National Progress Report: Germany

Germany, like many other long-term users of peaceful energy applications, had already achieved a high level of nuclear security well before the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit. This report concentrates on activities since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit. Germany has continued to enhance nuclear security implementation and has contributed to strengthening the global nuclear security architecture. The following actions, developments and initiatives are to be highlighted:

Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

  • The evaluation of the national nuclear security regulatory framework is an ongoing process involving all relevant authorities. Since 2010 many regulations have been adjusted or rewritten. Design Basis Threats (DBTs) and subsequent regulations for facilities, nuclear material transports and computer security are either in place and are being regularly evaluated or are in the final stage of development.
  • Nuclear security measures, including transport security measures, are being designed and implemented in accordance with the 2005 CPPNM Amendment and INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. In order to implement EU Council Directive 2003/122/Euratom, which demands strict control of each “High Activity Sealed Source” from manufacturing to the final disposal, a central register has been established at national level which ensures the comprehensive traceability of these sources and their whereabouts at any time.
  • Aiming at strengthening the security regime for other radioactive material, comprehensive guidelines are being developed, taking into account the IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 11 (Implementing Guide – “Security of radioactive Sources” and further recommendations). The guidelines include a graded approach based on the potential risk of other radioactive material and define requirements and measures for each security level. A first draft version of the guidelines is expected to be ready at the end of 2016.
  • Germany has co-signed Gift Baskets on the Security of Radioactive Sources at the Nuclear Security Summits in 2014 and 2016. Against this background, Germany will host an International Workshop in September 2016 in order to discuss whether the Code of Conduct for Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (CoC) is adequate for the designated purposes.
  • With regard to the human dimension Germany has incorporated the interfaces man -technology – organization into its safety and security regulations. The regulatory framework for the professional training of technical personnel in nuclear power plants has been adapted accordingly. In addition, it has been updated to cover nuclear power plants in a post-operational phase. At the same time training and education for personnel in nuclear facilities increasingly follows an integrated approach to assure nuclear safety and security in equal measure.

Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

  • In close cooperation with international partners Germany continues its efforts to develop high-density LEU fuel with high flux properties as part of its endeavours to minimize the use of HEU in research reactors where technically and economically feasible. The Federal Ministry of Education and Research is currently funding a project for the development of a lower-enriched fuel element for the German research reactor FRM II.
  • Germany, France and Belgium, supported by the European Commission and in close cooperation with their US counterparts, continue to work together within the HERACLES consortium, focusing on testing and developing a U-Mo dispersion fuel.
  • Germany continues to explore ways and means of ensuring the timely return of all spent nuclear fuel of foreign origin from German research reactors based on HEU to the country of origin.
  • As part of the Nuclear Security Summit process, Germany has pledged to eliminate excess nuclear material from its inventories. In early 2016, a significant amount of excess plutonium and HEU was successfully removed from Germany and transferred to the United States.

Countering Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Radiological Material

International aspects:

  • Germany has taken part in the international sharing of information on the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials through its participation in the IAEA ITDB, IAEA, NUSEC, ITWG and GICNT IAG.
  • The German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) closely cooperates with partners in the framework of Interpol’s CBRNE Programme. In addition, the BKA participates in the CBRN Working Group of the European Explosive Ordnance Disposal Network.

National aspects:

  • Since 2011, the Federal Customs Administration has more than doubled the number of mobile radiation measurement devices. The new highly sensitive radiation gauges enable customs authorities to conduct customs controls more efficiently.
  • In 2012, a special CBRN incident reporting scheme for police and customs was implemented on national level. This improved the information flow on CBRN incidents between federal and state authorities. It serves as an important tool for the BKA to assess the CBRN-related situation in Germany in a timely and concise manner and to produce its own periodical national CBRN crime situation report.
  • Finally, at federal level a CBRN information platform was established in 2014 to enable all relevant federal ministries and agencies to exchange information swiftly in the event of serious CBRN-related crime and possible CBRN terrorism threats in Germany.

Supporting Multilateral Instruments

  • Germany ratified the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM on 21 October 2010 and supported international efforts to reach the quorum for its entry into force. To that end, Germany financed IAEA-organized regional workshops in Europe, South America and Africa to facilitate interested states’ ratification processes. In the framework of Germany’s G7 Presidency in 2015, Germany organized a diplomatic demarche campaign reaching out to about 30 countries which had not yet ratified the Amendment.

Collaborating with International Organizations, Initiatives and Governments

  • Germany considers the leading role of the IAEA in developing international standards and guidance on nuclear security to be extremely important. Therefore Germany actively supports IAEA security-related activities such as the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee, the Consultancy and Technical Meeting, IPPAS missions, IAEA training courses and the Train-the-Trainer programme not only financially but also by seconding national experts and contributing to the drafting and revising of IAEA Nuclear Security Series documents.
  • Since 2011 Germany has donated around five million euros to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund and more than 6.5 million euros for the ECAS project to modernize the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria. Nuclear Security Fund projects supported by Germany included securing orphan and disused radioactive sources, setting up a global inventory of radioactive sources, monitoring the import and export of radioactive materials to and from Libya and establishing a postgraduate curriculum in nuclear security.
  • Germany has committed to work with the IAEA and its member states on the safety and security of high activity radioactive sources and to establish a roadmap of actions and cooperation in the following areas:
    • Further strengthening and expanding support for the international framework of conventions and IAEA guidelines relevant to the safety and security of high activity radioactive sources throughout their life cycle;
    • Supporting the development and use of alternatives to high activity radioactive sources;
    • Enhancing the efforts of the Ad hoc Group of States that are Major Suppliers of Radioactive Sources to further strengthen and harmonize supplier state activities to improve the safety and security of high risk radioactive sources.
  • Germany actively supports the IAEA in enhancing the Nuclear Security Series by providing nuclear security guidance on computer security, particularly at the recommendations level. In addition, Germany intensively exchanges knowledge and experience regarding the German DBT and guidelines on computer security with other states in bilateral meetings.
  • Germany held the 2015 G7 Presidency and thus chaired the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GPWG) – the largest G7 expert group, which currently includes 30 active members– from June 2014 until the end of 2015. The GPWG includes a sub-working group on Nuclear and Radiological Security (NRSWG), which provides a forum for GP members and international organizations to coordinate their assistance in this field. Germany hosted and chaired three meetings of the NRSWG with a focus on the Global Partnership Action Plan, to be adopted at the Nuclear Security Summit, on the coordination of assistance in response to individual requests as well as on the improvement of coordination mechanisms and procedures in emergency situations.
  • Germany is a founding member of the GICNT and attended all GICNT Plenary Meetings, the last one being held in 2015 in Helsinki. Furthermore, German experts took part in table-top exercises and workshops organized in the framework of GICNT, the most recent being a workshop of the GICNT Response Management Working Group which included a practical exercise in November 2015 and a joint International Maritime Transport Security Exercise which was conducted by Spain and Morocco in cooperation with the IAEA in October 2015.
  • Germany has extended its efforts in bi- and multilateral cooperation with respect to nuclear security of nuclear facilities, computer security and nuclear material transports. In this regard Germany will continue to host meetings and regional workshops for sharing information and good practices regarding, inter alia, threat assessment, Design Based Threats (DBT), legal frameworks, technical countermeasures against e.g. sabotage scenarios during transport, as well as protection against intentional airplane crashes.

Partnering with External Stakeholders

  • Germany remains fully committed to implementing the obligations deriving from UNSCR 1540. It continues to encourage, and, where appropriate and feasible, to assist other states in implementing UNSCR 1540. Moreover, Germany initiated the “Wiesbaden Process” in 2011 to improve cooperation between government and industry, one of the central aims in UNSCR 1540 implementation. Since 2012, Germany has hosted four industry outreach conferences in Wiesbaden, each focusing on different key aspects of government-industry relations in export control and non-proliferation. Last year’s conference took stock of the outcomes that have been achieved so far and tried to identify future trends and challenges. The final report of the conference will be published as a UN Security Council document. It contains concrete recommendations on how to further strengthen the partnership between governments and industry as well as how to best adapt to regulatory requirements from an industrial point of view. In addition, the final report shall be presented as a contribution to the 2016 comprehensive review of Resolution 1540. Germany is proud to have initiated an effective implementation mechanism in the framework of UNSCR 1540 and stands ready to further intensify its commitment.