April 06, 2016

Fact Sheet: Update on Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation (INFCIRC 869)

April 06, 2016/ NSS

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

For Immediate Release

FACT SHEET

Update on INFCIRC 869

On October 9, 2014, the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, on behalf of its Government and 34 other countries (full list below), conveyed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Secretariat the “Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation” from the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and requested that it be circulated to all IAEA Member States. The subscribing states pledged to take specific steps, including implementing key IAEA nuclear security guidance, accepting voluntary peer reviews, and committing that those responsible for nuclear security are demonstrably competent. The Dutch note verbale encouraged all States to meet the intent of these essential elements of a nuclear security regime and to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the principles therein. The IAEA has circulated the 2014 Joint Statement as INFCIRC/869, to which all IAEA Member States could ascribe.

On November 13, 2015, Jordan pledged its commitment to the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, as contained in INFCIRC/869. Jordan is the 36th IAEA member state to subscribe to the statement, and the first to do so outside the Summit process.

The United States continues to encourage all IAEA member states to indicate their commitment to implement the provisions of INFCIRC/869, noting that such public commitments provide public assurances that nuclear materials are effectively secured and underscore support for the IAEA and its nuclear security efforts.

Full List of Subscribers

Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Vietnam.

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April 05, 2016

Joint Statement on Certified Training

April 05, 2016/ NSS

Joint Statement on

Certified Training for Nuclear Security Management

2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Introduction

Gathered in Washington D.C. on the occasion of the fourth Nuclear Security Summit, the leaders of Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States welcome the progress that has been made by states to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the essential elements of nuclear security guidance, particularly in the area of ensuring that management and personnel with accountability for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.

At the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, thirty five states sponsored a Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation. The aim of this Joint Statement was for Subscribing States, at their own discretion, to meet the intent of the essential elements of a nuclear security regime and to commit to the effective and sustainable implementation of the principles therein. The Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation was subsequently published by the IAEA in 2014 as INFCIRC/869 and is open for any IAEA Member State to support.

One of the four key commitments outlined in the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation is for Subscribing States to “Ensure that management and personnel with accountability for nuclear security are demonstrably competent.” The challenges associated with managing nuclear and other radiological materials are complex, and it is essential that States ensure that such materials remain secure. The Joint Statement outlines two ways in which States can support the training of effective and competent managers of those materials and related facilities:

Maintaining and continuously improving domestic or regional training through education, certification and/or qualification activities; and
Supporting or participating in the development of World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) best practice guides and training activities.

In support of the commitments in the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States, together with a number of corporations and foundations, joined together to establish the WINS Academy, the world’s first structured professional development and certification program for nuclear security managers. The first training module of the WINS Academy was launched at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.

Since its launch at the 2014 Summit, and with support from Nuclear Security Summit participating States, corporations and foundations, the WINS Academy has developed a robust international nuclear security certification program. The training program is designed to develop a network of certified professionals who are implementing meaningful and sustainable changes to security culture and best practices worldwide. To date, 560 participants from 75 countries have registered in the WINS Academy certification program.

Next Steps

In support of the commitments in INFCIRC/869, and acknowledging the international recognition of the need for nuclear security training, education, certification and/or qualification activities, this gift basket records the intent of Canada, Finland, Hungary, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States to undertake to further support the WINS Academy in its efforts to expand its international certification program, including through the provision of advocacy, peer review support, contributions, or by other means as necessary.

The States listed above also recognize and undertake to promote cooperative efforts between the WINS Academy and the IAEA, including: WINS cooperation with the IAEA Nuclear Security Support Centre (NSSC) Working Group on Best Practices, whose 2014-2015 Action Plan includes the development of a program to collect lessons learned case studies from NSSC members; and WINS Academy cooperation with the IAEA’s International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN), which has helped academics connect and collaborate with WINS to help develop blended courses leading to joint certification.

We welcome other States, supported by industry and civil society, to provide a tangible commitment in support of the WINS Academy and certified professional development for nuclear security. Together we can help to ensure that nuclear and other radioactive materials remain secure under the management of demonstrably competent professionals.

April 05, 2016

Joint Statement on Consolidated Reporting

April 05, 2016/ NSS

Joint Statement

Sustainability in Reporting and Information Sharing

Introduction

Recalling paragraph 20 of the Communiqué adopted at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, we, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States recognize that a number of mechanisms exist for sharing relevant information on a State’s legal and regulatory framework and nuclear security practices. States are already obligated to submit reports pursuant to Article 14 of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), if they are party to the treaty, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540). If applicable, voluntary reporting also occurs with respect to the Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Code of Conduct) in the context of a formalized process for periodic exchange of information and lessons learned.

Furthermore, States could similarly share information voluntarily with regard to implementation of instruments that do not contain explicit reporting requirements, such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, now published as IAEA INFCIRC/869 (Joint Statement).

However, the number and variety of existing reporting mechanisms, as well as increasing requests for information, can be burdensome for States, requiring significant time and dedicated capacity to compile national reports. The substantial overlap in the type and scope of information required to be shared, or that could voluntarily be shared, through these mechanisms also complicates the reporting process. The result is a situation in which reporting and information sharing is limited and the existing mechanisms are underutilized.

Consolidating Reporting and Information Sharing

In order to simplify the process of reporting and information sharing, we offer the attached Consolidated National Nuclear Security Report (Consolidated Report) as a suggested reporting template and guide for States. States can choose to use this template, as necessary, as a means of fulfilling various reporting commitments and of sharing additional relevant information on national nuclear security efforts.

The Consolidated Report aims to:

Integrate related elements of treaty-based reporting requirements and other voluntary reporting mechanisms into a single consolidated document;
Provide a single source for updating national information;
Simplify the information-sharing process to enable States both to fulfil reporting requirements and to voluntarily provide additional information, as appropriate, to demonstrate the effectiveness of their nuclear security regimes in a comprehensive manner;
Provide useful guidance on the type and scope of information that could be shared pursuant to the provisions of relevant international legal instruments or other voluntary mechanisms;
Allow States to customize their reporting to reflect their own national circumstances and the relevant international legal instruments or voluntary mechanisms to which they have committed.

The Consolidated Report provides a model that could be used to help States:

Fulfill relevant reporting requirements under the CPPNM and UNSCR 1540 and update such reports on a regular basis;
If applicable, participate in the voluntary periodic exchange of information under the Code of Conduct; and
If applicable, voluntarily share information on steps taken to fulfil related commitments (e.g., ICSANT and the Joint Statement).

By consolidating national reporting on nuclear security, more States will be encouraged to share more information on their domestic systems. The consolidated reporting template will therefore bolster sustainability in reporting and information sharing. While continuing to ensure the protection of sensitive information, the resulting increased transparency will help build international confidence by demonstrating the establishment and maintenance of effective national nuclear security regimes.

April 05, 2016

Joint Statement on Countering Nuclear Smuggling

April 05, 2016/ NSS

2016 Statement of Activity and Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Smuggling

At the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Nuclear Security Summits, participating nations agreed on Communiqués and Work Plans that included actions aimed at thwarting the illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials. The following countries recognize that identifying nuclear smugglers, detecting and recovering nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, and prosecuting those responsible are important and effective activities to help prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear or other radioactive materials: Australia, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, The Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, The Philippines, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, The United Arab Emirates, The United Kingdom, The United States of America, INTERPOL, and the United Nations.

To follow through on these pledges, participating states are committed to working together to build and sustain national capabilities to counter the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials. These efforts may include:

1. Designating a national team or task force to link law enforcement, intelligence, technical experts, and other relevant authorities to investigate nuclear trafficking networks and incidents;

2. Developing plans that clearly outline individual agency roles and responsibilities when responding to incidents of material outside regulatory control;

3. Developing a national level detection architecture as an element of a whole-of-government counter nuclear smuggling capability;

4. Strengthening nuclear forensics capabilities to reliably analyze nuclear and other radioactive material discovered out of regulatory control;

5. Increasing legal training for prosecutors to ensure conviction of smugglers, as appropriate;

6. Developing laws, regulations, guidance and/or policies to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material;

7. Strengthening bilateral, multilateral, and international information sharing and other cooperation, such as training and education, best practices exchanges, and exercises;

8. Sharing applicable lead information through INTERPOL and acting on lead information received as an effective mechanism for identifying nuclear smuggling networks in a timely manner and to enhance cooperation;

9. Sharing information on incidents involving nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control through the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Incident and Trafficking Database.

April 05, 2016

Joint Statement on Cyber Security

April 05, 2016/ NSS

2016: Gift Basket on cyber security of industrial control and plant systems at nuclear facilities

Subscribed by: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the United Nations.

Introduction

The States listed above commit to ensure adequate cyber security at industrial control and plant systems at nuclear facilities. These control systems are often used within safeguards, security, and safety systems. Increased attention in this area will assist States, nuclear operators and the supply chain to continue to strengthen the resilience of these systems, protecting them from potential malicious attack or accidental damage.

To date, work has mainly focused on mitigating the vulnerabilities of enterprise systems used to manage information and data within nuclear facilities and supply chains. This work needs to extend to industrial control systems.

Nuclear facilities benefit from robust safety mechanisms which have been strengthened and developed over several decades. In addition to physical, logical, and human based controls, there has been an increase in the use of information technology to form part of the safety and security aspects of plant control systems, as well as nuclear material accountancy and control. More information on the use of information technology and the associated threats and vulnerabilities in this context is needed to inform continuous security improvements.

The Initiative

The States listed above agree, as resources permit, to participate in two international workshops on this topic in 2016. These workshops will enable States and their nuclear sectors to share good practice in managing risks to industrial control systems in nuclear sites, as well as examine the impact of using information technology in managing safety and security aspects of plant control systems.

These workshops will focus on areas including:

Threats and vulnerabilities, through considering case studies of recent incidents;
Potential or known incidents which can impact on control systems, through an interactive approach;
Technical and management challenges of managing risksto legacy systems;
Technical and management challenges of assuring new build nuclear and supply chains
Incident response and recovery.
Managing public/media expectation in light of an incident.

Outcomes and Next Steps

The States listed above propose to present the findings of this work at the Ministerial segment of the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security, in Vienna in December 2016 to contribute to IAEA efforts to increase cyber security at nuclear facilities, building on the IAEA International Conference on Computer Security in a Nuclear World held in June 2015.

April 05, 2016

Joint Statement on Forensics in Nuclear Security

April 05, 2016/ NSS

JOINT STATEMENT in the context of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit

Forensics in Nuclear Security

Applying science to investigate the illicit use of nuclear or other radioactive material is a crucial element of nuclear security. Nuclear forensic science assists in determining the provenance of materials encountered out of regulatory control by focusing on the questions that would be asked by regulatory authorities or law enforcement investigators.

This gift basket records the intent of 30 countries[1] to advance nuclear forensics as a key element of effective nuclear security. This may be accomplished by incorporating nuclear forensics as an important element of a nation’s coordinated response, cultivating and sustaining expertise in the fundamental scientific disciplines; and advocating for and supporting international efforts where the implementation of both traditional and nuclear forensic capabilities may be enhanced through sharing.

The Forensics in Nuclear Security Gift Basket presented at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit raised awareness about good practices employed by practitioners, developed education and training curricula, and advanced international collaboration through a common lexicon and knowledge platform. Continued effort is needed to strengthen and sustain national nuclear forensic capabilities through their inclusion in national response plans and communicating what nuclear forensics can provide to stakeholders.

Recognizing that practical implementation and sustainment of nuclear forensic capabilities are an enduring component of nuclear security, States that subscribe to this Joint Statement commit to one or more of the following elements:

Develop and sustain expertise through actions such as cross-disciplinary training of traditional forensic and nuclear scientists, transferring knowledge to the next generation of practitioners, cultivating attractive career paths, and facilitating participation in international training including, but not limited to, those offered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), or the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).
Promote employment of existing national nuclear science capabilities to support nuclear forensics.
Evaluate and adapt existing national response frameworks to incorporate the effective use of nuclear forensic capabilities.
Advance and mature nuclear forensic expertise in other countries through efforts such as providing instruction at or hosting international courses or conferences, publishing techniques in peer-reviewed scholarly journals, or serving as leaders in relevant international groups.

[1] The following countries are signatories to this Joint Statement: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, ROK, Thailand, UK and USA. The following organization also supports this Joint Statement: INTERPOL]

April 05, 2016

Joint Statement on Maritime Supply Chain Security

April 05, 2016/ NSS

2016 Nuclear Security Summit

Maritime Supply Chain Security Joint Statement

Over the past decade, many countries have deployed radiation detection systems at their seaports as a key component of their national approach to combating nuclear and radiological smuggling. These systems have detected numerous nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control (MORC) - some that pose security risks and others that just pose risks to public health and safety, or are of regulatory concern(e.g. contaminated goods and orphan sources). Due to the complexity of the maritime system and the many stakeholders involved, it is clear that national, regional and international coordination in both the public and private sector is needed to secure this vector and enable the permanent removal of these materials from the maritime supply chain.

With this in mind, 15 countries, nine international organizations, three terminal operators, and several academic representatives participated in a workshop from 16-18 November 2015, co-sponsored by the United States and the United Kingdom, focused on promoting radiation detection in the maritime supply chain and developing enhanced measures to permanently remove materials found out of regulatory control. This workshop was in fulfillment of a commitment made at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in a joint statement on maritime supply chain security. Workshop participants acknowledged that detection systems are an important tool in a nation’s approach to locating and securing MORC and identified a set of best practices and recommendations.

Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Georgia, Israel, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States endorse the following best practices and recommendations identified at the November 2015 workshop.

Best Practices

Nations with detection programs have agreed to continue to share technical advice, lessons learned and best practices with one another and with those nations seeking to implement and sustain detection systems. Specific examples of best practices include:

Plan for long-term sustainability of systems early in the process of developing and deploying radiation detection programs;
Establish a comprehensive "end-to-end" regulatory framework that provides the necessary framework and authorities to all stakeholders involved in the detection, notification and response to materials found out of regulatory control;
Implement and institutionalize regular training and adaptive exercises that address evolving threats, operational challenges and security strategies of detection systems to verify that roles and responsibilities are clearly understood and that all relevant stakeholders maintain a state of readiness;
Take appropriate national-level measures at the material’s origin, in accordance with the IAEA Code of Conduct on Radioactive Sources, to ensure that radiological materials are controlled at the point of origin and prevented from entering the maritime supply chain.
Take appropriate measures to ensure that detected nuclear other radioactive materials are placed back under control in either the country responsible for the detection eventor the country of material origin, as appropriate; and
Report incidents involving MORC to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) in a timely manner and seek other formal and informal mechanisms to share information on detections, trends, and challenges in addressing MORC with regional and international partners.

Recommendations:

Seek opportunities and mechanisms to enhance communication between public and private stakeholders regarding the responsibilities and obligations associated with the removal of MORC from the maritime supply chain and to ensure feedback mechanisms for all parties in the ultimate resolution of MORC cases, as appropriate;Develop technical and operational solutions to reduce alarms from innocent, naturally occurring radioactive material (“NORM”) to protect commerce and to focus resources on detecting materials of concern;
Request that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continue to study technical and operational issues related to detection operations through cooperative research projects and other mechanisms as appropriate;
Request that INTERPOL continue and enhance current efforts to ensure that threat information flows from law enforcement to front line officers (i.e. Customs and Border Protection) involved in detection operations;
Request that the World Customs Organization (WCO) expand its efforts to deploy a common communication platform between customs organisations, which could be leveraged to facilitate timely information sharing in member states on detections, trends and challenges in addressing MORC; and
Investigate whether the WCO or other appropriate organisations could expand their efforts to facilitate information sharing that goes beyond customs organisations to regulators or other applicable organisations in order to allow all those organisations involved in the detection and removal of MORC to share timely information, ensure that material is permanently removed from the supply chain and correctly disposed of.

The United States and the United Kingdom will document and share these and other best practices and recommendations with the international community.

April 05, 2016

Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004)

April 05, 2016/ NSS

Joint Statement on

Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)

2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Recognizing that United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 (hereinafter “1540 Committee”) are key parts of the international legal architecture for States to prevent and combat nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the full implementation of UNSCR 1540 is a long-term endeavour that requires both political and technical action at national, sub-regional, regional and international levels.

Recalling the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and Work Plan, the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, and the follow-up Resolutions of UNSCR 1540, particularly UNSCR 1977 (2011), which underscored the important role of UNSCR 1540 in strengthening global nuclear security and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Noting that the 1540 Committee will be completing its second Comprehensive Review in 2016 on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540, as set forth by UNSCR 1977 (2011). This Review provides an opportunity for the 1540 Committee to take stock of national and international progress in implementing UNSCR 1540 since the previous Comprehensive Review in 2009, and to put forward key findings and recommendations that will contribute to more effective implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Welcoming the contributions of States for updating and submitting reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 with the view of the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Reaffirming our commitment to the Joint Statement on Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of UNSCR 1540 delivered at the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit.

Noting that since the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, co-signatories have advanced national efforts to further the implementation of UNSCR 1540 by providing support for the 1540 Committee’s main areas of work, including, inter alia: monitoring implementation of the Resolution; providing capacity building assistance at the technical level to requesting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations; preparing and submitting UNSCR 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; organizing or supporting regional and sub-regional training seminars, exercises and initiatives; convening workshops to help facilitate the implementation of UNSCR 1540 into national legislation; conducting outreach to stakeholders in industry, civil society and academia; and strengthening cooperation with regional organizations such as the African Union, ASEAN, the Caribbean Community, and the European Union.

* * *

We, the Governments of Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, with the support of the United Nations, the European Union and INTERPOL, reaffirm our commitment to the full and universal implementation of UNSCR 1540, including the implementation of obligations to enhance the security of nuclear materials worldwide in line with the objectives of the 2016 Washington Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué and institutional Action Plans. We reiterate our support for the activities of the 1540 Committee and the Group of Experts. We also reaffirm our commitment to fully implement UNSCR 1540 in our respective States, in areas where we have not already done so, and further undertake to:

1. Work with and provide information to the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts for the 2016 Comprehensive Review on the status of the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

2. Consider providing additional support and assistance in fulfilling the Action Plan in support of the United Nations, particularly actions aimed at facilitating national and regional implementation of UNSCR 1540 and its nuclear security obligations, with a view to helping requesting States to fully implement UNSCR 1540 by 2021, as referenced in the UNSC Presidential Statement of 7 May 2014;

3. Encourage states to submit reports on national implementation of UNSCR 1540 on a regular basis, and focussing outreach on states yet to submit a first report to the 1540 Committee;

4. Advocate for international, regional, and sub-regional organizations that have not yet done so to designate a Point of Contact (PoC) or coordinator on the implementation of UNSCR 1540 in order to facilitate regional approaches to assisting States in implementing their UNSCR 1540 obligations and enhance coordination for their UNSCR 1540 implementation efforts;

5. Consider providing funding, where feasible, to organizations requesting for supporting their PoCs or coordinators for the implementation UNSCR 1540;

6. Enhance coordination through outreach events with a wide range of domestic stakeholders such as industry, parliamentarians, civil society and academia, and develop appropriate ways to inform these stakeholders of their obligations pursuant to domestic laws relating to the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

7. Consider organizing joint exercises at the national, regional or international levels that demonstrate ways of reinforcing national and regional capacities and international cooperation for better implementation of UNSCR 1540, and encourage the participation of relevant international organizations and initiatives;

8. Advocate for the 1540 Committee to continue to strengthen cooperation with other relevant international organizations and initiatives, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, other United Nations entities, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership), as well as regional and sub-regional organizations in promoting the implementation of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit institutional Action Plans;

9. Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to enhance their cooperation with other relevant entities in the United Nations system, such as the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)- and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), including through strengthening the legal framework to prohibit illicit activities, export controls, border security, and other measures that support obligations under UNSCR 1540, and the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate through joint country visits to monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1540;

10. Consider further enhancing the cooperation between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UNSCR 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts on strengthening nuclear security, through opportunities such as: enhancing complementarity and reducing duplication, including by using Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSP) to inform voluntary 1540 National Implementation Action Plans; coordinating with the IAEA’s International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) on outreach to academia relevant to implementing UNSCR 1540 and the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC) Network on outreach to nuclear security training centers; exploring establishing a liaison between the 1540 Committee and the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security;

11. Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue collaborative efforts and interactions with INTERPOL regarding assistance requests and training opportunities;

12. Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to continue to participate in GICNT exercises, workshops and events that focus on building and enhancing nuclear forensics, detection and response capabilities;

13. Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to develop strong UNSCR 1540 assistance requests that are sufficiently detailed to support responses from potential assistance providers, including through the Global Partnership. In this context, consideration should be given to strengthening the 1540 Committee’s “match-making” mechanism and coordination with assistance providers, including at the regional level, through the Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540;

14. Advocate for the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts to assist UN Member States to address new and emerging WMD threats relevant to the obligations and recommendations of the resolution; and

15. Advocate for increased contributions, where feasible, to the UN Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities dedicated to supporting UNSCR 1540 implementation and the work of the 1540 Committee.

April 05, 2016

Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security Architecture

April 05, 2016/ NSS

JOINT STATEMENT ON SUSTAINING ACTION TO

STRENGTHEN GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

The Nuclear Security Summit process has led to significant achievements in nuclear security at national, regional, and global levels; but the work of building a strengthened, sustained, and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture – consisting of legal instruments, international organizations and initiatives, internationally accepted guidance, and best practices – requires continuous attention.

We need sustained action and ambition on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit to address continuing and evolving nuclear security challenges, with the objectives of advancing implementation of nuclear security commitments and building a strengthened, sustainable and comprehensive global nuclear security architecture.

The Governments of Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Republic of Korea, Romania, Poland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, and the following international organizations: INTERPOL and United Nations, aiming to facilitate cooperation and sustain activity on nuclear security after the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, commit to:

Establish a Nuclear Security Contact Group; and
Designate an appropriately authorized and informed senior official or officials to participate in the Contact Group.

The Contact Group is tasked with:

Convening annually on the margins of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and, as may be useful, in connection with other related meetings;
Discussing a broad range of nuclear security-related issues, including identifying emerging trends that may require more focused attention;
Promoting and assessing implementation of nuclear security commitments, including those made during the Nuclear Security Summit process, reflected in the four Nuclear Security Summit Communiqués, the 2010 Washington Work Plan, the 2016 Action Plans, national commitments and associated joint statements, and gift baskets;
Developing and maintaining linkages to nongovernmental experts and nuclear industry; and,
Determining any additional steps that may be appropriate to support these goals.

The Contact Group may also consider and make recommendations to their respective leaders on convening any future Nuclear Security Summits.

We welcome the participation of all countries that subscribe to the goals set out in this Joint Statement and wish to contribute to the work of the Contact Group.

April 01, 2016

Joint Statement on Certified Training

April 01, 2016/ NSS

Joint Statement on Certified Training for Nuclear Security Management
2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Introduction

Maintaining and continuously improving domestic or regional training through education, certification and/or qualification activities; and
Supporting or participating in the development of World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) best practice guides and training activities.

Next Steps

March 31, 2016

Fact Sheet: Apex Gold

March 31, 2016/ NSS

Apex Gold Scenario-Based Policy Discussion

On January 27-28, 2016, the U.S. Department of Energy and the Kingdom of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted a scenario-based policy discussion entitled Apex Gold, the first ever minister-level exercise to identify national and international actions to address a nuclear crisis. The SBPD brought together ministers and other senior delegates from 37 nations, along with representatives from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the European Union, and the United Nations, to practice their ability to respond effectively to an emerging nuclear security threat.

During the discussion, the ministers were presented with a hypothetical nuclear terrorism scenario and then worked together to determine how each of their nations might respond at each step of the situation. The participants also toured Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to better understand some of the technical tools available for detecting and analyzing nuclear material and making decisions in the event of a nuclear terrorism crisis.

The primary objective of Apex Gold was to prepare ministers to advise their heads of government during a nuclear security crisis or emergency. Additionally, the exercise laid important groundwork for the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. At the Summit, national leaders will also be presented with a hypothetical scenario involving a nuclear security threat.

March 31, 2016

Joint Statement of the United States of America and the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the Scenario Based Policy Discussion Apex Gold

March 31, 2016/ NSS

On January 28, 2016, the Department of Energy of the United States and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands jointly hosted Apex Gold, a Scenario-Based Policy Discussion (SBPD) on nuclear security, at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, USA.

Apex Gold fostered international dialogue and cooperation through interactive discussion to resolve a fictional, transnational nuclear terrorism threat involving highly enriched uranium. This event built upon the successful SBPD at the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit (NSS).

Delegations from 37 NSS countries and 4 observing International Organizations – the European Union, the International Atomic Energy Agency, INTERPOL, and the United Nations – participated in a robust discussion dealing with policy and technical issues related to threat assessment, nuclear materials security and detection, nuclear forensics, and emergency preparedness and response.

The fictional scenario featured an evolving crisis requiring urgent senior-level Government decision-making in order to address an international threat with implications for interagency and international coordination, leading to the following key takeaways:

1. In a nuclear security emergency, leaders will need to prioritize prevention, protection, and prosecution, in that order.

2. In a nuclear security emergency, the ability to swiftly and effectively cooperate with international partners to identify and respond to threats is essential; in addition to urgently needed national and international technical capabilities, relationships and trust are “capacities” that must also be developed in advance of a crisis through frequent engagement, including exercises such as Apex Gold.

3. In a nuclear security emergency, leaders would face relentless demands for information from many stakeholders, including senior leadership, other government agencies, other nations, the media, and the public. Meeting this challenge requires advance planning and coordination. It is inevitable that the time for decisions by government leaders will outpace the availability of reliable information and analysis. In addition, decisions about how to inform the public about the threat may present significant challenges.

4. Leaders must support and advance the international legal framework that serves as the foundation for nuclear security commitments, including ratification and entry-into-force of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.

5. Exercising regularly at national, regional, and international levels will generate cumulative improvements and foster the interagency and international coordination that would be essential to responding successfully in a nuclear security emergency.

The United States and the Netherlands would welcome future scenario-based policy discussions involving different levels of responsibility and across multiple communities that would be affected by a nuclear or radiological event. International cooperation will continue to be essential to meeting the global nuclear security and proliferation challenge so long as weapons-useable fissile materials exist.