Fact Sheet: Update on Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation (INFCIRC 869)

/

THE WHITE HOUSE 

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                        

FACT SHEET

Update on INFCIRC 869

On October 9, 2014, the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, on behalf of its Government and 34 other countries (full list below), conveyed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Secretariat the “Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation” from the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and requested that it be circulated to all IAEA Member States.  The subscribing states pledged to take specific steps, including implementing key IAEA nuclear security guidance, accepting voluntary peer reviews, and committing that those responsible for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.  The Dutch note verbale  encouraged all States to meet the intent of these essential elements of a nuclear security regime and to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the principles therein.  The IAEA has circulated the 2014 Joint Statement as INFCIRC/869, to which all IAEA Member States could ascribe.

On November 13, 2015, Jordan pledged its commitment to the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, as contained in INFCIRC/869.  Jordan is the 36th IAEA member state to subscribe to the statement, and the first to do so outside the Summit process.

The United States continues to encourage all IAEA member states to indicate their commitment to implement the provisions of INFCIRC/869, noting that such public commitments provide public assurances that nuclear materials are effectively secured and underscore support for the IAEA and its nuclear security efforts.

Full List of Subscribers

Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Vietnam.

###

Joint Statement on Countering Nuclear Smuggling

/

2016 Statement of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling

At the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Nuclear Security Summits, participating nations agreed on Communiqués and Work Plans that included actions aimed at thwarting the illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials. The following countries recognize that identifying nuclear smugglers, detecting and recovering nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, and prosecuting those responsible are important and effective activities to help prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear or other radioactive materials: Australia, Canada, Chile, China,  the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,  France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan,  The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, The Philippines, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom, The United States of America, INTERPOL, and the United Nations.

To follow through on these pledges, participating states are committed to working together to build and sustain national capabilities to counter the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials. These efforts may include:

1.     Designating a national team or task force to link law enforcement, intelligence, technical experts, and other relevant authorities to investigate nuclear trafficking networks and incidents;

2.     Developing plans that clearly outline individual agency roles and responsibilities when responding to incidents of material outside regulatory control;

3.     Developing a national level detection architecture as an element of a whole-of-government counter nuclear smuggling capability;

4.     Strengthening nuclear forensics capabilities to reliably analyze nuclear and other radioactive material discovered out of regulatory control;

5.     Increasing legal training for prosecutors to ensure conviction of smugglers, as appropriate;

6.     Developing laws, regulations, guidance and/or policies to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material;

7.     Strengthening bilateral, multilateral, and international information sharing and other cooperation, such as training and education, best practices exchanges, and exercises;

8.     Sharing applicable lead information through INTERPOL and acting on lead information received as an effective mechanism for identifying nuclear smuggling networks in a timely manner and to enhance cooperation;

9.     Sharing information on incidents involving nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control through the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Incident and Trafficking Database.

 

Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security

/

JOINT STATEMENT in the context of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit

Forensics in Nuclear Security                                                                     

Applying science to investigate the illicit use of nuclear or other radioactive material is a crucial element of nuclear security.  Nuclear forensic science assists in determining the provenance of materials encountered out of regulatory control by focusing on the questions that would be asked by regulatory authorities or law enforcement investigators.

This gift basket records the intent of 30 countries[1] to advance nuclear forensics as a key element of effective nuclear security. This may be accomplished by incorporating nuclear forensics as an important element of a nation’s coordinated response, cultivating and sustaining expertise in the fundamental scientific disciplines; and advocating for and supporting international efforts where the implementation of both traditional and nuclear forensic capabilities may be enhanced through sharing.

The Forensics in Nuclear Security Gift Basket presented at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit raised awareness about good practices employed by practitioners, developed education and training curricula, and advanced international collaboration through a common lexicon and knowledge platform.  Continued effort is needed to strengthen and sustain national nuclear forensic capabilities through their inclusion in national response plans and communicating what nuclear forensics can provide to stakeholders.

Recognizing that practical implementation and sustainment of nuclear forensic capabilities are an enduring component of nuclear security, States that subscribe to this Joint Statement commit to one or more of the following elements: 

  • Develop and sustain expertise through actions such as cross-disciplinary training of traditional forensic and nuclear scientists, transferring knowledge to the next generation of practitioners, cultivating attractive career paths, and facilitating participation in international training including, but not limited to, those offered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), or the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). 
  • Promote employment of existing national nuclear science capabilities to support nuclear forensics.
  • Evaluate and adapt existing national response frameworks to incorporate the effective use of nuclear forensic capabilities.
  • Advance and mature nuclear forensic expertise in other countries through efforts such as providing instruction at or hosting international courses or conferences, publishing techniques in peer-reviewed scholarly journals, or serving as leaders in relevant international groups.

[1] The following countries are signatories to this Joint Statement: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, ROK, Thailand, UK and USA. The following organization also supports this Joint Statement: INTERPOL]

Joint Statement on National Nuclear Detection Architecture

/

Nuclear Security Summit 2016

Statement on National Nuclear Detection Architectures

Introduction

This gift basket records the intent of Finland, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Morocco, Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam and INTERPOL to demonstrate their commitment to develop national-level nuclear detection architectures and strengthen regional efforts as an effective capability in combating illicit trafficking and malevolent use of nuclear and other radioactive materials. An integral part of this commitment is international cooperation to promote key architecture elements and principles as well as to address common challenges and mitigation strategies.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a central role in nuclear security worldwide, including in the field of nuclear detection and cooperation.  Other international fora support international cooperation on nuclear detection, most notably, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).  Similarly, the Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction assists in providing practical assistance on nuclear and radiological security, upon state’s requests, and so supports the work of the IAEA.

IAEA

Through its Nuclear Security Programme, the IAEA supports States in their efforts to establish, maintain and sustain an effective nuclear security detection architecture. The IAEA has adopted a comprehensive approach to nuclear security and has elaborated guidance of major importance[1].  These publications aim at advocating the development and improvement of a nuclear security detection architecture that integrates comprehensive detection capabilities and measures and associated resources to improve a nation’s ability to detect nuclear and radiological threats.  

GICNT

Nuclear detection is a core nuclear security objective for the GICNT. GICNT activities bring critical added value to nuclear detection work through identifying cross-cutting issues, suggesting new solutions and promoting inter-disciplinary and inter-agency cooperation.

Good practices related to nuclear detection are shared, collected and developed under the auspices of the GICNT. They can contribute to producing, assessing and updating IAEA publications.  Frequent scenario-based discussions, table-top exercises and field exercises of the GICNT enhance expertise and skills of members of the global nuclear security community.

Commitments

On the occasion of the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, we the parties to this Statement reaffirm our commitment to improving further our national detection architectures with the goal to combat illicit trafficking and to prevent malicious acts.

We commit ourselves to efficient use of available nuclear detection resources as well as to avoiding duplication of work between IAEA, GICNT and other relevant bodies.

We further reaffirm our commitment to the IAEA’s recommendations, giving particular attention to the following principles:

  • An effective nuclear security detection architecture should be derived from a comprehensive, integrated detection strategy prepared by the State; 
  • The national nuclear security detection architecture should take into consideration that individual organizations’ roles in the fieldof detection are unambiguously clear;
  • Nuclear security culture is an effective tool that can strengthen the efficiency of the nuclear security detection systems; 
  •  Implementation should account for and integrate border and interior detection capabilities.

We reaffirm, also, our determination to maintain our contributions to the development of the IAEA’s guidance document in the field of detection.

To promote and improve international awareness and understanding of the importance of a national-level nuclear detection architecture, we also advocate and support the work of the IAEA’speriodic review workshops during which participating nations can share good practices and lessons learned and discuss challenges, mitigation strategies, and long-term sustainability approaches.  The IAEA will conduct the first such workshop in Seam Reap, Cambodia in April 2016. 

GICNT Partners joining to this Statement reaffirm their commitment to actively participate and contribute to nuclear detection work that takes place in the Global Initiative. 

[1] As a critical part of this approach, the IAEA published Nuclear Security Series No. 21; Implementing Guide on Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for the Detection of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control. 

Joint Statement on Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness and Response

/

Joint Statement on Supporting Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism

Preparedness and Response Capabilities 

Subscribed by Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the United Nations and INTERPOL.

A nuclear terror event anywhere in the world would have devastating human, environmental, economic, and political consequences. Building on the Summit’s nuclear terrorism prevention and nuclear and radiological material security accomplishments and efforts, wethe Parties to this statement recognize the need for ensuring adequate nuclear emergency preparedness and response capabilities.  Such capabilities contribute tofurther reducing not onlythe risks posed by nuclear or radiological terrorism (hereafter, “nuclear terrorism”), but also the risks posed by other malicious activities or accidents involving nuclear or radiological materials and facilities.Ensuring preparedness in National capabilities to counter and respond to nuclear terror acts is a critical task for all Nations, as exemplified by the Scenario-Based Policy Discussions successfully completed by participating nations as part ofthe 2016 Summit.  Nuclear terrorism preparedness requires a range of activities to establish,enhance, sustain, and exercise the capabilities necessary to counter and respond to nuclear terror incidents. Nuclear terrorism response requires a range of technical, operational, and communications capabilities toprovide coordination and resolution of the incident, as well as mitigatingits consequences.

Consistent with the Nuclear Security Summit goal of reducing the threat posed by nuclear terrorism and furthering the 2014 Hague Summit Communique pledge to “maintain effective emergency preparedness, response, and mitigation capabilities,”we the parties to this statementrecognize that ensuring adequate nuclear terrorismpreparedness and response capabilities complements international nuclear security efforts.  We also recognize that adequate nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities contribute to strengthening the interface between nuclear safety and security, and serve as a potential deterrent to attack.

Nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities include the following capabilities:

  • National policies and plans:Establish and maintainadequate National response plans and policies regarding preparedness, response, and mitigation of incidents and threats of nuclear terrorism, including guidance forlocalplanning in responding to such threats and incidents.
  • Technical expertise and capabilities:Identify, confirm, assess, and respond to nuclear terror incidentsand threats, including radiological characterization and assessments to inform protective actions, emergency medical training and response support, and decontamination tools and training.
  • Public communications and education: Develop and maintainstrategic communications and effective public messaging providing not only public safety awareness and emergency readiness in the event of a nuclear terror incident but also mechanisms and procedures for ensuring prompt dissemination of public safety information to potentially affected communities.
  • Sustainment of capabilities:  Sustain necessary capabilities through continuing education, training, and exercises involving National and local officials and multinational partners charged with nuclear terrorism preparedness, response, or associated decision-making.
  • International coordination and assistance mechanisms: Per the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and other relevant international legal instruments, and considering multilateral mechanisms and initiatives such as offered by the United Nations (UN), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), INTERPOL, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,establish mechanisms for requesting and/or providing (as appropriate):
    • Nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capacity building, 
    • As required, post-event mutualassistance offered by the State Partiesof the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency,
    • Government-to-Government coordination and communication in the event of nuclear terrorism.

Recognizing that an act of nuclear terrorism anywhere in the world would have global impacts affecting all Nations, wethe parties to this statement affirm ourwillingnessto cooperate to strengthen National and international nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities.  We agree on the following commitments in support of this objective:

  • Ensure adequate National nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities at home.  We the parties to this statement reaffirm our National commitment to establish and maintain the National-level capabilities required for nuclear terrorism preparedness and response.We also commit to conductcomprehensivenuclear terrorism preparedness and response drills, incorporating roles and responsibilities at the National and local levels to foster strong interagency cooperation across law enforcement, medical, technical/scientific, and policy agencies.  We commit to strengthen our National interagency coordination, cooperation, and information-sharing mechanisms needed in this regard, to support whole-of-government crisis response.
  • Support sharing relevant resources, expertise, and good practices, in order to strengthen global nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities, including relevant post-event mutual assistance.  Consistent with our respectiveinternational legal obligations,we the parties to this statementagree in principle to support--at the bilateral level, upon request--relevant expertise, training, or other related resources supporting nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilitieswith interested states, as well as offer relevant post-event mutual assistanceincluding through the IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET). We recognize that requests for bilateral assistance must be evaluated by the States involved on a case by case basis and would be subject to availability of resources, legal considerations, and other concerns.  However, we the parties to this statement recognize the importance of supporting nuclear terrorismpreparedness and response capacities and thus encourage bilateral and multilateral dialogue and coordination on how best to assure adequate global preparedness and response capabilities.As such, we also commit to making available relevant expertise or experience via international and multilateral effortsas the UN, IAEA, INTERPOL, GICNT, and the GP.  National Points of Contact will be provided, in addition to IAEA, INTERPOL, GICNT, and GP points of contact,to support the coordination and evaluation of requests and offers of assistance.
  • Support for international best practice guidance on preparedness and resilience objectives and the specific capabilities needed to meet them, as published by the organizations listed above,including the IAEA Nuclear Security Series 15 - Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, the IAEA Safety Series GSR Part 7 on Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism’s Fundamentals for Establishing and Maintaining a Nuclear Security Response Framework ,which build on the aforementioned core competencies We the parties to this statement recognize these documents as an excellent foundation for States wishing to establish or sustain baseline nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities, and actively support the broadest possible international application and use of these documents.
  • Share lessons learned from real world incidents (i.e., nuclear and radiological incidents, materials out of regulatory control, significant all hazards-related emergency response efforts, etc.) that have implications for or applications to nuclear terrorism preparedness, response, and mitigation, in order to incorporate this experience into Preparedness and Response capabilities nationally and internationally.
  • Encourage and support National and State/local-level full field and table-top exercises aimed at ensuring nuclear terrorism preparedness and response capabilities.  As appropriate, participating countries to the exercises will encourage reciprocal, bilateral observation of National and transborder exercises, with a view towards sharing good practices in sustaining preparedness and response capabilities, while ensuring confidentiality of sensitive information.We the parties to this statementcommit, as far as resources permit, to host, observe, or support the development and implementation of radiological emergency management exercises (REMEX) under the GICNT’s Response and Mitigation Working Group.  REMEXs emphasize the importance of international cooperation in preparedness and resilience by providing the opportunity for two or more governments to collaboratively exercise response capabilities for nuclear terrorism with bilateral or multilateral scenarios.  REMEXs also provide a venue for sharing the good practices and lessons learned from other national and State/local-level exercises encouraged under this gift basket.  

Joint Statement on Nuclear Training and Support Centres

/

Joint statement on

Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres / Centres of Excellence 

Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, Vietnam, INTERPOL and the United Nations

 

Italy hosted the 2014 Gift Basket on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres/Centres of Excellence (NSSC/CoE) following the 2012 Gift Basket hosted by the United States.  The 2014 Gift Basket attracted a large number of co-sponsoring Summit participants promoting the importance of nuclear security training and support centres, and the value of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres Network (NSSC Network) in strengthening international and regional cooperation and collaboration.  Now that the IAEA NSSC Network is maturing and a number of nuclear security training and support centers are being established, these centres can play an increasingly important and active role in promoting nuclear security.  These centres help meet domestic nuclear security needs, and can also provide an important platform for sharing resources and meeting needs on a regional basis, thus strengthening and sustaining the global nuclear security architecture.

In support of the IAEA NSSC Network and nuclear security training and support centre sustainability, the participants to the 2016 Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres / Centres of Excellence Gift Basket intend, within available resources, to support the following activities.

Strengthening of the IAEA NSSC Network

•    Nuclear security training and support centres not yet a member of the IAEA NSSC Network commit to join the Network and make every effort to take part in the IAEA NSSC Network activities, including meetings.

Establishment of regional networks

•    Building upon the establishment of the Asia Regional Network through the IAEA NSSC Network, establish additional networks with nuclear security training and support centres in the same region and mechanisms of regional coordination to promote best practices, exchange training experiences, share curricula and other activities on a regional basis. 

•    In collaboration with the IAEA NSSC network, share experiences in training with centres outside their region.

Strengthening nuclear security training and technical support programmes

•    Improve the quality of training by conducting peer review exchanges with other nuclear security training and support centres and by making use of the IAEA NSSC Network as a mechanism to promote peer-review exchanges.

•    Use IAEA material/guidance as a mechanism to achieve consistency in the technical content of the training programmes on nuclear security and participate in IAEA Train-the-Trainer activities to build a network of instructors qualified to deliver IAEA training course materials. 

•    Organize and be active participants in the development and running of nuclear and radiological security scenarios and exercises.

•    Share experiences and nuclear security training with other training centres and centres of excellence, as appropriate, as well as lessons learned through the IAEA NSSC network and IAEA Nuclear Security Information Portal (NUSEC).

•    Use IAEA material/guidance to support training programmes in key technical topics such as nuclear security culture, nuclear material accounting and control, computer security, transportation security, and insider threat mitigation. 

•    As appropriate, consider certification of nuclear security training and support centre training programmes, as per ISO 29990 and/or utilize applicable ISO best practices to support continuous improvement.
  
•    Collaborate with the Global Partnership’s Centre of Excellence Sub-working Group to implement this Gift Basket as noted in the Global Partnership Nuclear Security Summit Action Plan.

Sustainability

•    Focus attention on and build mechanisms to ensure the sustainability of nuclear security training and support centres, including developing business plans and e-learning tools, conducting needs analysis and regular evaluation of effectiveness, and identifying required financial, administrative and human resources.

•    Provide training, technical and scientific support to competent authorities to strengthen long-term sustainability of domestic nuclear and radiological security regimes. 

•    Broaden and strengthen international cooperation with the United Nations, especially United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540-related efforts, with INTERPOL, the Global Partnership, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and others.

Cooperation

•    Collaborate with educational institutions that teach nuclear security subjects to include nuclear security culture. Continue, improve, and expand the NSSC Network’s collaboration with the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN).

•    Cooperate in the area of research and development with national and international institutes to promote scientific advancements in nuclear security and continuous engagement of the scientific communities.

•    Engage industry and civil society through constant dialogue on the importance of nuclear security.

•    Promote public confidence in nuclear and radiological security.

Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004)

/

Joint Statement on

Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Recognizing that United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 (hereinafter “1540 Committee”) are key parts of the international legal architecture for States to prevent and combat nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the full implementation of UNSCR 1540 is a long-term endeavour that requires both political and technical action at national, sub-regional, regional and international levels.

Recalling the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and Work Plan, the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, and the follow-up Resolutions of UNSCR 1540, particularly UNSCR 1977 (2011), which underscored the important role of UNSCR 1540 in strengthening global nuclear security and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the 1540 Committee will be completing  its second Comprehensive Review in 2016 on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540, as set forth by UNSCR 1977 (2011). This Review provides an opportunity for the 1540 Committee to take stock of national and international progress in implementing UNSCR 1540 since the previous Comprehensive Review in 2009, and to put forward key findings and recommendations that will contribute to more effective implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Welcoming the contributions of States for updating and submitting reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 with the view of the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Reaffirming our commitment to the Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 delivered at the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit.

Noting that since the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, co-signatories have advanced national efforts to further the implementation of UNSCR 1540 by providing support for the 1540 Committee’s main areas of work, including, inter alia: monitoring implementation of the Resolution; providing capacity building assistance at the technical level to requesting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations; preparing and submitting UNSCR 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; organizing or supporting regional and sub-regional training seminars, exercises and initiatives; convening workshops to help facilitate the implementation of UNSCR 1540 into national legislation; conducting outreach to stakeholders in industry, civil society and academia; and strengthening cooperation with regional organizations such as the African Union, ASEAN, the Caribbean Community, and the European Union.

*  *  *

We, the Governments of Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, with the support of the United Nations, the European Union and INTERPOL, reaffirm our commitment to the full and universal implementation of UNSCR 1540, including the implementation of obligations to enhance the security of nuclear materials worldwide in line with the objectives of the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and institutional Action Plans. We reiterate our support for the activities of the 1540 Committee and the Group of Experts. We also reaffirm our commitment to fully implement UNSCR 1540 in our respective States, in areas where we have not already done so, and further undertake to:

1.       Work with and provide information to the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts for the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

2.       Consider providing additional support and assistance in fulfilling the Action Plan in support of the United Nations, particularly actions aimed at facilitating national and regional implementation of UNSCR 1540 and its nuclear security obligations, with a view to helping requesting States to fully implement UNSCR 1540 by 2021, as referenced in the UNSC Presidential Statement of 7 May 2014;

3.       Encourage states to submit reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 on a regular basis, and focussing outreach on states yet to submit a first report to the 1540 Committee;

4.       Advocate for international, regional, and sub-regional organizations that have not yet done so to designate a Point of Contact (PoC) or coordinator on the implementation of UNSCR 1540 in order to facilitate regional approaches to assisting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations and enhance coordination for their UNSCR 1540 implementation efforts;

5.       Consider providing funding, where feasible, to organizations requesting for supporting their PoCs or coordinators for the implementation UNSCR 1540;

6.       Enhance coordination through outreach events with a wide range of domestic stakeholders such as industry, parliamentarians, civil society and academia, and develop appropriate ways to inform these stakeholders of their obligations pursuant to domestic laws relating to the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

7.       Consider organizing joint exercises at the national, regional or international levels that demonstrate ways of reinforcing national and regional capacities and international cooperation for better implementation of UNSCR 1540, and encourage the participation of relevant international organizations and initiatives;

8.       Advocate for the 1540 Committee to continue to strengthen cooperation with other relevant international organizations and initiatives, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, other United Nations entities, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership), as well as regional and sub-regional organizations in promoting the implementation of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit institutional Action Plans;

9.       Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to enhance their cooperation with other relevant entities in the United Nations system, such as the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)- and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), including through strengthening the legal framework to prohibit illicit activities, export controls, border security, and other measures that support obligations under UNSCR 1540, and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate through joint country visits to monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

10.    Consider further enhancing the cooperation between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UNSCR 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts on strengthening nuclear security, through opportunities such as: enhancing complementarity and reducing duplication, including by using Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSP) to inform voluntary 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; coordinating with the IAEA’s International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) on outreach to academia relevant to implementing UNSCR 1540 and the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC) Network on outreach to nuclear security training centers; exploring establishing a liaison between the 1540 Committee and the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security;

11.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue collaborative efforts and interactions with INTERPOL regarding assistance requests and training opportunities;

12.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue to participate in GICNT exercises, workshops and events that focus on building and enhancing nuclear forensics, detection and response capabilities;

13.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to develop strong UNSCR 1540 assistance requests that are sufficiently detailed to support responses from potential assistance providers, including through the Global Partnership. In this context, consideration should be given to strengthening the 1540 Committee’s “match-making” mechanism and coordination with assistance providers, including at the regional level, through the Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540;

14.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to address new and emerging WMD threats relevant to the obligations and recommendations of the resolution; and

15.    Advocate for increased contributions, where feasible, to the UN Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities dedicated to supporting UNSCR 1540 implementation and the work of the 1540 Committee.

Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security Architecture

/

JOINT STATEMENT ON SUSTAINING ACTION TO

STRENGTHEN GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

The Nuclear Security Summit process has led to significant achievements in nuclear security at national, regional, and global levels; but the work of building a strengthened, sustained, and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture – consisting of legal instruments, international organizations and initiatives, internationally accepted guidance, and best practices – requires continuous attention.

We need sustained action and ambition on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit to address continuing and evolving nuclear security challenges, with the objectives of advancing implementation of nuclear security commitments and building a strengthened, sustainable and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture.

The Governments of Argentina, Armenia, ­­­­­Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Republic of Korea, Romania, Poland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, and the following international organizations: INTERPOL and United Nations, aiming to facilitate cooperation and sustain activity on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, commit to:

  • Establish a Nuclear Security Contact Group; and
  • Designate an appropriately authorized and informed senior official or officials to participate in the Contact Group.

The Contact Group is tasked with:

  • Convening annually on the margins of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and, as may be useful, in connection with other related meetings;
  • Discussing a broad range of nuclear security-related issues, including identifying emerging trends that may require more focused attention;
  • Promoting and assessing implementation of nuclear security commitments, including those made during the Nuclear Security Summit process, reflected in the four Nuclear Security Summit Communiqués, the 2010 Washington Work Plan, the 2016 Action Plans, national commitments and associated joint statements, and gift baskets;
  • Developing and maintaining linkages to nongovernmental experts and nuclear industry; and,
  • Determining any additional steps that may be appropriate to support these goals.

The Contact Group may also consider and make recommendations to their respective leaders on convening any future Nuclear Security Summits.

We welcome the participation of all countries that subscribe to the goals set out in this Joint Statement and wish to contribute to the work of the Contact Group.

National Progress Report: Czech Republic

/

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Czech Republic has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by…

 …Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

  • The Czech Republic has in place highly developed systems of tracking, accounting for and control of high activity sources and nuclear materials.
  • The Czech Republic is a signatory of the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and it also follows the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.
  • In this regard the Czech Republic pays attention especially to the management of high activity sources at the end of their life-cycle.
  • Regulatory body of the Czech Republic in 2014 and 2015 has been involved in preparation of the new Atomic Act and also in a Regulation on physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities which would cover the current nuclear security objectives based on the following documents: Nuclear Security Series (NSS) No. 20: Objective and Essential Elements of a States´ Nuclear Security Regime (2013), recommendation NSS No. 13: Nuclear Security Recommendation on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (2011) and Implementing Guides NSS No. 7: Nuclear Security Culture, NSS No. 8: Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threat, NSS No. 10: Development, Use and Maintenance of the Design Basis Threat, Technical Guidance NSS, No. 16: Identification of Vital Areas at Nuclear Facilities (2012) and NSS No. 17: Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (2011). The new regulation will be covering in greater detail especially the new aspects of nuclear security, such as: vital area identification, trustworthiness check by National Security Agency, computer security at NPPs and air-born threat. Since 2012, the Czech Republic has participated in the newly established IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance Committee responsible for publishing Nuclear Security Series.
  • The State Office for Nuclear Safety has been drafting for several years a new Atomic Act, which is now in the process of approval in the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. This new Act represents a complete and thorough overhaul of the Czech nuclear legislation and will address all contemporary nuclear topics and issues with special regard to nuclear security, nuclear non-proliferation and physical protection of nuclear materials.
  • During 2014, a permanent working group composed of representatives of central governmental authorities (Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, Presidium of the Police, Security Information Service, State Office for Nuclear Safety and Czech Power Company ČEZ) focused its efforts on developing and maintenance of the Design Basis Threat. As a result, the new DBT for Czech nuclear facilities and nuclear material led to re-evaluating of nuclear material transports in February 2015, now covering also airborne threats as well as cyber threats to computer based systems used for nuclear safety, nuclear security and nuclear material accountancy and control.
  • In 2014, a complex research by the operator of both Czech NPPs - Dukovany and Temelin has been carried out. It covers intentional use of three types of aircrafts (business jet, fighter and transport plane) to perform air crash to object located at nuclear power plant site. Results of the study shows the vulnerability of the different objects towards the attack and what can be done to protect the object and to minimize the consequences of such attack.
  • In 2014, there was a security exercise carried out at the NPP Dukovany. This exercise was aimed at verification of protocols and mechanisms for guarding of the outside perimeter of the NPP. It included cooperation and coordination of the Operator with the Czech Army and response units of the Police. The same exercise was conducted in 2015 at the second Czech NPP Temelin.
  • The Czech Republic participates in the GB on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation.
  • The Czech Republic participates in the GB on Transport Security.
  • The Czech Republic participates in the GB on Security of Radioactive Sources (HARS).
  • The Czech Republic participates in the GB on The Czech Republic participates in the GB on Insider Threat Mitigation.
  • The Czech Republic participates in the GB on Supporting Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Preparedness and Response Capabilities.

…Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

  • The Czech Republic as a partner of the United States in the Global Threat Reduction Initiative finished the removal of all its highly enriched Uranium and became effectively a HEU-free country. The final shipment of 68kg of HEU from the Nuclear Research Institute in Řež to Russia was completed at the turn of March 2013. Two previous shipments of fresh HEU from the Řež research reactor back to Russia were completed in 2004 and 2010 with weights of 6kg and 12kg respectively. Also a shipment of 80kg of spent HEU fuel from the Řež reactor was completed in 2007 and another transport of 14kg of fresh HEU from the training reactor at the Faculty of Nuclear Sciences and Physical Engineering of the Czech Technical University in Prague was completed in 2005. Another key component of this project was the conversion of the Czech research reactors from the use of nuclear weapons-usable HEU fuel to LEU fuel. This conversion was conducted in last years and both research reactors and the training reactor are now fully converted and operating with LEU fuel.
  • The Czech Republic continues to provide technical support to countries repatriating the HEU stocks. Such assistance was provided to Belarus, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Serbia, Ukraine and Vietnam.
  • The Czech Republic is a signatory of the statement on Minimizing and Eliminating the Use of highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications.

…Countering Nuclear Smuggling

  • Security of Nuclear Materials in the Czech Republic goes above and beyond all IAEA’s relevant nuclear security recommendations.
  • The Czech Republic is also a member of the Incident and Trafficking Database operated by the IAEA.
  • There are also several laboratories in the Czech Republic with a very high nuclear forensics capability, which are used for acquiring of analytical evidence for prosecution of cases where illicit trafficking, smuggling or unlicensed handling of nuclear materials is involved.
  • The Czech Republic has a long standing partnership with Armenia focused on raising security and safety levels of the Metsamor NPP through implementation of ageing management systems and protocols and introduction of corrosion-erosion analysis for all main components.
  • The Czech Republic also has in place an interagency cooperation mechanism, which integrates e.g. the Customs Administration, Police and State Office for Nuclear Safety and is focused on detection and capture of nuclear materials outside the scope of regulatory control.
  • The Czech Republic participates in the GB on Counter Nuclear Smuggling.
  • The Czech Republic participates in the GB on Forensics in Nuclear Security.
  • The Czech Republic participates in the GB on Statement on Nuclear Detection Architectures. 

…Supporting Multilateral Instruments

  • The Czech Republic is a signatory of the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and it also follows the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.
  • In 2014, the Czech Republic continued cooperation with Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). Physical protection of some facilities with high-risk radioactive sources was improved within the framework of the GTRI Project.
  • Physical Protection and Security Management Course was organised in cooperation with the GTRI and held in Prague in April 2014. The purpose of the course was to create a standardized basis for development and implementation of regulatory programmes, assessments and inspection planning, as well as an operator implementation and compliance program.
  • The Czech Republic participates in the GB on Nuclear Security Training & Support Centers/Centers of Excellence (NSSC/CoE).
  • The Czech Republic supports the Joint Statement on the Low Enriched Uranium Bank in Kazakhstan.
  • The Czech Republic participates in the GB on the UNSC Resolution 1540

…Collaborating with International Organizations

  • At the request of the Government of the Czech Republic, an Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission was carried out in 2013. The purpose of the peer review was to review the Czech regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety. As recommended by the IAEA Nuclear Safety Action Plan, the review compared the Czech regulatory framework for safety against IAEA safety standards as the international benchmark for safety. The IRRS mission confirmed that the Czech regulatory system for nuclear and radiation safety is robust and the State Office for Nuclear Safety, which is the national regulatory authority, is an effective and independent regulatory authority.
  • The Czech Republic proudly contributes to the strengthening of safeguards and IAEA’s capacities through the Member States Support Programme (MSSP), which is an ongoing IAEA’s developmental programme focusing on R&D, testing of new equipment, training of personnel and general assistance based on budgetary needs of the IAEA. 
  • Under this programme the Czech Republic hosts on an annual basis, for over a decade, among other projects, the Comprehensive Inspection Exercise at Light Water Reactors (LWRs) which is dedicated to final examination of IAEA’s inspector-candidates. In 2015 the demand for this exercise was such that two runs had to be organized, each of which was attended by 9 students and 3 instructors. The Czech Republic also hosts a Nuclear Materials Accounting in Action course, which was attended by 12 participants last year. But the most sought after course is the Technical visit to Uranium Mines which was attended last year by 21 Agency employees.
  • In total over 350 IAEA employees completed these three courses. Over 80 inspector-candidates have passed the Comprehensive Inspection Exercise at LWRs, almost 200 participants took part in the Technical visit to Uranium Mines and the Nuclear Materials Accounting in Action course was completed by approx. 90 participants.
  • The Czech Republic also actively participated in preparation of the Familiarization Workshop for Safeguards Practitioners on the “Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure” which was held in IAEA in February 2016. This project was preceded by preparation of four guidebooks focusing on different aspects of safeguards, particularly on nuclear materials verification activities, collaboration and provision of information and establishing regulatory infrastructure. The Czech Republic took part in drafting of all of these guides since the beginning of this project in 2012.
  • Outside the Czech MSSP, a workshop was organized by the State Office for Nuclear Safety and the IAEA for approx. 50 participants. It focused on synergy of nuclear safety and nuclear security, including practical implementation of new provision of Information Circulars (INFCIRC) 225/Rev. 5. Participants of this workshop represented utility as well as governmental authorities.
  • Since 2014, the Czech Republic also hosted or participated in several seminars and training courses organized in cooperation with the IAEA. These courses usually had attendance of 20 to 25 participants from developing countries and were mostly funded by hosting organizations:

1.       „Sustainable Energy Development“  organized by the Czech Technical University

2.      “9th EERRI Research Reactor Group Fellowship Training Programme“ organized by the Czech Technical University, Department of Nuclear Reactors

3.      „Advanced Digital I&C Modernization and Implementation Strategy“ organized by a company I&C Energo Ltd.

4.      „Strengthening Member State´s National Systems for Safety in Medical Exposure in Line with the Revised International Basic Safety Standards“, organized by the National Radiation Protection Institute.

  • The Czech Republic also hosted a series of internships and short-term scientific fellowships for specialists from Armenia, Pakistan, Brazil, Tanzania, Monte Negro, China, Algeria, Nigeria, Argentina, Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Slovakia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 
  • Two experts from the Czech Republic also attended an IAEA training course for new International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) staff in Vienna in December 2014. One participant is from the Czech Regulatory Authority while the other one was from the Czech NPP Operator.
  • Participation of Czech expert in IAEA IPPAS mission in Australia.

Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security→

/

Joint Statement on UNSCR 1540

/

Statement on Nuclear Information Security (UK)→

/

Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation

/

Joint Statement on the National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security

/

2012 NSS Deliverable - Global Partnership

/