Fact Sheet: Downblending in Argentina

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                         

FACT SHEET

Eliminating All Highly Enriched Uranium from Argentina

The United States and Argentina have collaborated for years to eliminate Argentina’s stocks of highly enriched uranium (HEU). Since this cooperative effort began, over 40 kilograms of HEU have been removed from Argentina.  Before the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, approximately 4 kilograms of HEU remained that was not eligible to be returned to the United States because of its form and composition.  Argentina was able to eliminate all of its HEU because it converted its medical isotope production to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) targets in 2002 and converted its last reactor from HEU to LEU fuel in 2008.

At the 2016 Summit, Argentina announced the successful disposition of Argentina’s remaining HEU.  The U.S. Department of Energy and Argentina’s National Atomic Energy Commission cooperated to down-blend and dispose this material in Argentina.

Having completed this down-blending project, Argentina — and the entire Latin America and Caribbean region — is now considered free of HEU, which is understood to mean that no country has more than 1 kilogram of HEU.

Fact Sheet: Downblending in Indonesia

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                         

FACT SHEET 

Eliminating All Highly Enriched Uranium from Indonesia

At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, the United States and Indonesia announced that all fresh (unirradiated) highly enriched uranium (HEU) has been downblended to low enriched uranium (LEU).  The two countries intend to continue their joint effort to eliminate all remaining HEU in Indonesia by September 2016, in furtherance of President Obama and President Jokowi’s October 2015 joint statement.  The HEU is residual material from medical isotope production.

Upon completion of these efforts, Indonesia will be the 30th country plus Taiwan to be declared HEU-free, defined as less than 1 kilogram of HEU remaining.  This is a particularly significant achievement, because all of Southeast Asia will be free of HEU. 

Indonesia is one of only a handful of countries that produce the medical isotope molybdenum-99 (Mo-99), which is used for diagnostic medical imaging. Through cooperative efforts with the U.S. Department of Energy and the International Atomic Energy Agency, Indonesia ceased using HEU to produce Mo-99 in 2010. Indonesia is committed to continuing to provide this much-needed medical isotope and plans to restart production using LEU in 2016.

Fact Sheet: EC-US 2016 Counter Nuclear Smuggling Workshop

US-EC Cooperation to Strengthen International Capacities to Counter Nuclear Smuggling

The European Commission and the United States of America are cooperating to prevent terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear or other radioactive materials.  Despite significant international achievement in strengthening the security of these materials at facilities of origin, seizures of weapons-grade nuclear material in Moldova (2011) and Georgia (2003, 2006, 2010) suggest these materials continue to be trafficked by transnational criminals.  Furthermore, analysis produced by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) show that nuclear and radioactive materials continue to be encountered out of regulatory control in all regions of the world. 

Recognizing the need for strengthened international cooperation to counter nuclear smuggling, the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the United States Department of State co-hosted the “2016 Counter Nuclear Smuggling (CNS) Workshop” at the JRC Institute for Transuranium Elements, in Karlsruhe, Germany.  Eighty experts from 30 countries and international organizations, including the IAEA, INTERPOL, and the United Nations, shared best practices and lessons learned in leveraging investigative and technical capabilities to counter smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive material. The workshop advanced the commitments made at the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Nuclear Security Summits and included demonstrations of CNS capabilities outlined in the 2012, 2014 and 2016 ‘Statements of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling.'

Through a series of informational presentations as well as exercises and demonstrations, the workshop addressed state of the art approaches and technical challenges associated with detection, response, nuclear forensic analysis and law enforcement investigation of nuclear smuggling incidents.  Workshop participants concluded that close inter-agency cooperation at the national level and international information sharing enable an optimized use of investigative and technical capabilities to effectively counter nuclear smuggling acts, detect nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control, and analyze seized material to understand its origin and history as well as potential linkages with other seizures. 

The March 2016 CNS Workshop marked a significant step in collaborative efforts to strengthen international capabilities to prevent nuclear and radioactive materials from falling into the hands of terrorists and other malicious actors.

Fact Sheet: EU-US Exchange

U.S.-Euratom Understanding on Highly Enriched Uranium Exchange

The United States and the European Commission share a commitment to minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian applications.

At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the European Commission’s Euratom Supply Agency (ESA) announced the details of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) outlining the principles of an HEU Exchange.  This understanding notes the mutual support for converting European research reactors and isotope production facilities to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and targets, where technically and economically feasible, while also acknowledging that HEU will be required during the transition period to conduct research and to produce medical isotopes.  The MOU outlines that, in exchange for U.S.-origin HEU supplied to research reactors and isotope production facilities in Euratom Member States, Euratom – in addition to meeting other U.S. legal requirements - will identify unirradiated, excess HEU that can be down-blended to LEU either in Euratom Member State facilities or in the United States, and will make efforts to return any such acceptable material to the United States.  The quantity of this excess material is to be greater than the quantity of HEU that eligible civilian facilities in Euratom Member States expect to receive from the United States in the future, prior to their conversion to LEU.  This agreement is a key component of the U.S. policy of net reduction of U.S.-origin fissile material located in other countries. 

The HEU Exchange Understanding involves contributions and participation from the United States, ESA, the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands.  These countries have now mutually identified the relevant materials and share a common view on the efforts and contributions that will be required by each of them to implement this exchange, so as to achieve the intended HEU minimization objective. 

Fact Sheet: EU-US ITRAP+10

Summary Report on the ITRAP+10 Test Campaign

The importance of nuclear security cannot be overstated.  The European Union and the United States of America, in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), share the international responsibility to develop and promote systems and measures for the prevention of, detection of, and response to nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control. Implementing effective capabilities to deter and detect unauthorized movement of nuclear and other radioactive materials both at borders and within a State’s interior enhances efforts to better combat nuclear terrorism.  Often, these capabilities necessitate the use of technical instruments and sensors that can detect, identify and/or validate the presence of nuclear or other radioactive materials so that they may be interdicted. In recognition of this international responsibility and necessary capabilities, and as part of the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit Key Topic of Combatting Illicit Trafficking, the European Union and the United States of America present the Illicit Trafficking Radiation Assessment Program (ITRAP+10) test campaign summary report.

Initiated by the European Union and the United States of America, the ITRAP+10 test campaign evaluated the performance of commercially available radiation detection equipment against consensus standards. To ensure the review of commercial equipment would be relevant to the global commons, the European Commission and the United States agreed to collaborate on the conduct of the ITRAP+10 test campaign and share in the design of the tests, their execution, and the analysis of the data. Using both the American National Standards Institute/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and the International Electrotechnical published consensus standards, the partners tested nine different classes of radiation detection instruments. The results of the test campaign provide an independent assessment of radiation detection instruments that are presently available on the market, or soon will be.

The summary report is available to the international community and includes an overview of the ITRAP+10 test program, a summary of test results across the nine classes of instruments with scientific and technical data, and information about the manufacturers of the instruments tested.  

The testing processes as well as the test results obtained during ITRAP+10 helped experts revise both the requirements and test methods described in the standards and increased the capabilities of the testing laboratories.  The performance results have also enabled manufacturers to improve their products and facilitate users’ understanding of the performance and limitations of the currently available radiation detection instruments. The European Union and the United States of America areconfident that this international cooperation among them and the IAEA to document detection instrument capabilities will emphasize the importance of technical means (detection instruments) as a facilitator for detection in the context of a national-level Nuclear Security Detection Architecture, exemplify proper usage and deployment, promote new research and development efforts, and assist international partners to ensure resources are deployed in an efficient manner.  

Fact Sheet: HEU Minimization Activities since March 2014

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                         

FACT SHEET

Highly Enriched Uranium Minimization Activities since March 2014

Minimization of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian applications is a priority for the Nuclear Security Summit process.  Eliminating all HEU from facilities or countries decreases the number of potential targets for terrorists, criminals, and other unauthorized actors to obtain this material.  Minimization efforts include HEU reactor conversions and shut-downs, nuclear material removals, technology substitution, and down-blending.  Each of these activities represents permanent threat reduction by preventing sensitive nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands.

Through the Nuclear Security Summit process, the international community has made considerable progress in this area.  Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, the United States has supported the conversion of HEU reactors in Russia, Jamaica, China, and Kazakhstan.  The United States also confirmed the shutdown of four HEU reactors: two in Russia, one in Uzbekistan, and one in Switzerland.

Once facilities are converted and HEU is no longer required, the material can be removed.  Since March 2014, the United States removed or confirmed disposition of approximately 450 kilograms of HEU from 10 countries (Poland, Kazakhstan, Canada, Switzerland, Jamaica, Uzbekistan, Austria, Germany, Japan, and Argentina).  As a result of these efforts, three additional countries are now considered free of HEU (Switzerland, Uzbekistan, and Argentina), defined as having less than one kilogram of HEU on their territory.  In total, 29 countries plus Taiwan are now HEU-free after eliminating their HEU.

Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on Certified Training

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                         

FACT SHEET

Certified Training for Nuclear Security Management

The challenges associated with managing nuclear and other radiological materials are varied and complex, and it is essential that states to their utmost to maintain security over such materials.  Effective security relies upon the competence of management and personnel who are responsible for this work.  Therefore, it is crucial that managers and personnel responsible for nuclear security continuously maintain and improve their skills.  Much progress has been made in this area since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, particularly with the development of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Information Circular 869 and with the establishment of the World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS) Academy Nuclear Security Management Certification Program.

The WINS Academy is a comprehensive training program for nuclear security professionals, with modules that cover a wide variety of disciplines.  Upon successful completion, students become Certified Nuclear Security Professionals.  Certification is valid for three years, after which time recertification is required.  The program is designed to develop a network of certified professional who are affecting meaningful and sustainable changes to nuclear security worldwide.

In support of this issue, Canada has sponsored the Gift Basket on Certified Training for Nuclear Security Management.  As a signatory to this Gift Basket, the United States commits to further support the WINS Academy, including through the provision of advocacy, peer review support, contributions, or by other means as necessary, and to promote cooperative efforts between the WINS Academy and the IAEA.  The United States has supported WINS through federal grants and works with the both IAEA and directly with partner countries to provide a wide variety of training to personnel responsible for securing nuclear and radiological materials.

Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                         

FACT SHEET

Forensics in Nuclear Security

The continued occurrence of transnational attempts to smuggle nuclear and other radioactive materials underscores the need for strong international efforts to deter potential perpetrators, investigate and disrupt smuggling networks, and improve nuclear security.  The advancement of international nuclear forensics cooperation will strengthen global capabilities to counter illicit trafficking by: 1) helping partner nations identify the origin and pathway associated with interdicted material; 2) enabling improved safeguards and physical protection measures at the place of theft or diversion to prevent future losses; and 3) supporting criminal prosecution.

To underscore the importance of nuclear forensics asa key component of nuclear security, Australia has sponsored a Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security.  Building upon the Joint Statement from 2014, which raised awareness about nuclear forensics capabilities, current commitments included in this Joint Statement highlight the importance of practical implementation and sustainment of such capabilities.

As a signatory to this statement, the United States will foster practical implementation and sustainment of nuclear forensics capabilities in several key areas. To further cultivate expertise, the U.S. will develop and implement an expert testimony training program for nuclear forensic scientists to establish practices for how to describe nuclear forensics conclusions in judicial proceedings.  The United States offers training curriculum to assist the inclusion of nuclear forensics capabilities in national response frameworks.  The United States seeks engagement opportunities with international partners to discuss nuclear forensics assistance pertaining to a nuclear security event.  Engagement with partners on nuclear forensics both bilaterally and with international organizations is a top priority.

Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on National Nuclear Detection Architecture

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                        

FACT SHEET

NATIONAL-LEVEL NUCLEAR SECURITY DETECTION ARCHITECTURE

Effectively coordinating domestic capabilities to counter nuclear smuggling requires a national-level approach for the prevention, detection and response to nuclear materials out of regulatory control.  A national-level nuclear detection architecture provides such a framework to integrate a comprehensive set of technical and non-technical detection capabilities, and the associated resources and infrastructure to improve a nation’s ability to detect nuclear and radiological threats.

In support of this objective, Finland has sponsored a Joint Statement on National Nuclear Detection Architectures to underscore that a national-level architecture is a necessary component for nuclear security and that countries commit to leveraging available resources for improving such architectures over time.

As a signatory to this Statement, the United States will seek to improve international awareness and understanding of the importance of a national-level nuclear detection architecture.  The United States will also advocate for and support the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct periodic review workshops to share best practices, challenges, mitigation strategies, and long-term sustainability approaches that may be common to all participating nations.

Based on a risk-informed approach, the U.S. continues to strengthen its nuclear detection architecture through layered, defense-in-depth detection countermeasures that balance border security with enhanced detection countermeasures for interior law enforcement.

Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004)

THE WHITE HOUSE 

Office of the Press Secretary

______________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                        

FACT SHEET

UN Security Council Resolution 1540

UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, adopted unanimously in 2004 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, establishes legally binding obligations on all States to develop and enforce appropriate and effective measures against the proliferation of nuclear weapons or material, their means of delivery and related materials.  The resolution also created a UN Security Council subsidiary body, the 1540 Committee, to monitor and foster implementation of the resolution.

The Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540, sponsored by Canada, Republic of Korea and Spain, recognizes the resolution and the 1540 Committee as key players in the international legal and institutional infrastructure for strengthening global nuclear security and combating nuclear terrorism.  In addition, the Joint Statement identifies ways to support the long-term efforts required to implement the resolution and the work of the 1540 Committee.  The Joint Statement further emphasizes the importance of the Second Comprehensive Review of the resolution by the 1540 Committee, now underway, in helping States achieve full implementation of the resolution by 2021, including the implementation of obligations to enhance the security of nuclear materials worldwide.

As part of its commitment to the Joint Statement, the United States pledges to continued support of the resolution and the 1540 Committee, robust participation in the Second Comprehensive Review of the resolution, and the submission of regular reporting on domestic implementation of the resolution. To further meet its obligations and commitments, the United States maintains a wide range of assistance programs and outreach efforts to help others implement their UNSCR 1540 obligations.

UNSCR 1540 and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism constitute key parts of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit’s Action Plan in support of the UN, in which the United States and other Summit participating States commit to further stregthen the global nuclear security architecture by working to enhance the capacity of States to implement their UNSCR 1540 obligations.  As part of this Action Plan, the United States and other Summit participants pledge to increase our efforts to enhance national implementation, coordination and cooperation, assistance, and outreach under the umbrella of UNSCR 1540.  Furthermore, the United States reaffirms its commitment to full implementation of the resolution as part of the Summit’s Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540. 

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Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security Architecture

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

______________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                         

FACT SHEET

Gift Basket on Sustaining Action to Strengthen the Global Nuclear Security Architecture

As the biennial, leader-level meetings engendered by the Nuclear Security Summits come to an end, the international cooperation and focus on implementing the Nuclear Security Summits’ vision and agenda must continue.  The Nuclear Security Contact Group envisioned by this Gift Basket will create a mechanism by which senior officials routinely consult and synchronize national actions in support of the commitments expressed in Summit Communiqués, Action Plans, Gift Baskets, and the 2010 Washington Work Plan.  The Contact Group will meet at least annually, maintaining the network of senior officials and experts that has supported the success of the Summits.  Thirty-nine Summit participants, plus the United Nations and INTERPOL, have indicated their intent to participate in this Contact Group, and other countries who wish to promote nuclear security outcomes are invited to accept the terms of the Gift Basket and join the Contact Group.  The United States looks forward to participating actively in the Nuclear Security Contact Group to sustain the momentum of the Nuclear Security Summits.

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Fact Sheet: Status of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                        

FACT SHEET

Status of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the

Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

The United States welcomes the recent ratifications of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM/A), which, once those countries to deposit their instrument of ratification with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), will bring this important treaty into force.  This treaty fills a gap in the existing international regime by modernizing the international legal framework for nuclear security, which is essential to our efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction or sabotaging nuclear facilties.  The 2005 Amendment strengthens the original Convention by imposing requirements for the physical protection of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in storage, use and domestic transport and security at related facilities.  Once the CPPNM/A enters into force, it becomes legally binding and will allow for the IAEA to convene regular review conferences on the implementation of the treaty.

The amendment will enter into force thirty days after two-thirds of the 153 states party to the CPPNM deposit their instruments of ratification with the IAEA.  As of April 1, 2016, 102 states party have deposited their instrument of ratification; two additional states party must deposit instruments of ratification for the amendment to enter into force.  The United States deposited its instrument of ratification for the amendment with the IAEA on July 31, 2015.  The United States has emphasized the importance of depositing the instruments of ratification and is offering assistance as needed to achieve the universalization of the Amended Convention, noting that 78 countries have ratified since April 2009. 

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Fact Sheet: U.S. Participation EC-US Counter Nuclear Smuggling Workshop

The United States is committed to preventing terrorists, criminals, and other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear and other radioactive materials.  Despite significant international progress in strengthening the security of these materials at facilities, seizures of weapons-usable nuclear material in Moldova (2011) and Georgia (2003, 2006, 2010) suggest these materials continue to be trafficked by transnational criminals.  Reporting from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Incident and Trafficking Database also shows nuclear and radioactive materials are encountered out of regulatory control in all regions. 

Recognizing the need for strengthened international cooperation to counter nuclear smuggling, the United States and the European Commission co-hosted the “2016 Counter Nuclear Smuggling (CNS) Workshop” at the Joint Research Centre-Institute for Transuranium Elements (JRC-ITU) in Karlsruhe, Germany, March 8-10, 2016.  Experts from 28 countries and international organizations shared best practices and lessons learned in investigative and technical capabilities to counter illicit trafficking.  The workshop advanced commitments made at previous Nuclear Security Summits and included demonstrations of CNS capabilities outlined in the ‘Statements of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling’ issued at the each Nuclear Security Summit since 2012.  Workshop instructors included experts from the JRC-ITU, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Energy, INTERPOL, and the IAEA.

Through a series of informational presentations, exercises, and demonstrations, the instructors guided discussions on state-of-the-art approaches and technical challenges associated with detection, investigative planning, radioactive crime scene management, and nuclear forensic analysis of nuclear smuggling incidents.  Workshop participants concluded that close interagency cooperation and international information sharing enable optimized use of investigative and technical capabilities to effectively counter nuclear smuggling.

The March 2016 CNS Workshop marked a significant step in the United States’ collaborative efforts to strengthen international capabilities to prevent nuclear and radioactive materials from falling into the hands of malicious actors.   

Fact Sheet: U.S. Participation in ITRAP+10

U.S. Participation in the Illicit Trafficking Radiation Program

The United States and the European Union understand the importance of nuclear security and embrace the shared international responsibility to develop, promote and enhance systems and measures to detect and respond to nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control.    The international partnership created to evaluate commercially available detection technologies was initiated through the Illicit Trafficking Radiation Program (ITRAP+10).  This joint test campaign between European Union and the United States has tested 79 models of radiation detection technologies from 26 world-wide manufacturers.  The ITRAP+10 report provides international stakeholders a robust assessment of technologies to assist resource planning in the deployment of more effective detection countermeasures.  Release of this report supports international efforts to combat the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control.  

Enhancing capabilities to detect nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control, both at borders and within States, is integral to bolstering global defenses against nuclear terrorism. In addition to this technical assessment,   the results of this joint test effort are expected to encourage industry to push technological advances, which will ideally result in better detection capabilities.

The ITRAP+10 report underscores the commitment of the United States and the European Union to support efforts to combat nuclear terrorism. Test results support evolving requirements and test methods for radiation detection instruments, guide industry towards product improvement, and promote better understanding of performance and limitations of current technologies. 

Fact Sheet: Update on Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation (INFCIRC 869)

THE WHITE HOUSE 

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                        

FACT SHEET

Update on INFCIRC 869

On October 9, 2014, the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, on behalf of its Government and 34 other countries (full list below), conveyed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Secretariat the “Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation” from the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and requested that it be circulated to all IAEA Member States.  The subscribing states pledged to take specific steps, including implementing key IAEA nuclear security guidance, accepting voluntary peer reviews, and committing that those responsible for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.  The Dutch note verbale  encouraged all States to meet the intent of these essential elements of a nuclear security regime and to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the principles therein.  The IAEA has circulated the 2014 Joint Statement as INFCIRC/869, to which all IAEA Member States could ascribe.

On November 13, 2015, Jordan pledged its commitment to the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, as contained in INFCIRC/869.  Jordan is the 36th IAEA member state to subscribe to the statement, and the first to do so outside the Summit process.

The United States continues to encourage all IAEA member states to indicate their commitment to implement the provisions of INFCIRC/869, noting that such public commitments provide public assurances that nuclear materials are effectively secured and underscore support for the IAEA and its nuclear security efforts.

Full List of Subscribers

Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Vietnam.

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Fact Sheet: Joint Statement on Certified Training

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                       

FACT SHEET

Certified Training for Nuclear Security Management

The challenges associated with managing nuclear and other radiological materials are varied and complex, and it is essential that states to their utmost to maintain security over such materials.  Effective security relies upon the competence of management and personnel who are responsible for this work.  Therefore, it is crucial that managers and personnel responsible for nuclear security continuously maintain and improve their skills.  Much progress has been made in this area since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, particularly with the development of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Information Circular 869 and with the establishment of the World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS) Academy Nuclear Security Management Certification Program.

The WINS Academy is a comprehensive training program for nuclear security professionals, with modules that cover a wide variety of disciplines.  Upon successful completion, students become Certified Nuclear Security Professionals.  Certification is valid for three years, after which time recertification is required.  The program is designed to develop a network of certified professional who are affecting meaningful and sustainable changes to nuclear security worldwide.

In support of this issue, Canada has sponsored the Gift Basket on Certified Training for Nuclear Security Management.  As a signatory to this Gift Basket, the United States commits to further support the WINS Academy, including through the provision of advocacy, peer review support, contributions, or by other means as necessary, and to promote cooperative efforts between the WINS Academy and the IAEA.  The United States has supported WINS through federal grants and works with the both IAEA and directly with partner countries to provide a wide variety of training to personnel responsible for securing nuclear and radiological materials.

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Joint Statement on Certified Training

Joint Statement on

Certified Training for Nuclear Security Management

2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Introduction

Gathered in Washington D.C. on the occasion of the fourth Nuclear Security Summit, the leaders of Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States welcome the progress that has been made by states to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the essential elements of nuclear security guidance, particularly in the area of ensuring that management and personnel with accountability for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.   

At the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, thirty five states sponsored a Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation.  The aim of this Joint Statement was for Subscribing States, at their own discretion, to meet the intent of the essential elements of a nuclear security regime and to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the principles therein. The Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation was subsequently published by the IAEA in 2014 as INFCIRC/869 and is open for any IAEA Member State to support.

One of the four key commitments outlined in the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation is for Subscribing States to “Ensure that management and personnel with accountability for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.” The challenges associated with managing nuclear and other radiological materials are complex, and it is essential that States ensure that such materials remain secure. The Joint Statement outlines two ways in which States can support the training of effective and competent managers of those materials and related facilities:

• Maintaining and continuously improving domestic or regional training through education, certification and/or qualification activities; and
• Supporting or participating in the development of World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) best practice guides and training activities.

In support of the commitments in the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States, together with a number of corporations and foundations, joined together to establish the WINS Academy, the world’s first structured professional development and certification program for nuclear security managers. The first training module of the WINS Academy was launched at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.

Since its launch at the 2014 Summit, and with support from Nuclear Security Summit participating States, corporations and foundations, the WINS Academy has developed a robust international nuclear security certification program.  The training program is designed to develop a network of certified professionals who are implementing meaningful and sustainable changes to security culture and best practices worldwide. To date, 560 participants from 75 countries have registered in the WINS Academy certification program.   

Next Steps

In support of the commitments in INFCIRC/869, and acknowledging the international recognition of the need for nuclear security training, education, certification and/or qualification activities, this gift basket records the intent of Canada, Finland, Hungary, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States to undertake to further support the WINS Academy in its efforts to expand its international certification program, including through the provision of advocacy, peer review support, contributions, or by other means as necessary.  

The States listed above also recognize and undertake to promote cooperative efforts between the WINS Academy and the IAEA, including: WINS cooperation with the IAEA Nuclear Security Support Centre (NSSC) Working Group on Best Practices, whose 2014-2015 Action Plan includes the development of a program to collect lessons learned case studies from NSSC members; and WINS Academy cooperation with the IAEA’s International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN), which has helped academics connect and collaborate with WINS to help develop blended courses leading to joint certification.

We welcome other States, supported by industry and civil society, to provide a tangible commitment in support of the WINS Academy and certified professional development for nuclear security. Together we can help to ensure that nuclear and other radioactive materials remain secure under the management of demonstrably competent professionals.

Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security

JOINT STATEMENT in the context of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit

Forensics in Nuclear Security                                                                     

Applying science to investigate the illicit use of nuclear or other radioactive material is a crucial element of nuclear security.  Nuclear forensic science assists in determining the provenance of materials encountered out of regulatory control by focusing on the questions that would be asked by regulatory authorities or law enforcement investigators.

This gift basket records the intent of 30 countries[1] to advance nuclear forensics as a key element of effective nuclear security. This may be accomplished by incorporating nuclear forensics as an important element of a nation’s coordinated response, cultivating and sustaining expertise in the fundamental scientific disciplines; and advocating for and supporting international efforts where the implementation of both traditional and nuclear forensic capabilities may be enhanced through sharing.

The Forensics in Nuclear Security Gift Basket presented at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit raised awareness about good practices employed by practitioners, developed education and training curricula, and advanced international collaboration through a common lexicon and knowledge platform.  Continued effort is needed to strengthen and sustain national nuclear forensic capabilities through their inclusion in national response plans and communicating what nuclear forensics can provide to stakeholders.

Recognizing that practical implementation and sustainment of nuclear forensic capabilities are an enduring component of nuclear security, States that subscribe to this Joint Statement commit to one or more of the following elements: 

• Develop and sustain expertise through actions such as cross-disciplinary training of traditional forensic and nuclear scientists, transferring knowledge to the next generation of practitioners, cultivating attractive career paths, and facilitating participation in international training including, but not limited to, those offered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), or the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). 
• Promote employment of existing national nuclear science capabilities to support nuclear forensics.
• Evaluate and adapt existing national response frameworks to incorporate the effective use of nuclear forensic capabilities.
• Advance and mature nuclear forensic expertise in other countries through efforts such as providing instruction at or hosting international courses or conferences, publishing techniques in peer-reviewed scholarly journals, or serving as leaders in relevant international groups.

[1] The following countries are signatories to this Joint Statement: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, ROK, Thailand, UK and USA. The following organization also supports this Joint Statement: INTERPOL]

Joint Statement on National Nuclear Detection Architecture

Nuclear Security Summit 2016

Statement on National Nuclear Detection Architectures

Introduction

This gift basket records the intent of Finland, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Morocco, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam and INTERPOL to demonstrate their commitment to develop national-level nuclear detection architectures and strengthen regional efforts as an effective capability in combating illicit trafficking and malevolent use of nuclear and other radioactive materials. An integral part of this commitment is international cooperation to promote key architecture elements and principles as well as to address common challenges and mitigation strategies.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a central role in nuclear security worldwide, including in the field of nuclear detection and cooperation.  Other international fora support international cooperation on nuclear detection, most notably, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).  Similarly, the Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction assists in providing practical assistance on nuclear and radiological security, upon state’s requests, and so supports the work of the IAEA.

IAEA

Through its Nuclear Security Programme, the IAEA supports States in their efforts to establish, maintain and sustain an effective nuclear security detection architecture. The IAEA has adopted a comprehensive approach to nuclear security and has elaborated guidance of major importance[1].  These publications aim at advocating the development and improvement of a nuclear security detection architecture that integrates comprehensive detection capabilities and measures and associated resources to improve a nation’s ability to detect nuclear and radiological threats.  

GICNT

Nuclear detection is a core nuclear security objective for the GICNT. GICNT activities bring critical added value to nuclear detection work through identifying cross-cutting issues, suggesting new solutions and promoting inter-disciplinary and inter-agency cooperation.

Good practices related to nuclear detection are shared, collected and developed under the auspices of the GICNT. They can contribute to producing, assessing and updating IAEA publications.  Frequent scenario-based discussions, table-top exercises and field exercises of the GICNT enhance expertise and skills of members of the global nuclear security community.

Commitments

On the occasion of the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, we the parties to this Statement reaffirm our commitment to improving further our national detection architectures with the goal to combat illicit trafficking and to prevent malicious acts.

We commit ourselves to efficient use of available nuclear detection resources as well as to avoiding duplication of work between IAEA, GICNT and other relevant bodies.

We further reaffirm our commitment to the IAEA’s recommendations, giving particular attention to the following principles:

• An effective nuclear security detection architecture should be derived from a comprehensive, integrated detection strategy prepared by the State; 
• The national nuclear security detection architecture should take into consideration that individual organizations’ roles in the fieldof detection are unambiguously clear;
• Nuclear security culture is an effective tool that can strengthen the efficiency of the nuclear security detection systems; 
•  Implementation should account for and integrate border and interior detection capabilities.

We reaffirm, also, our determination to maintain our contributions to the development of the IAEA’s guidance document in the field of detection.

To promote and improve international awareness and understanding of the importance of a national-level nuclear detection architecture, we also advocate and support the work of the IAEA’speriodic review workshops during which participating nations can share good practices and lessons learned and discuss challenges, mitigation strategies, and long-term sustainability approaches.  The IAEA will conduct the first such workshop in Seam Reap, Cambodia in April 2016. 

GICNT Partners joining to this Statement reaffirm their commitment to actively participate and contribute to nuclear detection work that takes place in the Global Initiative. 

[1] As a critical part of this approach, the IAEA published Nuclear Security Series No. 21; Implementing Guide on Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for the Detection of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control. 

Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004)

Joint Statement on

Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Recognizing that United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 (hereinafter “1540 Committee”) are key parts of the international legal architecture for States to prevent and combat nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the full implementation of UNSCR 1540 is a long-term endeavour that requires both political and technical action at national, sub-regional, regional and international levels.

Recalling the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and Work Plan, the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, and the follow-up Resolutions of UNSCR 1540, particularly UNSCR 1977 (2011), which underscored the important role of UNSCR 1540 in strengthening global nuclear security and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the 1540 Committee will be completing  its second Comprehensive Review in 2016 on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540, as set forth by UNSCR 1977 (2011). This Review provides an opportunity for the 1540 Committee to take stock of national and international progress in implementing UNSCR 1540 since the previous Comprehensive Review in 2009, and to put forward key findings and recommendations that will contribute to more effective implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Welcoming the contributions of States for updating and submitting reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 with the view of the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Reaffirming our commitment to the Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 delivered at the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit.

Noting that since the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, co-signatories have advanced national efforts to further the implementation of UNSCR 1540 by providing support for the 1540 Committee’s main areas of work, including, inter alia: monitoring implementation of the Resolution; providing capacity building assistance at the technical level to requesting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations; preparing and submitting UNSCR 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; organizing or supporting regional and sub-regional training seminars, exercises and initiatives; convening workshops to help facilitate the implementation of UNSCR 1540 into national legislation; conducting outreach to stakeholders in industry, civil society and academia; and strengthening cooperation with regional organizations such as the African Union, ASEAN, the Caribbean Community, and the European Union.

*  *  *

We, the Governments of Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, with the support of the United Nations, the European Union and INTERPOL, reaffirm our commitment to the full and universal implementation of UNSCR 1540, including the implementation of obligations to enhance the security of nuclear materials worldwide in line with the objectives of the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and institutional Action Plans. We reiterate our support for the activities of the 1540 Committee and the Group of Experts. We also reaffirm our commitment to fully implement UNSCR 1540 in our respective States, in areas where we have not already done so, and further undertake to:

1.       Work with and provide information to the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts for the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

2.       Consider providing additional support and assistance in fulfilling the Action Plan in support of the United Nations, particularly actions aimed at facilitating national and regional implementation of UNSCR 1540 and its nuclear security obligations, with a view to helping requesting States to fully implement UNSCR 1540 by 2021, as referenced in the UNSC Presidential Statement of 7 May 2014;

3.       Encourage states to submit reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 on a regular basis, and focussing outreach on states yet to submit a first report to the 1540 Committee;

4.       Advocate for international, regional, and sub-regional organizations that have not yet done so to designate a Point of Contact (PoC) or coordinator on the implementation of UNSCR 1540 in order to facilitate regional approaches to assisting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations and enhance coordination for their UNSCR 1540 implementation efforts;

5.       Consider providing funding, where feasible, to organizations requesting for supporting their PoCs or coordinators for the implementation UNSCR 1540;

6.       Enhance coordination through outreach events with a wide range of domestic stakeholders such as industry, parliamentarians, civil society and academia, and develop appropriate ways to inform these stakeholders of their obligations pursuant to domestic laws relating to the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

7.       Consider organizing joint exercises at the national, regional or international levels that demonstrate ways of reinforcing national and regional capacities and international cooperation for better implementation of UNSCR 1540, and encourage the participation of relevant international organizations and initiatives;

8.       Advocate for the 1540 Committee to continue to strengthen cooperation with other relevant international organizations and initiatives, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, other United Nations entities, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership), as well as regional and sub-regional organizations in promoting the implementation of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit institutional Action Plans;

9.       Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to enhance their cooperation with other relevant entities in the United Nations system, such as the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)- and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), including through strengthening the legal framework to prohibit illicit activities, export controls, border security, and other measures that support obligations under UNSCR 1540, and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate through joint country visits to monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

10.    Consider further enhancing the cooperation between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UNSCR 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts on strengthening nuclear security, through opportunities such as: enhancing complementarity and reducing duplication, including by using Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSP) to inform voluntary 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; coordinating with the IAEA’s International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) on outreach to academia relevant to implementing UNSCR 1540 and the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC) Network on outreach to nuclear security training centers; exploring establishing a liaison between the 1540 Committee and the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security;

11.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue collaborative efforts and interactions with INTERPOL regarding assistance requests and training opportunities;

12.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue to participate in GICNT exercises, workshops and events that focus on building and enhancing nuclear forensics, detection and response capabilities;

13.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to develop strong UNSCR 1540 assistance requests that are sufficiently detailed to support responses from potential assistance providers, including through the Global Partnership. In this context, consideration should be given to strengthening the 1540 Committee’s “match-making” mechanism and coordination with assistance providers, including at the regional level, through the Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540;

14.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to address new and emerging WMD threats relevant to the obligations and recommendations of the resolution; and

15.    Advocate for increased contributions, where feasible, to the UN Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities dedicated to supporting UNSCR 1540 implementation and the work of the 1540 Committee.