Fact Sheet: HEU Minimization Activities since March 2014

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release                         

FACT SHEET

Highly Enriched Uranium Minimization Activities since March 2014

Minimization of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian applications is a priority for the Nuclear Security Summit process.  Eliminating all HEU from facilities or countries decreases the number of potential targets for terrorists, criminals, and other unauthorized actors to obtain this material.  Minimization efforts include HEU reactor conversions and shut-downs, nuclear material removals, technology substitution, and down-blending.  Each of these activities represents permanent threat reduction by preventing sensitive nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands.

Through the Nuclear Security Summit process, the international community has made considerable progress in this area.  Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, the United States has supported the conversion of HEU reactors in Russia, Jamaica, China, and Kazakhstan.  The United States also confirmed the shutdown of four HEU reactors: two in Russia, one in Uzbekistan, and one in Switzerland.

Once facilities are converted and HEU is no longer required, the material can be removed.  Since March 2014, the United States removed or confirmed disposition of approximately 450 kilograms of HEU from 10 countries (Poland, Kazakhstan, Canada, Switzerland, Jamaica, Uzbekistan, Austria, Germany, Japan, and Argentina).  As a result of these efforts, three additional countries are now considered free of HEU (Switzerland, Uzbekistan, and Argentina), defined as having less than one kilogram of HEU on their territory.  In total, 29 countries plus Taiwan are now HEU-free after eliminating their HEU.

Joint Statement on Countering Nuclear Smuggling

2016 Statement of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling

At the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Nuclear Security Summits, participating nations agreed on Communiqués and Work Plans that included actions aimed at thwarting the illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials. The following countries recognize that identifying nuclear smugglers, detecting and recovering nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, and prosecuting those responsible are important and effective activities to help prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear or other radioactive materials: Australia, Canada, Chile, China,  the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,  France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan,  The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, The Philippines, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom, The United States of America, INTERPOL, and the United Nations.

To follow through on these pledges, participating states are committed to working together to build and sustain national capabilities to counter the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials. These efforts may include:

1.     Designating a national team or task force to link law enforcement, intelligence, technical experts, and other relevant authorities to investigate nuclear trafficking networks and incidents;

2.     Developing plans that clearly outline individual agency roles and responsibilities when responding to incidents of material outside regulatory control;

3.     Developing a national level detection architecture as an element of a whole-of-government counter nuclear smuggling capability;

4.     Strengthening nuclear forensics capabilities to reliably analyze nuclear and other radioactive material discovered out of regulatory control;

5.     Increasing legal training for prosecutors to ensure conviction of smugglers, as appropriate;

6.     Developing laws, regulations, guidance and/or policies to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material;

7.     Strengthening bilateral, multilateral, and international information sharing and other cooperation, such as training and education, best practices exchanges, and exercises;

8.     Sharing applicable lead information through INTERPOL and acting on lead information received as an effective mechanism for identifying nuclear smuggling networks in a timely manner and to enhance cooperation;

9.     Sharing information on incidents involving nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control through the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Incident and Trafficking Database.

Joint Statement on Cyber Security

2016: Gift Basket on cyber security of industrial control and plant systems at nuclear facilities 

Subscribed by: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the United Nations.

Introduction

The States listed above commit to ensure adequate cyber security at industrial control and plant systems at nuclear facilities.  These control systems are often used within safeguards, security, and safety systems.  Increased attention in this area will assist States, nuclear operators and the supply chain to continue to strengthen the resilience of these systems, protecting them from potential malicious attack or accidental damage.

To date, work has mainly focused on mitigating the vulnerabilities of enterprise systems used to manage information and data within nuclear facilities and supply chains.  This work needs to extend to industrial control systems.

Nuclear facilities benefit from robust safety mechanisms which have been strengthened and developed over several decades.  In addition to physical, logical, and human based controls, there has been an increase in the use of information technology to form part of the safety and security aspects of plant control systems, as well as nuclear material accountancy and control.  More information on the use of information technology and the associated threats and vulnerabilities in this context is needed to inform continuous security improvements.

The Initiative

The States listed above agree, as resources permit, to participate in two international workshops on this topic in 2016.  These workshops will enable States and their nuclear sectors to share good practice in managing risks to industrial control systems in nuclear sites, as well as examine the impact of using information technology in managing safety and security aspects of plant control systems.

These workshops will focus on areas including:

• Threats and vulnerabilities, through considering case studies of recent incidents;
• Potential or known incidents which can impact on control systems, through an interactive approach;
• Technical and management challenges of managing risksto legacy systems;
• Technical and management challenges of assuring new build nuclear and supply chains
• Incident response and recovery.
• Managing public/media expectation in light of an incident.

Outcomes and Next Steps

The States listed above propose to present the findings of this work at the Ministerial segment of the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security, in Vienna in December 2016 to contribute to IAEA efforts to increase cyber security at nuclear facilities, building on the IAEA International Conference on Computer Security in a Nuclear World held in June 2015. 

Joint Statement on Nuclear Training and Support Centres

Joint statement on

Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres / Centres of Excellence 

Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, Vietnam, INTERPOL and the United Nations

Italy hosted the 2014 Gift Basket on Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres/Centres of Excellence (NSSC/CoE) following the 2012 Gift Basket hosted by the United States.  The 2014 Gift Basket attracted a large number of co-sponsoring Summit participants promoting the importance of nuclear security training and support centres, and the value of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres Network (NSSC Network) in strengthening international and regional cooperation and collaboration.  Now that the IAEA NSSC Network is maturing and a number of nuclear security training and support centers are being established, these centres can play an increasingly important and active role in promoting nuclear security.  These centres help meet domestic nuclear security needs, and can also provide an important platform for sharing resources and meeting needs on a regional basis, thus strengthening and sustaining the global nuclear security architecture.

In support of the IAEA NSSC Network and nuclear security training and support centre sustainability, the participants to the 2016 Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres / Centres of Excellence Gift Basket intend, within available resources, to support the following activities.

Strengthening of the IAEA NSSC Network

•    Nuclear security training and support centres not yet a member of the IAEA NSSC Network commit to join the Network and make every effort to take part in the IAEA NSSC Network activities, including meetings.

Establishment of regional networks

•    Building upon the establishment of the Asia Regional Network through the IAEA NSSC Network, establish additional networks with nuclear security training and support centres in the same region and mechanisms of regional coordination to promote best practices, exchange training experiences, share curricula and other activities on a regional basis. 

•    In collaboration with the IAEA NSSC network, share experiences in training with centres outside their region.

Strengthening nuclear security training and technical support programmes

•    Improve the quality of training by conducting peer review exchanges with other nuclear security training and support centres and by making use of the IAEA NSSC Network as a mechanism to promote peer-review exchanges.

•    Use IAEA material/guidance as a mechanism to achieve consistency in the technical content of the training programmes on nuclear security and participate in IAEA Train-the-Trainer activities to build a network of instructors qualified to deliver IAEA training course materials. 

•    Organize and be active participants in the development and running of nuclear and radiological security scenarios and exercises.

•    Share experiences and nuclear security training with other training centres and centres of excellence, as appropriate, as well as lessons learned through the IAEA NSSC network and IAEA Nuclear Security Information Portal (NUSEC).

•    Use IAEA material/guidance to support training programmes in key technical topics such as nuclear security culture, nuclear material accounting and control, computer security, transportation security, and insider threat mitigation. 

•    As appropriate, consider certification of nuclear security training and support centre training programmes, as per ISO 29990 and/or utilize applicable ISO best practices to support continuous improvement.
  
•    Collaborate with the Global Partnership’s Centre of Excellence Sub-working Group to implement this Gift Basket as noted in the Global Partnership Nuclear Security Summit Action Plan.

Sustainability

•    Focus attention on and build mechanisms to ensure the sustainability of nuclear security training and support centres, including developing business plans and e-learning tools, conducting needs analysis and regular evaluation of effectiveness, and identifying required financial, administrative and human resources.

•    Provide training, technical and scientific support to competent authorities to strengthen long-term sustainability of domestic nuclear and radiological security regimes. 

•    Broaden and strengthen international cooperation with the United Nations, especially United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540-related efforts, with INTERPOL, the Global Partnership, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and others.

Cooperation

•    Collaborate with educational institutions that teach nuclear security subjects to include nuclear security culture. Continue, improve, and expand the NSSC Network’s collaboration with the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN).

•    Cooperate in the area of research and development with national and international institutes to promote scientific advancements in nuclear security and continuous engagement of the scientific communities.

•    Engage industry and civil society through constant dialogue on the importance of nuclear security.

•    Promote public confidence in nuclear and radiological security.

Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004)

Joint Statement on

Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Recognizing that United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 (hereinafter “1540 Committee”) are key parts of the international legal architecture for States to prevent and combat nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the full implementation of UNSCR 1540 is a long-term endeavour that requires both political and technical action at national, sub-regional, regional and international levels.

Recalling the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and Work Plan, the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, and the follow-up Resolutions of UNSCR 1540, particularly UNSCR 1977 (2011), which underscored the important role of UNSCR 1540 in strengthening global nuclear security and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the 1540 Committee will be completing  its second Comprehensive Review in 2016 on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540, as set forth by UNSCR 1977 (2011). This Review provides an opportunity for the 1540 Committee to take stock of national and international progress in implementing UNSCR 1540 since the previous Comprehensive Review in 2009, and to put forward key findings and recommendations that will contribute to more effective implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Welcoming the contributions of States for updating and submitting reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 with the view of the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Reaffirming our commitment to the Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 delivered at the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit.

Noting that since the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, co-signatories have advanced national efforts to further the implementation of UNSCR 1540 by providing support for the 1540 Committee’s main areas of work, including, inter alia: monitoring implementation of the Resolution; providing capacity building assistance at the technical level to requesting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations; preparing and submitting UNSCR 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; organizing or supporting regional and sub-regional training seminars, exercises and initiatives; convening workshops to help facilitate the implementation of UNSCR 1540 into national legislation; conducting outreach to stakeholders in industry, civil society and academia; and strengthening cooperation with regional organizations such as the African Union, ASEAN, the Caribbean Community, and the European Union.

*  *  *

We, the Governments of Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, with the support of the United Nations, the European Union and INTERPOL, reaffirm our commitment to the full and universal implementation of UNSCR 1540, including the implementation of obligations to enhance the security of nuclear materials worldwide in line with the objectives of the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and institutional Action Plans. We reiterate our support for the activities of the 1540 Committee and the Group of Experts. We also reaffirm our commitment to fully implement UNSCR 1540 in our respective States, in areas where we have not already done so, and further undertake to:

1.       Work with and provide information to the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts for the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

2.       Consider providing additional support and assistance in fulfilling the Action Plan in support of the United Nations, particularly actions aimed at facilitating national and regional implementation of UNSCR 1540 and its nuclear security obligations, with a view to helping requesting States to fully implement UNSCR 1540 by 2021, as referenced in the UNSC Presidential Statement of 7 May 2014;

3.       Encourage states to submit reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 on a regular basis, and focussing outreach on states yet to submit a first report to the 1540 Committee;

4.       Advocate for international, regional, and sub-regional organizations that have not yet done so to designate a Point of Contact (PoC) or coordinator on the implementation of UNSCR 1540 in order to facilitate regional approaches to assisting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations and enhance coordination for their UNSCR 1540 implementation efforts;

5.       Consider providing funding, where feasible, to organizations requesting for supporting their PoCs or coordinators for the implementation UNSCR 1540;

6.       Enhance coordination through outreach events with a wide range of domestic stakeholders such as industry, parliamentarians, civil society and academia, and develop appropriate ways to inform these stakeholders of their obligations pursuant to domestic laws relating to the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

7.       Consider organizing joint exercises at the national, regional or international levels that demonstrate ways of reinforcing national and regional capacities and international cooperation for better implementation of UNSCR 1540, and encourage the participation of relevant international organizations and initiatives;

8.       Advocate for the 1540 Committee to continue to strengthen cooperation with other relevant international organizations and initiatives, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, other United Nations entities, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership), as well as regional and sub-regional organizations in promoting the implementation of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit institutional Action Plans;

9.       Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to enhance their cooperation with other relevant entities in the United Nations system, such as the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)- and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), including through strengthening the legal framework to prohibit illicit activities, export controls, border security, and other measures that support obligations under UNSCR 1540, and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate through joint country visits to monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

10.    Consider further enhancing the cooperation between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UNSCR 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts on strengthening nuclear security, through opportunities such as: enhancing complementarity and reducing duplication, including by using Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSP) to inform voluntary 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; coordinating with the IAEA’s International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) on outreach to academia relevant to implementing UNSCR 1540 and the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC) Network on outreach to nuclear security training centers; exploring establishing a liaison between the 1540 Committee and the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security;

11.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue collaborative efforts and interactions with INTERPOL regarding assistance requests and training opportunities;

12.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue to participate in GICNT exercises, workshops and events that focus on building and enhancing nuclear forensics, detection and response capabilities;

13.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to develop strong UNSCR 1540 assistance requests that are sufficiently detailed to support responses from potential assistance providers, including through the Global Partnership. In this context, consideration should be given to strengthening the 1540 Committee’s “match-making” mechanism and coordination with assistance providers, including at the regional level, through the Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540;

14.    Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to address new and emerging WMD threats relevant to the obligations and recommendations of the resolution; and

15.    Advocate for increased contributions, where feasible, to the UN Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities dedicated to supporting UNSCR 1540 implementation and the work of the 1540 Committee.

Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security Architecture

JOINT STATEMENT ON SUSTAINING ACTION TO

STRENGTHEN GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

The Nuclear Security Summit process has led to significant achievements in nuclear security at national, regional, and global levels; but the work of building a strengthened, sustained, and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture – consisting of legal instruments, international organizations and initiatives, internationally accepted guidance, and best practices – requires continuous attention.

We need sustained action and ambition on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit to address continuing and evolving nuclear security challenges, with the objectives of advancing implementation of nuclear security commitments and building a strengthened, sustainable and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture.

The Governments of Argentina, Armenia, ­­­­­Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Republic of Korea, Romania, Poland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, and the following international organizations: INTERPOL and United Nations, aiming to facilitate cooperation and sustain activity on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, commit to:

• Establish a Nuclear Security Contact Group; and
• Designate an appropriately authorized and informed senior official or officials to participate in the Contact Group.

The Contact Group is tasked with:

• Convening annually on the margins of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and, as may be useful, in connection with other related meetings;
• Discussing a broad range of nuclear security-related issues, including identifying emerging trends that may require more focused attention;
• Promoting and assessing implementation of nuclear security commitments, including those made during the Nuclear Security Summit process, reflected in the four Nuclear Security Summit Communiqués, the 2010 Washington Work Plan, the 2016 Action Plans, national commitments and associated joint statements, and gift baskets;
• Developing and maintaining linkages to nongovernmental experts and nuclear industry; and,
• Determining any additional steps that may be appropriate to support these goals.

The Contact Group may also consider and make recommendations to their respective leaders on convening any future Nuclear Security Summits.

We welcome the participation of all countries that subscribe to the goals set out in this Joint Statement and wish to contribute to the work of the Contact Group.

National Progress Report: China

Since the third Nuclear Security Summit in March 2014, guided by a sensible, coordinated and balanced approach to nuclear security proposed by President Xi Jinping, China has comprehensively promoted its nuclear security, taken active measures to implement the outcomes of the previous summits. China has been continuously committed to improving its national nuclear security system and strengthening international nuclear security architecture, and has made significant progress in areas such as construction and operation of the national Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security, strengthening management of nuclear and radioactive material, combating illicit trafficking of nuclear material, enhancing nuclear emergency response capability, improving nuclear cyber security and establishing a radiation environment monitoring system. 

1. Improving national nuclear security system

It is the fundamental responsibility of each country to maintain security of its nuclear material and facilities. China is dedicated to improving its national nuclear security system, enhancing nuclear security capabilities and boosting nuclear security culture.

(1) Strengthening the top-level planning for nuclear security. China has brought nuclear security into its general national security system, and defined the strategic significance of nuclear security. The National People’s Congress has passed State Security Law in July 2015 and Anti-Terrorism Law in December 2015, which made it clear in legal terms that nuclear security is a vital aspect of national security and anti-terrorism issues, and formulated specific tasks and measures of nuclear security. China is making steady progress in promoting legislations on atomic energy and on nuclear safety, both of which have been included in the legislative agenda of the National People’s Congress.

(2) Improving nuclear security regulations and standards. China has been in the process of drafting Nuclear Security Regulations, which is being reviewed by the State Council. China has promulgated series of standardization documents such as administrative measures on inspection of nuclear material management, reporting of nuclear materials management,and registration of nuclear material. China has also amended the Regulations on Emergency Response to the Nuclear Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants. 

(3) Strengthening nuclear security capabilities. China has been promoting infrastructure and appliances construction, enhancing law enforcement capabilities and awareness of nuclear security of relevant personnel, and encouraging nuclear industries to adopt relevant guidelines and standards mainly in priority areas such as security of nuclear materials, nuclear facilities, radioactive sources, nuclear materials export control and combating illicit trafficking. China has been pushing forward the construction of the National Base for Research and Development of Nuclear and Radiological Safety and Security Monitoring Technologies, and strengthening such capabilities.

(4) Boosting nuclear security culture. In September 2014, Ministry of Environmental Protection, National Energy Administration and China Atomic Energy Authority jointly published the Policy Statement on Nuclear Security Culture, which calls on the nuclear industry and the whole society to strengthen nuclear security culture. China has also positively carried out publicity activities focusing on promoting nuclear security culture, and is in the process of establishing a mechanism on long-term and constant evaluation.

2. Strengthening the international nuclear security system

China is dedicated to building an international nuclear security system featuring fairness and win-win cooperation, which provides a strong and sustainable institutional guarantee to make sure that nuclear energy benefit human beings in a safe and secure way.  

(1) Strengthening international legal instruments on nuclear security

China has ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its amendment, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. China consistently and faithfully fulfills its international legal obligations, and positively promotes the universality and effectiveness of relevant conventions. China strictly implements United Nations Security Council  Resolution 1373, Resolution 1540, Resolution 1887 and other anti-terrorism and non-proliferation related resolutions. China will continue to support the United Nations General Assembly to adopt nuclear security related resolutions.

(2) Supporting the work of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

China supports the central role of the IAEA in international cooperation on nuclear security and has provided all-around support, including political, technical and financial support to the IAEA.

China has positively carried out cooperation with the IAEA in areas such as nuclear materials security, radioactive sources monitoring, and nuclear and radiation emergency response. China has recommended experts to participate in the formulation of IAEA nuclear security documents, and hosted workshops in China jointly with the IAEA, which has trained over 400 man-times of nuclear security personnel from China and other countries. China also joined the Response and Assistance Network of the IAEA.

China supports the IAEA to conduct International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) on nuclear security. In September 2015, China formally invited the IAEA to undertake an IPPAS mission at both national and facility levels in China and the mission will be formally carried out in 2016. China has also invited the IAEA to undertake an Integrated Regulatory Review Services(IRRS) follow-up mission in 2016.

China continuously makes contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, with a view to promoting nuclear security capacity building of China as well as other regional countries in Asia. Till the end of 2015, China has donated 1.15 million US dollars to this Fund. China will give positive considerations to increasing the annual amount of donation, and will continue to donate nuclear security equipment developed by China.    

(3) Actively participating in international exchanges and cooperation

China welcomes other relevant organizations and mechanisms, apart from the IAEA, to play an important role in nuclear security area in accordance with their respective mandates while enhancing synergy and coordination among themselves. China has been deeply involved in the work of the 1540 Committee of the United Nations Security Council. China received the first country visit by the 1540 Committee in October 2014, and hosted a training course on UNSC Resolution 1540 implementation for Points of Contacts in the Asia-Pacific region. China also actively participates in meetings and exercises on nuclear security organized under frameworks of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, International Criminal Police Organization, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and Asia-Europe Meeting(ASEM), among others. 

China highly values policy exchanges and practical cooperation in nuclear security between countries. In September 2015, President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Obama agreed to establish an annual bilateral nuclear security dialogue mechanism. The first round of dialogue was held on 20 February 2016, which further deepened bilateral coordination and cooperation on international nuclear security issues. China also constantly conducts consultations and exchanges on nuclear security issues with countries such as Russia,France,United Kingdom, India, Republic of Korea, and Pakistan.

China welcomes the gift baskets proposed by Participating States of the Nuclear Security Summit and will formally sign up for gift baskets including “Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation” and “Sustaining Actions to Promote Global Nuclear Security”.

3. Establishment and Operation of Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security

The Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security (COE) of China, constructed with cooperation between China and the U.S., was completed one year ahead of schedule in December 2015, and went into formal operation in March 2016. The COE has integrated mature and advanced technology and equipment from both China and other countries, including technology demonstration and training building, analytical laboratory, environmental laboratory, mock nuclear material bunker, mock facility for nuclear material accounting and control, response force training and drill facility, testing field for physical protection, international first class education&training facility as well as supporting facilities. The main functions of the COE include personnel training, research and development, international exchange, as well as testing and certification, covering a variety of areas such as nuclear security, nuclear safeguards and inspection, nuclear material control, physical protection and ect.. The COE is a nuclear security exchange and training center with the largest scale,most comprehensive equipment and most advanced facilities in Asia Pacific Region and even beyond.

China will actively fulfill commitments by President Xi Jinping at the third Nuclear Security Summit, and take this COE as a platform to promote further exchanges and cooperation with other counties, the IAEA and relevant international organizations, thereby make contribution to strengthening nuclear security in the Asia Pacific region and the entire world.

4. Enhancing the security of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)

China pays great attention to the safety and security of HEU and supports minimizing the use of HEU where technically and economically feasible. The core of the HEU research reactor in Chinese Institute of Atomic Energy was discharged in September 2015. The conversion of this reactor to using Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) was completed in March 2016 by Chinese Institute of Atomic Energy. The project of converting Ghana’s HEU research reactor is steadily making progress. The project entered implementation stage after China and Ghana signed in September 2014 an agreement for assistance in securing LEU for a research reactor. With the signing of a commercial contract between China and the United States in December 2015, production of LEU fuel elements for Ghana’s research reactor started.   

 China stands ready to consult with relevant countries on conversion of its China-origin HEU research reactors subject to voluntariness and feasibility, and is also willing to share with international community its experience and expertise in converting research reactors from using HEU to LEU.

5. Strengthening management of radioactive sources

China supports promoting radioactive sources application in civil areas with the precondition of strict management and ensuring security, and works hard to enhance its domestic radioactive sources security. China strictly follows the security standards of radioactive sources management, which cover all related aspects including production, sales, transportation, use and storage of the radioactive sources. China has made comprehensive efforts to upgrade the security level of radioactive waste repositories in various cities in China, completed compilation of the document “Security Requirements for Radioactive Waste Repositories in Cities” and conducted cooperation with the United States on radioactive sources security. China conducted security inspections of over 15,000 users of radioactive sources and properly disposed of disused radioactive sources. China also works to promote capacity building of radioactive sources security, actively hosts training courses and field exercises, promotes research and development of radioactive sources security technologies, and is conducting research on a tracking system of high-risk mobile radioactive sources, as well as technical protection measures of radiation devices.

 6. Combating illicit trafficking of nuclear materials

China takes combating illicit trafficking of nuclear material as the key element in preventing the acts of nuclear terrorism, and has always attached great importance to non-proliferation export control. China has been continuously strengthening the construction of the gateway ports in taking precautions against illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material, and has installed nationwide over 1000 radiation detecting equipments of various types at sea, air, highway and railway ports. China has enlarged the radiation inspection and detection coverage in key ports of large scale, and will soon achieve 100% radiation inspection and detection of all the inbound and outbound containers at Yangshan Port in Shanghai and Dongjiang Bonded Port in Tianjin. China has improved the law enforcement personnel’s ability and has held in China Customs Training Center for Radiation Detection 45 training courses on radiation detection and commodity identification for over 1280 officials from both domestic and abroad, as well as about 30 customs’ part-time trainers. China has timely amended and strictly implemented The Nuclear and Nuclear Dual-Use Items Export Control List with reference to the latest control list of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and started to implement the latest Nuclear Export Control List from January 1st, 2016. China has signed cooperation documents with the U.S. and Russia on preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material, and conducted joint exercise with Russia on preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material on borders in October 2015.

7. Strengthening nuclear emergency response capability

China has established a fairly comprehensive system of legislations, regulations and standards on nuclear emergency response,and has been constantly improving its nuclear emergency response plans and coordination mechanisms. China has strengthened nuclear emergency response capability building, enhanced communication and exchange with the general public,and actively conducted nuclear emergency response exercises. China is making efforts to strengthen technology support team and rescue force for national nuclear emergency response,and is building a nuclear emergency rescue force of 320 people. In June 2015, China conducted a nation-level exercise on nuclear emergency response coded ‘Shengdun-2015’, with 2900 participants. Delegates from France, Pakistan and the IAEA observed the exercise. In January 2016, China issued the white paper “China’s Nuclear Emergency Preparedness”, which gives a comprehensive introduction of China’s nuclear emergency response guidelines, achievements and future prospects.    

8. Enhancing nuclear cyber security

China attaches great importance to nuclear cyber security. China has been continuously enhancing related legislations, strengthening management on information security of industrial control system and cyber security in the internet industry, and enhancing capability to ensure information security and cyber security of nuclear industry. China has put in place cyber security requirements for the management of industry control system and is exploring the possibility of establishing a security risk notice mechanism. China has strengthened protection of internet infrastructure and operation system, and conducted risk assessment regularly. China has enhanced emergency response capabilities concerning cyber security incidents, and conducted a number of exercises in this regard. China has improved its capability to prevent cyber attack on the public internet, and strengthened internet data protection.

9. Establishing radiation environment monitoring system

China has established a fairly comprehensive national radiation environment monitoring network, which conducts radiation environment quality monitoring as well as monitoring of nuclear facilities of national priority for both supervision and emergency response purposes. All the provinces have established provincial-level radiation environment monitoring networks. The national radiation environment monitoring network includes radiation environment and air automatic monitoring stations, and 1400 quality monitoring spots for land, water, marine organism, soil and electromagnetic radiation. All the monitoring data are open to the public.

The fourth Nuclear Security Summit will be held in Washington D.C. of the United States from 31st March to 1st April 2016. China is willing to work with all parties to make this summit a success. After the summit process concludes, China will continuously take part in a deep way in the international nuclear security process,  commit to strengthen the international nuclear security system, and make contribution to strengthen global nuclear security and achieve common nuclear security for all.

U.S.-China Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation

1.  Today in Washington, D.C., on the occasion of the fourth Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), we, the United States and China, declare our commitment to working together to foster a peaceful and stable international environment by reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism and striving for a more inclusive, coordinated, sustainable and robust global nuclear security architecture for the common benefit and security of all.

2.  The United States and China, in this regard, are announcing the successful completion of the inaugural round of bilateral discussions on nuclear security that took place on February 20, 2016, in Stockholm, Sweden. We plan to continue this dialogue on an annual basis, so as to intensify our cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism and continue advancing Nuclear Security Summit goals.

3.  We further demonstrate today our conviction that strong communication and cooperation are essential to nuclear security by committing to continue strong support for the work of relevant international agencies on nuclear security, in accordance with their respective mandates, through engagement of our experts as well as financial and in-kind contributions.

4.  Together we continue to collaborate on key areas of nuclear security. In particular, we recognize significant accomplishments and ongoing engagement in the following areas:

5.  On conversion of Miniature Neutron Source Reactors (MNSR) from highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, the United States and China express satisfaction on the recent LEU start-up of the prototype MNSR reactor near Beijing, China. Building on this successful collaboration, China commits to work with the United States to convert its remaining MNSR reactors at Shenzhen University. Further, the United States and China together commit to work through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to support the conversion of MNSR reactors in Ghana and Nigeria as soon as possible. China reaffirms its readiness, upon the request of respective countries, to convert all remaining Chinese-origin MNSRs worldwide.

6.  On nuclear security training and best practices, the United States and China express satisfaction on the successful completion and official opening of the nuclear security Center of Excellence (COE) in Beijing, China on 18 March, 2016. The COE is a world-class venue to meet China's domestic nuclear security training requirements, as well as a forum for bilateral and regional best practice exchanges, and a venue for demonstrating advanced technologies related to nuclear security. The United States and China commit to continued engagement on nuclear security training and best practices to maximize the use and effectiveness of the COE. China further commits to sponsor training programs at the COE for regional partners and other international participants to further global nuclear security awareness and engagement.

7.  On counter nuclear smuggling, the United States and China state our enduring commitment to prevent terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear or other radioactive materials. Recognizing the need for strengthened international cooperation to counter nuclear smuggling, we will continue to seek opportunities to deepen our joint efforts to investigate nuclear and radioactive material smuggling networks; detect, recover and secure material out of regulatory control; and successfully arrest and prosecute the criminals involved. The United States and China will continue to coordinate efforts to strengthen counter nuclear smuggling capabilities and share best practices with the international community, taking full advantage of the training programs sponsored by the China Customs Training Center for Radiation Detection. We further commit to continuing a discussion in 2016 on counter nuclear smuggling where our two countries can exchange views on the nuclear smuggling threat, effective tools to counter this threat, and how our governments could strengthen collaboration in this area.

8.  On the security of radioactive sources, the United States and China express satisfaction on the fruitful cooperation between the two sides in enhancing the security of radioactive sources, in particular regarding recovery of disused sources and transport security of radioactive sources. We commit to further strengthen cooperation in this regard, and facilitate the sharing of experiences and best practices with other countries.

9.  The United States and China also express satisfaction on the recent signature of the Statement of Intent on Commodity Identification Training Cooperation between the General Administration of Customs of China and the Department of Energy of the United States.

10.  The United States and China express their strong commitment to addressing the evolving nuclear security challenge through continuing activities sustained efforts after the current Nuclear Security Summit process concludes.

中国在核安全领域的进展报告

中国在核安全领域的进展报告

自2014年3月召开第三届核安全峰会以来，中国以习近平主席提出的理性、协调、并进的核安全观为指导，全面推进核安全工作，切实落实峰会成果，不断完善国家核安全体系，致力于加强国际核安全体系，并在国家核安全示范中心建设和运营、强化核材料及放射性材料管理、打击核材料非法贩运、提升核应急水平、加强涉核网络安全、建立辐射环境监测体系等方面取得重要进展。

一、完善国家核安全体系

各国对本国的核材料及核设施安全负有首要责任。中国致力于完善国家核安全体系，提高核安全能力，培育核安全文化。

（一）加强核安全顶层设计。2014年4月，中国将核安全纳入国家总体安全体系，明确了对核安全的战略定位。全国人大分别于2015年7月、2015年12月通过《国家安全法》和《反恐怖主义法》，从法律层面明确将核安全列为维护国家安全、反对恐怖主义的重要方面，并规定了具体的核安全任务和措施。《原子能法》、《核安全法》立法工作稳步推进，目前已列入全国人大立法计划。

（二）完善核安全法规标准。研究编制《核安保条例》，目前已上报国务院；颁布实施《核材料管制视察管理办法》、《核材料管制报告管理办法》、《核材料登记管理办法》等规范性文件；修订《核电厂核事故应急管理条例》。

（三）加强核安全能力建设。重点针对核设施、核材料、放射源安全及核材料出口管制、打击非法贩运等领域，加强基础设施和硬件设备建设，提高执法人员水平，提升从业人员核安全意识，推动核工业界采纳国际原子能机构相关导则和规范。建设核安全监管技术研发基地，加强核安全监管技术能力。

（四）培育核安全文化。2014年9月，中国环境保护部、国家能源局、国家原子能机构联合发布《核安全文化政策声明》，面向全行业、全社会倡导加强核安全文化。积极开展核安全文化专项宣传活动，逐步建立长效评估机制。

二、加强国际核安全体系

中国致力于构建公平、合作、共赢的国际核安全体系，为核能安全地造福人类提供强有力、可持续的制度保障。

（一）加强核安全国际法律文书

中国已批准《核材料实物保护公约》及其修订案，批准了《制止核恐怖主义行为国际公约》，一贯忠实履行所承担的国际法律义务，积极推动加强有关公约的普遍性和有效性。中国严格执行联合国安理会第1373号、第1540号、第1887号等反恐、防扩散决议，继续支持联合国大会通过核安全相关决议。

（二）支持国际原子能机构工作

中国支持国际原子能机构在核安全国际合作中发挥核心作用，并从政治、技术和资金等方面，为国际原子能机构提供全方位支持。

中国与国际原子能机构在核材料安保、放射源监管、核与辐射应急响应等领域积极开展合作，推荐专家参加国际原子能机构核安全文件制定，与国际原子能机构一道在中国举办核安全培训班，2014年至2015年累计培训国内外从业人员400余人次。中国并加入了国际原子能机构核应急与响应救援国际网络。

中国支持国际原子能机构开展核安全国际实物保护咨询服务。中国于2015年9月正式邀请国际原子能机构对中国在国家层面和设施层面开展国际实物保护咨询服务，相关项目于2016年正式进入实施阶段。中国并已邀请国际原子能机构于2016年对中国开展核与辐射安全监管综合评估后续行动。

中国持续向国际原子能机构核安全基金捐款，用于支持中国和亚洲地区其他国家的核安全能力建设。截至2015年底，中国已向该基金累计捐款115万美元。中国将积极考虑增加每年捐款数额，并继续捐赠中国研发的核安全设备。

（三）积极参与国际交流与合作

除国际原子能机构外，中国欢迎其他相关组织和机制根据各自授权，在核安全领域发挥重要作用，并加强相互间的协调和互补。中国深入参与联合国安理会1540委员会工作，于2014年10月接待该委员会代表团进行首次国家访问，并于2015年9月举办执行安理会第1540号决议亚太地区联络点培训班。中国还积极参与“打击核恐怖主义全球倡议”、国际刑警组织、东盟地区论坛、亚欧会议等框架下的核安全会议和演练活动。

中国高度重视国家间的核安全政策交流与务实合作。2015年9月，习近平主席与美国总统奥巴马同意建立两国核安全年度对话机制。双方于2016年2月20日在瑞典斯德哥尔摩举行了首次对话，进一步深化了两国在国际核安全事务中的协调与合作。中国还同俄罗斯、法国、英国、印度、韩国、巴基斯坦等国家，就核安全问题保持磋商和交流。

中国欢迎核安全峰会成员国提出的核安全自愿性倡议，将正式加入“加强核安全举措落实”、“加强全球核安全的持续行动”等倡议。

 三、建设和运营核安全示范中心

 中国与美国合作建设的中国国家核安全示范中心于2015年12月提前建设完工，并于2016年3月正式投入运行。示范中心集成国内外成熟先进的技术和仪器设备，包括展示培训楼、分析实验楼、环境实验楼、模拟核材料库、核材料衡算模拟设施、响应力量培训与演练设施、室外实物保护测试场以及国内外一流的培训教学设施及国际交流配套设施，涵盖核安全、核保障监督、核材料管制、实物保护等多个领域，具备人员培训、技术研发、国际交流、测试与认证等功能。该示范中心是亚太地区乃至全球规模最大、设备最全、设施最先进的核安全交流与培训中心。

 中国将积极落实习近平主席在第三届核安全峰会上的承诺，以该中心为平台，与其他国家及国际原子能机构等国际组织开展交流与合作，为提升中国及亚太、全球核安全水平做出贡献。

四、加强高浓铀安全

中国重视高浓铀安全，支持在技术和经济可行的情况下，最大限度减少高浓铀的使用。2015年9月，中国原子能科学研究院高浓铀研究堆卸出高浓铀堆芯；2016年3月，中国原子能科学研究院完成了高浓铀研究堆的低浓化改造工作。加纳高浓铀研究堆改造项目进展顺利。2014年9月，中国与加纳签署了《关于为研究堆协助供应低浓铀的协定》，项目正式进入实施阶段。2015年12月，中美签署相关商务合同，加纳研究堆低浓铀燃料元件开始加工。

中国愿本着自愿、务实的原则，与相关国家协商改造自中国进口的高浓铀研究堆，并与国际社会分享高浓铀研究堆低浓化改造技术经验。

 五、强化放射源管理

 中国支持在严格管理、确保安全的前提下，促进放射源在民用领域的应用，着力提升国内放射源安全水平。中国严格执行放射源安全管理标准，全方位涵盖放射源生产、销售、运输、使用、收贮等环节；全面推进中国各城市放射性废物库安保升级，完成《城市放射性废物库安全防范系统要求》，与美国开展放射源安保方面的合作；完成了1.5万多家放射源利用单位的安全检查，妥善处置了废旧放射源；加强放射源安全能力建设，积极开展人员培训和安保实战演练；推进放射源安保技术研发，开展高风险移动放射源跟踪系统、辐照装置安保技防措施等研究设计工作。

六、打击核材料非法贩运

    中国将打击核材料非法贩运视为防止核恐怖主义的重要环节，一贯高度重视防扩散出口管制工作。中国不断加强国家开放口岸防范核材料及其他放射性材料非法贩运基础建设，已在全国重要的海港、空港、公路及铁路口岸配备各类辐射探测设备1000余台；加强重点大型港口辐射探测覆盖面，在上海洋山港和天津东疆保税港区即将对进出口集装箱实现100%辐射探测；提高一线执法人员能力，利用中美合作建设的中国海关辐射探测培训中心，已成功举办辐射探测培训、出口管制商品识别培训班45期，培训国内外学员达1280名，海关兼职教师30余名；参照核供应国集团最新管制清单，及时修订并严格落实核及核两用品出口管制清单，于2016年1月1日起正式执行最新《核出口管制清单》；与美国、俄罗斯等就防范核材料及其他放射性物质非法贩运签署合作文件，并于2015年10月与俄罗斯成功举行中俄边境防范核材料及其他放射性物质非法贩运联合演习。

 七、提升核应急水平

中国已建立了较为完整的核应急法律法规和标准体系，不断完善核应急预案和协调机制，加强核应急能力建设，强化与公众沟通和交流，积极开展核应急演练，着力建设国家核应急技术支持队伍和救援力量，正在组建一支320人的核应急救援队伍。2015年6月，中国组织开展代号为“神盾-2015”的国家核应急联合演习，参演规模达2900人，并接待法国、巴基斯坦及国际原子能机构等代表观摩演习。2016年1月，中国发布了《中国的核应急》白皮书，全面介绍了中国核应急工作方针、取得成就和未来展望。

    八、加强涉核网络安全

中国高度重视涉核网络安全，不断加强相关立法工作，加强工业控制系统信息安全和互联网行业网络安全管理，提高行业信息安全和网络安全保障能力。明确工业控制系统网络安全管理要求，探索安全风险发布机制；加强网络基础设施和业务系统安全防护，定期开展风险评估；提升突发网络安全事件应急响应能力，组织开展网络安全应急演练；提高公共互联网网络攻击防范能力，强化网络数据保护。

九、建立辐射环境监测体系

    中国建立了比较完善的国家辐射环境监测网，开展辐射环境质量监测、国家重点监管的核设施监督性监测及事故应急监测。各省也建立了省级辐射环境监测网。国家辐射环境监测网包括辐射环境空气自动监测站和陆地、水体、海洋生物、土壤、电磁辐射共计1400个质量监测点位，所有监测数据向公众公开。

第四届核安全峰会将于2016年3月31日至4月1日在美国华盛顿举行，中方愿与各方一道，推动本届峰会取得成功。峰会进程结束后，中方将一如既往地深入参与国际核安全进程，致力于强化国际核安全体系，为提高全球核安全水平、实现共同核安全做出贡献。

2012 Progress Report China

2012 Progress Report China