Fact Sheet: Downblending in Indonesia

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                         

FACT SHEET 

Eliminating All Highly Enriched Uranium from Indonesia

At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, the United States and Indonesia announced that all fresh (unirradiated) highly enriched uranium (HEU) has been downblended to low enriched uranium (LEU).  The two countries intend to continue their joint effort to eliminate all remaining HEU in Indonesia by September 2016, in furtherance of President Obama and President Jokowi’s October 2015 joint statement.  The HEU is residual material from medical isotope production.

Upon completion of these efforts, Indonesia will be the 30th country plus Taiwan to be declared HEU-free, defined as less than 1 kilogram of HEU remaining.  This is a particularly significant achievement, because all of Southeast Asia will be free of HEU. 

Indonesia is one of only a handful of countries that produce the medical isotope molybdenum-99 (Mo-99), which is used for diagnostic medical imaging. Through cooperative efforts with the U.S. Department of Energy and the International Atomic Energy Agency, Indonesia ceased using HEU to produce Mo-99 in 2010. Indonesia is committed to continuing to provide this much-needed medical isotope and plans to restart production using LEU in 2016.

Joint Statement on Certified Training

Joint Statement on

Certified Training for Nuclear Security Management

2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Introduction

Gathered in Washington D.C. on the occasion of the fourth Nuclear Security Summit, the leaders of Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States welcome the progress that has been made by states to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the essential elements of nuclear security guidance, particularly in the area of ensuring that management and personnel with accountability for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.   

At the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, thirty five states sponsored a Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation.  The aim of this Joint Statement was for Subscribing States, at their own discretion, to meet the intent of the essential elements of a nuclear security regime and to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the principles therein. The Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation was subsequently published by the IAEA in 2014 as INFCIRC/869 and is open for any IAEA Member State to support.

One of the four key commitments outlined in the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation is for Subscribing States to “Ensure that management and personnel with accountability for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.” The challenges associated with managing nuclear and other radiological materials are complex, and it is essential that States ensure that such materials remain secure. The Joint Statement outlines two ways in which States can support the training of effective and competent managers of those materials and related facilities:

• Maintaining and continuously improving domestic or regional training through education, certification and/or qualification activities; and
• Supporting or participating in the development of World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) best practice guides and training activities.

In support of the commitments in the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States, together with a number of corporations and foundations, joined together to establish the WINS Academy, the world’s first structured professional development and certification program for nuclear security managers. The first training module of the WINS Academy was launched at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.

Since its launch at the 2014 Summit, and with support from Nuclear Security Summit participating States, corporations and foundations, the WINS Academy has developed a robust international nuclear security certification program.  The training program is designed to develop a network of certified professionals who are implementing meaningful and sustainable changes to security culture and best practices worldwide. To date, 560 participants from 75 countries have registered in the WINS Academy certification program.   

Next Steps

In support of the commitments in INFCIRC/869, and acknowledging the international recognition of the need for nuclear security training, education, certification and/or qualification activities, this gift basket records the intent of Canada, Finland, Hungary, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States to undertake to further support the WINS Academy in its efforts to expand its international certification program, including through the provision of advocacy, peer review support, contributions, or by other means as necessary.  

The States listed above also recognize and undertake to promote cooperative efforts between the WINS Academy and the IAEA, including: WINS cooperation with the IAEA Nuclear Security Support Centre (NSSC) Working Group on Best Practices, whose 2014-2015 Action Plan includes the development of a program to collect lessons learned case studies from NSSC members; and WINS Academy cooperation with the IAEA’s International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN), which has helped academics connect and collaborate with WINS to help develop blended courses leading to joint certification.

We welcome other States, supported by industry and civil society, to provide a tangible commitment in support of the WINS Academy and certified professional development for nuclear security. Together we can help to ensure that nuclear and other radioactive materials remain secure under the management of demonstrably competent professionals.

Joint Statement on Countering Nuclear Smuggling

2016 Statement of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling

At the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Nuclear Security Summits, participating nations agreed on Communiqués and Work Plans that included actions aimed at thwarting the illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials. The following countries recognize that identifying nuclear smugglers, detecting and recovering nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, and prosecuting those responsible are important and effective activities to help prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear or other radioactive materials: Australia, Canada, Chile, China,  the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,  France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan,  The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, The Philippines, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom, The United States of America, INTERPOL, and the United Nations.

To follow through on these pledges, participating states are committed to working together to build and sustain national capabilities to counter the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials. These efforts may include:

1.     Designating a national team or task force to link law enforcement, intelligence, technical experts, and other relevant authorities to investigate nuclear trafficking networks and incidents;

2.     Developing plans that clearly outline individual agency roles and responsibilities when responding to incidents of material outside regulatory control;

3.     Developing a national level detection architecture as an element of a whole-of-government counter nuclear smuggling capability;

4.     Strengthening nuclear forensics capabilities to reliably analyze nuclear and other radioactive material discovered out of regulatory control;

5.     Increasing legal training for prosecutors to ensure conviction of smugglers, as appropriate;

6.     Developing laws, regulations, guidance and/or policies to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material;

7.     Strengthening bilateral, multilateral, and international information sharing and other cooperation, such as training and education, best practices exchanges, and exercises;

8.     Sharing applicable lead information through INTERPOL and acting on lead information received as an effective mechanism for identifying nuclear smuggling networks in a timely manner and to enhance cooperation;

9.     Sharing information on incidents involving nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control through the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Incident and Trafficking Database.

Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security

JOINT STATEMENT in the context of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit

Forensics in Nuclear Security                                                                     

Applying science to investigate the illicit use of nuclear or other radioactive material is a crucial element of nuclear security.  Nuclear forensic science assists in determining the provenance of materials encountered out of regulatory control by focusing on the questions that would be asked by regulatory authorities or law enforcement investigators.

This gift basket records the intent of 30 countries[1] to advance nuclear forensics as a key element of effective nuclear security. This may be accomplished by incorporating nuclear forensics as an important element of a nation’s coordinated response, cultivating and sustaining expertise in the fundamental scientific disciplines; and advocating for and supporting international efforts where the implementation of both traditional and nuclear forensic capabilities may be enhanced through sharing.

The Forensics in Nuclear Security Gift Basket presented at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit raised awareness about good practices employed by practitioners, developed education and training curricula, and advanced international collaboration through a common lexicon and knowledge platform.  Continued effort is needed to strengthen and sustain national nuclear forensic capabilities through their inclusion in national response plans and communicating what nuclear forensics can provide to stakeholders.

Recognizing that practical implementation and sustainment of nuclear forensic capabilities are an enduring component of nuclear security, States that subscribe to this Joint Statement commit to one or more of the following elements: 

• Develop and sustain expertise through actions such as cross-disciplinary training of traditional forensic and nuclear scientists, transferring knowledge to the next generation of practitioners, cultivating attractive career paths, and facilitating participation in international training including, but not limited to, those offered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), or the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). 
• Promote employment of existing national nuclear science capabilities to support nuclear forensics.
• Evaluate and adapt existing national response frameworks to incorporate the effective use of nuclear forensic capabilities.
• Advance and mature nuclear forensic expertise in other countries through efforts such as providing instruction at or hosting international courses or conferences, publishing techniques in peer-reviewed scholarly journals, or serving as leaders in relevant international groups.

[1] The following countries are signatories to this Joint Statement: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, ROK, Thailand, UK and USA. The following organization also supports this Joint Statement: INTERPOL]

Joint Statement on National Nuclear Detection Architecture

Nuclear Security Summit 2016

Statement on National Nuclear Detection Architectures

Introduction

This gift basket records the intent of Finland, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Morocco, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam and INTERPOL to demonstrate their commitment to develop national-level nuclear detection architectures and strengthen regional efforts as an effective capability in combating illicit trafficking and malevolent use of nuclear and other radioactive materials. An integral part of this commitment is international cooperation to promote key architecture elements and principles as well as to address common challenges and mitigation strategies.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a central role in nuclear security worldwide, including in the field of nuclear detection and cooperation.  Other international fora support international cooperation on nuclear detection, most notably, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).  Similarly, the Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction assists in providing practical assistance on nuclear and radiological security, upon state’s requests, and so supports the work of the IAEA.

IAEA

Through its Nuclear Security Programme, the IAEA supports States in their efforts to establish, maintain and sustain an effective nuclear security detection architecture. The IAEA has adopted a comprehensive approach to nuclear security and has elaborated guidance of major importance[1].  These publications aim at advocating the development and improvement of a nuclear security detection architecture that integrates comprehensive detection capabilities and measures and associated resources to improve a nation’s ability to detect nuclear and radiological threats.  

GICNT

Nuclear detection is a core nuclear security objective for the GICNT. GICNT activities bring critical added value to nuclear detection work through identifying cross-cutting issues, suggesting new solutions and promoting inter-disciplinary and inter-agency cooperation.

Good practices related to nuclear detection are shared, collected and developed under the auspices of the GICNT. They can contribute to producing, assessing and updating IAEA publications.  Frequent scenario-based discussions, table-top exercises and field exercises of the GICNT enhance expertise and skills of members of the global nuclear security community.

Commitments

On the occasion of the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, we the parties to this Statement reaffirm our commitment to improving further our national detection architectures with the goal to combat illicit trafficking and to prevent malicious acts.

We commit ourselves to efficient use of available nuclear detection resources as well as to avoiding duplication of work between IAEA, GICNT and other relevant bodies.

We further reaffirm our commitment to the IAEA’s recommendations, giving particular attention to the following principles:

• An effective nuclear security detection architecture should be derived from a comprehensive, integrated detection strategy prepared by the State; 
• The national nuclear security detection architecture should take into consideration that individual organizations’ roles in the fieldof detection are unambiguously clear;
• Nuclear security culture is an effective tool that can strengthen the efficiency of the nuclear security detection systems; 
•  Implementation should account for and integrate border and interior detection capabilities.

We reaffirm, also, our determination to maintain our contributions to the development of the IAEA’s guidance document in the field of detection.

To promote and improve international awareness and understanding of the importance of a national-level nuclear detection architecture, we also advocate and support the work of the IAEA’speriodic review workshops during which participating nations can share good practices and lessons learned and discuss challenges, mitigation strategies, and long-term sustainability approaches.  The IAEA will conduct the first such workshop in Seam Reap, Cambodia in April 2016. 

GICNT Partners joining to this Statement reaffirm their commitment to actively participate and contribute to nuclear detection work that takes place in the Global Initiative. 

[1] As a critical part of this approach, the IAEA published Nuclear Security Series No. 21; Implementing Guide on Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for the Detection of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control. 

Joint Statement on Certified Training

Joint Statement on Certified Training for Nuclear Security Management
2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Introduction

Gathered in Washington D.C. on the occasion of the fourth Nuclear Security Summit, the leaders of Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States welcome the progress that has been made by states to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the essential elements of nuclear security guidance, particularly in the area of ensuring that management and personnel with accountability for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.   

At the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, thirty five states sponsored a Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation.  The aim of this Joint Statement was for Subscribing States, at their own discretion, to meet the intent of the essential elements of a nuclear security regime and to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the principles therein. The Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation was subsequently published by the IAEA in 2014 as INFCIRC/869 and is open for any IAEA Member State to support.

One of the four key commitments outlined in the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation is for Subscribing States to “Ensure that management and personnel with accountability for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.” The challenges associated with managing nuclear and other radiological materials are complex, and it is essential that States ensure that such materials remain secure. The Joint Statement outlines two ways in which States can support the training of effective and competent managers of those materials and related facilities:

• Maintaining and continuously improving domestic or regional training through education, certification and/or qualification activities; and
• Supporting or participating in the development of World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) best practice guides and training activities.

In support of the commitments in the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States, together with a number of corporations and foundations, joined together to establish the WINS Academy, the world’s first structured professional development and certification program for nuclear security managers. The first training module of the WINS Academy was launched at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.

Since its launch at the 2014 Summit, and with support from Nuclear Security Summit participating States, corporations and foundations, the WINS Academy has developed a robust international nuclear security certification program.  The training program is designed to develop a network of certified professionals who are implementing meaningful and sustainable changes to security culture and best practices worldwide. To date, 560 participants from 75 countries have registered in the WINS Academy certification program.   

Next Steps

In support of the commitments in INFCIRC/869, and acknowledging the international recognition of the need for nuclear security training, education, certification and/or qualification activities, this gift basket records the intent of Canada, Finland, Hungary, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States to undertake to further support the WINS Academy in its efforts to expand its international certification program, including through the provision of advocacy, peer review support, contributions, or by other means as necessary.  

The States listed above also recognize and undertake to promote cooperative efforts between the WINS Academy and the IAEA, including: WINS cooperation with the IAEA Nuclear Security Support Centre (NSSC) Working Group on Best Practices, whose 2014-2015 Action Plan includes the development of a program to collect lessons learned case studies from NSSC members; and WINS Academy cooperation with the IAEA’s International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN), which has helped academics connect and collaborate with WINS to help develop blended courses leading to joint certification.

We welcome other States, supported by industry and civil society, to provide a tangible commitment in support of the WINS Academy and certified professional development for nuclear security. Together we can help to ensure that nuclear and other radioactive materials remain secure under the management of demonstrably competent professionals.

National Progress Report: Indonesia

Indonesia's commitment to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy - the three pillars of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - is total and absolute. The best way to stop proliferation and to ensure that nuclear and radioactive materials are not diverted for terrorist act is by realizing the goal of a world free of nuclear weapon. Indonesia calls upon all nations to promote universal adoption and full implementation of multilateral treaties whose aim are to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

The progress made by Indonesia in the field of nuclear security, have been among others:

A.     Non-Proliferation and Disarmament related issues

1. In the Southeast Asia region, efforts to realize nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation continue. During its Chairmanship in ASEAN in 2011, Indonesia had facilitated the conclusion of the negotiations on the revised Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) Protocol between ASEAN member states and Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS). This year Indonesia encourages the convening of consultations between ASEAN Member States and NWS with a view to the signing of the relevant instruments that enable NWS ratifying the Protocol of SEANWFZ.

2. Indonesia has ratified the Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by Law No 1 of 2012, and submitted its instrument of ratification to the United Nations Secretary General, as the depository of the Treaty, in February 2012. This is a significant step toward the global prohibition of nuclear-test explosions and through its ratification, Indonesia has called on the remaining Annex II countries to step out and start their own ratification process.

3. Since 2013 the Government has started the process of drawing up a draft law on nuclear security with the view to submit it to the parliament in 2016. The Government of Indonesia sees the importance to strengthen its national legislation which in turn can reinforce and complement existing law such as the Law No. 10 Year 1997 on Nuclear Energy. The law is expected to cover, inter alia, total prohibition of the use, possession and transfer of nuclear weapons; strengthening transfer control and nuclear and radioactive materials, and enhancing national nuclear security architecture.

4. Indonesia has acceded the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) by Law No 10 of 2014. The accession of ICSANT will strengthen the existing legislation regarding nuclear security, improve the legal framework and reinforce better national measures on nuclear security.

5. Indonesia has ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its amendment. Indonesia has ratified the CPPNM through Presidential Decree No 49 of 1986 and its amendment through Presidential Regulation No 46 of 2009.

B. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and its relations with Nuclear Security

1. Indonesia has endorsed the implementation of the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, supplementary to the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and has been incorporated through Indonesia National Single Window (INSW)

2. Indonesia has issued the Government Regulation No 54 of 2012 on the Safety and Security of Nuclear Installations and the Government Regulation No 2 of 2014 on Licensing of Nuclear Installations.

3. Indonesia continues to strengthen national coordination on the implementation of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement with relevant stakeholders.

4. Indonesia recognizes the importance of developing strong co-operation in the Asia Pacific region to improve and strengthen the non-proliferation regime through the Asia Pacific Safeguard Network (APSN).

5. Indonesia has issued the Government Regulation No 58 of 2015 on Radiation safety and Security in transport of radioactive materials.

6. Indonesia continues to strengthen nuclear security legislation framework by initiating draft of Nuclear Security Law.

7. Indonesia has revised the National Design Basis Threat (DBT) in 2014. The DBT is reviewed regularly and the next revision of DBT will cover the security of radioactive sources.

8. Indonesia continues to strengthen the security of its radioactive sources at industrial and medical facilities. Indonesia will establish a national network on the security of radioactive sources.

9. Indonesia cooperates with the IAEA to strengthen the existing network of Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) in the key seaports. Indonesia plans to expand the monitoring program to selected border stations.

10. Indonesia has established a mobile expert support team (MEST) and developed a qualification program of related personnel in the detection and response to illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials.

11. Indonesia continues to develop an international action plan on nuclear security under the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP). In addition, Indonesia continues to strengthen co-operation with other regulatory agencies in other countries on nuclear security.

12. Indonesia has declared the commencement of the Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) program to anticipate the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015.

13. Indonesia has launched the Centre of Excellence on Nuclear Security and Emergency Preparedness (I-CoNSEP) in 2014 to contribute the development of nuclear security at national and regional level.

14. With the support of the IAEA and cooperation with various international partners, Indonesia has carried out self-assesment on nuclear security culture in accordance with implementation guidelines of the IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 7 to assess the implementation of nuclear security culture in all nuclear facilities.

15. Indonesia is currently implementing the Human Reliability Program (HRP) to ensure that all personnel who work at nuclear facilities meet the necessary requirements, especially with regard to nuclear security.

16. Indonesia, in cooperation with various international partners, has conducted performance test on physical protection system of nuclear facilities, which was aimed to ensure the effectiveness of nuclear security at those facilities.

17. Indonesia is now in the process of drafting guidelines of nuclear security culture tailored to national characteristics in order to foster the implementation of nuclear security culture.

18. Indonesia is committed to downblending HEU (High Enriched Uranium) to LEU (Low Enriched Uranium). At the time being, the licensing application of the aforementioned activity is under review process.

Other Initiatives

1. Indonesia has submitted the National Legislation Implementation Kit as house gift in the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit with the objective to help States with building blocks to develop Comprehensive national legislation in accordance with their own respective legal cultures and internal legal processes.

2. Indonesia has established and submitted Safeguards Implementation Kit in the APSN annual meeting in 2014. The objective of the legislation kit is to give good examples to the member states on the implementation on safeguards and additional protocol.

3. Indonesia has shared knowledge, among others, by sending its staff as lecturers or participants in expert missions (IPPAS and INSSP), participating in meetings (Member of AdSec), and has sent its staff as a cost-free expert in nuclear security (INSSP) to the IAEA.

4. Indonesia has recently welcome a IAEA mission related to nuclear security, which is a follow up IPPAS mission in 2014, to strengthen physical protection in nuclear installations and radiation facilities.

5. Indonesia has conducted and participated in meetings or workshops regarding Nuclear Security and Safeguards in 2015, such as:  

Trainings and Workshops

• Regulation Review on Security and Safeguard
• Regulation Review on Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
• Radioactive Source Security Officer
• Radioactive Source Security for Security Officer in BAPETEN
• Basic Training on Nuclear Security
• Training of Nuclear Security for Management Level
• Training of Nuclear Security and Emergency Preparedness
• Radioactive Source Security Inspector Simulation Training
• Regulations and Radiological Sabotage Training
• Safeguards by Design
• Search and Secure Training
• Nuclear Security Culture and Human Reliability Workshop
• Workshop on Security Culture for Senior Managers
• Workshop on Security Culture for Regulators
• IAEA Regional Training Course on Computer

Additional Activities

• Conducting National Safeguards Awareness Workshop, a collaboration with IAEA.
• Conducting National Roundtable on the Development of National Regulatory Guidance for Nuclear Security Culture (NSC), a collaboration with University of Georgia, USA, and supported by the IAEA and US Department of State Partnership for Nuclear Security (PNS)

. In cooperation with the IAEA and the Center for International Trade Security University of Georgia, establishing a Center for Security Culture and Assessment dedicated for nuclear security culture.

7. Indonesia is currently in the process of establishing Nuclear Cyber Security Specialization Doctoral Degree Programme incorporated within Computer Science Department of Mathematic and Natural Science Faculty in Gadjah Mada University.

8. Indonesia has installed seven RPM (Radiation Portal Monitor) in main harbours (Batam, Balawan, Makassar, Bitung, Tanjung Priuk, Tanjung Perak, and Semarang) to strengthen the nuclear security detection.

9. Indonesia has initiated the infrastructures in supporting the I-CoNSEP programme in creating regional center of exellence in nuclear security.

Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres - Centres of Excellence→

Joint statement on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres / Centres of Excellence for the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit Submitted by Italy

Joint Statement on the National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security

Joint Statement on the National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security

In Larger Security: A Comprehensive Approach to Nuclear Security

Joint Statement by Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt,Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Ukraine and Vietnam In larger security: a comprehensive approach to nuclear security

Statement on Nuclear Information Security (UK)→

Statement on Nuclear Information Security: Progress update

2014 Progress Report Indonesia

2014 Progress Report Indonesia

Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security→

JOINT STATEMENT in the context of the Nuclear Security Summit 2014 Forensics in Nuclear Security

Security of Radioactive Sources

Contribution ("Gift basket") by the Federal Republic of Germany to the Nuclear Security Summit 2012 Security of Radioactive Sources

Nuclear Training Centers

Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers

2012 Progress Report Indonesia

2012 Progress Report Indonesia

Nuclear Information Security→

Multinational Statement on Nuclear Information Security