National Statement: New Zealand



The potential humanitarian, economic and environmental consequences of terrorists gaining access to nuclear or radioactive materials are so grave that the New Zealand Government is doing all within its power to minimise the possibility of this nightmare becoming a reality.  

In March 2016 New Zealand ratified the two cornerstone nuclear security conventions – the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (A/CPPNM) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).   We are pleased to make this contribution towards comprehensive and robust global nuclear security architecture.

In the last two years, since the last Nuclear Security Summit in 2014, New Zealand has also taken the following actions:

  • Enacted the Radiation Safety Act (2016), which completely overhauls our legislative framework dealing with the safety and security of nuclear and radioactive material;
  • Implemented a Code of Practice for the Security of Radioactive Material;
  • Hosted the first mission from the International Atomic Energy Agency’s International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS)  to review the security of New Zealand’s nuclear and radioactive materials;
  • Contributed over NZ$1 million to international work to improve nuclear security.

Since the Nuclear Security Summit process began in 2010, New Zealand has contributed over NZ$4.6 million to support international efforts to improve nuclear security and secure radioactive materials.  These include contributions to:

  • the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Nuclear Security Fund;
  • the World Institute for Nuclear Security’s training for workers in the nuclear industry;
  • supporting the repatriation of highly enriched uranium;
  • projects to provide radiation detection equipment at vulnerable borders;
  • radiation detection training;
  • regional training in securing radioactive sources.

The Nuclear Security Summit process initiated by President Obama shone a spotlight on the issue of nuclear security and, by focusing leaders’ intense attention, provided the political momentum for future action.

NSS participants have agreed on Action Plans to support this work in the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, INTERPOL, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction.   The IAEA already has a Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Security set for December 2016.   These initiatives will ensure that the momentum provided by the NSS process is maintained.  

New Zealand will continue to work actively with international partners to keep nuclear and radioactive materials secure and out of terrorists’ hands. 

New Zealand views nuclear security as part of our broader long-standing commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.  We are mindful that much of the most dangerous nuclear material remains in nuclear weapons programmes, not subject to international controls or transparency.  It remains our view that the greatest possible contribution to global nuclear security will be complete and verifiable nuclear disarmament.


March 2016


National Statement: Nigeria

Federal Republic of Nigeria




Mr. President,


Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,

First of all, I would like to thank President Barack OBAMA and the United States of America for the invitation to the 4th Nuclear Security Summit holding in Washington DC, from 31 March to 1 April 2016. Let me further pay special tribute to you Mr. President for your pace setting initiative and drive that have brought this process to this level. Nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to international security and preventing nuclear terrorism and all forms of terrorism around the globe is of concern to all of us.  

As we begin the 4th Nuclear Security Summit, I wish to reaffirm Nigeria’s commitment to the global fight against the threat of nuclear terrorism and other forms of terrorism in all their manifestations, and our support to multilateral efforts to advance a common approach and commitment to nuclear security at the highest level. Nigeria accords high priority to all global efforts towards ending the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including nuclear weapons. To this end, Nigeria has since the last Summit in Seoul strengthened the legal framework for fighting terrorism through the adoption in 2013 of an amendment to its Terrorism (Prevention) Act, ensuring the implementation of more robust counter-terrorism measures in the country.

In this regard, Nigeria remains committed to continue demonstrating strong support for the global nuclear security architecture. Nigeria have ratified the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM/A); and the International Convention for the Suppressions of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT); and is engaged in a process, together with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), relating to the conversion of its miniature neutron source reactor (NIRR-1)from the use of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), keeping in mind that minimizing the use of HEU remains an important goal of the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS). Nigeria is committed to the completeness of that process as soon as technically feasible.  

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Nigeria have taken a number of steps necessary for strengthening nuclear security architecture by building up its nuclear and other radioactive material security. Nigeria have developed and commenced comprehensive review and updating of the existing nuclear security regulations as well as drafting of new ones to ensure the safety and security of nuclear materials and other radioactive sources.

The Nigerian Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials Regulations; Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources Regulations; System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material; and the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities; are at various stages of completion of review and updating. With the changing nature of global and national threats, Nigeria in conjunction with relevant stakeholders is currently reviewing the Design Basis Threat (DBT) developed in 2012. This is aimed at guiding holders of nuclear and radiological materials on the appropriate physical protection systems to be put in place.

In the area of performance of Oversight, Nigeria undertakes regular security inspections of facilities to ensure that materials are secured. The inspections are regular and routine in nature and the inspectors are benefitting from requisite training. To this end, Nigeria has established a Nuclear Security Support Centre which is aimed at enhancing human capacity development in the area of nuclear security. The Centre continues to actively interact with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other relevant international organizations to develop and undertake training programmes for stakeholder organizations in 2016 and beyond. The Centre is intended to serve Nigeria and sub-Sahara Africa.

At the same time, Nigeria has developed a programme for search and secure of orphan and legacy radioactive sources. The programme has been established with the ultimate aim of identifying, securing and recovering vulnerable orphan and legacy radioactive sources in the country and to ensure that they are secured to prevent unauthorized access by terrorists and criminals. The Search and Secure programme is a yearly exercise. The latest exercise was conducted in November/December 2015 in three geopolitical zones of Nigeria, and efforts are on-going to acquire more equipment and expertise to ensure efficiency and sustainability of the programme.

The survey of Depleted Uranium (DU) which commenced in 2011 is an on ongoing programme with the latest exercise conducted in November/December, 2015. Nigeria has compiled and submitted earlier reports to the IAEA. The programme is continuing and comprehensive reports will be forwarded to the IAEA accordingly. Nigeria conducts regular inspection of the 234 legacy sources at Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited to guarantee their security pending their transfer to a temporary Radioactive Waste Management Facility, prior to the efforts in a more definitive manner to repatriate them to their country of origin. At the same time, regular inspection is conducted on the disused radioactive sources located at the Temporary Waste Management Facility. Efforts are also being made for their final repatriation to their countries of origin.

Nigeria undertakes regular inspection of NIRR-1 and supports IAEA safeguard inspection of the facility. Nigeria conducts various training and retraining programmes for its Frontline Officers from the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, Nigeria Customs Service, Nigeria Police Force, State Security Service, Nigeria Immigration Service, Federal Fire Service, Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria, Nigeria Ports Authority and the Defence Headquarters of the Nigerian Armed Forces. Frontline Officers are also nominated to attend IAEA organized training courses on Illicit trafficking/border monitoring, nuclear security, physical protection of nuclear and radiological facilities to make them respond to unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive materials.

Nigeria installed its first Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) at the Murtala Muhammed International Airport, Lagos in 2008 and put into operation in April 2009. The RPM was donated by the IAEA and meant to prevent accidental or undeclared import and export of radioactive sources as well as checking illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. Three more RPMs have since been procured and discussions are on-going with the manufacturer for the purpose of installing them at strategic ports of entry into the country. A specific airport is designated for import and export of radioactive materials. The Installation of the three portal monitors shall be completed before the end of 2016. Effort is being made to cover all points of entry into the Country. The NSSC shall give training of frontline officers a priority.

To enhance Nuclear Security, Nigeria has reinforced its cooperation with the IAEA; United States Department of State’s Partnership for Nuclear Security (PNS); and the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS); to mention a few. Nigeria actively participated in the WINS professional Certification programmes.

Nigeria is collaborating with Oak Ridge National Laboratory of the United States of America to implement a Human Reliability Programme (HRP) for the Nigerian nuclear industry. A pilot HRP programme is being developed at the Centre for Energy Research and Training, ABU Zaria, and is being facilitated by the ORNL with support from Partnership for Nuclear Security (PNS). The programme is expected to be replicated at other high risk nuclear and radiological facilities in the country.

In addition, Nigeria has signed an agreement of cooperation with the United States Department of Energy (US-DOE) Office of Radiological Security (ORS). The objectives of this cooperation are: to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive material located at civilian sites; remove and dispose excess nuclear and other radiological materials; and protect nuclear and other radiological materials from theft or sabotage. The cooperation included Physical Security upgrades of some high risk radiological facilities. Nigeria intends to strengthen its partnerships with relevant international organizations to promote capacity building, particularly in the development of the Nigerian Nuclear Security Support Centre, Physical Security Upgrades and HRP Implementation.

Thank you very much.


National Statement: Norway


I would like to express my appreciation to President Obama for hosting this fourth Nuclear Security Summit here in Washington D.C., and for his political leadership in the summit process. We are gathered to take stock of our common efforts to secure nuclear material, radiological sources and associated facilities against theft and sabotage. The consequences of a nuclear terrorist attack would be devastating. We cannot allow this to happen.

Nuclear security remains a top priority for Norway. However, improved nuclear security requires not only national and bilateral efforts, but also regional and multilateral efforts. And our common security will benefit from a strong global architecture for nuclear security.

The Nuclear Security Summits have brought political attention to the risk of nuclear terrorism, and we have achieved important results. The securing of nuclear materials has been improved, and many states have returned their material to the supplier state. Moreover, an increasing number of states have signed, ratified and implemented international legal instruments on nuclear security. The summit ‘gift baskets’ have been important drivers for deeper commitment. By emphasising the leading role of the IAEA, the summit process has paved the way for a sustainable global nuclear security architecture in the future. With its authority and expertise in the field, it is natural that the IAEA plays a pivotal role in the nuclear security domain. To do so, however, it needs predictable and sustainable funding.

Legal instruments are crucial. Norway has ratified the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM); we have adopted the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, with its supplementary guidance document; and we have ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). I will take this opportunity to congratulate the US Government with their ratifications of these two instruments in 2015, which is an important achievement.  We encourage all other states that have not done so to sign and ratify these important legal instruments. Let me add that Norway has also promoted negotiations on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).

Since the last summit in The Hague, Norway has intensified its activities in key areas:

  • First, Norway strongly advocates minimising and eliminating the use and stocks of highly enriched uranium (HEU), by converting to non-HEU alternatives. It is especially important when building new reactors to choose technologies that are not based on HEU. Transferring to non-HEU alternatives will reduce the nuclear-weapons-usable material to a minimum. At this summit, Norway is presenting a new initiative for making further progress on minimising and eliminating the use of HEU. We are proud to present a gift basket entitled NSS 2016: Gift Basket on Minimizing and Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications. We are very pleased to see that a large number of countries have subscribed to this gift basket. 
  • Second, Norway gives high priority to cooperation with Ukraine on nuclear security issues. At the Hague Summit, Norway and Sweden presented a plan to strengthen this cooperation. This was in response to Ukrainian concerns that the conflict in Ukraine could threaten its nuclear facilities and that radioactive sources could fall into wrong hands. We have since expanded our efforts in Ukraine. Together with the US, we are engaged in various projects on radioactive source security and border control. In addition, we are engaged in wide-ranging bilateral projects with the Ukrainian regulatory authorities. Later this year, Norway will initiate a meeting in the Global Partnership to review the lessons learned from our joint activities in Ukraine and discuss how to take this work further.
  • Let me add that Norway has worked consistently to reduce nuclear risks in the High North. Over the past 20 years, Norway has cooperated closely with Russia on nuclear safety and security to resolve the challenges stemming from the legacy of the Cold War. We have allocated USD 230 million to projects in north-western Russia. These funds have made it possible to reduce the threats from one of the world’s largest stocks of poorly secured fissile material. These efforts are ongoing, and in 2017 we will start the comprehensive work of removing spent fuels from around 100 nuclear submarines reactors in Andreeva Bay, the former nuclear submarine service base for Russia’s Northern Fleet.
  • Third, among the IAEA’s many important activities, the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) is especially important for nuclear security. IPPAS missions assist states in strengthening their national nuclear security regime and its implementation. Norway hosted an IPPAS mission in 2015, which resulted in a number of recommendations that are to be followed up by the operator and the Norwegian authorities. Let me share three priority areas where we will increase domestic efforts: cyber threats, insider threats, and ensuring good communication and coordination between various government agencies on threat assessments of – and response to – nuclear security incidents.
  • Fourth, we must make sure that all nuclear and radiological materials, both civilian and non-civilian, are included in our efforts to strengthen nuclear security. This means that in addition to transferring from HEU to non-HEU fuels, we also need to adopt alternative technologies that do not rely on radioactive material. Preventing unauthorised personnel from having access to high-activity radioactive sources reduces the risk of terrorism involving radiological material. In 2015, Norway finished phasing out the use of high-activity sources in blood irradiators, having gradually replaced them with x-ray based irradiators. These are no longer a security concern.
  • Fifth, as a follow up on the 2014 gift basket on Enhancing Radiological Security, Norway recently hosted a World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) workshop on the status of actions taken and challenges encountered by the signatories of the gift basket. Forty-seven participants from seventeen countries together with the IAEA attended this event. They shared valuable experiences, common practices, and lessons learned. The participants represented a wide variety of authorities, organisations and entities.
  • Sixth, Norway contributed actively to the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Under the agreement, Iran has committed itself to restricting its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, and Norway provided support for 60 000kg natural uranium and its transportation from Kazakhstan to Iran, amounting to around USD 6 million. This allowed Iran to dispose of its excess low-enriched uranium, which was then transported out of the country. Experts from the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority verified and controlled the transportation of the natural uranium. Norway has also provided extraordinary funding for the IAEA’s monitoring of the implementation of this agreement and its predecessor since 2013. So far, this has amounted to USD 2 million.

Dismantling nuclear weapons in a balanced, irreversible and verifiable manner and reducing the stocks of weapons-usable material are effective ways of preventing nuclear terrorism. Norway has been engaged in nuclear security efforts for many years. We see these efforts as an integral part of our work on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the ultimate goal of a safer world without nuclear weapons.

We need a global system for securing nuclear materials that holds all states accountable to a set of common standards and best practices. We are all responsible for nuclear security, and we must act together.  It is still a matter of the utmost urgency.

Thank you.

National Statement: Pakistan


Nuclear Security Summit

Washington, 31 March - 1 April 2016

Pakistan is strongly committed to the objective of nuclear security and has been proactively engaged with the international community to promote nuclear safety and security. It has ensured that nuclear and radioactive materials and all related facilities are secured in all places.

The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process has contributed to improve nuclear security by raising greater awareness about it. The process has reinforced nuclear security culture as an area of special focus. Valuable ground has been covered in strengthening nuclear security architecture worldwide through national efforts.

Nuclear security is a national responsibility. Effective measures taken at the national level contribute to nuclear security internationally.

As a responsible nuclear state, Pakistan takes nuclear security very seriously and accords it the highest priority in its security construct. Our nuclear security paradigm, evolved over the years, is effective and responsive against the entire range of possible threats. Nuclear security regime in Pakistan is dynamic and regularly reviewed and updated.

In line with the commitment made during the 2014 NSS, Pakistan has ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). This is a reaffirmation of Pakistan's confidence in its national nuclear security regime, which is consistent with the contemporary international standards.

Focus on nuclear security should further enhance international cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear technology. Confidence in safety and security of nuclear and radiological materials and associated facilities should facilitate collaboration in health, industry, agriculture and other sectors.

Post-NSS 2016, focus should be on broadening participation  in efforts towards promoting nuclear security through the platform of IAEA which has primacy and the competence in such matters.

National Nuclear Security Regime

Pakistan's nuclear security regime is based on national legislative, regulatory and administrative framework. The elements of nuclear security in Pakistan include robust command and control system led by the National Command Authority (NCA), rigorous regulatory regime, comprehensive export controls and international cooperation. We follow the principle of multi-layered defence to prevent and effectively respond to the entire spectrum of threats.

Pakistan has established a specially trained, highly skilled and well equipped force that is designed for nuclear security. Dedicated intelligence provides depth to our security architecture. Continuous threat appraisal and institutional reviews are conducted to upgrade response mechanism.

The regulatory regime encompasses all matters related to nuclear safety and security, including physical protection of materials and facilities, material control and accounting, transport security, prevention of illicit trafficking, border controls, and plans to deal with possible radiological emergencies through an elaborate Nuclear Emergency Management System (NEMS).

Pakistan’s export control regime is at par with the standards followed by Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Australia Group.

International cooperation, consistent with our national policies and international obligations, helps in voluntary sharing of best practices and experiences in the security domain.

Centre of Excellence: As part of nuclear security regime, Pakistan’s Centre of Excellence on Nuclear Security (PCENS) has been established. Working together, PCENS, the National Institute of Safety and Security (NISAS) and Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences (PIEAS) provide exhaustive education and training in areas including physical protection, material control and accounting, transport security, cyber security and personnel reliability. These training facilities continue to grow into a regional and international hub, with support of the IAEA.

In collaboration with IAEA, PCENS has conducted several regional and national training courses. Pakistan hosted the annual meeting of the ‘International Network of Nuclear Security Support Centres’ in March 2016, which was the first meeting of the Network held outside IAEA Headquarters, Vienna.

Technical and Scientific support: PNRA and PAEC maintain dedicated units to provide technical and scientific support services at the national level to ensure equipment lifecycle management and to provide assistance in case of any nuclear security event. These units are equipped with necessary laboratory tools, equipment, software and expert support.

Nuclear Safety: Pakistan attaches great importance to nuclear safety at all levels. Safety parameters, emergency preparedness and response, and operators' training protocols and procedures are continuously reviewed and enforced. The approach to ensure safety of nuclear power plants is in accordance with national regulatory system.

IAEA-Pakistan Nuclear Security Cooperation Program: Pakistan has successfully implemented IAEA-Pakistan nuclear security cooperation program. Several projects have been successfully implemented for capacity enhancement in nuclear security.

Nuclear Medical Centres: Security measures at all Nuclear Medical Centres withcategory-l radioactive sources are being upgraded, through IAEA-Pakistan cooperation. Physical protection at a number of Centers using Category-l sources has been upgraded consistent with the IAEA Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

In addition, collaboration with IAEA is an ongoing process for enhancing nuclear security systems and measures at civilian Nuclear Power Plants and Research Reactors consistent with global good practices, such as nuclear security recommendations contained in INFCIRC 225/Rev.5 and other nuclear security documents of IAEA.

Nuclear Emergency Management System: A Nuclear Emergency Management System (NEMS) has been established at the national level to handle nuclear and radiological emergencies. A Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Support Centre (NURESC) and Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Coordination Center (NRECC) provide technical guidance to licensees and users of nuclear and radiation facilities in case of an emergency and coordinate the response. Several training courses for the first responders and emergency response personnel have been conducted for emergency preparedness.

Revision of Pakistan's National Export Control List: The Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified second revision of the ‘National Export Control List’ in 2015. The List, classified on the basis of the European Union's integrated system, covers the scope of export controls maintained by NSG, Australia Group and MTCR.

Combating Illicit Trafficking: As part of its national detection architecture, Pakistan has deployed radiation detection equipment at several entry and exit points to deter, detect and prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials.

International Cooperation: Pakistan has submitted four reports to the UNSCR 1540 Committee. The reports elaborate measures taken by Pakistan for nuclear and radiological security as well as on controls over transfer of sensitive materials and technologies.

Pakistan is a party to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material including its 2005 Amendment, Nuclear Safety Convention, Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, and the Convention on Assistance in case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. Within this framework, Pakistan will continue to contribute to the strengthening of nuclear safety and security.

Pakistan has been working with the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) in different areas, including the development of GICNT guidelines. Pakistan is also a member of UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR).

Future Aspirations: Pakistan has an elaborate programme for harnessing peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We operate power plants, research reactors, agriculture and biotechnology research centers, medical centers, and also employ industrial applications of nuclear technology. Pakistan is proud to have more than 42 years' experience in safe and secure operations of nuclear power plants under IAEA safeguards.

Pakistan believes that safe and sustainable civil nuclear energy is essential to advance its economic development plans. Our Energy Security Plan includes a Nuclear Power Programme 2050, to meet current energy shortfalls and future requirements of a growing population and economy. Towards this end, we envisage generation of nuclear energy of 40,000 MW. To realize this plan, Pakistan seeks international civil nuclear cooperation.

Pakistan is ready to assist interested states with experience and expertise gained in the areas of nuclear power generation, and other applications of nuclear technology, under the auspices of the IAEA.

As a country with advanced nuclear fuel cycle capability, Pakistan is in a position to provide nuclear fuel cycle services under IAEA safeguards, and to participate in any non-discriminatory nuclear fuel cycle assurance mechanisms.

Over the years, Pakistan has streamlined and strengthened its export control regime and enhanced its engagement with multilateral export control regimes. Pakistan has strong credentials to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other multilateral export control regimes, on non-discriminatory basis.

Pakistan’s participation in the entire NSS process reflects its seriousness and strong sense of responsibility. We remain alive to the need for sustained national efforts in the domain of nuclear security.

National Statement: Philippines





2016 Nuclear Security Summit Ÿ Washington, DC, 1 April 2016

Mr. President,


The threat posed by non-State actors and violent extremists is very real and increasingly complex, and must be addressed through both national frameworks and international coordination.

To reduce this threat, the Philippines has enacted a number of relevant legislation to combat terrorism in all its forms.

We value the effort to pro-actively engage local communities to counter extremism. The Philippines continues to develop its capacity to detect and prevent insider threats from homegrown violent extremists and terror groups, and supports grassroots-based efforts to help communities protect themselves against extremist and terrorist propaganda.

Moreover, the Philippines implements de-radicalization programs through partnerships with local religious leaders and schools, which help improve their capacity to promote moderate views.

More recently, the Philippine Government established an inter-agency group that aims to monitor and prevent Filipino nationals from joining extremist and terror organizations abroad.

In terms of hardware, the Philippines has been continuously strengthening our capability to monitor and detect illicit or unaccounted radioactive material. We have, through the support of the US, installed radiation detection monitors in major ports around the country. Our government plans to install additional monitors at more ports in the near future. We also have portable radioactive detection devices for checking suspect material.  The Philippines has been putting in place an accounting system for all radiological materials.

In terms of facility security, we have installed a high-end security system at our nuclear research institute and in seven (7) hospitals that have high-risk radioactive sources.

Certainly, these domestic frameworks can be further augmented through international cooperation, both at regional and international levels, such as in the UN, APEC and ASEAN. We underscore the importance of the regular exchange of information among countries as a vital tool to thwart terrorist objectives.   

Mr. President,


This Summit is an opportune time to seriously consider the nexus between nuclear security, and nuclear and radiological safety. As more countries utilize the promise and potential of nuclear energy and widen the applications of nuclear science and technology, we need to complete the circle and exercise responsibility over risks to health, life and peace posed by the residues of our nuclear and radiological activities.

Again, international cooperation and partnership are keys to unlocking global solutions to this latent threat to health, welfare and lives.

Therefore, we call on the universal ratification of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

As a founding member of the United Nations, an active member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Interpol and the Global Initiative for Combatting Nuclear Terrorism (GCINT), the Philippines believes in a wholistic approach in dealing with the nuclear security issue. Disarmament, non-proliferation, nuclear security and safety should, therefore, go hand-in-hand.

The Philippines is committed to playing an active role in strengthening the nuclear security architecture in the national, regional and global levels.  In 2017, we will be assuming the chairmanship of ASEAN, which may present opportunities for further strengthening and enhancing the nuclear security and safety architecture in our part of the world.

In closing, Mr. President, allow me to give recognition to the excellent work done by your officials in shepherding this Summit through the last six (6) years.

Thank you. 

National Statement: Saudi Arabia (Arabic)





كلمة المملكة العربية السعودية

مؤتمر قمة الأمن النووي 2016م

واشنطن – الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية


معالي د. هاشم بن عبدالله يماني

رئيس مدينة الملك عبدالله للطاقة الذرية والمتجددة

31 مارس- 1 أبريل 2016م





بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

(صاحب الفخامة الرئيس باراك أوباما،  رئيس الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية،)

أصحاب الجلالة والسمو والفخامة ملوك ورؤساء وقادة الدول ورؤساء الوفود الموقرين، السيدات والسادة الحضور

يطيب لنا أن نعرب عن امتناننا وتقديرنا لعظيم الجهد الذي بذلته الولايات المتحدة في التحضير لهذه القمة. 

السيد الرئيس

نجتمع هنا اليوم مرة أخرى بعد ست سنوات على القمة الأولى التي رعيتموها يا فخامة الرئيس لمراجعة ما تحقق من إنجازات ووضع تصور للمرحلة المقبلة. ونأمل أن تساهم مخرجات اجتماعنا هذا في بلورة خطوات تنفيذية لاحقة تسهم في تحقيق الأهداف التي سعت إليها القمة.

لقد كانت المملكة العربية السعودية من أوائل الدول التي دعمت القرارات الدولية ذات الصلة بالأمن النووي، مثل قرار مجلس الأمن رقم 1540 للعمل على منع إساءة استخدام مواد التدمير الشامل للأغراض الإجرامية. لقد قامت المملكة العربية السعودية بالمصادقة على معاهدة الحماية المادية للمواد النووية وعلى التعديلات المتعلقة بها، ونأمل أن يكون بالإمكان إدخال هذه الاتفاقية حيز النفاذ في أقرب فرصة. هذا الى جانب دعم المملكة لمبادرة مكافحة الإرهاب النووي كما أنها طرف في الاتفاقية الدولية لقمع أعمال الارهاب النووي، كما ان المملكة كانت حاضرة بفاعلية وإيجابية في معظم الفعاليات والأنشطة الدولية المرتبطة بالأمن النووي منذ القمة الأولى في واشنطن 2010م، كما نظمت المملكة سلسلة من ورش العمل والندوات ذات الصلة بالمواد النووية والمشعة وبقية المواد الخطرة.

وأولت المملكة اهتماما خاصا بمسألة تطوير البنية التحتية للأمن النووي من خلال إدراك التكامل بين الأمان النووي والأمن النووي والعمل على إدراج الأمن النووي كأحد أهم مكونات هيئة الرقابة في الطاقة الذرية الجاري العمل على إنشائها في المملكة. تحرص المملكة على اتباع أعلى المعايير العالمية للأمان النووي من خلال التنظيم الفعال للأنشطة والممارسات المعتمدة في الطاقة الذرية. وفي هذا السياق، فإن المملكة مستمرة في تفعيل اتفاق الشراكة الاستراتيجية مع “هيئة السلامة النووية والإشعاعية في فنلندا”، كشريك استراتيجي لتقديم الدعم التقني والمعرفة والخبرة الضرورية لتنظيم قطاع الطاقة الذرية في المملكة ولتنمية الموارد البشرية اللازمة لإنشاء هيئة وطنية مستقلة للرقابة النووية.

هذا على الصعيد الوطني، اما في الاطار الدولي فقد قدمت المملكة وستستمر في تقديم الدعم الكامل لكل الأنشطة الدولية في مجال الأمن النووي. فقد نظمت المملكة ورشة العمل الدولية حول القرار 1540 في الرياض في ديسمبر من العام 2010م. وقدمت المملكة في قمة 2012م بسيول تبرعا بمبلغ 500 ألف دولار تنفيذا للفقرة العاملة  رقم 7 من القرار1977 القاضي بتمديد العمل بالقرار 1540 لمدة عشر سنوات. كما سبق أن أعلنت المملكة في العام 2014م عن تبرعها بمبلغ 100 مليون دولار لانشاء مركز الأمم المتحدة لمكافحة الإرهاب.

السيد الرئيس

تولي المملكة اهتماما بالغاً للمنظومة العالمية ذات الصلة بالامن النووي وخاصة للدور المحوري الذي تؤديه الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية، ولذا فاننا ندعو الجميع الى دعم وتعزيز الامكانات الفنية والبشرية للوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية من خلال انشاء مركز متخصص لمكافحة الارهاب النووي في مقر الوكالة في فيينا بمساهمة ودعم من كل الدول، ويسعدني في هذه المناسبة ان اعلن من منبر هذة القمة عن تبرع المملكة العربية السعودية بمبلغ عشرة ملايين دولار لانشاء ذلك المركز.  كما يسعدني كذلك ان اعلن عن دعم المملكة لمشروع تحديث معامل الوكالة في سايبرزدورف بمبلغ خمسمائة الف يورو.



السيد الرئيس

لقد أعلنت المملكة العربية السعودية عن عزمها تطوير برنامج طموح لاستغلال الطاقة النووية للأغراض السلمية لتحقيق أهداف التنمية المستدامة والمحافظة على الموارد الهيدروكربونية للأجيال القادمة، لذا فإن المملكة بصدد تخطيط برنامجها النووي السلمي بشكل يتوافق كليا مع متطلبات الأمن النووي، كما ان المملكة ملتزمة بتأسيس نظام وطني محاسبي للرقابة والتحكم في المواد النووية والإشعاعية وتبذل قصارى الجهد في تطوير أجهزة الجمارك ومراقبة الحدود وكافة أجهزة انفاذ القانون لكشف ومنع الاتجار غير الشرعي للمواد الخطرة.

السيد الرئيس

إن رؤية المملكة الاستراتيجية تتبنى مبدأ المحافظة على التوازن بين التزامات الدول تجاه قضايا الأمن النووي وبين حق الدول في الاستخدامات السلمية للطاقة النووية. لذلك، فإن المملكة في هذا المقام تلفت النظر إلى القيود المبالغ فيها وغير المبررة على الحقوق الأصيلة في التقنية النووية السلمية بما قد يؤدي إلى أثر سلبي حتى على برامج التعاون المشترك في الأمن النووي ذاته.

كذلك، وعلى نفس القدر من الأهمية، فإن المملكة تعرب عن قلقها حيال تباطؤ تحقيق الهدف الأسمى بالنزع الكامل عالميا للأسلحة النووية واستمرار وجودها وانتشارها.

ولذلك، فإن المملكة ترى ضرورة الاتفاق عالميا حول استراتيجية موحدة للحد من هذه المخاطر من خلال تحجيم مصادر المواد النووية عالية المخاطر وعلى رأسها السلاح النووي ونزعها بالكامل على المستوى الدولي عامة وعلى مستوى الشرق الأوسط بصفة خاصة، وهو ما يمثل في الأصل الهدف الأسمى لجهود الأمن النووي ومنع الانتشار السلاح النووي عالميا.



السيد الرئيس

إن جهود تحقيق غايات الأمن النووي تبدأ بادراك ضرورة تبني المجتمع الدولي بأكمله لما هو قائم بالفعل من معاهدات وأطر قانونية وأخلاقية، ولن يجدي استحداث أطر قانونية دولية وأنظمة جديدة لالزام من هو ملتزم في الأصل بينما يوجد من الدول من لا يتجاوب مع المعاهدات والأطر القائمة الهادفة للوصول إلى عالم خال تماما من الارهاب والسلاح النووي.

وفي هذا الصدد، فإن المملكة تثني على ما توصلت إليه القمة الموقرة من خطط عمل موجهة للأطراف الفاعلة في الأطر الدولية القائمة على شؤون الأمن النووي وعلى رأسها الأمم المتحدة والوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية والانتربول والمبادرة العالمية لمكافحة الإرهاب النووي وتتعهد ببذل أقصى الجهد للمساهمة في تفعيل هذه الخطط. كذلك وتدعو المملكة المجتمع الدولي لتبني هذه السياسات ليتخطى تأثيرها الدول المشاركة في هذه القمة إلى ما نصبو إليه جميعا من أمن نووي عالمي.

وختاما السيد الرئيس

فإننا نأمل، أن تكون هذه القمة الموقرة خطوة بناءة ومثمرة تقودنا نحو مزيد من الخطوات على طريق تحقيق الحماية والأمن والاستقرار للأجيال الحالية والقادمة.

شكرا السيد الرئيس

National Statement: Saudi Arabia

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s speech in front of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit – Washington DC, USA,

delivered by His Highness Dr. Hashim Bin Abdullah Yamani,

President of King Abdullah City for Nuclear and Renewable Energy,

03/31/2016 – 04/01/2016

In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate,

His Excellency president Barak Obama - the President of the United States of America, Your Majesties, Highnesses and Excellencies the kings, presidents and leaders of states and the honorable heads of delegations, ladies and gentlemen,

We are pleased to express our gratitude and appreciation for the great efforts exerted by the United States to prepare for this summit.

Mr. President,

Again, we gather here after six years of the first summit, which had been sponsored by your Excellency, to review what had been achieved, and to present a vision for the next phase.  We hope that the outcome of this meeting will result in the emergence of consequent executive steps towards achieving the goals sought by this summit.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had been one of the first countries which supported the international resolutions pertaining to nuclear security, such as the 1540 Security Council Resolution which seeks to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction for criminal purposes. 

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ratified the Convention on the Physical Security of Nuclear Materials and all pertinent amendments.  We hope that the entry into force of this convention can be made as soon as possible.  Besides that, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has supported the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and is part of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.  Since the first summit which was convened in Washington DC in 2010, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been actively and positively present at most of the international activities related to the nuclear security.  It also organized a series of workshops and symposia related to nuclear, radioactive and other hazardous materials.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has paid special attention to developing the infrastructure for nuclear security by the realization of integration between nuclear safety and nuclear security, and by seeking to include nuclear security as one of the most important components of the Supervisory Board of the nuclear energy which is being established at home.  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is keen to follow the highest international standards for nuclear security by effectively organizing activities and practices approved in the field of nuclear energy.  In this context, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia continues to invigorate the Strategic Partnership Agreement with the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority in Finland, which acts as a strategic partner seeking to provide technical support and the knowledge needed for organizing the nuclear energy sector in the Kingdom, and to develop the human resources needed for establishing an independent national authority for nuclear regulation.

At the international level, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia provided, and will continue to provide, full support for all international activities in the field of nuclear security.  It organized the International Workshop on the 1540 Security Council Resolution in Riyadh in December 2010.  At the Seoul summit in 2012 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia donated $500,000pursuant to Article 7 of the 1977 Resolution, which extended the execution of the 1540 Resolution for ten years.  In 2014 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has also donated $100 million for the establishment of the United Nations Center for Counterterrorism.

Mr. President,

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia pays great attention to the global system related to the nuclear security, especially the central role played by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  Therefore, we call on all to support and boost the technical and human capabilities of the (IAEA) by establishing a specialized nuclear counterterrorism center at the headquarters of (IAEA) in Vienna, with contribution and support from all countries.  I am pleased to announce at this summit the Kingdom’s donation of $10 million for establishing that center.  I am also pleased to announce the Kingdom’s donation of 500,000 Euros for the project of modernizing the IAEA laboratories in Saybrzdorf.

Mr. President,

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has declared its determination to develop an ambitious program for exploiting nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in order to achieve the goals of sustainable development and to preserve hydrocarbon resources for the next generations.  Therefore, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is in the process of planning its peaceful nuclear program in a way that utterly conforms to the requirements of nuclear security.  The Kingdom is also committed to establishing a national system for inspecting and controlling nuclear and radioactive materials, and is exerting utmost effort to develop customs and boarder control systems and all law enforcement systems in order to detect and prevent illicit trading of hazardous materials.

Mr. President,

The Kingdom’s strategic vision adopts the principle of maintaining the balance between states’ commitments towards issues of nuclear security and their rights in peaceful use of nuclear energy.  Therefore, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would like in this regard to point to the overstated and unjustified restrictions on the intrinsic rights of peaceful nuclear technology in a way that may negatively affect even joint cooperation programs related to nuclear security itself.  The Kingdom also expresses concern about the slow pace of achieving the ultimate goal of full nuclear disarmament at the international level, and about the continued existence and proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia believes that there is a need for an international agreement on a unified strategy aiming at minimizing these hazards by curbing high risk sources of nuclear materials, most important of which being the nuclear weapons, and by full nuclear disarmament at the international level in general, and at the Middle East level in particular.

Mr. President,

The efforts of achieving the aims of nuclear security start at realizing the need for the entire international community’s adoption of the existing conventions and legal and ethical frameworks.  There is no use of creating new international legal frameworks and systems to obligate those who are already committed, whereas there are other states that do not respond to the existing conventions and frameworks which aim at creating a world entirely free of terrorism and nuclear weapons.

In this regard, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia commends the action plans concluded by this venerable summit and directed towards the key players concerned with nuclear security affairs, led by the United Nations, IAEA, Interpol and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.  The Kingdom is committed to exerting the maximum effort to contribute to invigorating these plans.  It calls on the international community to adopt these policies so that their effect goes beyond the states participating in this summit, and to achieve the international nuclear safety we aspire to.

At the end, Mr. President, we hope that this venerable summit becomes a constructive and fruitful step leading to additional steps towards achieving protection, security and stability for current and future generations.

Thank you Mr. President   

National Statement: Singapore





Six years ago, we gathered in this same convention centre and pledged to address the threat of nuclear terrorism. We have made good progress since then, bringing us to this fourth meeting and I would like to thank President Obama for his personal commitment and his leadership which has done so much to bring us thus far.

Singapore does not have significant nuclear material or facilities but we still take our responsibilities seriously, because we like every other country can be vulnerable to the nuclear threat. We could be a place where illicit material passes through our port. We could be a target of attack and even if something happens elsewhere beyond our borders, its spill-over effects could affect Singapore’s population.

Therefore, we actively support counter-proliferation and nuclear disarmament in three ways. Firstly, as a global transhipment hub, Singapore is committed to combating illicit trafficking. Since the start of the Nuclear Security Summit process, we have tightened up our export control regime and upgraded radiation screening technology at our ports. We track every case of nuclear fuel transiting through Singapore and from time to time, we have intercepted cargo and confiscated items. In one recent case, we discovered a significant amount of thorium, a radioactive element. It had been imported into Singapore not as nuclear material, but as a contaminant of another chemical used as a coolant for printed circuit boards. Our first border laboratory – “Protective, Analytical and Assessment Facility” – will be operational by this year and it will be able to conduct radiation-nuclear detection and analysis, to interdict illicit activities at the border.

Secondly, Singapore cooperates closely and willingly with international efforts. We participate in the PSI - the Proliferation Security Initiative. We adopt Financial Action Task Force Recommendations to combat proliferation financing. We host the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation, which fosters information sharing among countries, to counter transnational threats and networks that exploit new technology. The Iranian nuclear dossier is another example. Singapore did our part and fully implemented the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and therefore, we are happy that the matter has been brought to a satisfactory outcome. There had been some expectations that we would go beyond that but as a small, open economy, dependent on the international rule of law in all cases, it would have been very difficult for us to act unilaterally, and exceed what had been mandated by the United Nations.

Thirdly, we encourage countries to reduce nuclear weapons steadily to zero so that they will never be used again, whether by accident or design. I hope this Summit will see countries committing to reduce their nuclear material stockpiles further, which can make for ready terrorist targets. We are very concerned by developments on the Korean peninsula, in particular in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The DPRK continues to develop nuclear capabilities to conduct tests and to raise tensions in North East Asia. If its neighbours respond and feel compelled to move closer to threshold status, it would gravely destabilise the whole region. I therefore urge the DPRK government to refrain from further provocations and to abide by its international obligations and I hope all countries will encourage the DPRK to restrain itself and work towards denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. I am encouraged that the recent UNSC resolution 2270 passed unanimously. All of the P5 members supported it. This sends a strong signal to the DPRK and should make a positive contribution towards a good outcome.

The recent terrorist attacks in Pakistan, Brussels, Iraq, Turkey, France, Indonesia, Egypt, Nigeria – and the list goes on – show that we are all vulnerable to terrorism and doubly so to nuclear terrorism. The ISIS’ English language magazine Dabiq published an article in the 9th issue in May last year, which highlighted a nuclear terrorism scenario where ISIS purchased a nuclear device from the black market to launch a major attack. It shows their intent, and it is a threat which countries must take seriously. Nuclear terrorism may not be the most imminent of the threats we face or the most urgent, but it is a very plausible and believable threat which can easily become a reality and if it ever happens, it would be disastrous. So we must, as an international community, continue to fight against nuclear terrorism and this series of summits, I am confident, has done a significant part to help towards that fight.

Thank you.


National Statement: South Africa







Washington, D.C.

March/April 2016

On behalf of the Government and People of the Republic of South Africa, I wish to express my appreciation to President Obama for hosting the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.  It is fitting that this Summit, which marks the end of the Nuclear Security Summit process in its present format, is again held in Washington, where the first Summit took place in 2010.  

Looking back, I believe that we should be pleased with the high level of political commitment to nuclear security that has been established amongst the States participating in the Nuclear Security Summit process.  Commencing in 2010, the various Summits have forged a common awareness of the importance of nuclear security and have strengthened the nuclear security architecture.

Regrettably, in the recent past the world has again witnessed acts of terrorism.  Our own Continent has also been a regular target for terrorist attacks.  It is clear that such incidents could occur anywhere in the world: in developing or developed countries, and in nuclear weapon or non-nuclear weapon States. Such incidents demonstrate the need to collaborate and work together, recognizing that no country is immune to acts of terrorism.  Addressing the root causes of terrorism in all its manifestations should remain our key priority.  At the same time, in the nuclear arena, we need to continue investing in nuclear security to enhance expertise to deter, detect and combat malicious acts in order to protect nuclear facilities, nuclear material and other radiological substances.     

Nuclear security is a global concern requiring global solutions that involve all States. It therefore follows that the level of nuclear security can only be effectively raised through cooperation in fora where all States can contribute to shaping a truly international response. It is for this reason that South Africa has long advocated for a multilateral approach to promoting nuclear security which upholds the centrality of the United Nations system and respects the principles enshrined in its Charter.  For South Africa, much of the value of the Nuclear Security Summit process has therefore been the politicalsupport generated for the work of existing multilateral bodies, notably that of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

South Africa believes that through a co-operative approach in the relevant multilateral organisations, we can effectively deal with nuclear security risks. We are therefore pleased that after this Summit, we will vest the issue of nuclear security mainly in the IAEA by infusing the gains of the NSS into the IAEA and bringing on board those countries that are currently not part of the NSS process. Although nuclear security remains a national responsibility, the IAEA has an essential role in facilitating and coordinating international cooperation and supporting the efforts of States to fulfil their nuclear security responsibilities.

South Africa remains committed to ensuring and maintaining effective nuclear security measures in respect of all nuclear and other radioactive material, including nuclear facilities in the country, in accordance with its national and international obligations. As South Africa is planning a future expansion to its nuclear programme, nuclear security remains a priority for us.

South Africa welcomes the progress that has been made since our first Summit in Washington D.C. followed by further Summits in Seoul and The Hague in 2012 and 2014. We are committed to the continuous enhancement of nuclear security control measures in accordance with the national threat assessment, as well as global threats, taking into consideration our international obligations. We remain committed to ensuring adherence to our international obligations and implementing nuclear security measures in accordance with our legislation. In this regard, South Africa is a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and is in the process of ratifying the Amended Convention with the objective of enhancing its obligations related to nuclear security.

South Africa will continue to work together with the international community to enhance nuclear security.  We have installed Radiation Portal Monitors at some facilities and currently we are working with the IAEA to enhance the detection capabilities at our Ports of Entry. In August 2014, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the United States of America audited one of our facilities with the objective of assessing security systems. I am pleased to say that the outcome was positive.

Following the FIFA World Cup in 2010 hosted by South Africa, the support we have received from the IAEA (including capacity building and detection equipment) has enabled the country to offer national training courses to law enforcement officials, including operators, to implement nuclear security measures at relevant events. South Africa has hosted and participated in numerous workshops with the objective of enhancing nuclear security at its nuclear installations.

We are continuing with our programme to recover, consolidate and return disused and orphan radioactive sources throughout Africa and some non-African countries. We are also in the process of finalising the establishment of a nuclear forensics capability. As South Africa recognises the need for a Nuclear Security Support Centre to coordinate nuclear security activities in the country, we are committed to establishing such a Centre to ensure sustainability of expertise in the nuclear security field.

Although the Summit process has done much to strengthen nuclear security, we should not forget that in order for the global nuclear security system to be truly effective, it needs to be comprehensive. Even if all civilian materials were fully secured to the highest standards, this would only cover an estimated 15% of the weapons-usable material around the world, leaving a critical gap in the architecture.

It is thus both legitimate and important to also address the issue of the remaining 85%, which is categorized as military materials that are not subject to any international security standards or oversight mechanisms. In this regard, it is important to note that the 2016 Communique reaffirms the commitment of leaders to the shared goals of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Enhanced nuclear security arrangements for nuclear material and facilities in civilian use and nuclear non-proliferation efforts alone will not eliminate the threat of nuclear terrorism. Progress towards the realization of our shared goal of a world without nuclear weapons can no longer be postponed.  As long as high-risk nuclear material remain outside international oversight, the threat of nuclear terrorism will remain.

Nuclear energy not only provides for the expanded opportunity to generate power for our development, but we also derive benefit from its application in areas such as health, nutrition and agriculture. It is therefore appropriate that the 2016 Communique states that measures to strengthen nuclear security will not hamper the right of States to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

As we are meeting for the last time as participating States in the Nuclear Security Summit process, it is important that we share the outcome of this Summit with other International Atomic Energy Agency Member States, as well as with the Agency and other multilateral organisations. It is trusted that the International Conference on Nuclear Security scheduled to take place in December this year in Vienna, Austria, will serve us well in carrying forward the 2016 Summit’s outcomes and deliverables.

I thank you.


National Statement: Spain


The Nuclear Security Summit process started in 2010 and represents a landmark in the international community’s efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism. For the first time, a multilateral initiative is addressing new security threats with a preventive approach, in order to avoid terrorist attacks going beyond the conventional forms of terrorism. Moreover, this is an ambitious initiative in which national security capabilities and international cooperation reinforce each other.  Spain, with decades of counterterrorist experience and a wide-ranging nuclear infrastructure, has been from the very outset an active participant in the Summit process.

Throughout all these years, it has become increasingly clear that there is a need for a coherent and effective global nuclear security architecture, based on integrating the efforts and synergies coming from the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, INTERPOL, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Global Partnership. As a result of this collective effort five different Action Plans have been submitted to support these multilateral organizations and initiatives to be endorsed by the participating Governments at this Washington Summit.

The Government of Spain would like to take advantage of this opportunity to reaffirm its national and international commitments in priority areas for our national security and for that of other friendly nations.

-          Firstly, we must continue our efforts to foster in Spain a culture of nuclear security, including training activities in cooperation with our law enforcement agencies, the industry and academia. Spain also stands ready to share this experience with other countries. 

  • Secondly, we will reinforce our national forensic analysis capabilities on nuclear issues of our State Security Forces.
  • Thirdly, we will focus our efforts on developing cybersecurity capabilities, particularly for nuclear facilities, within the framework of the National Cybersecurity Plan.
  • The fourth priority area for Spain is nuclear security in maritime transport, including security management at Spanish ports. To this end we will carry out exercises focused on strategic areas, in accordance with the objectives of our Plan on National Maritime Security.
  • It is also important to raise awareness, at every level, on the security of radioactive sources, which are very widely used in hospitals and industry across Spain. In addition to promoting the entry into force of the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (1987) and the implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005), the Government of Spain believes that the implementation and promotion of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Code of Conduct in this area, both at national and international levels, is an issue of vital importance for security, given the high number of these sources in use, and the special nature of management, decommissioning and storage processes.

The Spanish Government attaches great importance to a pragmatic approach in all these areas, which will require conducting practical exercises, both at national level and in cooperation with other countries.

The threat of nuclear terrorism requires a global response. This is why international efforts are so important. In this sense, Spain considers vital our cooperation with the United Nations, the IAEA, and INTERPOL, and we highly value the contribution of other initiatives in this area, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the Global Partnership, which offer adequate and flexible frameworks for international cooperation through a pragmatic approach.

In the recent years, the international community has made important steps against the threat of nuclear terrorism, including the Nuclear Security Summit process.

Spain attaches great importance to Security Council Resolution 1540, and chairs in 2015-16 the 1540 Committee that monitors and promotes the implementation of this resolution. Spain encourages all States to participate in a constructive manner in the 1540 Comprehensive Review to take place this year in order to urgently strengthen the capacity of the international community to face such a threat to international peace and security.

At international level, Spain works within a privileged cooperation framework with the European Union, Latin-American and Mediterranean countries. In recent years, this policy has borne fruits such as the progress made with Morocco through a bilateral Action Plan, launched in collaboration with the IAEA, including noteworthy results as the Gate to Africa exercise in October 2015 on the security of transport of radioactive sources.

Spain and Morocco have made substantial joint progress on combating the risk of nuclear terrorism.  With the Gate to Africa exercise, we have improved law enforcement coordination and response capabilities when addressing a radiological emergency caused by a terrorist attack. Sixty-four observers from the IAEA Member States and representatives from seven international organizations took part in this exercise, which constituted a major contribution to strengthening the international nuclear security system.

This bilateral relationship between Morocco and Spain has set an international standard that will be promoted as a model at other international fora, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the IAEA.

Fortunately, the world has not yet experienced the impact of nuclear terrorism. However, we know that the threat exists. As members of our Governments, it is our duty to protect our citizens, doing everything in our reach to prevent terrorist attacks with unpredictable consequences—and, should they occur, to stand ready to respond effectively to defend the victims and enforce the law.

National Statement: Switzerland

Nuclear Security Summit 2016

Statement by H.E. Johann N. Schneider-Ammann

President of the Swiss Confederation 


Mr. President,

Thank you for your initiative and leadership to bring us all together to strengthen nuclear security.

We all agree: nuclear terrorism remains a serious threat for our planet. Any nuclear terrorist attack would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences.

The Nuclear Security Summits have made a valuable contribution to awareness-raising and creating political momentum for action. Much has been achieved at the national and international level since 2010.

We need to acknowledge that nuclear security is part of a larger context. In Switzerland’s view, there is an obvious link between nuclear security and nuclear disarmament.  

We therefore call for further progress on nuclear disarmament and for the start of negotiations on a treaty covering fissile material used for nuclear weapons.  

We also need to be ready to meet new challenges that have a potential impact on nuclear security. Let me mention, as many colleagues already have done, the threats stemming from cyber-attacks.

Mr. President,

Switzerland is strongly committed to strengthening nuclear security as a responsible and constructive actor in international security policy.

I am pleased to announce that Switzerland has removed over 2 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium and approximately 20 kilograms of plutonium in the framework of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. This is a concrete contribution to enhanced global nuclear security.

My country was among the early ones to ratify the relevant legal instruments, even before the Summit process started.

We have also adapted our nuclear security legislation in the last years to reflect our international commitments and incorporate best practices as recommended by the IAEA. We are fully committed to maintaining the highest standards and implementing the best practices possible regarding nuclear security.

Mr. President,

Our international action should focus on the following three areas:

We should strengthen adherence to the international legal instruments and aim for their universality. With ratification completed by 102 States, the entry into force of the Amendment to the CPPNM (Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material) is now imminent. This is a major achievement of the Summit process.

We should also encourage further States to ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. We should work towards the universal application of the IAEA Code of Conduct (on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources). And we should use the comprehensive review of UN Security Council resolution 1540 this year to take stock of its implementation and reinforce it further.  

Second, we need to strengthen the leading and central role of the IAEA. With its 168 Member States, the Agency is well-placed to become the future hub of our activities. Nuclear security is an enduring responsibility. Our efforts have to continue after the Summit process ends. We welcome the convening of a Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Security by the Agency later this year, which will bring together both technical expertise and political leadership.

Thirdly, we need to broaden the agenda. If we want to build a truly comprehensive and effective global nuclear security regime, we also need to include nuclear material used for military purposes.

Voluntary transparency and assurance measures by the states possessing military material would help build confidence that international standards for effective nuclear security apply to all nuclear material. And all nuclear material that is no longer used for military purposes should be placed under the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

National Statement: Thailand

Thailand’s National Statement

2016 Nuclear Security Summit

Thailand attaches importance to the promotion of nuclear security, which has to be undertaken in parallel at the national, regional and international levels.  In fact, nuclear security issue is interlinked and should be carried out with other closely related matters, which are safety and safeguards.

Indeed, the issue of nuclear security is closer to us than we think. If a nuclear incident occurs, its impact is widespread and indiscriminate. The collaborative network within and across national borders is necessary to contain the consequences. That is why we are here today to renew and reaffirm our political commitment.

Thailand believes that it is a fundamental responsibility of states to maintain effective security of nuclear and other radioactive materials as well as nuclear facilities under their control, including military ones. Therefore, at the national level, the Royal Thai Government takes action seriously as nuclear technology is widely used in various peaceful applications in Thailand, so it is a priority to ensure nuclear security in all types of public and private facilities, where nuclear and radioactive materials are used -- hospitals, factories, research laboratories, and nuclear waste disposal facilities. Attention has to be given also to the security of transportation, importation, and exportation of nuclear and radioactive materials.

In terms of national legal frameworks, relevant regulations pertaining to exportation and importation of dual-use goods have been updated. The amended Customs Act has empowered Customs officials to inspect, search and confiscate suspected merchandise in transit or transshipment. In addition, the amended Nuclear Energy Act is now under consideration of the National Legislative Assembly. This Act has been amended to cover all relevant dimensions of peaceful use of nuclear energy, as well as impose penalties on those who violate any provision of this Act. Once the Nuclear Energy Act is enforced, Thailand will be able to ratify a number of international instruments, including the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM). As a state party to these conventions, Thailand will be able to do more under her international obligations to further enhance nuclear security.

Our efforts include an establishment of a national coordinating mechanism, the Sub-Committee on Coordinating for Prevention and Solution of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2013. This mechanism helps strengthen the coordination and collaboration among all relevant government agencies concerned, both at national and local levels, in efficiently and effectively fulfilling Thailand’s obligations and commitments. At present, a whole-of-government Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) is being drafted to ensure efficient and integrated implementation and coordination in cases of interdiction of suspected merchandise entering or passing through Thailand by sea, land and air. Several outreach and awareness-raising activities and programmes, including visits to ports and border checkpoints, have also been conducted throughout the countries, particularly frontline officers in the border areas prone to risks of illicit entry of persons or goods with ill intention, which could be used for malicious purposes.

As people are at the centre of nuclear security, it is therefore crucial to continuously develop and further enhance the capabilities of relevant agencies and their staff to be able to strictly comply with international standards and requirements, in order to ensure effective nuclear security. It is also necessary to raise the awareness of the general public as nuclear security is an issue very close to our daily lives and should not be overlooked in order to reduce potential risks from ignorance or negligence. Thus, Thailand gives importance to reach out and raise awareness among various target groups, including industrialists, entrepreneurs, healthcare personnel, exporters and importers, law enforcement agencies, academia, and civil society. Nuclear security should always remain in the public interest as minor issues can cause major consequences. If nuclear waste has not been properly disposed of, radiation will be harmful to health, food and water sources, and the environment.  Moreover, the impacts of radiation will be long-term, making it hard to determine the extent of damage, as well as how to contain and mitigate the detrimental consequences.

States also need to build up global nuclear security culture in nuclear facilities both at national and international levels. This will alert all stakeholders of potential risks which could arise at anytime, anywhere and in any form -- insider threats, outside trespassers, or through cyber space. Therefore, clear codes of conduct, stringent preventive and effective response measures must be in place. Building up nuclear security culture will reduce risks from nuclear threats and protect everyone in a systematic and sustainable manner.  

At the regional level, freer flow of people and goods in a borderless world, especially within the ASEAN Community, has increased the number of tourists as well as the volume of imports and exports passing through the borders. The Thai authorities concerned have boosted up their capacities in response to the changing environment by upgrading their systems and equipment, and training of staff. These efforts have helped improve the screening process and reduce risk of ill-intentioned entry and transit through Thailand and smuggling of illegal items, thereby contributing to the prevention and countering of unnecessary tragic incidents. 

Beyond national borders, regional cooperation is very important to Thailand as regional countries are our “neighbours”. It is thus necessary to keep our community harmonious as well as well integrated and coordinated. For ASEAN, Thailand initiated the setting up of the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy, or ASEANTOM, which was welcomed by the ASEAN Leaders in 2011 and has been functioning since 2012. It is a collaborative network of nuclear regulatory bodies and relevant agencies to share information, experiences, and best practices, as well as to discuss issues relevant to nuclear safety, security and safeguard. It is a confidence building measure within the region. ASEANTOM is complementary to other existing mechanisms, such as the Asian Nuclear Safety Networks (ANSN) and the ASEAN Nuclear Energy Cooperation Sub-Sector Network (NEC-SSN).  These mechanisms represent work in the 3 pillars of nuclear safety, security, and safeguard for peaceful use which have to be carried out in parallel, in order to ensure sustainability. Thailand stands ready to cooperate and implement our obligations in all 3 pillars, including nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It is our hope that all participating States, International Organisations and Initiatives also give equally emphasis on all 3 S-pillars.

At the international level, global efforts will certainly help strengthen efforts at the national and regional levels, through sharing of accurate, reliable and timely information and intelligence for preventive actions, as well as capacity building and technology transfer from more advanced countries to those which may be faced with implementation challenges, in order to achieve truly robust nuclear security at the global level. In this regard,     Thailand has cooperated with the IAEA in hosting regional meetings, seminars and training for capacity building in nuclear related matters for countries in the region.  Thailand has also established a Master’s degree program on nuclear security education -- the only one in the ASEAN region -- and receives on a regular basis, students from the region and beyond.

Cooperation at all levels is important in order to reduce potential risks and mitigate potential damage as the impact of nuclear accident or sabotage will be widespread and indiscriminate. States also need to be vigilant and cooperate more closely to prevent cybercrime and terrorism. 

All efforts undertaken by Thailand under various international frameworks have so far been complementary, and the Nuclear Security Summit has played an important role in bridging all the elements of nuclear security and further strengthening those frameworks in a comprehensive manner. The Nuclear Security Summit also helps promote international cooperation in this field in a sustainable manner through various collaborative measures set out in the 5 action plans, in line with the mandates of UN, IAEA and INTERPOL, as well as other international initiatives. These international organisations and initiatives will play significant roles to our efforts and help strengthen our national capacities.

When all countries join hands together and sustain our efforts to fulfill our obligations, promote international cooperation at all levels, and work with relevant international organisations, our world will be a safer and more secure place for all.

National Statement: Turkey




(Washington, 31 March-1 April 2016)

Mr. President,

Distinguished Heads of State and Government,

Esteemed Participants,

I salute you all with most heartfelt feelings and deepest regards.

I thank President Obama for hosting the fourth Nuclear Security Summit in Washington.

I wish that this Summit, which is being held at a time when critical developments on a global scale are taking place, will contribute to the strengthening of peace, serenity and security in the world.

Today, we hold this Summit immediately in the aftermath of the days when we once again witnessed the bloody face of terrorism in Ankara, Istanbul and Brussels where innocent people were brutally slaughtered.

We have to admit that our world is less secure than it was earlier because of terrorism.

Looking back at terrorist acts and emergence of new terrorist groups in the two year period since the last Hague Summit, we see that the international community has been unable to demonstrate the desired level of success in fighting terrorism.

As a country that has been fighting the PKK separatist terrorist organisation for the last 30 years and that has lost 40 thousand of its citizens who fell victim to terrorist acts, we are aware of the magnitude of the problem we are confronted with.

We feel in our heart the pain of all those who have lost their lives in acts of terror, from Paris to Beirut, from Tunisia to Nigeria and from Burkina Faso to Somalia, to Libya.

We can counter the globalising threat of terror only by increasing global solidarity and cooperation.

I once again wish to reiterate our long repeated calls upon all countries.

Despite the differences in their ideologies and identities, PKK, PYD, YPG, DAESH, DHKP-C, Al Qaeda, Al Shebab or Boko Haram are all dens of evil sharing the same methods, aims and objectives.

Let us take a common stance against these dens of evil who are enemies of all humanity.

Let us not allow the bloody acts of these organisations to be exploited by marginal circles to the benefit of their blind ideologies such as Islamophobia, racism, xenophobia and anti-migrationism.

Mr. President,

Distinguished Participants,

A world free from nuclear weapons continues to be our common objective.

Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime is thus a collective responsibility for us all.

Nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear terrorism remain to be among the most serious and real threats to global security. 

Strengthening security entails ensuring physical protection of all nuclear facilities and material as well as countering the threat of terrorism.

These challenges must be addressed in a collective and organized manner. 

Only effective nuclear security measures can prevent such material from falling into the hands of terrorists and other unauthorized actors.

We, therefore, support a broad approach to security through a partnership network.

It is with this understanding that Turkey has taken an active part in the Nuclear Security Summit process since its inception. 

Distinguished participants,

The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process began in 2010 with a call for a “new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years”.

The first three summits have achieved notable results, from reaffirming the goal of securing weapons-usable nuclear material worldwide, to reiterating the responsibility of states to secure nuclear material as well as through promoting their adherence to relevant conventions and various global initiatives.

These Summits have facilitated the efforts in safeguarding vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive material and enabled actions designed to make the world a safer place.

Thanks to additional measures and increased awareness, the potential for the acquisition of nuclear material by terrorist groups and non-state actors has been greatly reduced, even if the risk of nuclear terrorism cannot be ruled out in total.

However, more work is still needed to build an effective global nuclear security system in order to secure all weapons-usable nuclear material.

High-level political attention on nuclear security must be preserved to guide and expedite the ongoing work toward building such a system and improving nuclear security.

Additional ratifications by more States of legally binding instruments such as the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) would further strengthen the security regime.

I would like to seize this opportunity to underline once again our commitment to this goal, as Turkey already finalized the process of ratification of the 2005 Amendment and deposited its instrument of ratification to the IAEA on 8 July 2015.

Distinguished Participants,

We are going through a period where energy supply security has become more important than ever.

Turkey is determined to carry on its nuclear energy projects in order to increase and diversify its energy supplies.

We believe that construction of new nuclear power plants with the most advanced technology that ensure their safety and the highest standards of security, will contribute to Turkey’s sustainable growth by providing significant portion of its energy needs.

We have always supported the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy by all States in compliance with international obligations.

Measures that we are taking to ensure nuclear security should in no way hinder international cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Access to nuclear technology, equipment and material for peaceful purposes should be available to all countries.

With this understanding, back in 2010, in an effort to resolve the Iran nuclear issue, Turkey and Brazil signed with Iran the Tehran Declaration.

It should be recalled that this Declaration proposed a deal that contained elements not too different from those achieved with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

As a country that has strongly supported this process from the outset, we welcome the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as of 16 January this year.

As reflected in the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, it is the fundamental responsibility of the states to maintain effective security of all nuclear material, which also includes those used in nuclear weapons, and of the nuclear facilities under their control.

As leaders, we bear the primary responsibility to ensure public confidence in the safety and security of all aspects of our nuclear programs.    

Mr. President,

Distinguished Participants,

We appreciate the IAEA’s central role and competence in strengthening the international nuclear security framework.

The IAEA plays a key role on issues related to nuclear security by assisting member states in developing and implementing nuclear security programs.

We support the work of the Agency in promoting “nuclear security culture” at national levels.

A sustainable nuclear security culture is crucial for the management of activities involving nuclear or other radioactive material.  

We should strive to provide the Agency with the political support and financial resources it needs to continue to effectively discharge its duties.

As has been done until today, Turkey will continue to cooperate with the Agency and lend the necessary support.

Honourable Participants,

Allow me to conclude my remarks by underlining that for a better future, nations should rely on the reconciling and practical effects of cooperation and dialogue rather than a potentially deterrent impact of nuclear arms.

Global peace and security can be achieved only through common vision, mutual trust and common sense.

This requires a strengthened global nuclear security architecture that is comprehensive and based on international standards, which can also lead to reductions in stocks of weapons-usable nuclear material.

It is our hope and wish that the 2016 Washington Summit will result in a legacy that will sustain past accomplishments and establish a more effective structure.

I wish the Summit to lead to better days for our countries.

Thank you.

National Statement: Ukraine

NSS 2016 Statement on the Threats posed by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and Nuclear Militarization of Crimea to Safety and Security of Nuclear Sites and Material of Ukraine 

Ukraine confirms its firm adherence to the NSS community goals and principles. We remain fully committed to implementing further joint efforts to promote stable and strong international nuclear security system.

Ukraine, which abandoned its nuclear arsenal in 1994, has been always devoted to finding peaceful solutions to the existing security threats and challenges supporting the international efforts aimed at achieving the universal disarmament goals. In 1994 Ukraine signed Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances with Regard to Ukraine’s Joining the NPT as a Non-nuclear State. Since 2014 the Memorandum has been meanly violated with impunity by one of its guarantors and thus became senseless for the other parties to this document.

In 2010, at the first Nuclear Security Summit Ukraine took another cornerstone decision – to remove its stocks of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and responsibly and timely implemented its obligations by the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. In this regard, we are grateful to our U.S. partners who fully supported us in this endeavor and provided the relevant technical assistance. We also highly appreciate the assistance of the United States in completion of the construction of Neutron Facility in Ukraine.

During the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, we appealed to the NSS community to apply pressure on the Russian Federation (then a member of this forum) and persuade it to withdraw its armed forces from the territory of Ukraine, namely the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. We were insisting that Russia’s behavior constituted a real threat to the nuclear security, particularly to the Ukrainian research nuclear facilities in Crimea.

Unfortunately, the Russian Federation did not only stop its illegal actions in Crimea, but moved further by sending its troops to Donetsk and Luhansk regions and fueling terrorist actions against Ukraine.

Undermining the UN-based security system by violating the UN Charter and provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), breaching the IAEA Safeguards’ application regime, providing shelter to criminals wanted by Interpol and supporting terrorists, the Russian Federation eventually took logical decision to leave NSS process.

This fact is a real evidence that the NSS goals and principles to be onwards implemented in the framework of UN, IAEA, GP, Interpol and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) as well as commitments taken by all of us in 2010, 2012 and 2014 are not recognized by the Russian Federation any more.

On this background the Russian Federation is declaring its rights to deploy nuclear weapons on the Ukrainian territory, namely in Crimea. Russian occupants are thoroughly restoring soviet-era nuclear storage facilities and have already deployed at the occupied territories of Ukraine the means of nuclear weapons delivery, like warships and combat aircraft. To facilitate this activity Russia is likely to install uranium enrichment facilities, organize production of dual use materials and apply technologies linked to the nuclear weapons on the peninsula.

The occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and ongoing Russian aggression in the east of Ukraine have left without due control of the Ukrainian national regulator LEU research reactor in Sevastopol, 2 nuclear repositories and more than 1200 radionuclide sources in Crimea, as well as 277 in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, 65 and 53 sites using the sources of ionizing radiation respectively.

In such circumstances we cannot exclude the illicit trafficking and malicious use of these sources and could even tackle the threats posed by eventual smuggling of HEU to and from the occupied Ukraine's Crimea.

For example, in July 2015 the Security Service of Ukraine discovered that Luhansk-based terrorists sold out a number of sources of ionizing radiation from the occupied coal mine in Luhansk region, which was lately found in the populated area in Donetsk region.

As a result of the Russian aggression, Ukraine cannot resume control over more than 400 kilometers of its border. These sections of the border can be used by traffickers to illegally transfer to Ukraine and further to Europe radiation sources from Russia. The recent reports of the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies demonstrate that this is a real scenario. Just recently, in March 2016, the Security Service of Ukraine intercepted in Zaporizhia region three sources of ionized radiation, which, allegedly, arrived to Ukraine through the uncontrolled sections of the Ukraine-Russia border.

In this regard, we underscore the need for continued efforts by the NSS participating states to strengthen nuclear security to prevent terrorists, criminals and all other illegal armed groups from acquiring nuclear and other radioactive material, especially when such material is placed at risk by conflict or unrest.

We count on the firm support of the international community in ensuring territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders with a view to stop nuclear proliferation and mitigate threats emerging from the Russian aggression.

Ukraine welcomes the unequivocal decision of the IAEA to apply safeguards to all nuclear sites and material on the whole territory of Ukraine, including those located on the occupied territories, in conformity with the international law and relevant agreements between Ukraine and the Agency.

Ukraine fully supports the Action Plans for UN, IAEA, INTERPOL, Global Partnership and GICNT aimed at advancement of the principles and goals of nuclear security summits beyond 2016. The guidelines for the States and international organizations embedded in these documents should mitigate the consequences and roots of weakened nuclear safety and security architecture at the conflict areas. 

National Statement: United Kingdom

National Statement by the United Kingdom

Following our pledges at the 2010, 2012 and 2014 Nuclear Security Summits, the United Kingdom will continue to lead efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring sensitive nuclear or radiological material or knowledge.

The UK will:

  • undertake the largest single movement of Highly Enriched Uranium. The UK will transfer around 700kg of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) to the United States. In return, the United States will provide HEU in a different form for use in European reactors to produce medical isotopes used in the diagnosis and treatment of conditions including thyroid cancer. This transfer will consolidate and achieve a net reduction in global HEU holdings, whilst providing real societal benefits.
  • lead efforts to further strengthen the cyber security of nuclear plants.  The Prime Minister is launching an initiative at the Summit to share best practice among states, nuclear operators and the supply chain to enhance their resilience and manage cyber risks to control systems in civil nuclear sites. During 2016 the UK will also be conducting a joint cyber security exercise with the US on the civil nuclear industry to test our systems against attack.
  • invest over £10 million during 2016 to improve standards worldwide.  Delivered through the UK Government’s Global Threat Reduction Programme, this will provide financial and expert assistance worldwide to protect facilities, strengthen security culture and dispose of sensitive material.  It will include:
    • £7.1m to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Fund to enable the IAEA to respond to requests for assistance. This is in addition to our annual contribution of around £14m to the IAEA regular budget and around £3m to the Technical Cooperation Fund.
    • 500,000 to the World Institute for Nuclear Security Academy to provide online nuclear security training to the nuclear industry worldwide.
    • £300,000 to Interpol’s Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit to counter nuclear smuggling.
    • £100,000 to host the IAEA's International Physical Protection Advisory Service Review Conference in London in November to bring together nuclear security experts to review 20 years’ experience from peer reviews.

The United Kingdom’s ongoing national commitment to nuclear security

The UK will continue to maintain the highest standards of security nationally.

Within our civilian nuclear power programme we have rigorous, independent and expert regulation. The UK nuclear regulation framework is world-class. It sets high standards for nuclear security, and operates in line with international obligations and best practice. There is a clear regulatory regime for security set by the Government which is overseen and enforced by an independent regulator with its own statutory powers. The UK strives for continuous improvement, and expects operators and others in the industry to learn from operational experience to take further steps to enhance security.

The UK also takes its responsibilities for protecting its military nuclear material very seriously. Our security arrangements are based on the principle of no unauthorised access, through the delivery of multi-layered, integrated, security arrangements designed to counter a range of threats and which are kept under review.  Robust national security controls are applied to personnel responsible for, or who have access to, nuclear military material and associated information. We have a well-established and on-going programme of activity to protect defence networks and the information they hold from cyber attack. And in addition to other security measures, we have strict accountancy and control measures for military nuclear material which are based on UK legislation and industry best practice.