense et à la sécurité nationale (SGDSN)

Ø  Ministère de l’environnement, de l’énergie et de la mer (MEEM)

Ø  Ministère de la défense

Ø  Ministère de l’intérieur

Ø  Commissariat à l’énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA)

Ø  Autorité de sûreté nucléaire (ASN)

Ø  Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire (IRSN)

[1]  Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

[2]  International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

[3]  Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management – though this instrument is primarily related to safety, its provisions designed to strengthen the safety of radioactive sources contribute to strengthening their security.

[4]  Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

[5]  Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources

[6]  The term “GIP Sources HA” stands for “public interest grouping (GIP) - high activity (HA) sources”. In the French legislation, a public interest grouping (“groupement d’intérêt public” - “GIP”) is an ad hoc administrative structure established by a convention between public and private operators to accomplish a specific and punctual task. The “GIP sources HA” was established in 2009 and renewed in 2013 to secure and dispose of disused high-activity sources – among numerous other tasks related to the management of sources.

[7]  Green Notices are used to circulate information on individuals previously sentenced for their implication in illicit nuclear trafficking.

[8]  Red notices provide information on people wanted by a Member State’s authorities. Blue notices provide information on individuals who have been sentenced for their implication in an offense or suspected for their implication in such offenses. Purple notices describe processes, practices, methods or equipment used by criminals to commit offenses. Orange notices describe events, incidents, persons, process or equipment that generate threats for public security.

[9]  Détachement central interministériel d’intervention technique. This interagency structure is in charge of preventing and combatting CBRN terrorism.

[10]             Assystem, Nuc21, Point Core, Systel Electronique, Schlumberger and ABC Horus

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