Highlights of National Progress Reports

March 31 – April 1, 2016

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, Netherlands, participating States have reported a number of substantial actions and achievements that – individually and collectively – have strengthened nuclear security implementation at the national, regional, and international levels and built up the global nuclear security architecture.

Taken together, several common themes emerge.  Over 40 Summit countries have engaged in capacity building, whether through training, Centers of Excellence, or exercises.  Over 30 countries have updated national laws, regulations, or structures relating to nuclear security.  Over 20 countries have held or invited peer review missions, either bilaterally or through the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) International Physical Protection Advisory Service.  Three more countries – China, India, and Jordan – have pledged to strengthen nuclear security implementation through subscribing to the 2014 Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation (INFCIRC 869), bringing the total number to 38.  Eighteen countries have taken steps to increase the security of radioactive sources.  Seventeen countries have been involved in removal or disposal of nuclear materials, or minimization of highly enriched uranium (HEU).  Sixteen countries have ratified nuclear security treaties or taken particular steps to implement them.  Fifteen countries have carried out physical security upgrades or acquired security or detection equipment.  A dozen countries have joined or launched new international or regional structures to support nuclear security cooperation.  Twelve countries have indicated their financial contributions to support bilateral or international cooperation in nuclear security.  And 10 countries noted steps taken to support or implement United National Security Council Resolution 1540.  These represent tangible, practical steps towards locking down nuclear and other radioactive material and building up the global nuclear security architecture.

Algeria:  Issued a comprehensive governmental decree governing the physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, and the security of radioactive sources; established a national-level Nuclear Security Committee; developed work plan to strengthen national detection capabilities, in particular at borders; continued national and regional activities through the Nuclear Security Training and Support Center.

Argentina:  Down-blended and disposed of four kilograms of HEU, enabling Argentina to be declared free of HEU; co-hosted with Chile the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Radiological Emergency Management Exercise “PAIHUEN,” focused on demonstrating best practices for communication and coordination needed to respond to a criminal event involving radiation sources; is planning with Chile to organize another joint exercise, possibly “PAIHUEN 2;” jointly organized a national workshop with the IAEA on Design Basis Threat; in support of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, sent a technical assistance mission to Grenada covering nuclear regulatory issues and will undertake training activities in that country, including in the field of nuclear security; will host an IAEA regional training course on security of radioactive material in transport in 2016.

Armenia:  Committed to further strengthen efforts to combat nuclear smuggling, in part through the development of nuclear forensics capabilities; hosted a two-week security mission by the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA; submitted a National Action Plan for 2015-2020 to the United Nations 1540 Committee.

Australia: In its role as the chair of the Nuclear Forensics Working Group of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, will host nuclear emergency planning and response exercise “KANGAROO HARBOUR” in May 2016; requested a 2017 follow-up mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA; updated their report pursuant to Article 14.1 of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM); contributed over AU$2.4 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund since its inception.

Azerbaijan:  Acceded to the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM; endorsed the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources; signed a Country Program Framework for 2015 – 2020 with the IAEA, establishing a basis for national projects to improve the regulatory and legislative infrastructure, security of nuclear materials, and radiation monitoring and control of border and customs checkpoints; received assistance from the IAEA to strengthen the implementation of nuclear security measures before and during the 2015 Baku European Games.

Belgium:  Established a Cyber Security Centre under the authority of the Prime Minister, and expanded the scope of nuclear facility “stress tests” to include manmade events such as cyberattacks; established a Design Basis Threat for the nuclear sector nationwide; received a mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA; continued progress towards minimizing the use of HEU fuel in research reactors and medical isotope production; pledged an additional U.S. $300,000 dollars to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund in 2016.

Brazil:  Revising national regulation on security in transport of nuclear and radioactive material, taking into consideration IAEA recommendations; currently working on the revised text of its regulations on nuclear and radiological security applicable to material and associated facilities, taking into account international best practices, the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM, and other relevant IAEA guidance; conducted annual Regulatory Security Inspections; is continuing activities with the IAEA through the Brazilian Nuclear Physical Security Support Centre.

Canada:  Provided CAN $28 million in funding to improve global nuclear and radiological security through Canada’s Global Partnership Program, including CAN $5.5 million to enhance the physical security of nuclear facilities in Southeast Asia, CAN $12 million to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological material in the Americas and the Middle East, and CAN $10.4 million to promote the security of radioactive sources in Africa, the Americas, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia; dedicated an additional CAN $42 million in Global Partnership Program funding over the next two years; repatriated four shipments of U.S.-origin HEU stored at Chalk River Laboratories; is taking steps to decommission the SLOWPOKE research reactor at the University of Alberta, with its HEU fuel to be repatriated by 2019; will commence, in 2016, the repatriation of HEU-bearing liquids generated as a by-product from medical isotope production; assessed that approximately three-quarters of its inventory of plutonium is ready for dispositioning, and initiated discussions with the United States to determine whether it would accept the material for long-term management; assisted the U.S.-led reactor conversion and cleanout project for an HEU-fueled SLOWPOKE research reactor in Jamaica; is upgrading Canada’s Radiation Detection Network to help prevent illicit trafficking; hosted its first mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA; published a national standard to address cyber security at nuclear power plants and small reactor facilities; hosted an IAEA National Training Course on Computer Security and Conducting Assessments; provided the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee with an updated National Implementation Action Plan; with the World Institute for Nuclear Security, held a workshop on “Meeting Canadian Commitments for Demonstrable Competency in Nuclear Security Regulation and Implementation;” funded a regional Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Seminar in the Caribbean and hosted a meeting of the PSI Operational Experts Group; continued activities towards the development of a national nuclear forensics capability.

Chile:  With the United States, continued strengthening the physical protection of nuclear installations and five large-scale radiological installations; established the Radiological Emergency Security Commission (CONSER); officially launched a Border Strengthening Project offered by the IAEA to consider the implementation of the detection of radioactive material in selected border points and across “green borders;” conducted joint bilateral exercise “PAIHUEN” with Argentina under the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to improve communication channels between both countries to address trans-border radiological emergencies, and considering “PAIHUEN 2;” joined the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction; is designing training and implementation programs of the required equipment for the Nuclear Physical Security Support Center of Excellence at Lo Aguirre; is developing a centralized system of radiological, environmental, and operational monitoring of the nuclear and radioactive installations of the Chilean Commission on Nuclear Energy.

China:  Committed to convert the remaining Miniature Neutron Source Reactors (MNSR) at Shenzhen University from HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, to support the conversion of MNSR in Ghana and Nigeria as soon as possible, and – upon request of respective countries – to convert all remaining Chinese-origin MNSR worldwide; successfully completed and officially opened the Nuclear Security Center of Excellence in Beijing on March 18, 2016; launched an Annual Nuclear Security Dialogue with the United States; passed State Security and Anti-Terrorism laws which make it clear that nuclear security is a vital aspect of national security and formulated specific tasks and measures; published a Policy Statement on Nuclear Security Culture; invited a mission by the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA and a follow-up mission of the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Services for 2016; through 2015, donated U.S. $1.15 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund; conducted joint exercise with Russia on preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material on borders; conducted a national-level exercise on nuclear emergency response, “SHENGDUN-2015,” with 2,900 participants and international observers; pledged commitment to INFCIRC 869.

Czech Republic:  Issued a new Design Basis Threat for Czech nuclear facilities and material that now includes airborne and cyber threats; is preparing a new Atomic Act and Regulation that addresses these new aspects of nuclear security; in 2014 and 2015, carried out security exercises including the Czech Army and Police response units at the Dukavany and Temelin Nuclear Power Plants, respectively; in cooperation with the United States, organized a Physical Protection and Security Management Course in Prague; continued technical support to countries repatriating their HEU stocks:  Belarus, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Serbia, Ukraine, and Vietnam.

Denmark:  Put into force a revised nuclear emergency preparedness plan; continued actions to limit the number of high-activity sources at blood irradiator facilities; committed to lifting reservations made when ratifying the CPPNM and its 2005 Amendment, and when ratifying the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, so that these instruments will also apply to Greenland; in 2014, contributed DKK 8 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund; committed to enlisting relevant national operational assets to the IAEA Response and Assistance Network in 2016; plans to call for a mission of the Integrated Regulatory Review Service of the IAEA.

Egypt:  Signed the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan with the IAEA, leading to the implementation of:  national workshops on drafting nuclear security regulations and the design basis threat, training courses on the security of research reactors and associated facilities, and a national training course on preventative measures against the insider threat; with the IAEA, upgrading the physical protection systems of Egypt’s first and second research reactors; established a nuclear security support and training center; submitted its national report to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee.

European Union:  Euratom acceded to the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities following its ratification by all Member States; the Euratom Supply Agency, entrusted with securing the supply of nuclear materials for European Union (EU) users, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the United States under which the EU will eliminate HEU that is not directly usable, and the United States will supply the EU with the requisite HEU until its technological conversion to LEU is complete; Europol organized courses in Portugal and Poland focused on response to a radiological emergency resulting from a nuclear security incident; is continuing courses on training for first responders, incident commanders, and medical emergency staff on the triage, monitoring, and treatment of mass casualties following a terrorist attack involving ionizing radiation; held five sessions designed to meet the needs of customs officers from all member states responsible for detecting radioactive and other nuclear materials at border-crossing points; continued activities through the dedicated European nuclear security training centre (EUSECTRA); with the United States, co-chairs the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group; hosted the nuclear detection and forensics workshop and tabletop exercise 'Radiant City'; with the United States, is implementing a border-monitoring project in South-East Asia to enhance detection at border crossings, support capacity-building in selected countries, and involve the other ASEAN countries in regional initiatives; provided equipment and training to assist the Democratic Republic of Congo and countries in Central Asia and the Mediterranean to build capacities to counter the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials; since 2014, held two Senior Officials Meetings with the IAEA to ensure and exploit complementarity and avoid overlap between the parties’ activities in nuclear security; signed a contract with the IAEA on a 20 million euro contribution to the procurement of LEU for the Bank for the Utilisation of Nuclear Energy, and committed to provide 5 million euros for security-related costs; co-organized the Conference on International Cooperation for Enhancing Nuclear Safety, Security, Safeguards and Non-Proliferation; co-hosted a  Counter Nuclear Smuggling workshop; co-organizing for October 2016 a workshop in Jordan on regional cooperation to enhance a worldwide nuclear security culture; ongoing U.S.-European collaboration for the development of high-density LEU fuels for research; the European Commission will report to the Council and the European Parliament on implementation of the Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Directive in 2016.

Finland:  Established a Standing Nuclear Security Committee; is initiating a revision of national Design Basis Threat, to include information security/cyber threats; conducted an international training course on preventive and protective measures against insider threat; hosted a Plenary meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and a GICNT Nuclear Detection Working Group Workshop and Tabletop Exercise.

France:  Committed to close the high-performance research reactor Orphée, which is fueled using HEU, by 2019; continued its leadership in the security of high-activity radioactive sources, to include repatriation of French-origin sources from requesting States and new national legislation; comprehensively revised its national report to the United Nations 1540 committee to provide highly comprehensive information on the status of national nuclear security legislation; prepared a report in 2014 under article 14.1 of the Amended CPPNM; contribution of U.S. $1.2 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund since 2014; will host a follow-up IPPAS mission in 2017; will co-organize the annual meeting of the nuclear forensics International Technical Working Group and a forensics exercise CMX-5 in 2016 in Lyon.

Gabon:  Intends to ratify and put in place the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Security of Maritime Navigation and its 2005 Protocol; through law, established an independent body empowered todevelop regulations and issue guidelines regarding the safety and security of radioactive sources and to issue licenses for their management; is organizing a national workshop on domestic threats related to radioactive sources; is establishing a New Memorandum of Understanding with Customs services to control the import and export of radioactive sources.

Georgia:  With the support of the IAEA, adopted an Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan through 2019; is currently elaborating a new regulation for physical protection of material; in cooperation with the European Commission, acquired modernized equipment to conduct nuclear forensics investigations; adopted the legal act “The Procedure for Responding to the Illegal Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Substances;” in collaboration with the United States, established a Joint Maritime Operations Center on the Black Sea coast to facilitate interagency exchange of intelligence to address maritime threats, including nuclear smuggling.

Germany:  Removed all excess plutonium and HEU; established a central, national-level register to ensure the comprehensive traceability of high-activity sealed radioactive sources; will host a workshop in September 2016 on the adequacy of the Code of Conduct for Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources; established a federal-level information platform to enable swift interagency information exchange in the event of serious WMD-related crime or terrorism threats in Germany; continued efforts to develop high-density, low-enriched uranium fuel.

Hungary:  Issued a new governmental decree on actions to be performed in connection with missing, found, and seized nuclear and other radioactive material; revised design basis threat of nuclear facilities to include cyber threats; requested a 2017 mission by the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA; continued activities through its Nuclear Security Support Centre; joined the G7 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

India:  Establishment of a national-level Counter Nuclear Smuggling Team for effective and coordinated response to threats involving the acquisition of nuclear and radioactive materials for malicious purposes; is equipping all major sea and air ports with radiation portals and detection equipment; continued regional and international activities through the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership; contributed to the upgrade of the IAEA’s Seibersdorf Laboratory in 2015 and plans for a contribution in 2016 of U.S. $1 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund; pledged commitment to INFCIRC 869.

Indonesia:  Acceded to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; established a Mobile Expert Support Team for the detection and response to illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials; installed radiation portal monitors in seven main harbors; launched the Centre of Excellence on Nuclear Security and Emergency Preparedness to contribute to the development of nuclear security at the national and regional level; received a mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA; is establishing a Center for Security Culture and Assessment dedicated for nuclear security culture; will submit to Parliament in 2016 a draft law intended to enhance the national nuclear security architecture.

INTERPOL:  Launched Project STONE, increasing the ability to control illicit nuclear trafficking by providing technical resources and training to member countries interested in developing their counter nuclear smuggling capacity; organized and hosted a Global Counter Nuclear Smuggling Conference, bringing together representatives from almost 120 countries and organizations to share best practices as well as operational and investigative experiences; in September 2016, will launch Project MERCURY at the Nevada Nuclear Test Site to prepare international law enforcement to take immediate, decisive action in preventing or responding to terrorist use of nuclear or other radioactive materials; plans to develop a national counter nuclear smuggling capability in capacity, preparedness, and prevention for countries that either request it, or for countries where there is a strategic need.

Israel:  Established a national nuclear forensics laboratory; launched Phase II of the Soreq Applied Research Accelerator Facility, which will replace the IRR-1 research reactor fueled by HEU; conducted the large-scale exercise “BRIGHT SANDS,” simulating a terrorist attack on a nuclear research reactor; joined the IAEA Response and Assistance Network, and put its assets at the disposal of states facing a nuclear or radiological emergency; with the United States, conducted a workshop on human reliability and countering insider threats. 

Italy:  Ratified the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM; intends to remove remaining excess HEU and plutonium; continued activities through its international School on Nuclear Security.

Japan:  Completed removal of all HEU and separated plutonium fuels from the Fast Critical Assembly; pledged to remove all HEU from the Kyoto University Critical Assembly; continued regional capacity building through Japan Atomic Energy Agency’s Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security; concluded the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM; contributed approximately 900,000 euros to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, including the cost of dispatching cost-free experts; received a mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA; is establishing a system with concrete regulations to determine trustworthiness of personnel at nuclear facilities; adopted a Code of Conduct on Nuclear Security Culture, and is establishing a nuclear security culture through education and the personal interviews of Chief Executive Officers; incorporated transportation security measures in line with the IAEA’s INFCIRC/225/Rev.5; facilitated the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) table-top exercise “MARU 2015” in New Zealand, and will host a PSI exercise in 2018; implemented field exercises based on threat scenarios such as design basis threats at all protected facilities, as well as field exercises to counter cyber-attacks to the control system of nuclear facilities, including in combination with physical attacks; chairing the G7 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and its Nuclear and Radiological Security sub-Working Group; conducted two table-top exercises and two field exercises focused on the improvement of transport security; continued activities at Japan’s Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security; led discussions in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism on the technical aspects of nuclear forensics; will soon issue a report to further enhance the security of radioactive isotopes in line with IAEA guidelines.

Jordan:  Acceded to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; announced its commitment to “Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation” as contained in the IAEA document INFCIRC 869; signed with the United States a Joint Action Plan on Combating Smuggling of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials; hosted an international workshop on Counter Nuclear Smuggling Teams in Volatile Regions, presenting itself at the Workshop as a case study; with Canada, organized a regional Workshop towards Universal Implementation of International Legal Instruments for Nuclear Security hosted in Amman; hosted a Nuclear Security Peer Review Mission from the IAEA.

Kazakhstan:  Eliminated all fresh HEU from the VVR-K research reactor at the Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP); completed the conversion of INP’s VVR-K research reactor from highly-enriched to low-enriched uranium fuel; committed to eliminate all HEU from INP; committed to convert the IVG.1M and IGR research reactors to LEU fuel when an acceptable fuel comes available, and to return the highly-enriched spent fuel from these reactors to Russia once their conversion is completed; upgraded physical protection at the INP, Ulba Metallurgical Plant, and the former Semipalatinsk Test Site; hosted table-top exercises on the security of rail-road transportation of nuclear and radioactive materials; revised the Law on the Use of Atomic Energy to include further enhancement of the state system for control of radioactive materials and basic requirements for a state system of nuclear security; initiated construction of the Nuclear Security Training Center, to be completed October 2016; will finalize construction of the Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Bank storage facility in 2017.

Lithuania:  Passed new national legislation and guidelines on radioactive material security; officially requested a 2017 mission by the International Physical Protection Service of the IAEA; installed radiation detectors to counter illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials through Klaipeda Seaport; continued activities through its Nuclear Security Centre of Excellence.

Malaysia:  Approved the establishment of the Malaysian National Nuclear Security Support Centre, including a nuclear security detection laboratory; developed a high-level strategy to counter smuggling, involving all law enforcement and border authorities under the National Security Council; successfully cooperated on a planned nuclear security exercise with the Canadian Army; will continue joint nuclear security exercises with Thailand at shared borders in 2016; plans to host a mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA in 2016.

Mexico:  Received missions of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA in all its nuclear facilities; with the United States, created intergovernmental cooperation for the training of specialists in export controls and the identification of sensitive materials, with specialists from Panama and Columbia participating in 2015; created an Export Controls Committee, which is determining the export of special materials, taking into account their final use and destination; publication expected in 2016 of regulations for the transport of nuclear and radioactive materials.

Morocco:  Ratified the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM; passed new legislation on nuclear and radiological safety, security, and safeguards; established the Moroccan Agency on Nuclear and Radiological Safety and Security; with Spain, organized the “GATE TO AFRICA” maritime transportation security exercise; equipped customs-controlled borders and exit-entry points with radiation detectors; continued activities through its National Nuclear Security Support Center.

The Netherlands:  Updates to the Executive Order on the Security of Nuclear Facilities and Fissionable Materials to come into effect in 2016, incorporating all applicable parts of IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.5; updated Design Basis Threat (DBT), to be implemented in the course of 2016; DBT for cyber security to be updated in 2016, with regulations related to mandatory reporting of cyber incidents in the nuclear sector expected to come into force in 2017; hosted three regional training courses and a train-the-trainers course on physical protection (with one more planned for May 2016), as well as courses on security culture, DBT, protection against sabotage, and identification of vital areas; chaired the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance Committee; currently chairing the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) Implementation and Assessment Group, and will host the GICNT 10th Anniversary Meeting in June 2016; one million euros contributed to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund from 2014 – 2017; awarded a one million euro grant to three leading Dutch nuclear operators to further develop and improve security measures.

New Zealand:  Ratified the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; enacted the Radiation Safety Act, which completely overhauls the legislative framework dealing with the safety and security of nuclear and radioactive material; implemented a Code of Practice for the Security of Radioactive Material; hosted its first mission from the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA and plans to invite a follow-up mission; contributed over NZ$1 million to international work to improve nuclear security; hosted Proliferation Security Initiative Exercise MARU with participants from 21 countries, focused on steps countries with limited resources and capacity can take to intercept weapons of mass destruction and their components.

Nigeria:  Established a Nuclear Security Support Centre to serve sub-Sahara Africa, aimed at enhancing human capacity development in the area of nuclear security; developed a program for search and security of orphan and legacy radioactive sources; in 2016, will sign the Project and Supply Agreement for China to procure a low-enriched uranium core to replace the HEU fuel at Nigeria Research Reactor 1; commenced a comprehensive review and the updating of existing nuclear security regulations and the drafting of new ones, with review and development to be completed and published in 2016; review of Design Basis Threat to be completed and communicated to operators in 2016; by 2017, install three radiation portal monitors at strategic ports of entry; by 2017, ensure the passage of the Nuclear Safety, Security, and Safeguards Bill; continuing cooperation with United States on implementation of a Human Reliability Program for the Nigerian nuclear industry.

Norway:  Is supporting activities to secure nuclear material in northwestern Russia; strengthened Ukraine’s capacity to counter nuclear smuggling through provision of equipment and training; initiated a collaborative project with Slovakia to improve border control against nuclear smuggling; hosted a mission by the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA; hosted a World Institute for Nuclear Security workshop on progress towards enhancing radiological security; replaced all Cesium-137 Category 1 radioactive sources with X-ray technology; will host a 2016 international meeting on minimization of HEU stocks in a uranium-thorium mixture.

Pakistan:  Ratified the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM; established Pakistan’s Centre of Excellence on Nuclear Security (PCENS); in collaboration with the IAEA, hosted the annual meeting of the “International Network of Nuclear Support Centres,” the first such meeting outside IAEA headquarters in Vienna; with the IAEA, is upgrading security measures at all nuclear medical centers with category 1 radioactive sources; with the IAEA, is enhancing nuclear security systems and measures at civilian nuclear power plants and research reactors consistent with global good practices; established a national-level Nuclear Emergency Management System; deployed radiation detection equipment at several entry and exit points to deter, detect, and prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials.

Philippines:  With the United States, installed additional security upgrades in hospitals and Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) facilities with category 1 radiological sources, conducted radiological security incident response training for the Philippine National Police, and upgraded the PNRI perimeter fence to harden the physical protection along the Radioactive Waste Facility; received four mobile detection vans with handheld-based detection and identification systems to enhance capabilities for countering radiological and nuclear material smuggling; hosted a U.S. Bilateral Assessment Visit Update to review plans and discuss topics on threats and physical protection based on the IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.5; in preparation of the 27th APEC Economic Leaders Meeting in November 2015 in Manila, conducted training workshops on Threat Assessment and Design Basis Threat, Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for a Major Public Event, Concept of Operations between Front Line Officers and Mobile Expert Support Teams, and Responding to Nuclear Security Events at Venues and other Strategic Locations; with Canada, and in furtherance of the G-7 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, finalized a Memorandum of Understanding and initiated installation of a physical protection system at Philippines’ research reactor; with the European Union, is developing a training center at PNRI to train port operators, customs police, and other first responders in the field of nuclear detection and response.

Poland:  Will, in 2016, complete the removal and shipment of HEU spent nuclear fuel from the “Maria” nuclear research reactor; adopted the National Anti-terrorist Program, which includes objectives related to strengthening nuclear security against terrorist threats; conducted the intensive operational exercise “PATROL 2015” at the Maria reactor to improve preparedness of experts and first responders to effectively react to incidents and emergencies involving radiological and nuclear materials; adopted a National Plan for Management of Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel; received a mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Serviceof the IAEA; will host a follow-up mission of the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service in 2017; will host a follow-up mission of the IAEA Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review in 2016; updated regulation related to Design Basis Threat expected to enter into force in 2017.

Republic of Korea:  Ratified the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; incorporated IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 into its national regulations; established the legal and administrative framework for the security of Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources as provided in the IAEA Code of Conduct; contributed U.S $1 million annually to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund; will hold in September 2016 a regional outreach event to promote implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 amongst relevant stakeholders in industry and academia; included cyber threats as an element in the Design Basis Threat of nuclear facilities, and, since 2015, conducted regular cyber security inspections and reviews; with the IAEA, hosted a Regional Workshop on Computer Security for Nuclear Facilities; initiated development of a national nuclear forensics system, including a national response plan and nuclear forensics library; continued activities through the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Security Academy; continued work with Belgium, France, Germany, and the United States on a joint project to develop and qualify new high-density LEU fuels for research reactors, including the provision of atomized U-Mo powder for use in the fabrication of LEU test fuels.

Romania:  Approved updates to its National Strategy for Nuclear Safety and Security; received a mission of the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service of the IAEA; invited a follow-up mission for 2016 of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA; is contributing to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, fulfilling a 2014 Nuclear Security Summit pledge; completed the installation of radiological detection portals at road, rail, and pedestrian access points on the Romanian northeastern border, and at Romania’s national airport.

Saudi Arabia:  Committed to contribute U.S. $10 million to the IAEA for a new center to combat nuclear terrorism; committed to contribute 500K euros to support the renovation of the IAEA’s Seibersdorf Laboratory; conducted a national workshop in cooperation with the IAEA on nuclear safeguards and security; organized a joint meeting  on nuclear security between border control experts from the Republic of Yemen and Saudi Arabia, in cooperation with the IAEA; joined the European Union Centers of Excellence on Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation and became a member of the Regional Center of Excellence under this initiative, which is based in the U.A.E.; organized a workshop in collaboration with Japan on the development of human resources in security and nuclear safety and safeguards; organized a national workshop for protection from the risks of chemical, biological radioactive, and nuclear materials in cooperation with the United Nations crime and Justice Research Institute (UNCRI); signed the Convention for Practical Coordination between the IAEA and Naif University for Security Sciences for cooperation in the field of education and training programs related to nuclear security; organized a symposium on nuclear security presented by the head of Nuclear Security at the IAEA; organized a workshop in cooperation with the IAEA on capacity assessment and strategy for education and training in nuclear disciplines. 

Singapore:  Became a Party to the CPPNM and its 2005 Amendment; established an interagency working group to assess nuclear security measures, conduct inspections, and make recommendations to further improve security at storage sites; joined the International Nuclear Security Education Network of the IAEA; established a Cyber Security Agency; is establishing a border laboratory equipped with nuclear detection and analysis to interdict illicit activities at the border; is working towards ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

South Africa:  Hosted and participated in workshops with the objective of enhancing nuclear security, to include an International Training Course on Nuclear Material Accounting and Control and a Fact Finding Meeting on the Detection and Response to Nuclear and other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control; continuing its program to recover, consolidate and return disused and orphan radioactive sources throughout Africa and some non-African countries; is finalizing the establishment of a nuclear forensics capability; committed to establish a Nuclear Security Support Centre to ensure the sustainability of expertise.

Spain:  Amended and updated its regulations through a new Royal Decree for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, adapting it to new threats including cyber and insider threats; approved a new National Security Act which organizes the management of prevention and response to national threats; approved the National Action Plan for Compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540; is serving as Chair of the UNSCR 1540 Committee and in 2016 will lead the “Global Review” for a full and universal implementation of the Resolution; with Morocco and in collaboration with the IAEA, organized in Madrid a joint exercise, “GATE TO AFRICA,” on security in the transportation of radioactive sources; organized a national exercise on security in land transportation of spent fuel from nuclear power plants; with the United States, organizing the “Second International Regulators Conference on Nuclear Security”  in Madrid in May 2016; with the IAEA, organized an International Workshop on Nuclear Security Culture; joined the G7 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

Sweden:  Ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; will receive a follow-up mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA in 2016; issued new requirement to strengthen physical protection (including arming guards) at relevant nuclear sites, for highly-radioactive sealed sources, and materials in the medical, industrial, and university sectors; together with Georgia, the United States, and Poland, preparing a conference in October 2015 in Tbilisi, Georgia for states in the Black Sea region on the implementation of Nuclear Security Summit commitments and objectives.

Switzerland:  Removed approximately 20 kilograms of separated plutonium, leaving Switzerland free of all separated plutonium; removed 2.2 kilograms of HEU; is updating the design basis threat for nuclear facilities nationwide; is planning to invite another mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA by 2018; is developing a nuclear security culture program based on the IAEA Nuclear Security Series No 7.

Thailand:  Organized annual training and drill exercises for frontline officers who may be faced with nuclear incidents; conducted national emergency exercises in compliance with the National Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Plan; with the European Union and the United States, initiating a Project on Border Monitoring Activities aimed at strengthening national capacity in countering illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials; in cooperation with Canada and the United States, will, in 2016, begin upgrading the physical protection system of the Thai Research Reactor and waste storage facility; entry into force of an amended Customs Act; is establishing principles for transit and transshipment in line with international standards as obligated under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; hosted workshop for concerned Thai agencies on obligations related to non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; National Legislative Assembly considering amendment to the Nuclear Energy Act that, once enacted, will enable accession to the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment, and the International Contention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

Turkey:  Ratified the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM and deposited its instrument with the IAEA; will receive a mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA in 2016; hosted a training course on nuclear security detection architecture; with support from Japan, organized a national workshop on the “Nuclear Security Plan.”

Ukraine:  Approved a new design basis threat to nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste, and other sources of ionizing radiation; approved an Integrated Nuclear Security Support National Plan for 2016–2018; continued installation of radiation detectors, training, and exercises at borders to counter nuclear smuggling; with Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, and with funding from the European Union, agreed to create a regional network of nuclear forensics expertise; with the United States, is creating a scientific and methodological basis for determining attributes of uranium-bearing materials of different origin and development of nuclear forensics library data and materials; established the trilateral Swedish-Norwegian-Ukrainian Initiative with seven projects implemented from 2014 – 2015, to include security upgrades at Khmelnytsky nuclear power plant, modernization of the radioactive source register, and the 13th Ukrainian conference on nuclear security to be held October 2016; in 2016, will revise the respective Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers to adjust national legislation on physical protection to IAEA recommendations.

United Arab Emirates:  Hosted the Inter-Arab Nuclear Detection and Response Exercise “FALCON,” aimed at enhancing national and regional interagency coordination and cooperation; is hosting a mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA in 2016; hosted an IAEA workshop and issued a new regulatory guide on nuclear transport security; provided its national report to the United Nations 1540 Committee; updated its regulations on the export and import control of nuclear material; hosted a regional training course on nuclear forensics.

United Kingdom:  Invested £20.8 million in global threat reduction across 20 countries, to include physical security upgrades in Tajikistan, the Philippines, Georgia, and Kazakhstan, expert advice and majority funding for the construction of a new facility in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone to ensure secure storage of up to 500,000 disused radioactive sources from across Ukraine, and improving cooperation in countering nuclear smuggling in the Black Sea region, including through a regional conference in Georgia and a response exercise in Moldova; supported the IAEA, providing over £5.8 million in funding and expertise; hosted a workshop for participants from 25 countries to develop good practice in responding to radiological and nuclear emergencies; supported INTERPOL’s Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit with £650,000 of funding; hosted a visit by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee, and served as Vice-Chair of the Committee; became the first nuclear weapon state to host a follow-up mission by the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA; hosted two tailored workshops leading to the development of best practice guidance on measures to enhance supply chain security and the transportation of civilian nuclear material by sea; continued to consolidate unused “exotic” fuel stores, with the majority of moves scheduled to be completed by 2018.

United States:  Publicized specific information outlining the measures utilized to secure military nuclear materials, including through the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 reporting process; declassified and publically released updated data on the national inventory of HEU, highlighting the fact that the inventory has decreased by more than 20 percent since 1996; disposed of an additional five metric tons of weapons-usable HEU domestically, bringing the total to more than 150 metric tons; pledged to explore the feasibility of converting navy submarine reactor cores from HEU to LEU fuel; established a pilot production line for high-density LEU fuel to support the conversion of remaining high performance research reactors in the United States and abroad; deposited instruments of ratification for the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM and International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; contributed an additional U.S. $30M to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund; supported the expansion and acceleration of international capabilities to arrest nuclear smugglers, seize illicit nuclear material, investigate illicit nuclear trafficking, and effectively prosecute perpetrators.

Vietnam:  Approved a Master Plan for Nuclear Power Infrastructure Development, instructing relevant Ministries and agencies to carry out their respective duties to ensure nuclear security and safety; with the IAEA, organized a national seminar on "National Regulatory Framework for Nuclear Security for Vietnam;" invited a mission of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service of the IAEA; organized three seminars on nuclear security culture for local authorities, radiation facilities and research facilities; since 2014, put into operation eight radiation portal monitors  at an international airport, and 12 others at a major seaport; established an integrated nuclear security network between the customs authority and the nuclear regulatory body, creating a national early warning and response network; with the IAEA, organized multiple training courses for first responders and the Mobile Expert Support Team to ensure the sustainability of the radiation detection system and effective response to radiation alerts; organized the International Workshop on Combatting Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Materials in Ho Chi Minh City; joined the Proliferation Security Initiative.

National Progress Report: Algeria

IMultilateral Instruments:

 

1. Algeria has ratified all International Legal Instruments relevant to Nuclear Security in particular; those mentioned in the 2010 Washington Summit Final Communiqué and Work Plan, namely, the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).

2.Algeria also completed the process of ratification of all related International Legal Instruments such as the United Nations Conventions on combating terrorism, organized crime, corruption and money laundering.

IILegislation and Regulations:

1. Algeria has amended its penal code to criminalize malicious utilization of radioactive materials, including in general acts of nuclear terrorism. This amendment is related to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).

2. Algeria is pushing ahead with efforts to put in place strong regulatory provisions to strengthen nuclear security regime, namely in the area of physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities and security of radioactive sources during use, storage and transport.

3. In addition to the existing decrees, those establishing security perimeters around three nuclear research centers hosting nuclear materials and facilities, the government has just after the 2014 Hague nuclear security summit, issued a comprehensive decree governing the physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear material as well as the security of radioactive sources.  

4. The content of this decree reflects the provisions of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM as amended) and takes into account criteria of the IAEA related recommendations as well as the implementing guides and technical guidance documents.

5.     As part of this regulatory development process, Algeria has established a Nuclear Security Committee at the national level, in charge of the development and update of the Nuclear Security Program.

6. The Committee is also given the mandate to conduct threat assessment and to define appropriate security measures in compliance with the requirements applicable to storage, transport and use of nuclear material and radioactive sources.

7. Algeria has made significant progress, strengthening its national nuclear security architecture through the establishment of sustainable mechanisms and updated procedures to address nuclear security issues at borders including export control of dual-use materials.

8. Memorandums of understanding between involved national actors are regularly updated, to take charge of actions related to safety and security of nuclear materials and other radioactive materials.

9. As a result of these Memorandums of understanding, joint work plans have been developed aiming to strengthen national detection capabilities, in particular at borders, through training programs and technical support.

10. Significant updating of regulations is under development, with input from every department involved in security issues, taking into account international requirements and experiences.

IIINational and Regional Capacitybuilding Actions:

1.     A Nuclear Security Training and Support Center was entrusted in 2012 by presidential decree. Its mission is to provide a high quality technical and scientific support to the competent authorities as well as to contribute in enhancing human resources at both the national and regional level.

2. Training and support activities of the Centre follow the IAEA conceptual methodology, based on systematic approach to training and nuclear security needs assessment. Specific training courses and workshops are regularly delivered to various operators and stakeholders involved in applying nuclear security measures.

3. Several outreach Conferences on illicit trafficking of radioactive sources are regularly organized for customs.

4.  Master’s degree course in nuclear security has been implemented as well as nuclear security and physical protection modules were included in the nuclear engineering education programs.

5. During 2013-2016, Algeria organized several national and regional courses in nuclear security. Some of them were supported by the IAEA, namely, the workshops on Design basis threat, nuclear forensics, radiological crime scene management and nuclear security culture.

6.   Courses are regularly organized, in cooperation with the IAEA, on nuclear safety, safeguards and security; they met with great success and have had strong participation among African states, for both the English and French speaking countries.

IV International Cooperation and Coordinating Mechanisms:

1. Algeria is a founding member of the international network of nuclear security and support centers, created under the auspices of the IAEA on the 2nd February 2012. Algerian experts from different institutions are actively contributing in its working groups.

A particular importance is attached to strengthening the activities of the network by fostering those aimed at promoting an intensive and sustainable collaboration between the network members through exchange of experience and best practices in nuclear security training.

2.     Algeria is cooperating with the IAEA to adopt and implement the integrated nuclear security and support plan (INNSP). Since the last INSSP meeting, held in Algiers in November 2013, gathering national representatives and IAEA experts, Algeria issued many regulations and took several steps with a view to enhancing its nuclear security framework for which an update is about to be completed during the year 2016.

3. Algeria has participated in training courses on Physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear security infrastructure development in Republic of Korea, International Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security Academy (INSA).

4. During 20122016, Algeria, with the U.S./State Department, has identified relevant areas of collaboration in the field of nuclear security.

The cooperation with the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) has now entered the phase of implementation.

Needs assessment has been jointly conducted with the objective of identifying topical areas of training and technical support. Several Action plans focusing on specific training and technical cooperation in nuclear security are being deployed.

The scope of work for these Action Sheets includes in particular, tasks focusing on physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities and the security of radioactive sources as well as nuclear security curriculum training development, train-the-trainer, cyber-security and nuclear forensics.

Train-the-trainer was outlined as a priority task, to provide the Algerian nuclear security training and support centre, powerful human resource capabilities to deliver nuclear security training at both national and regional level.

Various Workshops were organized within the framework of this cooperation, namely: The Fundamentals of physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, Development of an Analytical Plan in Support of a Nuclear Forensics Investigation based on CMX-4 Exercise, Graded approach to developing a national nuclear forensics library.

5. Since its adherence to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), in February 2012, Algeria is following with great interest its activities and looks forward to contributing to its continuous efforts toward the goal of strengthening the overall global architecture to combat nuclear terrorism

6. Algeria has been involved through the NorthAfricaandSahel Regional Secretariat of the EUCBRN threat reduction Centre of Excellence (EU CBRNCoE) in the coordination of several cooperative projects in the area of capacity building to enhance nuclear security and CBRN safety and security at the national, regional and international level.

The initiative has now entered a new phase, where the participating countries are invited, as a next step, to carry out a needs assessment. This initiative plays a major role by ensuring cooperation and coordination with partner countries through their National Focal Points and by facilitating the implementation of projects in the region.

7.  Algeria has hosted several workshops and meetings through the (EU CBRNCoE) cooperation project, related to nuclear detection instruments at ports and airports (JRC/EU), dual use equipment and control (EU/CBRN) and export control regulation with (BAFA), Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control.

An additional mechanism was also established in 2015 to enhance the cooperation among African police. Called the African Police Cooperation Organization- AFRIPOL (under the aegis of the African Union), headquartered in Algiers, Algeria. AFRIPOL will bring together all African police forces to cooperate in the fight against crime, especially terrorism and cross-border crimes like illicit trafficking.

National Progress Report: Argentina

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Argentina has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by…

…Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

  • Argentina has been implementing the provisions included in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment and in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.
  • The Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ARN) has updated the domestic norm on "Transport of Radioactive Materials". The norm encompasses the "Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials" (2012 edition) of the IAEA.
  • ARN and the IAEA jointly organized a national workshop on Design Basis Threat during May 2015.
  • Argentina strengthened the attention to the nuclear security component in the storage of fuel elements from the Embalse NPP during the first stage of the life extension process.
  • ARN is working on the revision of the pertinent norm for implementing INFCIRC 225 Rev. 5 during 2016.

…Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

  • The total stock of HEU agreed under FRRSNF acceptance program has been just finally minimized by down-blending last HEU inventories.
  • Argentina continues to support the LEU technology for fission radioisotope production, contributing to a worldwide HEU minimization.

…Countering Nuclear Smuggling

  • Argentina will continue to strengthen its national export control regime, with particular attention to preventing the diversion of sensitive materials including nuclear material.

…Supporting Multilateral Instruments

  • As part of its efforts to support the implementation of UNSC resolution 1540, Argentina sent a technical assistance mission to Grenada covering nuclear regulatory issues and will undertake training activities in that country including in the field of nuclear security.

…Collaborating with International Organizations

  • In order to continue Argentina’s active participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) activities and to promote the GICNT in the region, Argentina co-hosted with Chile a Response and Mitigation Working Group workshop and tabletop exercise on August 2014. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism’s Radiological Emergency Management Exercise (REMEX) 2014: “Paihuen”, focused on demonstrating best practices for interagency communication and coordination needed to respond to criminal event involving radiation sources.
  • In terms of international nuclear security related activities Argentina participates in the GICNT, within which framework contributed to the development of documents and guidelines for the three working groups: NUCLEAR FORENSICS, NUCLEAR DETECTION and RESPONSE AND MITIGATION.
  • Argentina took active participation in main GICNT exercises:
    • Tiger Reef Feb 2014
    • Northern LightsJan 2015
    • Radiant CityMay 2015
    • Gate to AfricaOct 2015
    • Blue RavenNov 2015
  • Argentina and Chile are planning to organize another joint exercise, possibly “Paihuen 2”.
  • Argentina will continue to support and actively participate in the GICNT
  • Argentina is a member of the Program Committee for the 2nd International Conference on Nuclear Security convened by the IAEA on December 2016 and fully supports the Agency’s role in nuclear security.
  • Argentina integrated the Organization Committee for the International Conference “Computer Security in a Nuclear World – Expert Discussion and Exchange” IAEA Jun 2015.
  • Argentina will host an IAEA regional training course on security of radioactive material in transport in 2016.

National Progress Report: Armenia

Enhancement efforts in Combating Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials

Seizures of nuclear and radiological materials out of regulatory control in the South Caucasus region highlight the need for enhanced cooperation to counter the smuggling of these materials. The threat posed to regional and global security by the potential smuggling of hazardous materials is best met through the joint efforts.

Armenia continuously works at multilateral and bilateral levels to enhance its capabilities in countering nuclear smuggling in a comprehensive manner. These include the information collection and sharing, analysis, as well as law enforcement, and the issues of technical preparedness.

Within the framework of the U.S.-Armenia Joint Action Plan, signed in July 2008, the representatives of the governments of Armenia and the United States held a review meeting in Yerevan in April 2014. The ways of further strengthening cooperation to counter smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials have been discussed. The sides shared information on nuclear smuggling threats and trends, and discussed best practices in the areas of nuclear detection, nuclear forensics, law enforcement and other tools to prevent, detect and respond to incidents of nuclear smuggling. They reaffirmed their commitments to cooperate more closely to prevent terrorists and other criminals from acquiring nuclear materials at black market. In particular, the US-Armenia intergovernmental working group outlined the following:

  • to build nuclear forensics capabilities,
  • to continue development of Armenia’s counter nuclear and radiological materials smuggling capabilities,
  • to assist and support Armenia’s law enforcement agencies in investigations and prosecution of criminals involved in illegal activities.

Following these arrangements, a group of US experts had a nuclear forensics coordination meeting with Armenian counterparts in October 2015 in Yerevan. They discussed the provision of nuclear forensic equipment (an alpha spectrometer) and introductory training, which provides a sustainable capability for nuclear smuggling investigations. Currently the sides are discussing the establishment of a national nuclear forensics library which is enshrined in Nuclear Security Summit documents and IAEA Nuclear Security Series guidelines.

IAEA Nuclear Security Related Activities

The Government of Armenia attaches great importance to the full implementation of relevant International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) instruments on nuclear security and safety. Much attention is paid to the physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear material[1]. In December 2014 a team of IAEA experts conducted a two-week International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission in Armenia. The mission reviewed the country’s nuclear security-related legislative and regulatory framework for nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities and activities, as well as security arrangements applied to the transport of radioactive sources. The team also reviewed physical protection systems at the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and at three facilities where high activity sources are used or stored. The IPPAS team concluded that Armenia’s nuclear security is robust and that important progress has been made in enhancing nuclear security since a previous IPPAS mission in 2003. The team also identified several good practices in the national nuclear security regime and at the visited facilities. At the same time, recommendations and suggestions were made for further improvements in nuclear security.

Nuclear Security-Related International Activities

Armenia continues its involvement in activities of Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and fully shares its key principles enshrined in the Statement of Principles. Armenian officials and experts actively participated at the GICNT meetings and workshops, in particular at the Plenary Meeting in Helsinki and the Nuclear Forensics working Group meeting in the United States respectively in June and October 2015. The Armenian side presented the progress in nuclear forensics and in investigation of radiological or nuclear material smuggling.

A National report on the activities in Combating Nuclear Terrorism, in accordance with UN GA resolution N69/39 requirements, was presented to UNODA in May 2015. The Report contains the information on Government activities in the area of non-proliferation and protection of potentially-dangerous materials from terrorists and other criminal groups.

 

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

 

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials pose a real threat to international peace and security. In this regard, the Proliferation Security Initiative remains an important tool of prevention.

Armenia brings its contribution to the activities and the events organized within the Initiative’s framework. Armenia’s officials actively participated in the PSI high and mid-level meetings held in Warsaw (May 2013) and subsequently in Washington D.C. (January 2016). In parallel, the Armenian experts have been actively engaged in the US EXBS and DTRA operational exercises and workshops, which have enabled them to improve their individual and collective interdiction capabilities.

Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540

With the assistance of experts of 1540 Committee and the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center, Armenia’s National Action Plan for 2015-2020 was elaborated and eventually adopted on February 5, 2015 by the Government of Armenia. In March 2015 it was submitted to the 1540 Committee. This dyadic document takes stoke and outlines a series of concrete steps ranging from reviewing already implemented national measures to the coordination of ongoing and anticipated activities. It underlines Armenia’s activities and law regulations in nuclear, chemical and biological spheres as well as the export control and border security subjects. Particular attention is paid to multilateral and bilateral cooperation.

CBRN activities

Alongside with above mentioned initiatives and programs Armenia is dynamically involved in the EU-led CBRN (chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear) regional projects. In particular, with the assistance of the EU Centres of Excellence Armenia is currently implementing the projects N44 and N52 which are designed to develop national capabilities in risk mapping, risk assessment and mitigation, and the technical assistance to the National Team for their execution. The results of these practical arrangements will bring to the development of the National Action Plan.

Combating Proliferation Financing

Armenian government is taking a number of significant steps to address the issues that might be conducive to proliferation related illegal activities. The governmental agencies involved in licensing and export control of dual-use items and sensitive material are well attuned to the risks. Meanwhile, close cooperation, including information sharing, has been established between these agencies and the country's financial intelligence unit (Financial Monitoring Centre)[2], which, within the framework of combating money laundering, terrorism and proliferation financing, is scrutinizing on a daily basis the UN SC lists of designated entities involved in proliferation financing. At the same time FMC has been proactive in equipping the financial institutions with software which ought to ensure that matches are made with names on PF lists.

On January 28, 2016 the Council of Europe MONEYVAL Committee published the 5th round mutual evaluation report of anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing measures of Armenia adopted in December 2015. The Report concluded that Armenia demonstrated substantial level of effectiveness for the issues related to proliferation financing (Immediate outcome 11).

[1] In 2013 the Parliament of Armenia ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Adoption of the Government Decree №985-А as of 13.09.2013 on appointment of competent authorities for implementation of obligations set in the Amendment to the Convention followed.

[2] A separate unit in the structure of the Central Bank of Armenia

National Progress Report: Australia

1. Supporting multilateral instruments: Australia has ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Australia has completed its UNSCR 1540 reporting requirements. Australia has supported IAEA workshops and conducted regional outreach in support of ratification of the CPPNM amendment. Australia has submitted to the IAEA updated information pursuant to Article 14.1 of the CPPNM to inform the depositary of its laws and regulations giving effect to the convention.

2. Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radiological Material Security: Australia has independent nuclear security regulators for nuclear material and radioactive material. Australia follows key IAEA guidance documents including Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (NSS-13), the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, and the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.  Australia employs a Design Basis Threat (DBT) for its nuclear facilities, which includes a cyber-security component.  Australia is a subscriber to the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, promulgated as INFCIRC/869 in the IAEA.

The security system at the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation is regularly tested and evaluated through an exercise program which includes multi-agency and force on force exercises that are designed to test a DBT scenario.

3. Contribution to and use of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security-Related Activities and Services: Australia has contributed over AU$2.4 million to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund since its inception, hosted regional training courses on nuclear security, and been heavily involved in the development of the IAEA’s nuclear security series of guidance documents. 

Australia hosted an IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission in November 2013 and has requested the IAEA to conduct a follow-up mission in 2017.

4. Collaborating with International Organisations, Initiatives and Partnerships: Australia is a member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and chairs its Nuclear Forensics Working Group. In May 2016, Australia will host a GICNT nuclear emergency planning and response workshop and exercise “Kangaroo Harbour” which will demonstrate best practices in issuing and responding to notifications and assistance requests to increase nuclear detection, nuclear forensics and emergency response involving the threat and use of radioactive materials in a terrorist attack. Australia has been a member of INTERPOL since 1948, and is a donor participant in the (G8) Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

5. Minimising Sensitive Nuclear Material: Australia has shut-down its HEU-based research reactor at the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) in Sydney, repatriated all its spent fuel, and now uses only low-enriched uranium technology to fuel the research reactor and produce radiopharmaceuticals. Australia repatriated surplus stocks of HEU to USA in late 2012. Australia’s total holdings of highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium are below 5 Kg.

6. Efforts to Combat Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Radiological Materials: Australia contributes to the IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking Database and has contributed to an IAEA project to improve technical measures to detect and respond to Illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

7. Strengthened cooperation between government and nuclear industry: The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) is an active member of the World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS) and is involved in the development of best practice guides on nuclear and radioactive source security.

For Australia's nuclear security profile tables, click here

National Progress Report: Azerbaijan

Republic of Azerbaijan

National Progress Report 

2016 NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT

 

1.    Supporting Multilateral Instruments

Azerbaijan is a state party to relevant international instruments, such as International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM).

Endorsement by Azerbaijan of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources in August 2014 further helped to bolster national measures in the area of nuclear security. 

As a further step in its contributions to international efforts on the nuclear security and as a country committed to combating nuclear terrorism, Azerbaijan has recently ratified the Amendment to the CPPNM and deposited its instrument of ratification to the Director-General of the IAEA.

2.    Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

Since the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, the capacities of relevant state agencies in the area of nuclear security and physical protection have been further enhanced through various staff trainings, and provision with modern equipment, surveillance and screening systems, as well as radiation control devices.   

The State Agency on Nuclear and Radiological Activities Regulation (SANRAR) maintain stringent regulatory regime covering all matters related to nuclear safety and security, including physical protection of materials and facilities. SANRAR is closely cooperating with international partners to improve its expertise and capacities for regulation and licensing of all types of activities related to the use of ionizing radiation sources.

Existing legislative acts and regulations are currently being reviewed with a view to ensuring a sufficiently improved legislative framework. Currently, new draft law on “Radiation Protection and Nuclear Security” is under elaboration by SANRAR. IAEA recommendations and international practice, as well as relevant IAEA Guidelines and conventions, including the provisions of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, were taken into account during the process of drafting. The adoption of this law will further strengthen national nuclear security regime.   

3.    Countering Nuclear Smuggling

In the face of emerging proliferation threats and due to its geographic location, Azerbaijan attaches utmost importance to the prevention of possible use of its territory as a transit route for illicit nuclear trafficking. In close cooperation with international partners, Azerbaijan has developed a comprehensive national export control system with a solid legislation basis in line with international standards. Up to date, national export control system has proved itself as a reliable mechanism in preventing illicit nuclear trafficking. Portable radiation control devices and other detection capabilities at border crossing points were increased even further by upgrading some checkpoints.

Unfortunately, due to the continued occupation of its territories by neighboring Armenia, Azerbaijan is unable to provide proper border control along the substantial part of its borders. 

4.  Collaborating with International Partners, Organizations and Initiatives

Recognizing and commending the key role of the IAEA in developing nuclear security regulations and standards, Azerbaijan continues to maintain a successful cooperation with the Agency on various aspects of nuclear security. Azerbaijan participates in international information sharing on illicit trafficking issues through contribution to the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database.

Within the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, in 2015 Azerbaijan and the IAEA signed a Country Programme Framework document for 2015-2020, which establishes a basis for national projects in the area of improvement of the regulatory and legislative infrastructure, capabilities in radiation safety, security of nuclear materials, radioactive waste management, as well as in radiation monitoring and control of border and customs check points.   

Moreover, in 2015 Baku European Games the IAEA has provided assistance to Azerbaijan in order to strengthen the implementation of nuclear security measures before and during this major public event. 

Azerbaijan also welcomes the efforts of the United Nations for strengthening nuclear security. In this regard, ensuring full implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540 and subsequent resolutions plays an important role in prevention the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery.  

Ever since Azerbaijan became a partner country to the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), representatives and national experts of the country have been actively participating in GICNT events and thematic exercises. These forums provided an opportunity to share the measures that Azerbaijan has undertaken in fulfilling its international obligations in the area of nuclear safety and security.

In addition, bilateral cooperation is being continued with partner countries in the field of combating illicit trafficking, non-proliferation and strengthening the regulatory infrastructure.

National Progress Report: Belgium

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Belgium has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by[1]

STRENGTHENING NUCLEAR & OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SECURITY

A.- NATIONAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL SECURITY REGIME

a)   LEGAL & REGULATORY FRAMEWORK- LICENSING

Belgium strengthened and updated its legal and regulatory framework regarding physical protection a few years ago. This enhanced legal and regulatory framework necessitates the restructuring of the physical protection systems of the nuclear facilities. This restructuring process will be finalized in the coming months. It is being monitored by the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC), which is an independent public agency responsible for nuclear safety and security, radiation safety and for many aspects related to nuclear safeguards.

b) IPPAS (International Physical Protection Advisory Service)

An IPPAS mission took place in Belgium in November 2014. According to its findings, the national physical protection regime is a robust one, but there is room for some improvements. The Belgian authorities responsible for nuclear security are currently working towards the implementation of the IPPAS report.

c)  CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

 In the framework of the protection of critical infrastructures, the Belgian authorities are continuously improving the security of the Belgian nuclear power plants, including the parts dedicated to the transmission of electricity.

d) THREAT- TRUSTWORTHINESS

DESIGN BASIS THREAT (DBT)

Belgium's Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA) and the FANC have pooled their activities to establish the Design Basis Threat for the nuclear sector nationwide. In particular, thanks to a fruitful collaboration with the stakeholders, the specific reference threat for each nuclear operator has been established. The Belgian authorities are currently revising the DBT in function of the changing threat environment.

INSIDER THREAT & TRUSTWORTHINESS

The Belgian authorities are currently assessing how to strengthen the legal and regulatory framework regarding vetting and trustworthiness, and how to extend its scope. Moreover, the nuclear operators have implemented specific programmes aiming at increasing the vigilance with regards to trustworthiness.  This vigilance towards the insider threat relates not only to the nuclear security areas, but also to the non-nuclear areas of the nuclear installations.

Regarding the security of radioactive materials, the insider threat issue is already taken into account in a concrete manner, as illustrated (see point B)) by the practical aspects of the recent training organised jointly with the IAEA.

e) RESPONSE

The restructuring process of the national physical protection regime calls for strengthened and improved response capabilities in case of a nuclear security incident. At the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit in 2012,  Belgium stated its determination to accomplish this task which requires the cooperation and efforts of all involved parties. One of the main achievements in this regard is the recent decision by the Government to establish a new General Directorate “Surveillance and Protection”, within the Federal Police. This Directorate will be tasked with the protection of the critical infrastructures and the nuclear facilities. In the interim period, the military forces ensure this protection. 

As a follow-up to the IPPAS mission, reflection is currently underway to extend the powers and competencies of private security guards, notably with a view to improve their equipment for self-protection, to improve the synergies with the intervention forces and to better take into account the specificities of sensitive activities.

B.- NATIONAL RADIOLOGICAL MATERIAL SECURITY REGIME

Belgium underscores the need to protect all radioactive materials which are not nuclear materials by taking into account their potential danger and their attractiveness for criminals or terrorists. In this perspective, the relevant Belgian authorities are updating the legal and regulatory framework, in order to strengthen both safety and security of radioactive materials, notably by duly taking into account the nexus between them.

Two achievements are worth mentioning in this regard. First, the FANC has organized a workshop aimed at raising awareness of the threat posed by these materials and of their potential attractiveness for criminals and terrorists. Second, Belgium and the IAEA have jointly organized a national training course related to the protection of radioactive materials, which took place from 15 to 19 February 2016. This training course for the main operators and carriers has effectively reinforced the good cooperation with these stakeholders.

C.- CYBER SECURITY

For several years, international as well as national efforts focused on  strengthening the physical protection systems of nuclear facilities. However, given the numerous cyber-attacks against governments and industries, cybersecurity is now a top priority both at the international and the national level. This is why the relevant Belgian authorities have initiated a process aimed at identifying the principal features of potential cyber-attacks against the nuclear sector. This has allowed the identification of the specific threats and risks against our nuclear facilities.

The Cyber Security Centre for Belgium, under the authority of the Prime Minister, was established in 2015.

As far as the regulatory framework is concerned, it should be mentioned that in line with the existing regulations (in particular the Royal Decree of 17 October 2011 regarding the categorisation and the protection of nuclear-related documents), the nuclear operators must protect all sensitive information, whatever medium is being used. As a consequence, they have to protect any piece of information in digitalised form on networks or other electronic systems.

Belgium voluntarily extended the scope of the “stress-tests”, set up after the Fukushima accident, to include man-made events, such as cyber-attacks.  These stress-tests provided valuable insights, but they gave only a kind of snapshot. Given the rapidly and constantly evolving situation, a continuous monitoring is indispensable and this mind-set is fostered in all nuclear facilities of the country.

The FANC pays heed to the global recommendations of the IAEA in the field of cybersecurity. The FANC is also committed to the exchange of information with foreign authorities in order to share good cybersecurity practices.

Finally, the Cybersecurity Centre and the FANC are examining what kind of initiatives Belgium should take in order to optimize its cybersecurity and to reinforce the international cooperation in this field.

II.-  …MINIMIZING NUCLEAR & OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS

Belgium subscribes to the objective to eliminate in time, when economically and technically feasible, the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes.

Belgium actively works towards the timely conversion, subject to regulatory approval, of the research reactor BR2 of the Nuclear Research Centre (SCK•CEN) to low enriched uranium, as soon as an appropriate high density fuel has been qualified for this purpose. The SCK•CEN is participating in numerous irradiation experiments for the qualification of the high density LEU fuel, not only for its own reactor, but also for foreign research reactors. As such, the SCK•CEN takes the lead in a broad international cooperation.

Belgium also works towards the timely conversion, subject to regulatory approval, of the processing facility of the National Institute for Radioelements (IRE) for medical radio-isotopes to low enriched uranium. This conversion program is very advanced and runs on schedule. IRE is regularly communicating with the appropriate US authorities on the progress of this project.

Belgium plans to continue its collaboration with interested European countries and the United States to eliminate additional stocks of excess special nuclear materials, consistent with their commitment to prevent nuclear terrorism.

III.- …COUNTERING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING

Belgium participates in the Megaports Initiative aimed at enhancing the detection capabilities for special nuclear and other radioactive materials in containerized cargo transiting the global maritime shipping network.

IV .-  …SUPPORTING MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENTS

Belgium deposited its instrument of ratification of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) on 22 January 2013. Although the 2005 Amendment has yet to enter into force, the Belgian national legislation, regulations and policies have already been adapted to fully comply with the amended CPPNM.

Belgium ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) on 2 October 2009. Through the implementation law of 23 May 2013, intrusion or attempted intrusion into the security areas of the Belgian nuclear sites constitutes a criminal offence.

V.- COLLABORATING WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

A.- CONTRIBUTION TO THE IAEA’S NUCLEAR SECURITY-RELATED ACTIVITIES

Belgium actively supports the IAEA’s nuclear security initiatives, and Belgian experts contribute to many of these activities. For instance, Belgium actively participates in the process of developing documents in the IAEA's Nuclear Security Series, notably in the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee; Belgian experts have participated in IPPAS missions in other States; Belgium also shares information on the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials by participating in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database.

In addition, since the 2010 Washington NSS, Belgium has contributed 300.000 USD annually to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. The same contribution is scheduled for 2016. This will bring the total amount of Belgian voluntary contributions to this Fund since 2010 to more than two million USD.

B.- SUPPORT FOR OTHER NUCLEAR SECURITY-RELATED INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES

The Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCKŸCEN and the national Institute for Radioelements (IRE) have collaborated with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), US and European organisations to examine how medical isotope production facilities influence Treaty related noble gas analysis and to help develop an understanding of the global radioxenon inventory.

The SCK-CEN, together with the FANC and the Royal Meteorological Institute (KMI/IRM), has become a national data centre within the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the CTBTO.

Belgium is a partner country in the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and also participates in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

Belgium is committed to the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540 and has fulfilled its national reporting obligations in this regard.

Belgium recognizes the important role ENSRA (European Nuclear Security Regulators’ Association) plays as a forum for exchange on nuclear security regulatory matters, aiming notably at achieving or promoting, as far as practicable, a common approach of nuclear security practices. The FANC is one of the founders of this forum, and intensively participates in its activities.

VI.- PARTNERING WITH EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS

The policy of the Belgian nuclear security authorities is to consult and to collaborate to the greatest possible extent with the stakeholders. Outreach efforts were undertaken during the process of reinforcing the physical protection regulatory framework. Such outreach is also taking place during the current process of enhancing the security of radioactive materials. The national training course on the physical protection of radioactive materials, jointly organized by Belgium and the IAEA in February 2016, illustrated the close cooperation with the stakeholders.

ANNEX: LIST OF THE JOINT STATEMENTS/GIFT BASKETS BELGIUM JOINED

1.   Multilateral Cooperation on High-Density Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Development for High-Performance Research Reactors

2.   Strengthening the Security of High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources (HASS)

3.   Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security

4.   Mitigating Insider Threats

5.   Sustainability in Reporting and Information Sharing

6.   Increasing Cyber Security of Industrial Control and Plant Systems at Nuclear Facilities

7.   Promoting Full and Universal Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)

[1] As one of the subscribing states to IAEA Information Circular (INFCIRC) 869, some of the accomplishments mentioned in this report are directly associated with the additional commitments described in this Information Circular.

 

National Progress Report: Brazil

International Legal Framework – The 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) is under consideration by the Brazilian National Congress.

Contribution to IAEA Nuclear Security-Related Activities – Brazil has been supportive of several IAEA activities in the field of nuclear security, including the elaboration of the Nuclear Security Series documents, the sponsorship of regional and international courses in Latin America and the Caribbean (5 of which since 2009), the organization of national workshops and the appointment of experts to missions. Brazil has actively participated in the Joint Task Force of the Commission of Safety Standards, in the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC) and the Advisory Group to the IAEA Director-General on Nuclear Security to discuss the synergies between nuclear safety and security.

Enhance efforts in combating the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials – Brazil contributes to the IAEA Incident Trafficking Database (ITDB) and the IAEA Nuclear Security Information Portal (NUSEC). At the regional level, within the MERCOSUL and Associated States, Brazil has participated in the Specialized Working Group to prevent, detect and respond to the threat of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials, including training courses for border officials, exchange of information and best practices.

Contribution to efforts on HEU Minimization – Brazil has converted all of its nuclear research reactors for the use of low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. All highly enriched nuclear fuel elements have been repatriated to the country of origin. The new Brazilian Multipurpose Reactor is being designed also to use LEU.

Strengthening of nuclear and radioactive material security in transport – The National Regulatory Authority (CNEN) has been working with all concerned institutions to improve security standards in the transport of nuclear and radioactive material across the national territory. The Brazilian national regulation on security in transport of nuclear and radioactive material is currently under revision, taking into consideration the IAEA recommendations on this issue.

Strengthening of National Nuclear and Radiological Material Security System – CNEN is currently working in the revised text of its regulations on nuclear and radiological security applicable to nuclear and radioactive material and associated facilities, taking into account international best practices and provisions of the 2005 Amendment of the CPPNM, as well as INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 and other relevant IAEA recommendations.

Strengthening the Role of Nuclear Industry in Nuclear Security –Through the organization of workshops, seminars and training courses, CNEN has made progress in fostering a culture of nuclear security within the national nuclear industry. The implementation of CNEN's Annual Program of Regulatory Security Inspections has also contributed to enhance a culture  of nuclear security by improving the security measures and systems in the Brazilian nuclear facilities.

Establishment of Centres of Excellence –In partnership with the IAEA, the Brazilian Nuclear Physical Security Support Centre was established in 2012 with the aim of training and qualifying personnel in the area of physical security. Since its inception, one international, two regional and eight national courses were organized.

National Progress Report: Canada

2016 Nuclear Security Summit
National Progress Report
Canada
(March 2016)

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), Canada has strengthened nuclear security implementation domestically and significantly contributed to global nuclear security.

1.  Strengthened Nuclear and Other Radiological Material Security

a)    Nuclear Security

Vulnerable supplies of weapons-usable nuclear materials pose a significant international security threat given the potential for non-state actors to acquire and use them for malicious purposes. Physical protection of nuclear and radiological materials includes securing these goods against theft or sabotage, during use, storage, or transport.

Canada is committed to maintaining a world-class domestic nuclear safety and security system. Canada hosted its first International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission from October 19-30, 2015. The IPPAS mission reviewed Canada’s regulatory and legislative framework for the security of nuclear facilities and material and visited nuclear power and research reactors to assess their physical protection systems. The mission concluded that Canada’s nuclear security regime was strong, resilient and sustainable.

The 2016 Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Nuclear Materials Security index ranks Canada third globally with respect to securing nuclear materials from the risks of both theft and sabotage. Canada continues to improve, having increased its score by 2 points from 2014, due to strengthened cyber security regulations and regulatory assessments for nuclear facilities, and by 8 points from 2012.

Canada is in the process of updating its March 2014 Design Basis Threat Analysis for nuclear high security facilities, building on international benchmarking and increased collaboration with domestic partners. Canada is also contributing to the revision of the IAEA’s nuclear security guidance on the Development, Use and Maintenance of the Design Basis Threat.

Canada continues to enhance its fitness for duty requirements for nuclear facility personnel and will expand the target population for these beyond nuclear security forces at high security sites. The expanded requirements are expected to address substance abuse (impairment at the workplace) screening, hours of work monitoring, and physical, medical and psychological screening for an expanded worker population at nuclear power plants.  

As part of the $28 million commitment made at the 2014 NSS to enhance nuclear and radiological security internationally, Canada’s Global Partnership Program (GPP) invested $5.2 million in key physical protection upgrades at vulnerable nuclear facilities in Southeast Asia to help prevent the theft of nuclear materials. This support has resulted in strengthened physical protection of nuclear facilities through infrastructure upgrades and enhanced emergency response capabilities in the event of radiological accidents.

b)    Radiological Security

Canada is one of the world’s largest suppliers of highly radioactive sealed sources and supports their protection from potential loss, theft and malicious use. As part of the $28 million commitment made by Canada at the 2014 NSS to enhance nuclear and radiological security, Canada’s GPP has contributed $7 million to strengthen the security and management of highly radioactive sources by enhancing physical security and local capacity, including through the provision of training, equipment and infrastructure. These projects have focused on countries with inventories of Canadian-origin material in Africa, the Americas, and Southeast Asia.

Canada continues its efforts to implement IAEA security requirements for radiological sources with Canadian industry. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission’s (CNSC) regulatory document “Security of Nuclear Substances: Sealed Sources” is fully aligned with the IAEA’s Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

Canada continues to support IAEA and World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) training courses and workshops to assist other States to develop the competencies necessary for comprehensive radioactive source security. Canada participates in exchanges of information on programmes and technical solutions for improving the security of radioactive sources.

c)    Transport Security

Further to a 2014 NSS joint statement on transport security of nuclear and radiological materials, Canada participated in the NSS Transport Security gift basket and contributed to good practice guides on the security of transport for civilian nuclear and other radioactive materials. These guides will be shared with other countries at the 2016 NSS, through the IAEA and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), to inform future activity in this area. 

Additionally, Canada co-sponsored the 2014 NSS maritime security joint statement and participated in the November 16-19, 2015 Wilton Park workshop which formulated recommendations to enhance the security of the global maritime supply chain, particularly through deterring, detecting and responding to nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control. The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) delivered a presentation on Canada’s maritime detection architecture and related experiences.

Canada’s GPP will contribute to transportation security projects, including the possibility of funding the provision of containers to safely and securely transport and consolidate radioactive sources into long-term storage.

Canada continues to support IAEA and WINS training courses and workshops to assist other States to develop the competencies necessary for a comprehensive security regime for the transport of nuclear and other radioactive material.

d)    Nuclear Forensics Capabilities

Should nuclear or radioactive materials not under regulatory control be interdicted in Canada, it is essential for the Government of Canada to be able to identify where this material came from, the nature of the material, and the risks it poses so that the related security threat can be addressed. Nuclear forensics is therefore a key element in responding to illicit trafficking of nuclear materials.

Further to its commitment at the 2012 NSS to promote the development of a national nuclear forensics capability, the Canadian National Nuclear Forensics Capability Project (CNNFCP) was started in May 2013 to help establish a national network of nuclear forensics laboratories and a national nuclear forensics library. The CNNFCP will conclude its research and development activities by the end of March 2016. The next step will be to build on existing capacity and formally create a network of nuclear forensics laboratories and a national nuclear forensics library. The Defence Research and Development Canada’s Centre for Security Science and the CNSC are leading these efforts. The CNSC has committed to maintaining and operating a national nuclear forensics library on behalf of the Government of Canada.

e)    Information and cyber security

In addition to protecting sensitive and classified nuclear information in all its forms, Canada believes that the protection of critical systems and equipment is important to nuclear safety, nuclear security, and emergency preparedness and response.

Canada has developed a national standard (CSA N290.7) to address cyber security at nuclear power plants and small reactor facilities. This standard was published in December 2014. Furthermore, nuclear power plant operators in Canada have in place cyber security programs aligned with international standards and best practices.

Canada hosted an IAEA National Training Course on Computer Security and Conducting Assessments in December 2015, with industry, regulator and government partner participants. This included a methodology for conducting computer security assessments at nuclear facilities that is consistent with international standards, IAEA guidance and recognized best practices regarding the protection of information and industrial control systems. Canada has robust procedures in this area, but believes that more work needs to be done to raise standards globally. Canada supports the efforts of the IAEA and WINS to develop such guidance for state-level government departments and agencies, regulatory bodies, nuclear facility operators, and research and educational institutes.

2.  Contribution to Minimization of Sensitive Nuclear Materials

Minimizing the global stocks of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium will help prevent non-state actors from acquiring such materials, thereby reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism. Canada remains committed to the minimization of HEU and has made strong progress domestically and internationally.

Canada is committed to eliminating the use of HEU in the production of medical isotopes. Canada has announced that it will cease the routine production of molybdenum 99 (Mo-99) from Atomic Energy Canada Limited’s (AECL) Chalk River National Research Universal reactor in October 2016, and will remove this facility as a potential supplier of last resort in the international Mo-99 supply chain by March 2018, thereby ending HEU-based medical isotope production in Canada. The government continues to work to ensure a reliable global supply of medical isotopes.

At the 2010 NSS, Canada committed to repatriate its United States (U.S.)-origin HEU fuel stored at Chalk River Laboratories and has made good progress in implementing this repatriation initiative. Canada repatriated one shipment of used HEU fuel in 2010, another in 2012, and four more in 2015. The last and largest phase of the repatriation initiative for used HEU fuel started in August 2015, and is slated to conclude in May 2019. 

Following Canada’s March 2012 announcement of the expansion of the repatriation initiative, to include the return of additional HEU materials stored at Chalk River Laboratories, a second initiative was launched to repatriate AECL’s inventory of HEU-bearing liquids that were generated as a by-product from medical isotope production. Shipments of HEU-bearing liquids are scheduled to commence in mid-2016, and be completed by May 2019.

Furthermore, the University of Alberta is taking steps to decommission its SLOWPOKE research reactor which operates on HEU fuel. The University of Alberta plans to repatriate the HEU fuel by May 2019. Once the decommissioning of the University of Alberta’s research reactor has been completed, Canada will have only one remaining HEU-fueled research reactor.

Canada has assessed that approximately three-quarters of its inventory of plutonium is ready for dispositioning, and has initiated discussions with the U.S. to determine whether it would accept the material for long-term management. The remainder will continue to be safely stored and will be used to support future research and development work. 

Internationally, Canada assisted a U.S.-led reactor conversion and cleanout project for an HEU-fuelled SLOWPOKE research reactor in Jamaica, which was completed in October 2015.

3.   Enhanced Efforts to Combat Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Radiological Materials

Increased efforts and capacity to prevent, detect and interdict illicitly trafficked nuclear and radiological materials are necessary to reduce the risk of non-state actors acquiring and using these materials in nuclear weapons or radiological dispersal devices. The CBSA is upgrading Canada’s Radiation Detection Network (RADNet) to help prevent illicit trafficking. RADNet scans nearly all commercial marine containers entering Canada for the presence of radiation using stand-alone, automated radiation detection portals at the major marine ports. The CBSA is replacing aging equipment with advanced-radiation portal monitors, which enable greater sensitivity and source characterization to improve Canada’s ability to combat the illicit trafficking of radiological material. Canada also participates in international information sharing on illicit trafficking in nuclear material through contributions to the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database and bilateral cooperation.

Canada continues to implement a risk-based security compliance program for licensing of radioactive sources, and has implemented comprehensive import and export control programs for both Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources.

As part of the $28 million Canadian commitment made at the 2014 NSS to enhance nuclear and radiological security, Canada’s GPP has contributed $15 million to strengthen the capacities of partner countries to detect and interdict illicit cargos of nuclear and radiological materials. This includes the provision of $12.2 million to support the purchase of vehicle-based and man-portable radiation monitoring and detection equipment, and the installation of radiation portal monitors at key border crossings in Jordan. Canada’s GPP has also provided $2.3 million to support counter nuclear smuggling (CNS) initiatives in Peru, and has contributed funding to The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) for the delivery of training programmes in Southeast Asia and Jordan to help disrupt illicit trafficking activities. This support enhanced the security of border crossings in Jordan and mitigated the risk of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological material in the region.

Further to Canada’s co-sponsorship of the 2014 NSS gift basket on CNS, Canada participated in a workshop on CNS teams in vulnerable regions held in Amman, Jordan in November 2015. Participants exchanged experiences on the challenges in conducting investigations and operations to locate and secure illicitly trafficked nuclear or radioactive material. Canada also participated in the March 2016 CNS workshop held in Karlsruhe, Germany and hosted by the U.S. and the European Commission. This three day workshop addressed crime scene management and laboratory analysis of interdicted material with a focus on ensuring that nuclear smuggling investigations lead to successful prosecutions.

4.   Support for International Legal Instruments

a)    CPPNM/A and ICSANT

Canada believes that the universal implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) would significantly augment existing global counter-terrorism efforts. Accordingly, Canada enacted legislation in 2013, known as Bill S-9 (the Nuclear Terrorism Act), which enabled Canada to ratify both the CPPNM/A and ICSANT. This legislation amended the Criminal Code in order to create a number of new offences related to nuclear terrorism, in accordance with the CPPNM/A and ICSANT.

Canada also continues to advocate for a strong multilateral framework for the global fight against nuclear terrorism, supporting IAEA efforts to promote the entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM/A) and encouraging States that have not yet done so to ratify the CPPNM/A as soon as possible.

Internationally, Canada has shared its experience on the development and design of its Nuclear Terrorism Act, highlighting obstacles and how they were overcome, to help other States facilitate their own legislative efforts. Since October 2011, Canada’s GPP has provided $720,000 towards six regional workshops and provided follow-up assistance for the purpose of assisting other countries with the implementation of CPPNM/A and ICSANT through identifying and addressing obstacles to ratification. These workshops facilitated the ratification of the CPPNM/A by eight countries.

b)    UN Security Council Resolution 1540

Canada supports the full and universal implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 as a key tool in the global fight against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and terrorism. The Resolution imposes several binding obligations on States to establish and maintain domestic controls to enhance the security of nuclear materials, in line with the objectives of the NSS.

At the 2014 NSS, Canada and the Republic of Korea welcomed the support of 32 countries and the UN for the joint statement on the full and universal implementation of UNSCR 1540. This joint statement encouraged participating States to offer assistance to help other States implement the nuclear security provisions of UNSCR 1540 and to advance key 1540 Committee priorities. Canada also circulated the joint statement at the May 7, 2014, UNSC Special Session on the 10th anniversary of UNSCR 1540, where the text was submitted to the UNSC for inclusion in its record of the debate. At the 2016 NSS, Canada worked with Spain and the Republic of Korea to renew the 2014 joint statement on UNSCR 1540 with a 2016 joint statement outlining further voluntary actions for States to undertake, such as advocating for better coordination and cooperation between the 1540 Committee and key international nuclear security organizations and institutions.

Canada’s GPP works closely with the 1540 Committee to look for ways to address outstanding needs for the implementation of UNSCR 1540, including a coordination role for the 1540 Committee. To this end, Canada welcomes the regular participation of 1540 Committee experts in recent Global Partnership Working Group meetings, and strongly supports the 1540 Committee’s ongoing efforts to achieve the universal implementation of 1540.

Canada’s GPP programming unit for UNSCR 1540 works to reduce the threat posed by terrorist acquisition of WMDs and related material by increasing States’ capacities to prevent the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and their means of delivery, and establish domestic controls over related materials to prevent their illicit trafficking. The three main pillars of the GPP UNSCR 1540 programming unit are: 1) providing CBRN related training and equipment; 2) providing legislative and regulatory assistance for CBRN-related treaties; and 3) enhancing export controls and border security. This GPP programming unit also works with the UNSCR 1540 Committee to respond to UN Member States’ requests for assistance.

Domestically, Canada has provided the UNSCR 1540 Committee with an updated UNSCR 1540 National Implementation Action Plan further to a commitment made at the 2014 NSS. This plan outlines both domestic and international plans and priorities for implementing provisions of UNSCR 1540, which will further enhance Canada’s ability to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism.

5.   Contribution To and Use of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security-Related Activities and Services

Canada currently ranks as the third-largest national contributor to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund, having contributed over $20.6 million through the GPP since 2004. Results include: physical upgrades to radiological security and associated facilities; radiological source recovery and end-of-life management; enhanced physical security and the lock-down of weapons–usable materials at nuclear sites; and enhanced capacities of Member States to manage and respond to nuclear and radiological threats. Canada actively contributes to the development of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Series, most recently by participating in the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee and assisting in the development of documents within the Nuclear Security Series. Canada also supported the revision of international guidance on measures against the insider threat, facilitated the development of related training materials and instructed at an international training course.

In 2014, Canada participated in and provided support for the organization of the International Conference on Advances in Nuclear Forensics. In June 2015, Canada participated in the International Conference on Computer Security in a Nuclear World: Expert Discussion and Exchange. Canada led a computer security demonstration, chaired a Main Session and two Technical Sessions and presented six papers. Canada welcomes the 2016 International Conference on Nuclear Security to be held in December 2016 and will participate actively in the Conference by supporting renewed engagement by IAEA Member States to tackle the challenge of nuclear security in light of new threats and challenges.

a)    IPPAS Mission

Further to a commitment made at the 2014 NSS in The Hague, Canada hosted its first IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission from October 19-30, 2015. At Canada’s request, the IPPAS mission reviewed all five IPPAS modules, including Canada’s security-related legislative and regulatory regime for nuclear material and nuclear facilities, as well as the security arrangements applied to the transport of nuclear material, the security of radioactive material and associated facilities and activities, and the information and computer security systems in place. The team visited several facilities, including power reactors and research reactors, to review physical protection systems.

The IPPAS Mission’s final report provides a comprehensive overview of Canada’s nuclear security regime which it assesses as robust, resilient and sustainable. Canada values the IPPAS mission’s report and findings, noting in particular the opportunity to further hone our nuclear security regime and share our good practices. Canada remains a strong proponent of the voluntary disclosure of information from IPPAS missions in order to better build up a global repository of best practices and lessons learned and will publish a publicly available summary of the IPPAS mission report. Canada values the creation and implementation of IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance documents and supports continuously improving physical protection and nuclear security both nationally and globally. To this end, Canada has assisted the IAEA in its undertaking of IPPAS missions to other countries including the United Kingdom, Indonesia, Hungary, Romania, the U.S. and Australia.

b)    Nuclear Security Support Centre

Nuclear Security Support Centres (NSSC) can help to ensure sustainable and effective nuclear security by facilitating the development of the necessary knowledge, expertise and skills for personnel with a responsibility for nuclear security. Canada therefore continues to support the IAEA in its efforts to establish NSSCs and provided a presentation at the August 2015 working group meeting on the Canadian Regulatory Framework and training of personnel at nuclear facilities.

The CNSC is continuing to explore the establishment of a virtual NSSC to help ensure sustainable and effective nuclear security. In May 2015, a workshop on “Meeting Canadian Commitments for Demonstrable Competency in Nuclear Security Regulation and Implementation” was held with participation from Canadian nuclear security stakeholders and WINS with the goal of creating a common competency framework and professional development curriculum for nuclear security regulators and licensees.

6.   Support for Nuclear Security-Related International Activities

Canada participates in all major nuclear security-related international activities, including the G-7 Nuclear Safety and Security Group (G-7 NSSG), the GICNT, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), INTERPOL and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) and works with the UNSCR 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts.

a)   Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

In recognition of the threat posed by terrorist acquisition of weapons and materials of mass destruction (WMD) the then-G8 launched the GP under Canada’s leadership at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit. Canada is an active participant in the GP and co-chairs the Global Partnership Expansion and Outreach Working Group.

Canada’s GPP supports the GP with projects to prevent WMD proliferation and reduce the threat posed by CBRN  terrorism. The GPP implements projects worldwide in priority areas including: nuclear and radiological security; biological security; and support for the implementation of UNSCR 1540 and chemical weapons destruction.

To date, Canada’s GPP has spent over $1.2 billion on WMD threat reduction programming. At the 2014 NSS, Canada committed $28 million to further nuclear security programming, which has been fully disbursed and resulted in enhanced physical security of nuclear facilities, with a focus on Southeast Asia, mitigation of the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological material in the Middle East, and enhanced the security of radioactive sources in Latin America.

At the 2016 NSS, Canada is pleased to announce $42 million in additional projects to further enhance nuclear and radiological security, and maintain momentum beyond the NSS process.

b)   Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

Canada is committed to the GICNT goal of strengthening global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. Canada is an active participant in GICNT events and exercises, including the Implementation and Assessment Group meetings and the GICNT biennial plenary meetings. Canada continues to lead in the development of technical advances in the area of nuclear forensics, and works closely with the GICNT Nuclear Forensics Working Group. For instance, Canada played a leading role in the development and delivery of technical exercises, including “Mystic Deer” in Budapest in October 2014 and “Glowing Tulip” in The Hague in March 2015. “Glowing Tulip” demonstrated the utility of strong legal provisions for criminalizing material out of regulatory control, highlighted good practices for laboratory management of forensics evidence, and provided partner countries with tools and information to increase the capacity of their national laboratories to provide expert testimony in a court of law.

Canada has also supported cross disciplinary events, such as the “Radiant City” event held in Karlsruhe, Germany, in May 2015, which examined the interplay between the areas of nuclear detection and forensics. Canada will continue its support of the GICNT by providing additional technical expertise for GICNT activities, such as Nuclear Forensics and Nuclear Detection work and other technical nuclear security work of the GICNT working groups.

c)   Proliferation Security Initiative

Canada continues to work with other Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) partners to enhance collective abilities to disrupt illicit shipments of nuclear and radiological weapons and related materials by sea, land, and air. This is accomplished through capacity-building exercises, the exchange of information and best practices, and participation in practical exercises. In September 2014, Canada funded a regional PSI Seminar in the Caribbean that brought together CARICOM partners to encourage their participation in the PSI and to enhance WMD interdiction-relevant capabilities and cooperation in the region. Canada also hosted the PSI Operational Experts Group (OEG) meeting in Ottawa in May 2015, which helped to focus PSI efforts on new proliferation challenges, including proliferation financing and intangible technology transfer. Domestically, Canada will continue to share domestic lessons learned learnt with partners and contribute materials to the Critical Capabilities and Practices (CCP) Tools and Resources Library.

7.    Partnering with External Stakeholders

a)   Cooperation between Government and Nuclear Industry

Given the important role played by the nuclear sector in ensuring that standards in nuclear security are upheld, Canada continues to place emphasis on strong cooperation between industry and government. This helps to ensure relevance and transparency in the creation of domestic compliance systems for both nuclear safety and nuclear security. Ongoing efforts to phase out the use of HEU-based production of medical isotopes in Canada is one example of close cooperation between government and industry.

The Government of Canada has invested approximately $60 million to support research and the development of alternatives to HEU technologies in the production of medical isotopes technologies, as well as to encourage their uptake by industry. Specific investments in alternative production technologies that do not use HEU and reduce radioactive waste in isotope production include the Non-Reactor-Based Isotope Supply Contribution Program (2010 – 2012) and the Isotope Technology Acceleration Program (2012 – 2016) by Natural Resources Canada. Additional efforts have been directed towards developing cyclotrons and linear accelerators for use in the production of the key medical isotope, technetium-99m. Partners in these programs have upgraded infrastructure and equipment, and are now undertaking the clinical trials necessary for licensing. These cooperative efforts aim to reduce the use of HEU as well as to achieve a more diverse and secure supply of isotopes.

Additionally, Canada participates in five multilateral export control regimes aimed at preventing the export of goods and technology that can be used in WMD programs or delivery systems: the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and Zangger Committee (ZC), the Australia Group (AG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA). Under these arrangements, Canada has undertaken measures to control export of goods and technology in order to ensure that they are not used in WMD programs or delivery systems, and provided information to exporters regarding implementation of requirements under the Export and Import Permits Act and the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, which codify in Canadian law Canada’s political commitments made through participation in the five foregoing regimes.

b)    Partnership with NGOs

Canada was one of the founding donors to the WINS Academy, a leader in professional development and certification for nuclear security management, and continues to provide financial and technical support. Further to a commitment made at the 2014 NSS, Canada’s GPP provided funding towards a project with the WINS to develop a competency framework for personnel and management with accountabilities for nuclear security. A related best practice guide was published in 2015. In the context of the 2016 NSS, Canada has worked with the United Kingdom and other contributors to the WINS Academy to issue a gift basket which encourages expansion of WINS’ international certification program, and urges NSS participating states to contribute to the Academy’s continued development.

National Progress Report: Canada (French)

 

SOMMET SUR LA SÉCURITÉ NUCLÉAIRE 2016

RAPPORT D’ÉTAPE NATIONAL

CANADA

(Mars 2016)

Depuis le Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire (SSN) de 2014, le Canada a renforcé la mise en œuvre de la sécurité nucléaire sur la scène nationale et a contribué de manière importante à la sécurité nucléaire mondiale.

 

1.     RENFORCEMENT DE LA SÉCURITÉ DES MATIÈRES NUCLÉAIRES ET D’AUTRES PRODUITS RADIOLOGIQUES

a)    SÉCURITÉ NUCLÉAIRE

L’approvisionnement vulnérable de matières nucléaires militaires représente une menace internationale importante en matière de sécurité étant donné le risque que des acteurs non étatiques se les procurent et en fassent usage à des fins malveillantes. La protection physique des matières nucléaires et radiologiques comprend la protection contre le vol ou le sabotage au cours de leur utilisation, de leur entreposage ou de leur transport.

 

Le Canada s’engage à préserver un système national de sûreté et de sécurité nucléaire de niveau international. Le Canada a accueilli sa première mission du Service consultatif international sur la protection physique (SCIPP) de l’Agence internationale de l’énergie atomique (AIEA) du 19 au 30 octobre 2015. La mission du SCIPP a examiné le cadre réglementaire et législatif du Canada sur la sécurité des installations et des matières nucléaires et a visité des centrales nucléaires et des réacteurs de recherche afin d’évaluer leurs systèmes de protection physique. La mission a permis de conclure que le programme national en matière de sécurité nucléaire était résistant, résilient et durable.

 

L’indice mondial de sécurité des matières nucléaires de 2016 de l’Initiative contre la menace nucléaire a placé le Canada au deuxième rang mondial en ce qui a trait à la sécurité des matières nucléaires par rapport aux risques de vol et de sabotage. Le Canada continue de s’améliorer, ayant augmenté son pointage de 2 points depuis 2014, en raison du renforcement des règles de sécurité informatique et des évaluations réglementaires des installations nucléaires, et de 8 points par rapport à 2012.

 

Le Canada est en train de mettre à jour son Analyse de la menace de référence de mars 2014 pour les installations nucléaires de sécurité élevée, en se basant sur l’analyse comparative internationale et la collaboration accrue avec les partenaires nationaux. Le Canada contribue également à la révision de documents sur la sécurité nucléaire de l’AIEA sur l’élaboration, l’utilisation et l’entretien de la menace de référence.

 

Le Canada continue d’améliorer ses exigences d’aptitude au travail pour le personnel des installations nucléaires et élargira la population cible pour ces dernières au-delà des forces de sécurité nucléaire dans les sites à sécurité élevée. Les exigences élargies devraient traiter le dépistage de la toxicomanie (facultés affaiblies sur le lieu de travail), la surveillance des heures de travail et le dépistage physique, médical et psychologique pour une population de travailleur élargie dans les centrales nucléaires.

 

Dans le cadre de l’engagement de 28 millions de dollars réalisé lors du SSN de 2014 visant à rehausser la sécurité nucléaire et radiologique à l’échelle internationale, le Programme de partenariat mondial (PPM) du Canada a investi 5,2 millions de dollars dans la mise à niveau clé de la protection physique dans les installations nucléaires vulnérables de l’Asie du Sud-Est pour aider à prévenir le vol de matières nucléaires. Ce soutien a entraîné un renforcement de la protection physique des installations nucléaires grâce à des mises à niveau des infrastructures et à l’amélioration des capacités d’intervention d’urgence dans le cas d’accidents radiologiques.

 

b)    SÉCURITÉ RADIOLOGIQUE

Le Canada est l’un des principaux fournisseurs de sources scellées fortement radioactives et il appuie leur protection contre les pertes, les vols et les usages malveillants potentiels. Dans le cadre de l’engagement du Canada de 28 millions de dollars réalisé lors du SSN de 2014 dans le but de rehausser la sécurité nucléaire et radiologique, le PPM du Canada a accordé 7 millions de dollars pour renforcer la sécurité et la gestion de sources fortement radioactives en améliorant la sécurité physique et la capacité locale, notamment en offrant des formations, de l’équipement et des infrastructures. Ces projets ont mis l’accent sur des pays ayant des stocks de matières d’origine canadienne en Afrique, en Amérique et en Asie du Sud-Est.

 

Le Canada poursuit ses efforts de mise en œuvre des exigences de sécurité de l’AIEA pour les sources radiologiques avec l’industrie canadienne. Le document réglementaire de la Commission canadienne de sûreté nucléaire (CCSN) intitulé « La sécurité des substances nucléaires : sources scellées » reflète entièrement le Code de conduite sur la sûreté et la sécurité des sources radioactives de l’AIEA.

 

Le Canada continue d’appuyer les formations de l’AIEA et du World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) pour aider d’autres États à développer les compétences nécessaires à la sécurité globale des sources radioactives. Le Canada participe aux échanges de renseignements sur les programmes et les solutions techniques visant à améliorer la sécurité des sources radioactives.

 

c)    SÉCURITÉ DU TRANSPORT

 

À la suite d’un énoncé conjoint du SSN en 2014 sur la sécurité du transport des matières nucléaires et radiologiques, le Canada a participé aux « engagements complémentaires » du SSN sur la sécurité du transport et a contribué à des guides sur les bonnes pratiques de sécurité du transport pour les matières nucléaires civiles et d’autres produits radioactifs. Ces guides seront communiqués à d’autres pays lors du SSN de 2016, à l’aide de l’AIEA et de l’Initiative mondiale de lutte contre le terrorisme nucléaire (IMLTN), pour rendre compte des activités futures dans ce domaine.

 

De plus, le Canada a coparrainé la déclaration conjointe sur la sécurité maritime du SSN de 2014 et a participé à l’atelier du 16 au 19 novembre 2015 à Wilton Park qui a permis de formuler les recommandations visant à améliorer la sécurité de la chaîne d’approvisionnement maritime mondiale, plus particulièrement à l’aide de la dissuasion, de la détection et de l’intervention face à des matières nucléaires et à d’autres produits radioactifs en dehors du contrôle réglementaire. L’Agence des services frontaliers du Canada (ASFC) a effectué une présentation sur l’architecture de détection maritime du Canada et sur les expériences connexes.

 

Le PPM du Canada contribuera aux projets sur la sécurité du transport, y compris l’occasion de financer la mise à disposition de conteneurs dans le but de transporter et de consolider de façon sécuritaire les sources radioactives vers l’entreposage à long terme.

 

Le Canada continue d’appuyer les formations et les ateliers de l’AIEA et du WINS pour aider d’autres États à développer les compétences nécessaires en vue d’une politique de sécurité globale pour le transport des matières nucléaires et d’autres produits radioactifs.

 

d)    CAPACITÉS DE CRIMINALISTIQUE NUCLÉAIRE

 

Dans le cas où des matières nucléaires ou radioactives qui ne font pas l’objet d’un contrôle réglementaire sont interdites au Canada, il est essentiel que le gouvernement du Canada soit en mesure de connaître l’origine de ces matières, leur nature, et les risques qu’elles présentent pour contrer la menace de sécurité associée. La criminalistique nucléaire est donc un élément essentiel de l’intervention face au trafic illicite de matières nucléaires.

 

Conformément à son engagement lors du SSN de 2012 de promouvoir la création d’une capacité nationale de criminalistique nucléaire, le projet national sur la capacité d’analyse nucléolégale du Canada a été créé en mai 2013 pour appuyer la création d’un réseau national de laboratoires de criminalistique nucléaire et d’une bibliothèque nationale de criminalistique nucléaire. Le projet national sur la capacité d’analyse nucléolégale du Canada terminera ses activités de recherche et de création d’ici la fin mars 2016. La prochaine étape consistera à développer la capacité existante et à créer de manière formelle un réseau de laboratoires de criminalistique nucléaire ainsi qu’une bibliothèque nationale de criminalistique nucléaire. Le Centre des sciences pour la sécurité de Recherche et Développement pour la défense Canada et la CCSN dirigent ces efforts. La CCSN s’est engagée à maintenir et à faire fonctionner une bibliothèque nationale de criminalistique nucléaire au nom du gouvernement du Canada.

 

 

 

 

 

e)    INFORMATION ET CYBERSÉCURITÉ

 

En plus de protéger les renseignements nucléaires sensibles et classifiés sous toutes ses formes, le Canada est d’avis que la protection d’équipement et de systèmes essentiels est importante pour la sûreté nucléaire, la sécurité nucléaire et la préparation et l’intervention en cas d’urgence.

 

Le Canada a conçu une norme nationale (CSA N290.7) pour contrer les risques en matière de cybersécurité dans les centrales nucléaires et les installations dotées de petits réacteurs. Cette norme a été publiée en décembre 2014. Par ailleurs, les exploitants de centrales nucléaires au Canada disposent de programmes de cybersécurité conformes aux normes et aux pratiques exemplaires internationales.

 

Le Canada a accueilli une formation nationale de l’AIEA sur la sécurité informatique et la réalisation d’évaluations en décembre 2015 avec des participants de l’industrie, des organismes de réglementation et des pays partenaires. La formation comprenait une méthode pour la réalisation d’évaluations sur la sécurité informatique dans les installations nucléaires conformes aux normes internationales, l’orientation de l’AIEA et les pratiques exemplaires reconnues au sujet de la protection des renseignements et des systèmes de contrôle industriels. Le Canada dispose de procédures robustes dans le domaine, mais croit qu’il faut travailler davantage pour élever les normes à l’échelle internationale. Le Canada appuie les efforts de l’AIEA et du WINS visant à créer une telle orientation pour les ministères et les organismes gouvernementaux, les organismes de réglementation, les exploitants d’installations nucléaires et les instituts de recherche et d’enseignement à l’échelle nationale.

 

 

2.     CONTRIBUTION À LA RÉDUCTION AU MINIMUM DES MATIÈRES NUCLÉAIRES SENSIBLES

La réduction des stocks mondiaux d’uranium hautement enrichi (UHE) et de plutonium séparé contribuera à empêcher que les acteurs non étatiques fassent l’acquisition de telles matières, réduisant ainsi le risque de terrorisme nucléaire. Le Canada demeure engagé en faveur de la réduction des stocks d’UHE et a réalisé des progrès importants à l’échelle nationale et internationale.

 

Le Canada s’est engagé à mettre un terme à son utilisation d’uranium hautement enrichi dans la production d’isotopes médicaux. Le Canada a annoncé qu’il cessera la production régulière de molybdène 99 (Mo-99) du réacteur national de recherche universelle de Chalk River d’Énergie atomique du Canada limitée (EACL) en octobre 2016, et retirera cette installation en tant que fournisseur potentiel de dernier recours de la chaîne d’approvisionnement international de Mo-99 d’ici mars 2018, mettant ainsi fin à la production d’isotopes médicaux à base d’UHE au Canada. Le gouvernement poursuit son travail visant à assurer une chaîne d’approvisionnement fiable d’isotopes médicaux.

 

Lors du SSN de 2010, le Canada s’est engagé à rapatrier son carburant d’UHE d’origine américaine entreposé dans les Laboratoires de Chalk River et a accompli des progrès satisfaisants dans la mise en œuvre de cette initiative de rapatriement. Le Canada a rapatrié une cargaison de carburant d’UHE usé en 2010, une autre en 2012, puis quatre autres en 2015. La dernière et la plus importante phase de l’initiative de rapatriement pour le carburant d’UHE usé a commencé en août 2015, et devrait se terminer en mai 2019.

 

Après l’annonce de mars 2012 du Canada au sujet de l’élargissement de l’initiative de rapatriement de manière à inclure le renvoi de matières d’UHE supplémentaires entreposées dans les Laboratoires de Chalk River, une deuxième initiative a été lancée dans le but de rapatrier l’inventaire des liquides contenant de l’UHE d’EACL qui sont des sous-produits de la production d’isotopes médicaux. Les envois de liquides contenant de l’UHE devraient commencer au milieu de l’année 2016, et se terminer d’ici mai 2019.

 

De plus, l’Université de l’Alberta est en train de prendre des mesures afin d’arrêter son réacteur de recherche SLOWPOKE qui fonctionne au carburant d’UHE. L’Université de l’Alberta prévoit rapatrier le carburant d’UHE d’ici mai 2019. Une fois l’arrêt du réacteur de recherche de l’Université de l’Alberta effectuée, le Canada ne comptera plus qu’un seul réacteur de recherche au carburant d’UHE.

 

Le Canada a déterminé que les trois quarts de ses stocks de plutonium sont prêts à être éliminés, et il a entamé des discussions avec les États-Unis pour savoir s’ils accepteraient ces matières en vue d’une gestion à long terme. Le reste continuera d’être entreposé de manière sécuritaire et sera utilisé pour soutenir les travaux futurs de recherche et de développement.

 

À l’échelle internationale, le Canada a participé à un projet de conversion de réacteurs et d’enlèvement d’uranium dirigé par les États-Unis pour un réacteur de recherche SLOWPOKE au carburant d’UHE en Jamaïque, qui s’est terminé en octobre 2015.

 

3.     INTENSIFICATION DES EFFORTS DE LUTTE CONTRE LE TRAFIC ILLICITE DES MATIÈRES NUCLÉAIRES ET RADIOLOGIQUES

L’intensification des efforts et de la capacité de prévention, de détection et d’interdiction du trafic illicite de matières nucléaires et radiologiques est nécessaire pour réduire les risques que des acteurs non étatiques se procurent et utilisent ces matières comme armes nucléaires ou dispositifs de dispersion radiologiques. L’ASFC est en train de mettre à niveau le réseau de détection de radiations (RADNet) du Canada pour aider à prévenir le trafic illicite. RADNet analyse presque tous les conteneurs maritimes commerciaux qui entrent au Canada pour détecter la présence de radiations à l’aide de détecteurs indépendants de radiations sur portique automatisés aux principaux ports maritimes. L’ASFC travaille au remplacement de l’équipement vieillissant avec des moniteurs-portiques de détection de radiations avancés, qui permettent une sensibilité accrue et la caractérisation des sources pour améliorer la capacité du Canada à combattre le trafic illicite de matières radiologiques. Le Canada participe également à la diffusion d’information à l’échelle internationale sur le trafic illicite des matières nucléaires en apportant des contributions à la Base de données sur les incidents et les cas de trafic de l’AIEA et dans le cadre de coopérations bilatérales.

 

Le Canada continue à mettre en œuvre un programme axé sur le risque de la conformité à la sécurité relativement à l’autorisation de sources radioactives, et a mis en place des programmes exhaustifs de contrôle des importations et des exportations pour les sources radioactives des catégories 1 et 2.

 

Dans le cadre de l’engagement du Canada effectué lors du SSN de 2014 d’apporter 28 millions de dollars pour améliorer la sécurité nucléaire et radiologique, le PPM du Canada a accordé 15 millions de dollars pour renforcer les capacités des pays partenaires à détecter et interdire l’entrée de cargaisons illicites de matières nucléaires et radiologiques. Cet apport comprend l’octroi de 12,2 millions de dollars pour appuyer l’achat d’équipement embarqué et portatif de surveillance et de détection de radiations, et à l’installation de moniteurs-portiques aux principaux postes frontaliers en Jordanie. Le PPM du Canada a également apporté 2,3 millions de dollars pour appuyer les initiatives de lutte contre la contrebande de matières nucléaires au Pérou, et a contribué au financement de l’Organisation internationale de police criminelle (INTERPOL) pour la prestation de programmes de formation en Asie du Sud-Est et en Jordanie dans le but d’empêcher les activités de trafic illicite. Ce soutien a permis d’améliorer la sécurité aux passages frontaliers en Jordanie et d’atténuer les risques de trafic illicite de matières nucléaires et radiologiques dans la région.

 

À la suite du coparrainage du Canada des engagements complémentaires du SSN de 2014 pour la lutte contre la contrebande de matières nucléaires, le Canada a participé à un atelier dans les équipes de lutte contre la contrebande de matières nucléaires dans les régions vulnérables à Amman, Jordanie, en novembre 2015. Les participants ont partagé leurs expériences sur les défis que représente la réalisation d’enquêtes et d’opérations pour localiser et sécuriser les matières nucléaires ou radioactives faisant l’objet de trafic illicite. Le Canada a également participé à l’atelier de mars 2016 sur la lutte contre la contrebande de matières nucléaires qui a eu lieu à Karlsruhe, Allemagne, et organisé par les États-Unis et la Commission européenne. L’atelier d’une durée de trois jours a traité de la gestion de lieux de crime et de l’analyse en laboratoire des matières interdites, en visant à assurer que les enquêtes sur la contrebande de matières nucléaires entraînent des poursuites fructueuses.

 

4.     Appui aux instruments juridiques internationaux

a)    MODIFICATION DE LA CPPMN ET DE LA CIRATN

Le Canada est d’avis que la mise en œuvre universelle de la Convention internationale pour la répression des actes de terrorisme nucléaire (CIRATN) augmenterait de manière importante les efforts mondiaux existants de lutte antiterroriste. En conséquence, le Canada a adopté une loi en 2013, connue comme le projet de loi S-9 (la Loi sur le terrorisme nucléaire), qui a permis au Canada de ratifier l’Amendement à la Convention sur la protection physique
des matières nucléaires (A/CPPMN) et la CIRATN. Cette loi a modifié le Code criminel dans le but de créer un certain nombre de nouvelles infractions liées au terrorisme nucléaire, conformément à l’A/CPPMN et à la CIRATN.

 

Le Canada continue également de promouvoir un solide cadre de travail multilatéral axé sur la lutte mondiale contre le terrorisme nucléaire, en appuyant les efforts de l’AIEA à promouvoir l’entrée en vigueur de l’Amendement de 2005 à la Convention sur la protection physique des matières nucléaires (A/CPPMN) et en encourageant les États qui ne l’ont pas encore fait à ratifier l’A/CPPMN dès que possible.

 

À l’échelle internationale, le Canada a partagé son expérience sur l’élaboration et la conception de sa Loi sur le terrorisme nucléaire, en soulignant les obstacles et la façon dont ils ont été surmontés, dans le but d’aider d’autres États à faciliter leurs propres mesures législatives. Depuis octobre 2011, le PPG du Canada a octroyé 720 000 $ à six ateliers régionaux et a fourni une aide de suivi dans le but d’aider d’autres pays avec la mise en œuvre de l’A/CPPMN et de la CIRATN par l’identification des obstacles à la ratification et en les surmontant. Ces ateliers ont permis la ratification de l’A/CPPMN par huit pays.

 

b)    RÉSOLUTION 1540 DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ DES NATIONS UNIES

Le Canada appuie la mise en œuvre intégrale et universelle de la Résolution 1540 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies (RCSNU) en tant qu’outil essentiel dans la lutte mondiale contre la prolifération et le terrorisme lié aux armes de destruction massive (ADM). La Résolution impose plusieurs obligations contraignantes pour les États visant à établir et à maintenir des contrôles nationaux dans le but de renforcer la sécurité de matières nucléaires, en harmonie avec les objectifs du SSN.

 

Lors du SSN de 2014, le Canada et la République de Corée ont accueilli l’appui de 32 pays et de l’ONU pour l’énoncé conjoint sur la mise en œuvre intégrale et universelle de la RCSNU 1540. Cet énoncé conjoint a encouragé les États participants à aider d’autres États à mettre en œuvre les dispositions en matière de sécurité nucléaire de la RCSNU 1540 et pour faire avancer les priorités du Comité 1540. Le Canada a également fait circuler l’énoncé conjoint lors de la séance spéciale du CSNU du 7 mai 2007 sur le 10e anniversaire de la RCSNU 1540, ou le texte a été présenté au CSNU aux fins d’inclusion dans le compte rendu du débat. Au cours du SSN de 2016, le Canada a collaboré avec l’Espagne et la République de Corée pour renouveler l’énoncé conjoint de 2014 sur la RCSNU 1540 avec un énoncé conjoint de 2016 décrivant les mesures supplémentaires volontaires à prendre par les États, comme la défense d’une meilleure coordination et coopération entre le Comité 1540 et les organisations et institutions internationales de sécurité nucléaire.

 

Le PPM du Canada travaille en étroite collaboration avec le Comité 1540 pour trouver des moyens de répondre aux besoins non satisfaits en vue de la mise en œuvre de la RCSNU 1540, y compris un rôle de coordination pour le Comité 1540. À cette fin, le Canada applaudit la participation régulière des experts du Comité 1540 lors des récentes réunions du Groupe de travail du Partenariat mondial, et appuie fortement les efforts en cours du Comité 1540 visant à atteindre la mise en œuvre universelle de la RCSNU 1540.

 

L’équipe des programmes réalisés au titre de la RCSNU 1540 du PPM du Canada œuvre à la réduction de la menace posée par l’acquisition d’ADM et de matières connexes par des terroristes en rehaussant la capacité des États d’empêcher la prolifération des armes chimiques, biologiques, radiologiques et nucléaires (CBRN) et de leurs vecteurs, et de mettre en place des contrôles nationaux pour les matières connexes dans le but de prévenir leur trafic illicite. Les trois principaux piliers de l’équipe des programmes réalisés au titre de la RCSNU 1540 du PPM sont les suivants : 1) fournir des formations et de l’équipement liés aux armes CBRN; 2) fournir une assistance législative et réglementaire pour les traités liés aux armes CBRN; 3) renforcer les contrôles à l’exportation et la sécurité frontalière. Cette équipe des programmes du PPM collabore également avec le Comité de la RCSNU 1540 pour répondre aux demandes d’assistance des États membres de l’ONU.

 

À l’échelle nationale, le Canada a présenté au Comité de la RCSNU 1540 un Plan d’action national de mise en œuvre à la suite de son engagement fait lors du SSN de 2014. Ce plan décrit les plans et les priorités à l’échelle nationale et internationale pour la mise en œuvre des dispositions de la RCSNU 1540, ce qui renforcera la capacité du Canada d’éviter la prolifération d’ADM et le terrorisme.

 

5.     CONTRIBUTION AUX SERVICES ET AUX ACTIVITÉS LIÉES À LA SÉCURITÉ NUCLÉAIRE DE L’AIEA ET UTILISATION DE CES SERVICES ET ACTIVITÉS

À l’heure actuelle, le Canada est le troisième bailleur de fonds national en importance pour le Fonds de sécurité nucléaire de l’AIEA, grâce à une contribution de plus de 20,6 millions de dollars dans le cadre du PPM depuis 2004. Les résultats comprennent l’amélioration physique de la sécurité radiologique et des installations connexes; le recouvrement des sources radiologiques et la gestion en fin de vie; le renforcement de la sécurité physique et la séquestration des matières utilisables dans les armes nucléaires aux sites nucléaires; et le renforcement des capacités des États membres à gérer les menaces nucléaires et radiologiques et à y répondre. Le Canada contribue de manière active à la Collection Sécurité nucléaire de l’AIEA. Il a récemment participé au comité d’orientation sur la sécurité nucléaire et il a contribué à l’élaboration de documents pour la Collection Sécurité nucléaire. Le Canada a également soutenu la révision de l’orientation internationale sur les mesures prises contre la menace interne, a facilité la création du matériel de formation connexe et a prodigué une formation internationale.

 

En 2014, le Canada a participé à la Conférence internationale sur les avancées en criminalistique nucléaire, et a apporté son soutien sur le plan de l’organisation. En juin 2015, le Canada a participé à la Conférence internationale sur la sécurité informatique dans un monde nucléaire : discussions et échanges entre les experts. Le Canada a dirigé une démonstration sur la sécurité informatique, a présidé une séance principale et deux séances techniques, et a présenté six documents. Le Canada accueille la Conférence internationale sur la sécurité nucléaire de 2016, qui aura lieu en décembre 2016, et participera de manière active à la Conférence en appuyant un engagement renouvelé par les États membres de l’AIEA pour relever le défi de la sécurité nucléaire à la lumière des nouvelles menaces et des nouveaux défis.

 

a)    Mission du SCIPP

 

Suite à son engagement effectué lors du SSN de 2014 à La Haye, le Canada a accueilli sa première mission du Service consultatif international sur la protection physique (SCIPP) de l’AIEA du 19 au 30 octobre 2015. À la demande du Canada, la mission du SCIPP a examiné les cinq modules du SCIPP, notamment le cadre législatif et réglementaire lié à la sécurité du Canada pour les matières et les installations nucléaires, les arrangements en matière de sécurité appliqués au transport des matières nucléaires, la sécurité des matières radioactives et les installations et activités connexes, et les systèmes d’information et de sécurité informatique en place. L’équipe a visité plusieurs installations, y compris les réacteurs de puissance et les réacteurs de recherche, pour examiner les systèmes de protection physique.

 

Le rapport final de la mission du SCIPP présente un survol global du cadre de sécurité nucléaire du Canada, qui est considéré comme solide, résilient et durable. Le Canada accorde de l’importance au rapport et aux conclusions de la mission du SCIPP, notant en particulier l’occasion de parfaire son cadre de sécurité nucléaire et de partager ses pratiques exemplaires. Le Canada demeure un ardent défenseur de la divulgation volontaire d’information des missions du SCIPP afin d’être mieux à même de constituer un répertoire mondial de pratiques exemplaires et d’enseignements tirés, et publiera un résumé accessible au public du rapport de la mission du SCIPP. Le Canada reconnaît l’importance de la création et de la mise en œuvre de documents d’orientation sur la sécurité nucléaire de l’AIEA et appuie l’amélioration continuelle de la protection physique et de la sécurité nucléaire à l’échelle nationale et internationale. À cette fin, le Canada a aidé l’AIEA dans la conduite des missions du SCIPS dans d’autres pays, dont le Royaume-Uni, l’Indonésie, la Hongrie, la Roumanie, les États-Unis et l’Australie.

 

b)    CENTRE DE SOUTIEN EN SÉCURITÉ NUCLÉAIRE

Les centres de soutien en sécurité nucléaire peuvent permettre d’assurer une sécurité nucléaire durable et efficace en facilitant la création des connaissances, de l’expertise et des compétences nécessaires pour le personnel responsable de la sécurité nucléaire. Ainsi, le Canada continue d’appuyer l’AIEA dans ses efforts visant à établir des centres de soutien en sécurité nucléaire et a offert une présentation lors de la réunion d’août 2015 du groupe de travail sur le cadre de réglementation canadien, ainsi que la formation du personnel dans les installations nucléaires.

 

La CCSN poursuit l’étude de la mise en place d’un centre de soutien en sécurité nucléaire pour permettre d’assurer une sécurité nucléaire durable et efficace. En mai 2015, un atelier sur le respect des engagements canadiens en matière de compétences démontrables dans la réglementation et la mise en œuvre de la sécurité nucléaire a eu lieu avec la participation des intervenants canadiens en sécurité nucléaire et du WINS en vue d’établir un cadre de compétence commun et un programme de perfectionnement professionnel pour les organismes de réglementation et les titulaires de permis.

 

6.     SOUTIEN DES ACTIVITÉS INTERNATIONALES LIÉES À LA SÉCURITÉ NUCLÉAIRE

Le Canada participe à l’ensemble des principales activités internationales liées à la sécurité nucléaire, notamment au G-7 Groupe sur la sûreté et la sécurité nucléaires (G-7 GSSN), à l’IMLTN, à l’Initiative de sécurité contre la prolifération (ISP), à INTERPOL et au Partenariat mondial contre la prolifération des armes de destruction massive et des matières connexes (PM), et travaille avec le Comité de la RCSNU 1540 et son groupe d’experts.

 

a)    PARTENARIAT MONDIAL CONTRE LA PROLIFÉRATION DES ARMES DE DESTRUCTION MASSIVE ET DES MATIÈRES CONNEXES

 

Reconnaissant la gravité de la menace posée par l’acquisition terroriste d’armes de destruction massive (ADM) et de matières connexes, le G8 a lancé le PM sous la direction du Canada lors du Sommet de 2002 tenu à Kananaskis. Le Canada participe activement au PM et copréside le Groupe de travail du Partenariat mondial sur l’expansion et le rayonnement.

 

Le PPM du Canada appuie le PM avec des projets visant à empêcher la prolifération des ADM et à réduire la menace posée par le terrorisme CBRN. Le PPM met en place des projets à l’échelle internationale dans les domaines de priorités, notamment la sécurité nucléaire et radiologique, la sécurité biologique, le soutien à la mise en œuvre de la RSCNU 1540 et la destruction des armes chimiques.

 

À ce jour, le PPM du Canada a contribué à plus de 1,2 milliard de dollars dans les programmes de réduction de la menace posée par les ADM. Lors du SSN de 2014, le Canada s’est engagé à accorder 28 millions de dollars pour améliorer les programmes de sécurité nucléaire, engagement qui a été respecté et qui a permis l’amélioration de la sécurité physique dans les installations nucléaires, en mettant l’accent sur l’Asie du Sud-Est, sur l’atténuation du trafic illicite de matières nucléaires et radiologiques au Moyen-Orient, et sur l’amélioration de la sécurité des sources radioactives en Amérique latine.

 

Dans le cadre du SSN de 2016, le Canada est heureux d’annoncer qu’il apportera 42 millions de dollars pour des projets additionnels visant à améliorer la sécurité nucléaire et radiologique, et pour maintenir l’élan au-delà du processus du SNN.

 

b)    INITIATIVE DE LUTTE MONDIALE CONTRE LE TERRORISME NUCLÉAIRE

 

Le Canada s’est engagé à atteindre l’objectif de l’IMLTN de renforcer la capacité mondiale à éviter et à détecter le terrorisme nucléaire, et à y répondre. Le Canada participe de manière active aux événements et aux exercices de l’IMLTN, notamment aux réunions du Groupe d’application et d’évaluation et aux réunions plénières biennales de l’IMLTN. Le Canada continue de diriger le développement de progrès techniques dans le domaine de la criminalistique nucléaire, et travaille en étroite collaboration avec le Groupe de travail sur la criminalistique nucléaire de l’IMLTN. Par exemple, le Canada a joué un rôle important dans l’élaboration et la prestation d’exercices techniques, y compris « Mystic Deer » à Budapest en octobre 2014 et « Glowing Tulip » à La Haye en mars 2015. L’exercice « Glowing Tulip » a permis de démontrer l’utilité de dispositions juridiques solides pour la criminalisation des matières qui ne font pas l’objet d’un contrôle réglementaire, a souligné les pratiques exemplaires pour la gestion en laboratoire de preuves criminalistiques, et a offert aux pays partenaires des outils et des renseignements visant à accroître la capacité de leurs laboratoires nationaux à fournir des témoignages d’experts dans un tribunal.

 

Le Canada a également appuyé des événements pluridisciplinaires, dont l’événement « Radiant City » tenu à Karlsruhe, Allemagne, en mai 2015, qui a examiné l’interaction entre les domaines de la détection et de la criminalistique nucléaires. Le Canada continuera d’appuyer l’IMLTN en offrant une expertise technique additionnelle dans le cadre des activités de l’IMLTN, notamment les travaux de criminalistique nucléaire et de détection nucléaire ainsi que d’autres travaux techniques liés à la sécurité nucléaire des groupes de travail de l’IMLTN.

 

c)    INITIATIVE DE SÉCURITÉ CONTRE LA PROLIFÉRATION

 

Le Canada continue de collaborer avec d’autres partenaires de l’Initiative de sécurité contre la prolifération (ISP) dans le but de renforcer les capacités collectives d’empêcher l’exportation illicite d’armes nucléaires et radiologiques et de matières connexes par voie maritime, terrestre ou aérienne. Cette collaboration est accomplie grâce à des exercices de renforcement des capacités, à l’échange d’information et de pratiques exemplaires et à la participation à des exercices pratiques. En septembre 2014, le Canada a financé un séminaire régional de l’ISP dans les Caraïbes en juin 2014 qui a réuni des partenaires de la CARICOM dans le but d’encourager leur participation à l’ISP et de renforcer les capacités et la coopération dans la région en matière d’interdiction des ADM. Le Canada a également accueilli la réunion du Groupe d’experts opérationnels de l’ISP à Ottawa en mai 2015, qui a permis de concentrer les efforts de l’ISP sur les nouveaux défis liés à la prolifération, notamment le financement de la prolifération et le transfert technologique intangible. À l’échelle nationale, le Canada continuera à communiquer les leçons tirées à l’échelle nationale à ses partenaires et à fournir des documents au répertoire d’outils et de ressources de l’Initiative sur les capacités et les pratiques essentielles (ICPE).

 

7.     Partenariat avec des intervenants externes

a)    COOPÉRATION ENTRE LE GOUVERNEMENT ET L’INDUSTRIE NUCLÉAIRE

Compte tenu de l’important rôle joué par le secteur nucléaire dans le respect des normes en matière de sécurité nucléaire, le Canada continue de mettre l’accent sur une forte coopération entre l’industrie et le gouvernement. Cela permet d’assurer à la fois pertinence et transparence dans la création de systèmes de conformité nationaux pour la sûreté nucléaire et la sécurité nucléaire. Les efforts en cours visant à éliminer l’utilisation de la production d’isotopes médicaux à base d’UHE au Canada sont un exemple de l’étroite collaboration entre le gouvernement et l’industrie.

 

Le gouvernement du Canada a investi environ 60 millions de dollars pour appuyer la recherche et la création de méthodes alternatives aux technologies à base d’UHE dans la production de technologies d’isotopes médicaux, en plus d’encourager leur utilisation par l’industrie. Les investissements spécifiques dans les technologies alternatives de production qui n’utilisent pas d’UHE et qui réduisent les déchets radioactifs dans le cadre de la production d’isotopes comprennent le Programme de contribution financière à la production d’isotopes (2010-2012) et le Programme d’accélération des technologies des isotopes (2012-2016) par Ressources naturelles Canada. Des efforts supplémentaires ont été déployés pour la création de cyclotrons et d’accélérateurs linéaires aux fins d’utilisation dans la production de l’isotope médical technetium-99m. Les partenaires dans ces programmes ont adapté les infrastructures et l’équipement, et procèdent actuellement aux essais cliniques nécessaires aux fins d’obtention d’un permis. Ces efforts coopératifs visent à réduire l’utilisation d’UHE et à atteindre un approvisionnement d’isotopes plus diversifié et plus sécuritaire.

 

De plus, le Canada participe à cinq régimes multilatéraux de contrôle à l’exportation qui ont pour but d’éviter l’exportation de marchandises ou de technologies pouvant être utilisées dans des programmes ou des vecteurs d’ADM : le Groupe des fournisseurs nucléaires (GFN) et le Comité Zangger, le Groupe d’Australie, le Régime de contrôle de la technologie relative aux missiles (RCTM) et l’Accord de Wassenaar. En vertu de ces accords, le Canada a mis en place des mesures pour contrôler l’exportation de biens et de technologies afin d’empêcher leur utilisation dans le cadre de programmes d’ADM ou de systèmes de livraison d’ADM, et a fourni des informations aux exportateurs sur la mise en œuvre des exigences contenues dans la Loi sur les licences d’exportation et d’importation et dans la Loi sur la sûreté et la réglementation nucléaires, qui enchâssent dans la loi canadienne les engagements politiques pris par le Canada dans le cadre des cinq régimes susmentionnés

 

b)    Partenariat avec les ONG

Le Canada était un des donateurs fondateurs du WINS, un chef de file en perfectionnement professionnel et en certification pour la gestion de la sécurité nucléaire, et continue de fournir du soutien financier et technique. Suite à un engagement effectué lors du SSN de 2014, le PPM du Canada a participé au financement d’un projet avec le WINS visant à créer un cadre de compétences pour le personnel et la direction ayant des responsabilités dans la sécurité nucléaire. Un guide sur les pratiques exemplaires connexes a été publié en 2015. Dans le contexte du SSN de 2016, le Canada a collaboré avec le Royaume-Uni et d’autres contributeurs de l’Académie du WINS pour émettre des engagements complémentaires qui encouragent l’expansion du programme de certification internationale du WINS, et qui exhortent les États participants du SSN à contribuer au développement continu de l’Académie.

National Progress Report: Chile

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Chile has carried out the following activities to enhance the global nuclear physical security architecture.

1.       Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

Accomplishments

  • Radiological Emergency Security Commission (CONSER)

CONSER was established by Decree N° 647 of 2015, of the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, as a presidential advisory commission of permanent technical nature. The Commission has an inter-ministerial and inter-sectoral composition. Its objective is to propose measures to strengthen national capacities to jointly address the different stages of an event that may endanger nuclear or radiological physical security, advise on adequate inter-sectoral coordination, and suggest actions aimed at disseminating international know-how and standards on nuclear and radiological security. This new national entity, of a preventive nature, will contribute to promote knowledge of international norms among public institutions and will advise ministerial authorities on appropriate decision-making when facing these types of events. 

Commitments

  • Center for Excellence: Design and Implementation of the Nuclear Physical Security Support Center

This Center has a physical plant located in Lo Aguirre Nuclear Center and will be focused on the formation of human resources in nuclear physical security. The design of its training programs and the implementation of the required equipment are currently taking place.

  • Preparation of “Regulations on the Physical Protection of Radioactive Sources”.

The Regulations are awaiting approval from the competent regulating organs (Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, Ministry of Health, and the Chilean Commission on Nuclear Energy).

  • Preparation of a Plan on Strengthening the Security Culture.

The plan is being developed by the Nuclear and Radiological Authority, which involves Physical and Radiological Security in operators at the national level.

2.       Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

Accomplishments

  • Contribution to the minimization of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)

Chile has converted its reactors to less than 20% of enriched uranium (LEU) and does not possess highly enriched uranium (HEU) nuclear fuel. Moreover, Chile does not consider plutonium separation as part of its activities of the nuclear fuel cycle.  All research and development initiatives do not consider the use of highly enriched uranium.

Commitments

  • Development of a remote centralized system of radioactive source monitoring

A centralized system of radiological, environmental, and operational monitoring of the nuclear and radioactive installations of the Chilean Commission on Nuclear Energy is being developed. They store the most important radioactive sources at the national level.

With respect to environmental monitoring, radiological surveillance of the nuclear centers is ongoing, by means of 10 monitoring stations (5 in each center). Regarding operational monitoring, to date there are 11 stations that allow for the measuring of dose rates, distributed in both nuclear centers.

In addition, Chile started the implementation of a national network of environmental radiological monitoring.  It has 6 stations that permit the measuring of environmental dose rates in real time, with centralized information in the La Reina Nuclear Center. The national network’s monitoring stations are distributed in the cities of Arica, Iquique, Antofagasta, La Serena, Valparaiso, and Santiago, located in the meteorological parks of their respective airports and/or airfields. There are plans to expand the network to the cities of Concepcion, Temuco, and Puerto Montt in 2016, thus completing the 9 stations programmed for its first stage.

3.       Countering Nuclear Smuggling

Accomplishments

  • MERCOSUR Specialized Working Group on Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and/or Radioactive Material (GTETIMNR)

Chile’s participation in this group has resulted in the generation of the capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to situations of radiological risk, with an emphasis on border control points. 

Commitments

  • Border Strengthening Project

During 2014 Customs, Carabineros (National Police), and the Chilean Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCHEN) formally committed to participate in this project offered by the IAEA, derived from the Appraisal Mission of the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ). The project considers the implementation of the detection of radioactive material in selected border points, including those that transport large amounts of cargo and persons (Port of San Antonio, Santiago Airport, and Los Libertadores Border Complex) and “green borders” (border area between two border checkpoints) in northern Chile.  It was officially launched In March 2015 and is currently being implemented.

4.       Supporting Multilateral Instruments

Chile has declared its international commitment to the physical protection of its nuclear and radioactive installations with regard to the non-authorized removal of nuclear or radioactive material and sabotage.  Several treaties and agreements signed by the Government are a testament to this, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM – 1994) and its Amendment, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1995), support for the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (2001), and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2010).

Adhesion to international instruments

  • Signing of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and acceptance of its Amendment

Chile has participated in the promotion, in the Latin American sphere, of the signing of these instruments, which has been supported by the IAEA and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)

  • Ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT)

Commitments

  • Chile and its incorporation process to the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)

In 2015 Chile requested admission to the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), and it is working with the aim to fulfill the Arrangement requirements by the 2017 plenary session.

Chile’s commitment to the WA evolved from its national policy to promote international transparency, develop efficient systems of cooperation and information sharing, and encourage greater responsibility in the foreign trade of defense and dual use material, avoiding the stockpiling of arms that could endanger global security.

  • Chile’s request for incorporation into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

Chile requested for entry into NSG in May 2015, in accordance with its commitment to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

5.       Collaborating with International Organizations

Accomplishments

  • Contribution to IAEA activities related to Physical Nuclear Security

Chile has adopted the recommendations of IAEA documents regarding Security and has made a political commitment on the implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources in national practices and the strengthening of RAIS (Regulatory Authority Information System). Likewise, in order to improve its infrastructure on nuclear physical security in all spheres, Chile adhered to NUSIMS (Nuclear Security Information Management System). This is a voluntary system conceived to help IAEA Member States examine the state of their national infrastructure on physical nuclear security and support its development.

  • Member of the Global Alliance against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Chile has consistently supported forums that promote real progress in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament. In this regard, in February 2015 decided to join the Global Alliance, in the framework of the G7.

  • Joint Bilateral Exercise between Chile and Argentina on Trans-border Radiological Emergency under the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) - “Paihuen”

This exercise, conducted in August 2014, helped to improve the communication channels between both countries to address trans-border radiological emergencies.

Commitments

  • Implementation of the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) of the IAEA

The scheduled activities of the Plan have continued, centered on training of national organisms that comprise the CONSER.

  • Implementation of the recommendations of the INSServ mission of the IAEA (Evaluation of Physical Nuclear Security at the national level).

This task is being carried out, headed by the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security.

  • Joint Bilateral Exercise Chile - Argentina on Trans-border Radiological Emergency – Paihuen 2

There are conversations with Argentina to conduct a second exercise to improve coordination and sharing information mechanisms between both countries emergency agencies.

6.       Partnering with External Stakeholders

Accomplishments

  • Physical protection of the two research nuclear reactors

The strengthening of the physical protection of nuclear installations has continued, with the participation of the Chilean Army and CCHEN as the operating entity.  The United States Department of Energy (DOE), through the Office of Radiological Security (ORS, ex Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)) has collaborated in this endeavor.

  • Enhancement of the public-private partnership in relation to the industrial irradiation facilities.

Regarding the industrial irradiation, nuclear medicine, and radiation therapy installations (regulated and overseen by the competent authorities), the control of its sources concerning its physical security is carried out, including the application of protection measures and systems, tracking of use and destination, and improvement of the security culture, for its permanent strengthening.

 

Commitments

·       Adhesion to the Nuclear Security Information Management System (NUSIMS).

Designation of the points of contact that facilitates the coordination between different competent authorities in the area of physical nuclear security, in order to work in collaboration to self-assess national capacities in physical nuclear security, in the framework of NUSIMS.

 

·       Physical security of medicinal radioactive and industrial installations.

 

The process of strengthening the physical security systems in the 5 large-scale radiological installations has continued, in the areas of medicine and industry in the country, with radioactive sources greater than 1000 Ci. In this regard, we have had the support of the United States Department of Energy, through the ORS (ex GTRI), with the participation of CCHEN as facilitator of the process.

 

National Progress Report: China

Since the third Nuclear Security Summit in March 2014, guided by a sensible, coordinated and balanced approach to nuclear security proposed by President Xi Jinping, China has comprehensively promoted its nuclear security, taken active measures to implement the outcomes of the previous summits. China has been continuously committed to improving its national nuclear security system and strengthening international nuclear security architecture, and has made significant progress in areas such as construction and operation of the national Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security, strengthening management of nuclear and radioactive material, combating illicit trafficking of nuclear material, enhancing nuclear emergency response capability, improving nuclear cyber security and establishing a radiation environment monitoring system. 

1. Improving national nuclear security system

It is the fundamental responsibility of each country to maintain security of its nuclear material and facilities. China is dedicated to improving its national nuclear security system, enhancing nuclear security capabilities and boosting nuclear security culture.

(1) Strengthening the top-level planning for nuclear security. China has brought nuclear security into its general national security system, and defined the strategic significance of nuclear security. The National People’s Congress has passed State Security Law in July 2015 and Anti-Terrorism Law in December 2015, which made it clear in legal terms that nuclear security is a vital aspect of national security and anti-terrorism issues, and formulated specific tasks and measures of nuclear security. China is making steady progress in promoting legislations on atomic energy and on nuclear safety, both of which have been included in the legislative agenda of the National People’s Congress.

(2) Improving nuclear security regulations and standards. China has been in the process of drafting Nuclear Security Regulations, which is being reviewed by the State Council. China has promulgated series of standardization documents such as administrative measures on inspection of nuclear material management, reporting of nuclear materials management,and registration of nuclear material. China has also amended the Regulations on Emergency Response to the Nuclear Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants

(3) Strengthening nuclear security capabilities. China has been promoting infrastructure and appliances construction, enhancing law enforcement capabilities and awareness of nuclear security of relevant personnel, and encouraging nuclear industries to adopt relevant guidelines and standards mainly in priority areas such as security of nuclear materials, nuclear facilities, radioactive sources, nuclear materials export control and combating illicit trafficking. China has been pushing forward the construction of the National Base for Research and Development of Nuclear and Radiological Safety and Security Monitoring Technologies, and strengthening such capabilities.

(4) Boosting nuclear security culture. In September 2014, Ministry of Environmental Protection, National Energy Administration and China Atomic Energy Authority jointly published the Policy Statement on Nuclear Security Culture, which calls on the nuclear industry and the whole society to strengthen nuclear security culture. China has also positively carried out publicity activities focusing on promoting nuclear security culture, and is in the process of establishing a mechanism on long-term and constant evaluation.

2. Strengthening the international nuclear security system

China is dedicated to building an international nuclear security system featuring fairness and win-win cooperation, which provides a strong and sustainable institutional guarantee to make sure that nuclear energy benefit human beings in a safe and secure way.  

(1) Strengthening international legal instruments on nuclear security

China has ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its amendment, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. China consistently and faithfully fulfills its international legal obligations, and positively promotes the universality and effectiveness of relevant conventions. China strictly implements United Nations Security Council  Resolution 1373, Resolution 1540, Resolution 1887 and other anti-terrorism and non-proliferation related resolutions. China will continue to support the United Nations General Assembly to adopt nuclear security related resolutions.

(2) Supporting the work of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

China supports the central role of the IAEA in international cooperation on nuclear security and has provided all-around support, including political, technical and financial support to the IAEA.

China has positively carried out cooperation with the IAEA in areas such as nuclear materials security, radioactive sources monitoring, and nuclear and radiation emergency response. China has recommended experts to participate in the formulation of IAEA nuclear security documents, and hosted workshops in China jointly with the IAEA, which has trained over 400 man-times of nuclear security personnel from China and other countries. China also joined the Response and Assistance Network of the IAEA.

China supports the IAEA to conduct International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) on nuclear security. In September 2015, China formally invited the IAEA to undertake an IPPAS mission at both national and facility levels in China and the mission will be formally carried out in 2016. China has also invited the IAEA to undertake an Integrated Regulatory Review Services(IRRS) follow-up mission in 2016.

China continuously makes contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, with a view to promoting nuclear security capacity building of China as well as other regional countries in Asia. Till the end of 2015, China has donated 1.15 million US dollars to this Fund. China will give positive considerations to increasing the annual amount of donation, and will continue to donate nuclear security equipment developed by China.    

(3) Actively participating in international exchanges and cooperation

China welcomes other relevant organizations and mechanisms, apart from the IAEA, to play an important role in nuclear security area in accordance with their respective mandates while enhancing synergy and coordination among themselves. China has been deeply involved in the work of the 1540 Committee of the United Nations Security Council. China received the first country visit by the 1540 Committee in October 2014, and hosted a training course on UNSC Resolution 1540 implementation for Points of Contacts in the Asia-Pacific region. China also actively participates in meetings and exercises on nuclear security organized under frameworks of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, International Criminal Police Organization, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and Asia-Europe Meeting(ASEM), among others. 

China highly values policy exchanges and practical cooperation in nuclear security between countries. In September 2015, President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Obama agreed to establish an annual bilateral nuclear security dialogue mechanism. The first round of dialogue was held on 20 February 2016, which further deepened bilateral coordination and cooperation on international nuclear security issues. China also constantly conducts consultations and exchanges on nuclear security issues with countries such as Russia,France,United Kingdom, India, Republic of Korea, and Pakistan.

China welcomes the gift baskets proposed by Participating States of the Nuclear Security Summit and will formally sign up for gift baskets including “Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation” and “Sustaining Actions to Promote Global Nuclear Security”.

3. Establishment and Operation of Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security

The Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security (COE) of China, constructed with cooperation between China and the U.S., was completed one year ahead of schedule in December 2015, and went into formal operation in March 2016. The COE has integrated mature and advanced technology and equipment from both China and other countries, including technology demonstration and training building, analytical laboratory, environmental laboratory, mock nuclear material bunker, mock facility for nuclear material accounting and control, response force training and drill facility, testing field for physical protection, international first class education&training facility as well as supporting facilities. The main functions of the COE include personnel training, research and development, international exchange, as well as testing and certification, covering a variety of areas such as nuclear security, nuclear safeguards and inspection, nuclear material control, physical protection and ect.. The COE is a nuclear security exchange and training center with the largest scale,most comprehensive equipment and most advanced facilities in Asia Pacific Region and even beyond.

China will actively fulfill commitments by President Xi Jinping at the third Nuclear Security Summit, and take this COE as a platform to promote further exchanges and cooperation with other counties, the IAEA and relevant international organizations, thereby make contribution to strengthening nuclear security in the Asia Pacific region and the entire world.

4. Enhancing the security of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)

China pays great attention to the safety and security of HEU and supports minimizing the use of HEU where technically and economically feasible. The core of the HEU research reactor in Chinese Institute of Atomic Energy was discharged in September 2015. The conversion of this reactor to using Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) was completed in March 2016 by Chinese Institute of Atomic Energy. The project of converting Ghana’s HEU research reactor is steadily making progress. The project entered implementation stage after China and Ghana signed in September 2014 an agreement for assistance in securing LEU for a research reactor. With the signing of a commercial contract between China and the United States in December 2015, production of LEU fuel elements for Ghana’s research reactor started.   

 China stands ready to consult with relevant countries on conversion of its China-origin HEU research reactors subject to voluntariness and feasibility, and is also willing to share with international community its experience and expertise in converting research reactors from using HEU to LEU.

5. Strengthening management of radioactive sources

China supports promoting radioactive sources application in civil areas with the precondition of strict management and ensuring security, and works hard to enhance its domestic radioactive sources security. China strictly follows the security standards of radioactive sources management, which cover all related aspects including production, sales, transportation, use and storage of the radioactive sources. China has made comprehensive efforts to upgrade the security level of radioactive waste repositories in various cities in China, completed compilation of the document “Security Requirements for Radioactive Waste Repositories in Cities” and conducted cooperation with the United States on radioactive sources security. China conducted security inspections of over 15,000 users of radioactive sources and properly disposed of disused radioactive sources. China also works to promote capacity building of radioactive sources security, actively hosts training courses and field exercises, promotes research and development of radioactive sources security technologies, and is conducting research on a tracking system of high-risk mobile radioactive sources, as well as technical protection measures of radiation devices.

 6. Combating illicit trafficking of nuclear materials

China takes combating illicit trafficking of nuclear material as the key element in preventing the acts of nuclear terrorism, and has always attached great importance to non-proliferation export control. China has been continuously strengthening the construction of the gateway ports in taking precautions against illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material, and has installed nationwide over 1000 radiation detecting equipments of various types at sea, air, highway and railway ports. China has enlarged the radiation inspection and detection coverage in key ports of large scale, and will soon achieve 100% radiation inspection and detection of all the inbound and outbound containers at Yangshan Port in Shanghai and Dongjiang Bonded Port in Tianjin. China has improved the law enforcement personnel’s ability and has held in China Customs Training Center for Radiation Detection 45 training courses on radiation detection and commodity identification for over 1280 officials from both domestic and abroad, as well as about 30 customs’ part-time trainers. China has timely amended and strictly implemented The Nuclear and Nuclear Dual-Use Items Export Control List with reference to the latest control list of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and started to implement the latest Nuclear Export Control List from January 1st, 2016. China has signed cooperation documents with the U.S. and Russia on preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material, and conducted joint exercise with Russia on preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material on borders in October 2015.

7. Strengthening nuclear emergency response capability

China has established a fairly comprehensive system of legislations, regulations and standards on nuclear emergency response,and has been constantly improving its nuclear emergency response plans and coordination mechanisms. China has strengthened nuclear emergency response capability building, enhanced communication and exchange with the general public,and actively conducted nuclear emergency response exercises. China is making efforts to strengthen technology support team and rescue force for national nuclear emergency response,and is building a nuclear emergency rescue force of 320 people. In June 2015, China conducted a nation-level exercise on nuclear emergency response coded ‘Shengdun-2015’, with 2900 participants. Delegates from France, Pakistan and the IAEA observed the exercise. In January 2016, China issued the white paper “China’s Nuclear Emergency Preparedness”, which gives a comprehensive introduction of China’s nuclear emergency response guidelines, achievements and future prospects.    

8. Enhancing nuclear cyber security

China attaches great importance to nuclear cyber security. China has been continuously enhancing related legislations, strengthening management on information security of industrial control system and cyber security in the internet industry, and enhancing capability to ensure information security and cyber security of nuclear industry. China has put in place cyber security requirements for the management of industry control system and is exploring the possibility of establishing a security risk notice mechanism. China has strengthened protection of internet infrastructure and operation system, and conducted risk assessment regularly. China has enhanced emergency response capabilities concerning cyber security incidents, and conducted a number of exercises in this regard. China has improved its capability to prevent cyber attack on the public internet, and strengthened internet data protection.

9. Establishing radiation environment monitoring system

China has established a fairly comprehensive national radiation environment monitoring network, which conducts radiation environment quality monitoring as well as monitoring of nuclear facilities of national priority for both supervision and emergency response purposes. All the provinces have established provincial-level radiation environment monitoring networks. The national radiation environment monitoring network includes radiation environment and air automatic monitoring stations, and 1400 quality monitoring spots for land, water, marine organism, soil and electromagnetic radiation. All the monitoring data are open to the public.

The fourth Nuclear Security Summit will be held in Washington D.C. of the United States from 31st March to 1st April 2016. China is willing to work with all parties to make this summit a success. After the summit process concludes, China will continuously take part in a deep way in the international nuclear security process,  commit to strengthen the international nuclear security system, and make contribution to strengthen global nuclear security and achieve common nuclear security for all.

                                                                                                                

National Progress Report: Czech Republic

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Czech Republic has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by…

 …Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

  • The Czech Republic has in place highly developed systems of tracking, accounting for and control of high activity sources and nuclear materials.
  • The Czech Republic is a signatory of the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and it also follows the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.
  • In this regard the Czech Republic pays attention especially to the management of high activity sources at the end of their life-cycle.
  • Regulatory body of the Czech Republic in 2014 and 2015 has been involved in preparation of the new Atomic Act and also in a Regulation on physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities which would cover the current nuclear security objectives based on the following documents: Nuclear Security Series (NSS) No. 20: Objective and Essential Elements of a States´ Nuclear Security Regime (2013), recommendation NSS No. 13: Nuclear Security Recommendation on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (2011) and Implementing Guides NSS No. 7: Nuclear Security Culture, NSS No. 8: Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threat, NSS No. 10: Development, Use and Maintenance of the Design Basis Threat, Technical Guidance NSS, No. 16: Identification of Vital Areas at Nuclear Facilities (2012) and NSS No. 17: Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (2011). The new regulation will be covering in greater detail especially the new aspects of nuclear security, such as: vital area identification, trustworthiness check by National Security Agency, computer security at NPPs and air-born threat. Since 2012, the Czech Republic has participated in the newly established IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance Committee responsible for publishing Nuclear Security Series.
  • The State Office for Nuclear Safety has been drafting for several years a new Atomic Act, which is now in the process of approval in the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. This new Act represents a complete and thorough overhaul of the Czech nuclear legislation and will address all contemporary nuclear topics and issues with special regard to nuclear security, nuclear non-proliferation and physical protection of nuclear materials.
  • During 2014, a permanent working group composed of representatives of central governmental authorities (Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, Presidium of the Police, Security Information Service, State Office for Nuclear Safety and Czech Power Company ČEZ) focused its efforts on developing and maintenance of the Design Basis Threat. As a result, the new DBT for Czech nuclear facilities and nuclear material led to re-evaluating of nuclear material transports in February 2015, now covering also airborne threats as well as cyber threats to computer based systems used for nuclear safety, nuclear security and nuclear material accountancy and control.
  • In 2014, a complex research by the operator of both Czech NPPs - Dukovany and Temelin has been carried out. It covers intentional use of three types of aircrafts (business jet, fighter and transport plane) to perform air crash to object located at nuclear power plant site. Results of the study shows the vulnerability of the different objects towards the attack and what can be done to protect the object and to minimize the consequences of such attack.
  • In 2014, there was a security exercise carried out at the NPP Dukovany. This exercise was aimed at verification of protocols and mechanisms for guarding of the outside perimeter of the NPP. It included cooperation and coordination of the Operator with the Czech Army and response units of the Police. The same exercise was conducted in 2015 at the second Czech NPP Temelin.
  • The Czech Republic participates in the GB on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation.
  • The Czech Republic participates in the GB on Transport Security.
  • The Czech Republic participates in the GB on Security of Radioactive Sources (HARS).
  • The Czech Republic participates in the GB on The Czech Republic participates in the GB on Insider Threat Mitigation.
  • The Czech Republic participates in the GB on Supporting Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Preparedness and Response Capabilities.

…Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

  • The Czech Republic as a partner of the United States in the Global Threat Reduction Initiative finished the removal of all its highly enriched Uranium and became effectively a HEU-free country. The final shipment of 68kg of HEU from the Nuclear Research Institute in Řež to Russia was completed at the turn of March 2013. Two previous shipments of fresh HEU from the Řež research reactor back to Russia were completed in 2004 and 2010 with weights of 6kg and 12kg respectively. Also a shipment of 80kg of spent HEU fuel from the Řež reactor was completed in 2007 and another transport of 14kg of fresh HEU from the training reactor at the Faculty of Nuclear Sciences and Physical Engineering of the Czech Technical University in Prague was completed in 2005. Another key component of this project was the conversion of the Czech research reactors from the use of nuclear weapons-usable HEU fuel to LEU fuel. This conversion was conducted in last years and both research reactors and the training reactor are now fully converted and operating with LEU fuel.
  • The Czech Republic continues to provide technical support to countries repatriating the HEU stocks. Such assistance was provided to Belarus, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Serbia, Ukraine and Vietnam.
  • The Czech Republic is a signatory of the statement on Minimizing and Eliminating the Use of highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications.

…Countering Nuclear Smuggling

  • Security of Nuclear Materials in the Czech Republic goes above and beyond all IAEA’s relevant nuclear security recommendations.
  • The Czech Republic is also a member of the Incident and Trafficking Database operated by the IAEA.
  • There are also several laboratories in the Czech Republic with a very high nuclear forensics capability, which are used for acquiring of analytical evidence for prosecution of cases where illicit trafficking, smuggling or unlicensed handling of nuclear materials is involved.
  • The Czech Republic has a long standing partnership with Armenia focused on raising security and safety levels of the Metsamor NPP through implementation of ageing management systems and protocols and introduction of corrosion-erosion analysis for all main components.
  • The Czech Republic also has in place an interagency cooperation mechanism, which integrates e.g. the Customs Administration, Police and State Office for Nuclear Safety and is focused on detection and capture of nuclear materials outside the scope of regulatory control.
  • The Czech Republic participates in the GB on Counter Nuclear Smuggling.
  • The Czech Republic participates in the GB on Forensics in Nuclear Security.
  • The Czech Republic participates in the GB on Statement on Nuclear Detection Architectures. 

…Supporting Multilateral Instruments

  • The Czech Republic is a signatory of the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and it also follows the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.
  • In 2014, the Czech Republic continued cooperation with Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). Physical protection of some facilities with high-risk radioactive sources was improved within the framework of the GTRI Project.
  • Physical Protection and Security Management Course was organised in cooperation with the GTRI and held in Prague in April 2014. The purpose of the course was to create a standardized basis for development and implementation of regulatory programmes, assessments and inspection planning, as well as an operator implementation and compliance program.
  • The Czech Republic participates in the GB on Nuclear Security Training & Support Centers/Centers of Excellence (NSSC/CoE).
  • The Czech Republic supports the Joint Statement on the Low Enriched Uranium Bank in Kazakhstan.
  • The Czech Republic participates in the GB on the UNSC Resolution 1540

…Collaborating with International Organizations

  • At the request of the Government of the Czech Republic, an Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission was carried out in 2013. The purpose of the peer review was to review the Czech regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety. As recommended by the IAEA Nuclear Safety Action Plan, the review compared the Czech regulatory framework for safety against IAEA safety standards as the international benchmark for safety. The IRRS mission confirmed that the Czech regulatory system for nuclear and radiation safety is robust and the State Office for Nuclear Safety, which is the national regulatory authority, is an effective and independent regulatory authority.
  • The Czech Republic proudly contributes to the strengthening of safeguards and IAEA’s capacities through the Member States Support Programme (MSSP), which is an ongoing IAEA’s developmental programme focusing on R&D, testing of new equipment, training of personnel and general assistance based on budgetary needs of the IAEA. 
  • Under this programme the Czech Republic hosts on an annual basis, for over a decade, among other projects, the Comprehensive Inspection Exercise at Light Water Reactors (LWRs) which is dedicated to final examination of IAEA’s inspector-candidates. In 2015 the demand for this exercise was such that two runs had to be organized, each of which was attended by 9 students and 3 instructors. The Czech Republic also hosts a Nuclear Materials Accounting in Action course, which was attended by 12 participants last year. But the most sought after course is the Technical visit to Uranium Mines which was attended last year by 21 Agency employees.
  • In total over 350 IAEA employees completed these three courses. Over 80 inspector-candidates have passed the Comprehensive Inspection Exercise at LWRs, almost 200 participants took part in the Technical visit to Uranium Mines and the Nuclear Materials Accounting in Action course was completed by approx. 90 participants.
  • The Czech Republic also actively participated in preparation of the Familiarization Workshop for Safeguards Practitioners on the “Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure” which was held in IAEA in February 2016. This project was preceded by preparation of four guidebooks focusing on different aspects of safeguards, particularly on nuclear materials verification activities, collaboration and provision of information and establishing regulatory infrastructure. The Czech Republic took part in drafting of all of these guides since the beginning of this project in 2012.
  • Outside the Czech MSSP, a workshop was organized by the State Office for Nuclear Safety and the IAEA for approx. 50 participants. It focused on synergy of nuclear safety and nuclear security, including practical implementation of new provision of Information Circulars (INFCIRC) 225/Rev. 5. Participants of this workshop represented utility as well as governmental authorities.
  • Since 2014, the Czech Republic also hosted or participated in several seminars and training courses organized in cooperation with the IAEA. These courses usually had attendance of 20 to 25 participants from developing countries and were mostly funded by hosting organizations:

1.       „Sustainable Energy Development“  organized by the Czech Technical University

2.      “9th EERRI Research Reactor Group Fellowship Training Programme“ organized by the Czech Technical University, Department of Nuclear Reactors

3.      „Advanced Digital I&C Modernization and Implementation Strategy“ organized by a company I&C Energo Ltd.

4.      „Strengthening Member State´s National Systems for Safety in Medical Exposure in Line with the Revised International Basic Safety Standards“, organized by the National Radiation Protection Institute.

  • The Czech Republic also hosted a series of internships and short-term scientific fellowships for specialists from Armenia, Pakistan, Brazil, Tanzania, Monte Negro, China, Algeria, Nigeria, Argentina, Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Slovakia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 
  • Two experts from the Czech Republic also attended an IAEA training course for new International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) staff in Vienna in December 2014. One participant is from the Czech Regulatory Authority while the other one was from the Czech NPP Operator.
  • Participation of Czech expert in IAEA IPPAS mission in Australia.

National Progress Report: Denmark

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Denmark has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by… 

…Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

  • Denmark maintains a high level of security regarding nuclear and radioactive materials stored at the Danish national nuclear site at Risoe, and for radioactive sources used in industry, health care and research as well. The security of radioactive sources in Denmark is regulated through legislation and associated orders, closely reflecting the recommendations provided in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series as well as the IAEA Code of Conduct.
  • Security measures related to nuclear facilities are graded according to the state of decommissioning or plans for decommissioning for these facilities. Denmark has no operational nuclear reactors, neither for power production nor research purposes. In 2014, police and military special forces conducted an exercise at the national nuclear facility site at Risoe. In addition, an inspection of computer systems with safety and security functions at the national nuclear site was carried out in the same year.
  • The Danish Health Authority underpins a system for establishing and maintaining a high level of security for radioactive sources in Denmark with a graded focus on security and reference to “Categorization of Radioactive sources, IAEA, RS-G-1.9, 2005”. As part of this effort, the Danish Health Authority launched an inspection campaign focusing on the security of blood irradiator facilities using Cs-137. The campaign started in 2015 and will continue in 2016 to focus on the security of such sources with a particular terrorism threat potential.
  • From 2015 through 2017, The Danish Health Authority initiated an inspection campaign of industrial radiographers using sealed source irradiators. The campaign draws on the experience and feedback from the IAEA ISEMIR project, and includes a review of safety as well as security aspects of the use of sealed sources in industrial radiography.
  • A revised nuclear emergency preparedness plan came into force in 2014. The plan uses an all-hazards approach and sets out roles and responsibilities for the governmental agencies which have a role during a nuclear or radiological emergency. These include Danish Emergency Management Agency, the Danish Health Authority, Danish Police, Danish Defense and Danish Veterinary and Food Administration. The plan ensures fast and coordinated decision making through a joint national operational staff and makes sure that all relevant national resources will be available during an accidents or incident with nuclear/radiological materials.
  • Denmark is committed to strengthening nuclear security through reviews and updates as needed of the security infrastructure for nuclear and radioactive materials in Denmark. As part of the implementation of the Basic Safety Standards Directive[1], Denmark plans to call for an IAEA IRRS mission including a security module, in order to address nuclear security aspects in a manner consistent with the state of decommissioning or plans for decommissioning of nuclear facilities in Denmark.

…Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

  • Following inspections of the security of blood irradiator facilities using Cs-137, operational activities at one facility were terminated in 2014 and another facility is planned for termination in 2016, in both cases due to the perspectives of continued operations under a strengthened security regime. The total number of Cs-137 based blood irradiator facilities in Denmark is thus expected to be 12 by the end of 2016.
  • Denmark is committed to improving security of high activity sources in blood irradiator facilities through limiting the number of such sources in Denmark. The Danish Health Authority will actively promote this goal by selectively accepting applications for new blood irradiator facilities based on x-ray technologies and not high activity sources.

…Supporting Multilateral Instruments

  • Denmark ratified the CPPNM in 1991 and approved the 2005 amendment to the CPPNM in 2010. Denmark ratified ICSANT in 2007.
  • Denmark and Greenland has signed an agreement concerning the special foreign-, defense- and security policy issues related to the possible future mining and export of uranium in Greenland in January 2016.  While Denmark is responsible for non-proliferation matters in the Kingdom of Denmark, especially safeguards, security and dual-use exports, the agreement establish a framework for at shared approach to ensure compliance with the Kingdom of Denmark’s international non-proliferation obligations. The agreement underlines the joint Danish and Greenlandic commitment to observe the highest international standards comparing with other uranium supplier states. The agreement also serves as a basis for forthcoming Danish legislation for Greenland on safeguards and export controls, including export of uranium being subject to nuclear cooperation agreements to provide assurances that exports are properly protected and used for peaceful purposes. As part of the agreement, the territorial restrictions regarding six nuclear conventions for Greenland will be lifted. This includes the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
  • Denmark is committed to lifting the reservations made when ratifying the CPPNM and approving its amendment and when ratifying ICSANT so that these instruments will also apply to Greenland
  • Denmark is committed to continue to strengthen the non-proliferation of the Kingdom of Denmark as Greenland moves towards supplier status. This will include implementing new legislation on safeguards and export-controls for Greenland, ensuring high level of security in Greenland and lifting of the territorial restrictions of six nuclear conventions for Greenland.

…Collaborating with International Organizations

  • In collaboration with the Nordic countries Denmark continues to develop the so-called Nordic Manual (NORMAN) with guidelines for notification of neighboring countries in the event of accidents and incidents, such as e.g. sources out of regulatory control. The work is done within the framework of the Nordic Emergency Preparedness Group under the auspices of the Directors of the Nordic Radiation Protection and Safety Authorities.
  • The Danish Emergency Management Agency has over the past few years significantly upgraded the nuclear training program for first responders. This means that Denmark can now on short notice deploy a number of highly skilled field assistance teams in nuclear detection. The teams can map a radioactive contamination, perform nuclide identification and estimate doses.
  • Denmark is a dedicated contributor to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund. The most recent contribution of DKK 8,000,000 was made in December 2014 and aims to support the implementation of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Plan for 2014-2017and subsequent plans. This brought Denmark’s contribution to the Fund to a total of DKK 26,000,000.
  • Denmark subscribed to the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation made by a number of states in the context of the 2014 NSS and has supported the initiative to open up this statement for subscription by further IAEA Member States.
  • Denmark is committed to enlisting relevant national operational assets to IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET) in 2016. Operational units with radionuclide detection and identification capability will be made available for RANET together with advanced systems and expertise for dispersion calculation and decision support.

[1] Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom of 5 December 2013 laying down basic safety standards for

protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation, and repealing

Directives 89/618/Euratom, 90/641/Euratom, 96/29/Euratom, 97/43/Euratom and

2003/122/Euratom

National Progress Report: Egypt

Legislative framework:

The Egyptian nuclear and radiation law no. 7 of 2010:

Egypt promulgated the Egyptian nuclear and radiation law no. 7 of 2010 on March 29th, 2010. The Law covers safety, security, safeguards, emergency, and liability for the whole peaceful applications of atomic energy.

The law stipulated that all nuclear and radiation facilities, practices, and activities in the Arab Republic of Egypt shall exclusively be restricted to peaceful purposes.

The Law established an independent regulatory body to monitor all nuclear and radiation facilities, activities and practices known as “Egyptian Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Authority (ENRRA)", having a public juridical personality, reporting to the Prime Minister, having an independent budget and centrally located in Cairo.

ENRRA established on 5 March 2012. ENRRA shall be entrusted with regulatory and control functions for safety, security and safeguards related to the nuclear and radiation fields.

The Law established the Egyptian System of Nuclear Security within ENRRA’s organizational structure. The System deals with all nuclear security related activities for (in cooperation and collaboration with relevant stakeholders):

  • Defining the anticipated threats.
  • Reviewing and evaluating the performance of the design of the nuclear security systems,
  • Classification for the nuclear materials and radioactive sources from the nuclear security perspective,
  • Physical Protection on nuclear material and facilities,
  • Approving Import and Export activities,
  • Monitoring Illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material measures and procedures, and
  • Establishing the State’s database for nuclear material and radiation sources in all applications.

The executive regulation of the law no. 7 of 2010 was promulgated by the prime minister decree no. 1326 of 2011.

Nuclear security regulations:

Egyptian nuclear and radiological regulatory authority (ENRRA) promulgated certain regulations related to nuclear security, as follows:

  • Regulation on the procedures and rules regulating the activities related to nuclear safeguards. This regulation was issued to ensure that all nuclear materials are controlled and used only in the peaceful applications and ensuring the non-diversion of these materials to non-peaceful applications.
  • Regulation on classification of nuclear materials and radiation sources from nuclear security perspective. This regulation issued to specify the appropriate requirements and measures to be applied on each category to ensure that the nuclear materials and radiation sources is well protected from theft, sabotage or unauthorized access or any malicious act directed to the materials or sources.

ENRRA is drafting three other regulations concerning nuclear security as follows:

  • Regulation on security of radioactive sources and facilities,
  • Regulation on the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities,
  • Regulation on security of radioactive materials during transport.

United Nation Security Council resolution 1540 of 2004

In the context of Egypt's commitment to Security Council resolution 1540, Egypt keens to submit its national report to the committee 1540 to illustrate the Egyptian progress concerning the implementation of UNSCR 1540 of 2004, Egypt recently submitted its national report to the 1540 committee in 2016.

Integrated nuclear security Support Plan:

Egypt signed the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) with the International Atomic Energy Agency on 27 November 2014 to promote the collaboration between the two parties in the field of Nuclear Security.

From the signature of the INSSP a large scale of activities has been implemented in coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency as follows:

  • National workshop on drafting nuclear security regulations
  • National workshop on the design basis threat
  • Training courses on security of research reactors and associated facilities
  • Training courses on drafting nuclear security plan for research reactor and associated facilities
  • National training course on preventive measures against insider threat

In addition to that, ENRRA, Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority, and IAEA are collaborating in upgrading the physical protection systems of the Egyptian first and second research reactors.

Training and education

ENRRA Keens to promote the capabilities of all the competent authorities working in the field of nuclear security, for that reason, ENRRA established a nuclear security support and training center to provide training technical support to the national authorities working in this field. This center was established to ensure that all the employees working in this field are highly qualified and well trained.

As well as, ENRRA convened number of training course and workshops, as follows:

  • Training courses to the civil protection employees on security of nuclear and radiation facilities and managing radiological accidents.
  • Workshops to the front line officers

Other activities:

In addition to the abovementioned activities, ENRRA took several steps to enhance the national nuclear security regime including but not limited to:

  • Technical support to the competent authorities working in the field of nuclear security.
  • Developing the database on the nuclear materials and radioactive sources.
  • Participated in drafting protocol on the security of land. Air, and sea borders from nuclear and radiation perspective.

Future vision:

  • Complete the implementation of the Integrated Nuclear Security Plan in cooperation with IAEA.
  • Training the workers in the field of nuclear security in all competent authorities.
  • Developing the nuclear security support and training center.
  • Collaboration with the Egyptian universities in developing curriculum concerning nuclear security.

National Progress Report: Finland

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Finland has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by… 

…Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

  • Finland has a well established and strong nuclear security regulatory framework. Finland has extensive legislation in place concerning criminal acts in the field of nuclear security, including the authority to prosecute cases of illicit nuclear trafficking and nuclear terrorism. The National Counter Terrorism Strategy and Cyber Security Strategy include elements relevant to nuclear security.
  • The responsibility for nuclear safety, radiation safety and nuclear security regulatory control, as well as the accounting for and control of nuclear material in Finland, have been vested in the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), which is effectively independent in its decision making. Having nuclear security, safety and safeguards issues within the same regulatory authority is considered beneficial for the synergy of these three areas.
  • The role and independency of STUK was further strengthened by its new mandate to issue binding regulations, which are positioned between legislation and the regulatory guides in the regulatory framework. Hence the former Governmental decree on the security in the use of nuclear energy was replaced by STUK regulation on security in the use of nuclear energy, which entered into force in 2016.
  • The nuclear security regulatory requirements are periodically reviewed, and in 2013 STUK has completed a comprehensive revision of its regulatory guides governing the use of nuclear energy (nuclear facilities, nuclear material, nuclear technology, and transports). The framework of international references was taken into account, including the latest developments of IAEA recommendations and experiences from the Fukushima Daiichi accident. A new regulatory guide on information security (including cyber security) entered into force in 2013 as part of the comprehensive revision of STUK guides, covering information security management (including cyber security) in nuclear facilities in Finland. A new regulatory guide on the security of radioactive sources entered into force in 2013, and STUK has, accordingly, developed further its inspection practices for the use of radiation in health care, industry and research.
  • The results of an IAEA-coordinated national DBT workshop and the IAEA Implementing Guide on the Development, Use and Maintenance of the Design Basis Threat were made use of in the national DBT process. The new DBT entered into force in 2013. The DBT includes physical and information security/cyber security threats. A DBT revision is being initiated in 2016. The related threat assessment is maintained by the responsible authorities through regular reviews.
  • STUK has identified synergies between nuclear safety, security and safeguards, and shares its experiences internationally. STUK takes into account the aspects of safety, security and safeguards when licensing the final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, the first of its kind in the world. STUK plans its safeguards control activities together with international inspectorates in such a way that supports also the objectives of nuclear security.
  • Together with the IAEA and Finnish nuclear facility operators, STUK hosted two workshops in Helsinki and the Olkiluoto NPP site in 2012 and in 2014 for states pursuing nuclear power programmes. The theme was the relationship and roles between a nuclear facility operator and the regulator in the areas of safety, security, safeguards, emergency preparedness, and public communication. The third workshop in the series is planned for June 2016.
  • STUK is coordinating an informal information security working group with other national authorities with a role in information security and the Finnish nuclear facility operators, the aim of which is to improve information exchange on cyber security threats and incidents, to develop training and testing and to strengthen response.
  • In support of the STUK regulatory control activities on nuclear security, a Standing Nuclear Security Committee, composed of senior experts from various government bodies and main nuclear industry operators, has been established by the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act. Its main functions are the provision of support in threat assessment and promotion of coordination and cooperation in nuclear security issues.
  • STUK participates in the national counter terrorism expert group, to follow up the implementation of the counter-terrorism strategy and to exchange information related to the current threat assessment.
  • While Finland scored well in the NTI Nuclear Security Index 2016, it is clear that continuous improvement of the state nuclear security regime must prevail to address the present and changing threat.

…Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

  • There are no significant amounts of weapons grade nuclear materials in Finland. The research reactor is in permanent shutdown and entering the decommissioning phase.
  • Replacement of radioactive material in certain applications (e.g. blood irradiators) with alternative technologies has been encouraged.

…Countering Nuclear Smuggling

  • The Finnish Customs and Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority run an ongoing joint programme to update, enhance, and maintain the radiation monitoring system at the borders and the related operational procedures.
  • The Finnish authorities - the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, the police and other first responders - are operating a concept, based on mobile units, for in-field radionuclide detection, identification, on-line data transmission, and expert support (reach-back).
  • Finnish authorities have also jointly developed a concept for national nuclear security detection architecture for nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control.
  • The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority is developing novel methods for crime scene management of alpha radiation sources in a European Union FP7-GIFT project (2014-2017).
  • See commitments of the first section.

…Supporting Multilateral Instruments

  • Finland ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in December 2009.
  • Finland is Party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Finland has also completed the amendments to its legislation as required by the Amendment to the CPPNM and has deposited its ratification instrument in June 2011.
  • Pending the entry into force of the Amendment to the CPPNM, Finland is acting in accordance with its object and purpose.
  • Finland has supported the Henry L. Stimson Center project promoting the implementation of Resolution 1540 in developing countries since 2006 and continues to do so.  The Finnish-funded Stimson Center initiative works in close cooperation with the 1540 Committee in promoting universal adherence to the Resolution.
  • Finland stands ready to provide assistance, as appropriate, in response to specific requests, to the States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the provisions of Security Council resolution 1540.
  • Finland is committed to full implementation of the Security Council Resolution 1540 and has fulfilled national reporting obligations in this regard. 

…Collaborating with International Organizations

  • Finland continues to provide financial and in-kind support to the IAEA's Nuclear Security Programme. In addition to the collective EU contribution, Finland has over many years provided a national contribution to the Nuclear Security Fund. Finland has also actively participated in the process of developing documents in the IAEA's Nuclear Security Series, inter alia, by participating in the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC). Finland is participating in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) Programme.
  • Finland has successfully made use of the IAEA advisory and peer review services. At request of the Government of Finland, IAEA team of experts conducted an IPPAS mission in Finland in 2009. A follow-up IPPAS mission was conducted in 2012. Its final report was issued in 2013. In addition, Finland has provided experts for IPPAS missions in other Member States.
  • Finland is actively cooperating with the IAEA in the information security/cyber security domain. Finland hosted in 2012 an IAEA Consultancy Meeting on the development of a guidance document in Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Finland supports and participates in the development of IAEA guidance on Computer Security.
  • Finnish experts have participated in the development and conduct of IAEA training courses on nuclear security, for example in the topic of preventive and protective measures against insider threat. Such an international insider training course was conducted in Finland in 2015, in cooperation with the IAEA for Member States worldwide.
  • A national Nuclear Security Culture Workshop was conducted in Finland in 2011, in cooperation with the IAEA, for top management of relevant stakeholders, including the nuclear operators. Finland hosted an IAEA International Workshop on Nuclear Security Culture in 2013. Within its inspection and evaluation programmes, STUK has started to address how the processes of nuclear security (physical and information/cyber security) are linked to the integrated management system of nuclear facilities and how security issues are included in their organizational culture, together with safety issues. As a reflection of such linkage and inclusion, nuclear facility operators have adopted a concept of site-walks to collect observations on physical security, information security, safety, and safeguards, which contributes to situational awareness and management of anomalies.
  • Finland provides assistance also through the G-8 Global Partnership Program, to which it joined in 2003. Nuclear safety and security projects have been implemented in the Russian Federation together with the Russian authorities and since 2009 Finland has contributed to the US State Department’s Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI), which has implemented border security related projects in Eastern European and Central Asian countries. Finland intends to continue its support to the Global Partnership Program also in the future.
  • Finland hosted a GICNT Nuclear Detection Working Group (NDWG) Workshop and Tabletop Exercise "Northern Lights” in January and a Plenary and Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG) Meeting in June 2015. In January 2016 Finland hosted a NDWG experts meeting in Helsinki.
  • Finland stays committed to international cooperation in nuclear security with the aim to enhance nuclear security globally and continues to contribute to IAEA’s nuclear security activities, including the development of the guidance in the Nuclear Security Series.

…Partnering with External Stakeholders

  • Some of the activities with external stakeholders are included in the first section, Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security, such as the information security working group and the counter-terrorism expert group.
  • See commitments of the first section.

 

National Progress Report: France

During the third Nuclear Security Summit, held in The Hague (Netherlands) on March 24th and 25th, 2014, France made a number of commitments – especially in the field of the security of radioactive sources. Since the NSS 2014, France has been very active to fulfil these commitments and, in so doing, to continue bringing a significant contribution to the global nuclear security through its actions in all the areas covered by the Nuclear Security Summit.

1)   Reminder of the main commitments made by France during the NSS 2014

During the NSS 2014, France made the following commitment.

A/      President Hollande announced that the security of radioactive sources should become a major political priority regarding the risks associated. In this regard, he announced that France would increase its international efforts on the following three axes of work: 1) strengthening further the content and the implementation of the international framework applicable to sources, 2) promoting international exchanges on the development and spread of technologies alternative to high activity sources when technically and economically feasible, and 3) deepening further the cooperation between sources supplier States to improve further the security of disused sources once withdrawn from service.

B/      France confirmed its will to deepen its efforts to identify, secure and, if need be, repatriate French-origin disused sources currently in States with insufficient resources to manage them - consistently with the President’s announcements.

C/      Regarding the international framework on nuclear security, the French President made a number of commitments:

  • Following on its ratification of the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM[1] in 2013, France announced that it would submit to the IAEA a national implementation report prior to the NSS 2016 – in accordance with CPPNM article 14.1;
  • France also announced it would support a better implementation of the relevant international instruments (CPPNM, ICSANT[2] and Joint Convention[3]) and IAEA guidance related to radioactive sources (Code of conduct[4] and Supplementary Guidance especially[5]);

D/      France also announced it would request the IAEA to organize a follow-up IPPAS mission. Indeed, in 2011, France had hosted a successful IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission on its territory – at the power plant of Graveline. France intends to send its request to the IAEA for a follow up mission to be organized on its territory ideally in 2017.

E/      Since 2012, France had been involved in international effort on the minimization of civilian uses of high-enriched uranium (HEU), especially to develop, qualify and certify alternative high-density low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels for high-performances research reactors – along with the Belgium, the Republic of Korea and the United States. On the occasion of the NSS 2014, France then renewed its commitment to actively support these international efforts that should ultimately enable to convert HEU-powered facilities

F/      France also renewed its commitment to support the efforts undertaken since 2012 by the Working group on the security of nuclear transportation, chaired by Japan following of a NSS 2012 gift basket.

2)   The security of radioactive sources – the main French priorities and actions

a)   French gift basket on the security of radioactive source for the NSS 2016

Following on the commitment by the French President during the NSS 2014 in the field of radioactive sources, France prepared a gift basket submitted to the NSS 2016 with three main objectives:

  • Contributing to raising the level of political awareness on this topic of concern;
  • Proposing concrete measures to be considered after 2016 to raise further the global level of security of these materials; and
  • Offering a platform, agreed by the largest possible number of States, to initiate substantive work after the NSS 2016 – particularly in the IAEA.

In accordance with the President’s commitments made in 2014, this gift basket focuses on the previously-described three areas of work – strengthening the content and implementation of the relevant international framework, promoting exchanges on technologies alternative to high-activity radioactive sources, and encouraging a stronger cooperation between sources supplier States to better manage disused sources and avoid them becoming orphan.

This gift basket will be open to the signature of every States participating to the NSS 2016 and France will actively promote its content in the IAEA work following on the end of the NSS process.

b)   Assistance to third States to secure radioactive sources 

Consistent with its political focus on the security of radioactive sources, France has also deepened its technical work in this field. In 2011, France signed an agreement with the IAEA to increase cooperation to identify, locate and secure French-origin high-activity radioactive sources in requesting third States with insufficient resources to store them in a safe and secure way.

This agreement strengthened the work France had been carrying out since 2000 in this field. Since then, France has been able to identify and locate hundreds of French-origin sources, out of which 20 could not be secured on site and, consequently, were repatriated to France from five requesting States in Africa and the Middle-East. France also carried out five expertise or fact-finding missions in four other countries in Latin America, Asia and the former USSR. They enabled to secure on site nearly 30 high-activity sources. A part of this work was led in the context of the G7 Global Partnership against the spread of weapons of mass destruction (G7GP) and allowed to locate and secure on site 23 radioactive sources from RTGs abandoned in the former USSR.

From 2000 to March 2016, a total of 54 high-activity radioactive sources has been either evacuated from third States to France or secured on site in the recipient States thanks to French expertise and/or assistance. Hundreds of other such sources have been secured on site following on French contributions to the construction and/or equipment of storage facilities – mainly in the former USSR. Twelve more operations are planned for the years 2016, 2017 and 2018 to repatriate a dozen of French-origin radioactive sources from four requesting States in the Middle-East and in Africa.

Besides these efforts, France contributed to G7GP efforts in Ukraine from 2005 to 2013 to the construction and equipment of a radioactive sources storage facility. This site will enable to store in a safe and secure way hundreds of sources and quantities of radioactive scrap metal abandoned throughout the country following on the collapse of the USSR.

Since 2003, France has dedicated 6.2 million dollars to such work on radioactive sources, out of which 20% (1.2 million US$) were invested in 2014-2015 only, to support the increased efforts requested by the President at the NSS 2014. This global funding was invested either directly by France (4.75 million US$; 77%) or as contributions to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund (1.43 million US$; 23%).

c)    Contribution on alternative technologies to high-activity radioactive sources

A/      Following on the President’s announcement in the NSS 2014 regarding technologies alternative to high-activity radioactive sources, France promoted exchange of political, technical, legal and economic information on such technologies through many forum. In the IAEA’s General Conferences 2014 and 2015, France proposed amendments on this topic during the debates on the draft resolution on nuclear security. France acted likewise in the 2014 United Nations General Assembly when proposing amendment on such alternative technologies in the draft resolution on the prevention of the acquisition of radioactive sources by terrorist it has been introducing every second year since 2007.

B/      France also agreed to co-chair with the United States an ad hoc working group of stakeholder States involved with technological alternatives to high-activity radioactive sources. While reminding that such a choice remains the responsibility of each State, this exercise enabled to generate technical discussions on how to spread such technologies in an economically and technically realistic fashion. This working group will be gathered once every year under American-French chairmanship in 2016 and 2017 at least. Terms of reference have been approved and an agenda for the next meeting (6th of June 2016) is currently under development. During this meeting, operators could be invited to present the lessons learned while implementing alternative technologies and the incentives and disincentives they face.

D/      These efforts came along with French national polices to minimize the use of high-activity sources when technically and economically realistic. This was especially undertaken since 2006 to progressively phase out isotopic medical gamma blood-irradiators to replace them by X-ray devices, following on an impulsion from the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN). This effort could be supported by the production of adequate non-isotopic technologies by French companies.

d)   Supporting the international framework applicable to radioactive sources

On the diplomatic ground, France also increased its involvement in favor of strengthening further the global level of security of radioactive sources.

A/      Between April and October 2015, France undertook diplomatic demarches to encourage 40 States that have not yet done so to ratify the ICSANT and the Joint Convention as well as to make a political commitment towards the Code of Conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources and its Supplementary Guidance on Import and Export (cf. results in paragraph 3.a.A below).

B/      France is also involved in the elaboration of the IAEA’s technical recommendations. Indeed, French experts took part in the working group on the elaboration of a new NSS document on the end of life of disused radioactive sources as well as guidance on the security of radioactive materials. It is also worth mentioning the contribution of the Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) to the current elaboration by the IAEA of a « Technical Guide on Security of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material in Transport ».

C/      Several French experts are involved in the revision of IAEA guidance. Indeed, experts from the ASN and the IRSN are involved in the still ongoing revision of two important documents from the Nuclear Security Series (NSS): the NSS 9 on the security of radioactive material in transport, and the NSS 11 on the security of radioactive material in use and storage and of associated facilities.

D/      In 2015, French experts from IRSN were involved as lecturers in 4 regional or international training course and one workshop organized by the IEA in different countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa on the security in the transport of radioactive material.

e)    Contribution to international events on the security of radioactive sources

In the intersession period between the NSS 2014 and 2016, France has also contributed to international workshops and seminars on the security of radioactive sources.

In April 2014, the ASN and representatives from the Ministry of Energy attended a workshop organized by the WINS regarding the security of radioactive sources used for industrial radiography and well-logging applications. During the event, a French operator specialized in non-destructive testing (NDT) introduced the work performed by operators, under the aegis of the ASN regarding the identification of technologies alternative to gamma industrial radiography.

In September 2014, the French public interest group “GIP Sources HA”[6] and WINS organized an international workshop regarding the end of life management of radioactive sources. 57 participants of 17 countries attended this 2-day workshop.

In January 2016, the ASN and the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) also took part in a workshop organized in Oslo by the United States, Norway and WINS as a follow-up on the progress made with regard to the gift basket adopted in 2014 in the field of radiological security. This was the occasion for France to explain in detail the objectives of the axes of work announced by the President in 2014 as well as of the actions undertaken since then.

In January 2016, experts from the French National Police took part in the Interpol Conference on the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials – including radioactive sources.

In March 2016, in the framework of the Regulatory Infrastructure Development Project, two French experts from ASN were involved in the conduct of the IAEA Regional Workshop on Radiation Safety Regulatory Infrastructure: Strategy for Regaining Control over Orphan Sources.

f)    Publication of a Handbook on the security of radioactive sources

In the margins of the preparation of the NSS 2016, France has prepared a document entitled “Security of high-activity radioactive sources – handbook on policies and practices”. It aims at giving a clear idea of why radioactive sources are currently used for, what are their associated risks and how to further improve their security globally. It will be circulated in the margins of the NSS 2016 and later made available in electronic format on the website of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development.

In this regard, this document should contribute to raise awareness among decision-makers, diplomats, civils servants and experts on the security of radioactive sources by providing clear and detailed overviews on 10 major topics. It could ultimately be used to implement the French-proposed gift basket on the security of radioactive sources after 2016 or to carry-out demarches toward States that have not yet done so to ratify relevant instruments or to make political commitments with regards to pertinent IAEA guidance.

3)   Supporting the universalization of the relevant international texts

a)   To combat trafficking and nuclear and radiological terrorism

From April to October 2015, France undertook indeed a round of diplomatic demarches towards 40 States that are not parties to both the ICSANT and the Joint Convention and that also made no political commitment regarding the Code of Conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources and its Supplementary Guidance on the import and export of such sources. The purpose was to encourage these States to ratify these instruments and to make political commitments towards the relevant IAEA guidance. Indeed these instruments and IAEA guidance represent the most fundamental texts applicable to the security of radioactive sources. In this regard, their universalization would represent an important step forwards to deepen further the security of these materials.

Seven States expressed their clear will to ratify the ICSANT while three of them made a similar commitment regarding the Joint Convention. However, six other States made the commitment to assess their need and interest to ratify the ICSANT and / or the Joint Convention in the coming months. Regarding the Code of Conduct and its Supplementary Guidance, three States noted they would make the political commitment to use them in their national nuclear security regime. Seven other States indicated they would assess their interest to make such a commitment in the coming months.

b)   To strengthen further the physical protection of nuclear materials

France also carried out diplomatic demarches to 107 States regarding the CPPNM in January and February 2016. These demarches targeted primarily the 65 States parties to the CPPNM that have not yet ratified the 2005 Amendment to this Convention, in order to encourage them to do so – and if possible prior to the NSS 2016 to enable its entry into force on this occasion.

These demarches further targeted 42 States that have not even ratified the CPPNM itself to encourage them to do so and, ultimately, push towards the universalization of this instrument and of its 2005 Amendment. Indeed, the CPPNM is currently the only legally-binding international instrument in the field of nuclear security – and consequently the most important document on this topic.

As of March 2016, twenty-two States made the commitment to ratify the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM and five others made a similar commitment towards both the Convention and its Amendment. Though only eight of these twenty-seven States considered themselves able to complete such a ratification before the NSS 2016, two of them completed the ratification process prior to the NSS 2016. Among the targeted States thirteen others expressed interest for the Amendment and/or for the CPPNM itself and indicated they would assess their interest and need to ratify them in the coming months. A point of significant interest was that no State but one expressed disinterest for the CPPNM and its Amendment.

c)    Other initiatives related to the CPPNM

As part of its action towards the entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM, France actively contributed to the Meeting of the Points of Contact and Central Authorities of States Parties to the CPPNM, organized by the IAEA in December 2015 to convince States that have not yet done so to ratify the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM and implement it in their domestic legislation.

4)   Reporting to international organizations

a)   To the IAEA

During the NSS 2014, France committed to prepare a report on the basis of article 14.1 of the CPPMN, as amended in 2005. This reporting exercise aims at providing the IAEA with the appropriate information on the domestic legal framework adopted to implement the provision of the CPPMN and of its 2005 Amendment. France provided such a report to the IAEA on October 23rd, 2014. This 33-pages long document provides detailed information on the French domestic nuclear security legislation that was largely upgraded between 2010 and 2014.

b)   To the United Nations

In November 2014, France engaged a comprehensive revision of its national report to the 1540 Committee. Indeed, the first French report had been published on October 28th, 2004 and later updated on August 25th, 2005 and December 14th, 2007. But, from 2007 to 2014, the French legislation regarding proliferation and nuclear security had been significantly upgraded which required an equivalent effort to update the French 1540 report in accordance. The new updated report was eventually published on August 15th, 2015. Its 44 pages now provide highly-comprehensive information on the status of the French legislation – especially in the field of nuclear security – presented in the model tables proposed by the 1540 Committee.

5)   Supporting the IAEA’s services to States and technical expertise

a)   Contribution to the NSF

France has long been an important contributor to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund (NSF). For the period comprised between 2002 and 2016 it ranks 11th donor among more than 40, with 2.83 million US$ provided to the Fund – including 1.2 million in 2014 and 2015 only. It must also be recalled that among the 38 million US$ provided to the NSF by the European Union, approximately one fifth came from French funding. The CEA and the IRSN provided other contributions directly to some IAEA technical programs or to finance IPPAS missions with a global amount, between 2010 and 2016, of 238 000 US$.

b)   Cost-free expert 

France has provided the IAEA with a cost-free expert from the IRSN since 2010, in order to help the Agency providing expertise and carrying out various services to States – including IPPAS missions. The current expert has been provided for a two-year period, from March 1st, 2014 to March 1st, 2016. It will be renewed for another two-year period. From 2010 to 2016, the provision of cost-free experts has represented an indirect contribution to the IAEA of 1 million US$.

c)    Translation of technical documents 

France has also provided secondary contribution to the IAEA’s efforts in the field of nuclear security. They consisted mostly in funding dedicated to translating into French technical guidance adopted by the Agency. Such contributions were made by the CEA and the IRSN from 2010 to 2015 and represent a total of 38 000 US$. In 2015 by EDF (the French electric operator) made a contribution to translate NST23 and NST37 (7 000 €) and was followed by the Ministry of the Environment, Energy and the Sea (MEEM) to translate NST22.

d)   French experts also contributed to various services provided by the IAEA 

Five French experts working for the Agency have been involved in IPPAS missions carried out by the Agency since 2014, including four in 2014 and one in 2015. Other experts acting on behalf of the French government (from the IRSN especially) were also active in the activities of the Agency – especially to elaborate guidance, organize training courses or workshops or delivering trainings. French experts have in particular been highly involved in the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC) and its working groups. It is also worth mentioning the organization by France of the first International Seminar on IPPAS missions in Paris, on December 4th and 5th, 2013 in cooperation with the IAEA.

e)    Contribution to technical work of the Agency 

France contributed further to other important technical activities of the IAEA in 2014 and 2015 in many fields such as:

  • The improvement of security culture (i.e. consultant meeting and development of training modules aimed in particular at assisting the IAEA with the continuous development of its nuclear security culture program);
  • Crisis management (i.e. consultants meeting);
  • Physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities (i.e. consultant meeting on security during the lifetime of a nuclear facility, consultancy meeting on security by design);
  • Security during the lifetime of a nuclear facility (i.e. consultant meeting on developing an implementing guide on the security during the different phase in the lifetime of a facility including for instance the design phase and the decommissioning phase);
  • Security of materials being transported (i.e. technical meeting on physical protection of nuclear materials during transport);
  • Accountability and control of materials (i.e. consultants meeting on nuclear materials control – for example, in 2015, one expert from IRSN was involved as lecturer in one regional and one international training course on Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security at Facilities, in Turkey and in China); and
  • Cyber-security (i.e. consultancy meetings on developing possible future recommendation level document on cyber security; training courses including the holding in France of the first training course on conducting computer security assessment; revision of a document on computer security in nuclear facilities, consultants meetings on taking into account current or emerging cyber threats in the nuclear security planning or on the evaluation of cyber threats for nuclear facilities).

6)   Supporting other relevant international organizations or diplomatic initiatives

France supports many international initiatives in the field of nuclear security outside the IAEA.

a)   In the United Nations

A/      The 1540 report published in 2015 (cf. 3.b.B) updated significantly the information on the French legislation related to nuclear security. 

B/      France also offers assistance and expertise, through the 1540 Committee to every requesting States in the field of nuclear and radiological security. It has also participated to various seminars and workshops related to CBRN security with the same purpose.

C/      On the occasion of the Comprehensive review of the 1540 Resolution (June 2016), France will promote a better focus on the security of radioactive sources in the direction of assistance. France will also encourage providing more powers to the 1540 Committee to actively organize the matchmaking between the offers and requests of assistance and to direct more of its resources on this strategic aspect.

b)   In Interpol

A/      France contributes strengthening of Interpol’s Operation Fail Safe. This is program was initiated in 2012 to support each Member State’s efforts to gather and exchange information on individuals suspected of being involved in nuclear-related offenses (trafficking especially). This operation was initially limited to the use of Interpol’ Green Notices[7] but France support’s Interpol’s suggestion to extend it to all the categories of Notices[8] used by the organization. Following on a request from Interpol in September 2015 to every member States, France designated a national point of contact for Operation Fail Safe – the Central Section for Weapons, Explosives and Sensitive Materials (SCAEMS) of the Central Department of Judiciary Police (DCPJ).

B/      France takes part in events organized by Interpol on nuclear security, such as the Interpol Global Counter-Nuclear Smuggling Conference held in Lyon (France) on January 27th to 29th, 2016. This event enabled delegates from 120 States to exchange on the prevention of the risk of nuclear terrorism. France was involved in this Conference through the commander of the Central Interagency Detachment for Technical Intervention (DCI-IT)[9] and experts from the Division for Scientific and Technical Police (SDPTS) and the Central Direction for Judiciary Police (DCPJ).

C/      France also cooperates with Interpol at the operational and technical level in the field of nuclear security. For example, in October 2015, experts from Interpol were invited to attend a national meeting of all the French Ministries’ services involved in the combat against the CBRN threat – Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Atomic Energy Commission etc. – which was organized by the SDPTS. Experts from close partner States, like the United Kingdom, were also invited to attend this event.

D/      The French National Central Bureau for Interpol also publishes a monthly bulletin on CBRN criminality. This bulletin gathers information collected from open sources on incidents that took place during the previous month in the world and that had a CBRN dimension – theft/loss of materials or associated equipment, action against sensitive facilities, threats to commit offenses etc. This information is then circulated to every services of the State involved in combating the CBRN threat.

c)    In the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)

A/      The French delegation is active in the policy level meetings of the Initiatives, i.e. the Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG) and the Plenary Meetings. In the Helsinki Plenary meeting (June, 16th-17th, 2015) France supported a stronger focus of the GICNT’s on the risks of terrorist uses of radioactive sources as well as on the actions to repair and mitigate the consequences of a radiological attack.

B/      France is also active in the three working groups of the GICNT, as they address NSS priorities in nuclear detection, nuclear forensics and response / mitigation. France hosted the May 2014 session of the Response and Mitigation Working Group in Paris and has also contributed to the elaboration and reviewing of the Exercises, Training and Awareness Document. Within the framework of the GICNT Nuclear Forensics working group activities, France has actively participated in the elaboration and the reviewing of the “Fundamentals for Policy and Decision Maker’s Document” which has been approved during the 2012 Mid-Year IAG Meeting in February 2014 in Marrakech.

C/      France was also involved in several GICNT seminars and exercises, in the field of:

  • Nuclear forensics, with exercise “Bleu Eagle”, organized by the United Kingdom in London in January 2014 as well as exercise “Radiant City” organized by the European Union in Karlsruhe in May 2015, and a thematic workshop in the United States in October 2015;
  • Illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials with the exercise organized by the United States in Karlsruhe (Germany) in February 2014; and
  • Detection of radioactive materials with exercise “Northern Lights”, organized by Finland in January 2015.

 d)   In the G7 Global Partnership against the spread of weapons of mass destruction (G7GP)

France has also been a contributor to the G7GP since its creation in 2002. Since then, France has dedicated more than 130 million dollars to this program, out of which 67% have been dedicated to programs related to nuclear and/or radiological security.

From 2003 to 2013, the French G7GP programs have enabled to dismantle the reactors of two abandoned submarines, to secure 900 nuclear fuel assemblies and the high-activity sources of 16 RTGs in the former USSR, as well as to upgrade nuclear fuel storage facilities in the same area.

Since 2011, the French involvement in the nuclear programs of the G7GP was reoriented on the security of high-activity radioactive sources. France dedicated about 6.2 million dollars to this topic, which enabled to secure dozens of such radioactive sources in Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle-East, as well as to provide equipment to a radioactive wastes storage facility in Ukraine – with the capacity to safely and securely dispose of more than 10 000 sources.

e)    In the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG)

France is an active contributor to the ITWG, created in 1995 following on an initiative of the G7. That group, which comprises about 40 States, is tasked to provide recommendations and expertise on nuclear forensics. France, thanks to the laboratories of the CEA, took an active part in exercise CMX-4 in late 2014 and to the analyses of the results in March 2015 in Karlsruhe (Germany). An expert of the CEA was appointed in the ITWG Executive Committee in 2015. France also hosts and maintains the ITWG web pages.

This commitment in favor of nuclear forensics will be further deepened in 2016, as France will co-organize the annual meeting of the ITWG in Lyon (June 2016) but also the preparation of exercise CMX-5 thanks to samples of materials provided by the CEA.

f)    In favor of the Centers of excellence

France continues to support and offer expertise through centers of excellence, for example in the context of the European Union Centers of Excellences on CBRN risk mitigation. One project is currently being implemented in North Africa. It focuses on nuclear security. CEA signed an agreement with the Indian Center of Excellence GCNEP which includes cooperation in training and research and development in the field of nuclear security. The concrete phase of the implementation of this Center of Excellence has started on January 3rd, 2014.

g)   At the bilateral level

France also maintains bilateral contacts with partners States in the field of nuclear security, to share information or to provide them with advice or expertise. Delegations were welcomed in Paris and on French nuclear sites in this regard, including from the Indian government-related think-tank ORF (March 2014), from the United States Government Accountability Office (January 2015), from the UAE nuclear security authorities (February 2015), Japanese security authority (September 2015), or from the Polish nuclear security authorities (December 2015).

7)   Expertise and contribution in the field of radiological detection

A/      France has proposed, over the past years, its expertise to requesting States to secure major public events from radiological risks. France will support the IAEA in its assistance to Mali concerning the security of the French / Africa Summit to be held in Bamako in January 2017, through the training of Malian first line officers to radiological security, and through the organization of adequate visits and Workshops.

B/      French companies have also been active to develop tracking technologies. This is mainly the case of the consortium of small and medium-size businesses[10] involved since July 2014 in the Nuc-Track Project, supported by the Nuclear Pole of Burgundy, the IRSN and the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS). The project aims at developing a technology to ensure an automated real-time tracking of radioactive sources in transport, to avoid any loss of control and to send alarm signals immediately in case of abnormal event.

8)   Role in the development of LEU high-density fuel for high performance research reactors

A/      During the NSS 2012, France signed with Belgium, the Republic of Korea and the United States a gift basket that initiated an international cooperation to develop high-density low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels to convert high-performance research reactors using highly-enriched uranium (HEU).

B/      France further made the commitment to minimize the civilian uses of HEU when technically and economically feasible, including for the production of medical radioisotopes. France decided to close the high performance research reactor Orphée (which is using HEU fuel) by 2019, which contributes to the minimization effort in the utilization of HEU.

C/      Following on the NSS 2012, the HERACLES program has been initiated between Belgium, France and Germany in close cooperation with the United States to develop, test and qualify uranium-molybdenum dispersion fuel. Scientific difficulties were identified in the process (excessive dilatation of the fuel) which resulted in important delays and in the impossibility to determine a deadline for qualifying an LEU fuel for research reactor. However, the HERACLES program still represents an important cooperation that will serve as a basis for new scientific works on LEU fuel development. Furthermore, many scientific lessons were drawn from the researches undertaken since 2012.

9)   Contributions to the security of international nuclear transportations

A/      During the NSS 2012, France signed a gift basket with Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom, the United States on the security of nuclear transportations. It resulted in the organization of a working group tasked to draft four guides of good practices of the four transport modes (air, road, rail, sea). Following on their adoption by the States participating to the working group on the occasion of the NSS 2016, these documents should ultimately be used in the IAEA as reference documents in the context of the elaboration of guidance on the security of transports.

B/      France was also involved, in the IAEA, in exercises related to the security of nuclear transportations. The most important was the table-top exercise organized on June 17th, 2015. It was designed to assess the communication channels between shipper (France, Japan and United Kingdom) and coastal States during an international transport of nuclear materials. This table-top exercise was unanimously regarded as successful as it enabled every participant to understand better the way communication channels in case of incident could be activated and used. This exercise was also considered as a good basis of work for future discussion in the IAEA on the security of such transportations. The Coastal and Shipping States are planning to visit to a transport ship in United Kingdom with the participants to the dialogue process by the end of 2016.

10)    Strengthened cooperation between the government and the nuclear industry

The competent authorities pursue a continuous the dialogue with the nuclear industry in particular to promote the nuclear security culture (for example by contributing to the training of the security managers of the facilities), to ensure the sharing of experience amongst operators as well as to facilitate, in particular through guidance, the understanding and implementation of new requirements (for example cybersecurity). Whenever relevant, the nuclear industry is consulted on the new laws and regulations as part of the regulatory process.

11)    Strengthening further the French national nuclear security regime

a)   Organization of an IPPAS follow-up mission 

At the NSS 2014, France had made the commitment to call the IAEA to organize a follow-up IPPAS mission, after the first such mission hosted in France in 2011. France intends to send its request to the IAEA for a follow up mission to be organized on its territory ideally in 2017. This mission will cover the areas already observed by the IPPAS mission of 2011 but it should also be extended to other topics such as cyber-security.

b)   Deepening further the French national legislation

A/      The French legislative and regulatory framework on the physical protection and control of nuclear materials, facilities and transportation has been revised in depth since 2009, through distinct successive steps. An IPPAS mission was successfully hosted in late 2011. Its conclusions stressed the robustness of the French nuclear security regime.

A law on strengthening the legal means to fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was then adopted on March 15th, 2011, in order to criminalize new acts related to infringements to nuclear security and introduce harsher sentences for such offences.

This step was followed in 2013 by the above-mentioned ratification of the ICSANT and Amendment to the CPPNM. This evolution strengthened even more the French nuclear security regime even it had already been adapted prior to both ratifications.

B/      This progressive consolidation has been continued since then, with the adoption of further pieces of legislation between 2013 and 2016. Technical regulations will be adopted to implement these new legislative provisions in the next few years:

  • A law on cyber security that applies to the critical infrastructures, including nuclear facilities, was voted in late 2013 and will contribute to a reinforcement of the requirements on cyber security;
  • Provisions to strengthen deterrence and improve the capacity to detect suspicious actions around nuclear sites as well as the physical protection of facilities;
  • Various provisions to reinforce the regulatory oversight by the nuclear security authority.

C/      More specifically, the French legal corpus on the security of radioactive sources was complemented it 2015-2016 with the adoption of additions to the existing framework. Through the article 128 of the law n°2015-992 of August 17th, 2015 on the energetic transition for a green growth, the French Parliament has empowered the Government to adopt by legislative ordinance provisions to make more stringent the obligation for operators to take the appropriate measures to protect their radioactive sources against malicious acts and to entrust ASN, the Ministry of environment, energy and the sea (MEEM), and the Ministry of defense, in their respective areas of competence to enforce them.

A legislative ordinance n°2016-128 has then been adopted on February 10th, 2016. It establishes the legal principles and obligations that operators will have to abide by regarding the measure to protect their radioactive sources against malicious acts. The MEEM, together with ASN and the ministry of defense have been tasked, in their respective areas, to supervise, assess and control these security measures. These legislative provisions have to be complemented by regulatory texts, developed under the auspices of the MEEM and the sea and will enter into force on July 1st, 2017 at the latest.

D/      The French regulatory framework, including its Design Basis Threat (DBT) is regularly reviewed and updated to live up to the evolution of the threats.

E/      At last, the operators are to fully re-assess the physical protection of their facilities as part of the implementation of the regulation on physical protection and control of nuclear materials, facilities and transportation. If needed, they have to upgrade the means and measures for nuclear security to fulfill the regulatory requirements. The MEEM, with the support of the technical expertise from the IRSN, is tasked to assess all these security studies carried out by operators. As part of the constant enhancement of the national nuclear security regime, the various French bodies involved in nuclear security work on a day to day basis on continuous improvement of their policies, practices and interagency mutual coordination.

Acronyms used in the French Progress Report for the NSS 2016

ASN: French Nuclear Safety Authority – Autorité de sûreté nucléaire

CNRS: French National Center for Scientific Research – Centre national de la recherche scientifique. 

CEA: French Atomic Energy Commission – Commissairat à l’énergie atomique.

CPPNM: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

DCPJ: French Central Department of Judiciary Police – Direction centrale de la police judiciaire.

DCI-IT: French Central Interagency Detachment for Technical Intervention – Détachement central interministériel d’intervention technique.

G7GP: G7 Global partnership against the spread of weapons of mass destruction

GICNT: Global initiative to counter nuclear terrorism

HEU: highly enriched uranium

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency

IAG: Implementation and Assessment Group (GICNT)

ICSANT: International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

IPPAS: International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IAEA)

IRSN: French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety – Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire

 ITWG: Nuclear forensics International Technical Working Group

LEU: Low-enriched uranium

MEEM: French Ministry of Environment, Energy and the Sea – Ministère de l’environnement, de l’énergie et de la mer

NSF: Nuclear Security Fund (IAEA)

NSGC: Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (IAEA)

NSS: Nuclear Security Summit

NSS: Nuclear Security Series of documents (IAEA)

RTG: Radio-isotope thermoelectric generator 

SCAEMS: French Police Central Section for Weapons, Explosives and Sensitive Materials – Section centrale armes, explosifs et matières sensibles.

SDPTS: French Police Division for Scientific and Technical Police – Sous-direction de la police technique et scientifique 

Report elaborated by:

Ø  Ministère des affaires étrangères et du développement international (MAEDI)

Ø  Secrétariat général à la défense et à la sécurité nationale (SGDSN)

Ø  Ministère de l’environnement, de l’énergie et de la mer (MEEM)

Ø  Ministère de la défense

Ø  Ministère de l’intérieur

Ø  Commissariat à l’énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA)

Ø  Autorité de sûreté nucléaire (ASN)

Ø  Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire (IRSN)

 

[1]  Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

[2]  International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

[3]  Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management – though this instrument is primarily related to safety, its provisions designed to strengthen the safety of radioactive sources contribute to strengthening their security.

[4]  Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

[5]  Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources

[6]  The term “GIP Sources HA” stands for “public interest grouping (GIP) - high activity (HA) sources”. In the French legislation, a public interest grouping (“groupement d’intérêt public” - “GIP”) is an ad hoc administrative structure established by a convention between public and private operators to accomplish a specific and punctual task. The “GIP sources HA” was established in 2009 and renewed in 2013 to secure and dispose of disused high-activity sources – among numerous other tasks related to the management of sources.

[7]  Green Notices are used to circulate information on individuals previously sentenced for their implication in illicit nuclear trafficking.

[8]  Red notices provide information on people wanted by a Member State’s authorities. Blue notices provide information on individuals who have been sentenced for their implication in an offense or suspected for their implication in such offenses. Purple notices describe processes, practices, methods or equipment used by criminals to commit offenses. Orange notices describe events, incidents, persons, process or equipment that generate threats for public security.

[9]  Détachement central interministériel d’intervention technique. This interagency structure is in charge of preventing and combatting CBRN terrorism.

[10]             Assystem, Nuc21, Point Core, Systel Electronique, Schlumberger and ABC Horus

National Progress Report: Gabon

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Gabon has strengthened its nuclear security implementation and built up the national nuclear security infrasctructure with the adoption of thelawn°17 /2013of21 august 2013 portantorganisationdu régime de la sûreté et de la sécurité radiologiques et nucléaires et des garanties, which established l'Agence Gabonaise de Sûreté et de Sécurité Nucléaires (AGSSN) (Gabonese Nuclear Safety and Security Agency), regulatory authority for radiation protection, nuclear safety and security.

Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

The AGSSN is responsible, among others, to set the rules of physical protection of nuclear materials and radioactive sources; but above all to establish and implement the National System of Control and Accounting of Nuclear Materials.

The draft decree fixant les principes généraux de sécurité (for establishing the general security principles), developed on the basis of the document N°13 of the collection Nuclear Security of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has already been examined by experts of the Office of Legal Affairs of IAEA, but it could not be submitted for adoption by the Council of Ministers because of the enormous delay in the effective establishment of the AGSSN.

However, high level staff of the National Police, Customs, GABON's National Security Council and the AGSSN participated in a number of training courses and events organized by the IAEA:

  • International Seminar on Essential Elements Nuclear Security, in Argonne, Illinois, USA, 9 to 20 June, 2014;
  • Meeting on Benefits of joining the IAEA's Incident and Trafficking database (ITDB) Program, in Vienna, from 25 to 26 November 2014,
  • Regional Training Course on Nuclear Security Detection Architecture in Rabat, Morocco, 2 to. 6 March 2015;
  • International Training Course on Developing a Defense in Depth Approach for the Detection of Transboundary Movement of Nuclear and Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, in Athens, Greece, 7 to 10 July 2015;
  • International Training Course on Security in the Transport of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material, in Tokai, Japan, 16 to 20 November 2015).

Gabon is in the process of organizing in the coming months a national workshop on domestic threats related to radioactive sources.

In this sense, Articles 50 and 51 of Law No 17/2013 provide: "The development, implementation, evaluation and review of the threat by the competent services of the Ministry of Interior, in coordination with the ministries of Energy, National Defence, Foreign Affairs and AGSSN."

Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

Establishment of a regulatory body whose regulatory functions will be truly independent of other functions related to radioactive sources, such as management or promotion of their use.  The AGSSN is an independent administrative authority.

This regulatory body created by Law n°17 /2013 is empowered, todevelop regulations, to issue guidelines regarding the safety and security of radioactive sources and to issue licenses for the management of sources radioactive, among others.

There is an effective regulatory control of exploration, operating and rehabilitation sites of radioactive minerals.

The return to the supplier of all spent radioactive sources is the rule. It is planned, the establishment of a service for searching missing radioactive sources and securing found radioactive sources.

Countering Nuclear Smuggling

A new Memorandum of Understanding is being established with Customs services to control the import and export of radioactive sources.

To date, Gabon is yet to benefit from the assistance of the United States despite the pledge made by the US to accelerate the strengthening of national and international capacities to stop nuclear crime, seize illicit nuclear materials, and effectively prosecute any offenders.

Gabon was not able to participate in the workshop on nuclear forensics organized by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).  

Gabon has not been invited to participate in virtual exercises (Snake Galaxy in 2014, and Snake Galaxy 2.0. 2015) on the development and use of the National Nuclear Forensic Libraries.

Supporting Multilateral Instruments

Gabon intends to ratify and put in place the following international legal instruments related to nuclear security

  • International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (Terrorist Bombings Convention)
  • Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention)
  • The Convention for the Suppression of unlawful Acts against the Security of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention of 1988)
  • Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Security of Fixed Platforms
  • Located on the Continental Shelf (1988 Protocol on fixed platforms)
  • The 2005 Protocol to the 1988 SUA Convention
  • The 2005 Protocol to the 1988 Protocol relating to fixed platforms

Gabon will strive to meet its obligations included in the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and Resolution 1373, under Chapter VII of   the United Nations Charter.  

Collaborating with International Organizations

Through the Country Programme Framework jointly signed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Government of Gabon, Gabon enjoys a multifaceted technical assistance from this organization, even if the number of national projects presented by the country is still very limited.

The Office of Nuclear Security of the IAEA's Department of Safety and Security Nuclear has also offered assistance in Gabon during the CAN 2012 (securing strategic points).

Partnering with External Stakeholders

A partnership was established with the National Nuclear Security Administration of the U.S Department of Energy/Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI),

The European Commission and the UN Interregional Institute for Research of Crimes and Justice (UNICRI) have initiated the creation of NRBC Centres of Excellence worldwide. The Focal Point of Gabon is the former Secretary General of the Ministry of Interior who has worked to establish National Teams. An Action Plan was developed and exercises with training of personnel of the Body of the fire brigade and Urgent Medical Aid Service (SAMU) has been made.

National Progress Report: Germany

Germany, like many other long-term users of peaceful energy applications, had already achieved a high level of nuclear security well before the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit. This report concentrates on activities since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit. Germany has continued to enhance nuclear security implementation and has contributed to strengthening the global nuclear security architecture. The following actions, developments and initiatives are to be highlighted:

Strengthening Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Security

  • The evaluation of the national nuclear security regulatory framework is an ongoing process involving all relevant authorities. Since 2010 many regulations have been adjusted or rewritten. Design Basis Threats (DBTs) and subsequent regulations for facilities, nuclear material transports and computer security are either in place and are being regularly evaluated or are in the final stage of development.
  • Nuclear security measures, including transport security measures, are being designed and implemented in accordance with the 2005 CPPNM Amendment and INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. In order to implement EU Council Directive 2003/122/Euratom, which demands strict control of each “High Activity Sealed Source” from manufacturing to the final disposal, a central register has been established at national level which ensures the comprehensive traceability of these sources and their whereabouts at any time.
  • Aiming at strengthening the security regime for other radioactive material, comprehensive guidelines are being developed, taking into account the IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 11 (Implementing Guide – “Security of radioactive Sources” and further recommendations). The guidelines include a graded approach based on the potential risk of other radioactive material and define requirements and measures for each security level. A first draft version of the guidelines is expected to be ready at the end of 2016.
  • Germany has co-signed Gift Baskets on the Security of Radioactive Sources at the Nuclear Security Summits in 2014 and 2016. Against this background, Germany will host an International Workshop in September 2016 in order to discuss whether the Code of Conduct for Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (CoC) is adequate for the designated purposes.
  • With regard to the human dimension Germany has incorporated the interfaces man -technology – organization into its safety and security regulations. The regulatory framework for the professional training of technical personnel in nuclear power plants has been adapted accordingly. In addition, it has been updated to cover nuclear power plants in a post-operational phase. At the same time training and education for personnel in nuclear facilities increasingly follows an integrated approach to assure nuclear safety and security in equal measure.

Minimizing Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

  • In close cooperation with international partners Germany continues its efforts to develop high-density LEU fuel with high flux properties as part of its endeavours to minimize the use of HEU in research reactors where technically and economically feasible. The Federal Ministry of Education and Research is currently funding a project for the development of a lower-enriched fuel element for the German research reactor FRM II.
  • Germany, France and Belgium, supported by the European Commission and in close cooperation with their US counterparts, continue to work together within the HERACLES consortium, focusing on testing and developing a U-Mo dispersion fuel.
  • Germany continues to explore ways and means of ensuring the timely return of all spent nuclear fuel of foreign origin from German research reactors based on HEU to the country of origin.
  • As part of the Nuclear Security Summit process, Germany has pledged to eliminate excess nuclear material from its inventories. In early 2016, a significant amount of excess plutonium and HEU was successfully removed from Germany and transferred to the United States.

Countering Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Radiological Material

International aspects:

  • Germany has taken part in the international sharing of information on the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials through its participation in the IAEA ITDB, IAEA, NUSEC, ITWG and GICNT IAG.
  • The German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) closely cooperates with partners in the framework of Interpol’s CBRNE Programme. In addition, the BKA participates in the CBRN Working Group of the European Explosive Ordnance Disposal Network.

National aspects:

  • Since 2011, the Federal Customs Administration has more than doubled the number of mobile radiation measurement devices. The new highly sensitive radiation gauges enable customs authorities to conduct customs controls more efficiently.
  • In 2012, a special CBRN incident reporting scheme for police and customs was implemented on national level. This improved the information flow on CBRN incidents between federal and state authorities. It serves as an important tool for the BKA to assess the CBRN-related situation in Germany in a timely and concise manner and to produce its own periodical national CBRN crime situation report.
  • Finally, at federal level a CBRN information platform was established in 2014 to enable all relevant federal ministries and agencies to exchange information swiftly in the event of serious CBRN-related crime and possible CBRN terrorism threats in Germany.

Supporting Multilateral Instruments

  • Germany ratified the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM on 21 October 2010 and supported international efforts to reach the quorum for its entry into force. To that end, Germany financed IAEA-organized regional workshops in Europe, South America and Africa to facilitate interested states’ ratification processes. In the framework of Germany’s G7 Presidency in 2015, Germany organized a diplomatic demarche campaign reaching out to about 30 countries which had not yet ratified the Amendment.

Collaborating with International Organizations, Initiatives and Governments

  • Germany considers the leading role of the IAEA in developing international standards and guidance on nuclear security to be extremely important. Therefore Germany actively supports IAEA security-related activities such as the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee, the Consultancy and Technical Meeting, IPPAS missions, IAEA training courses and the Train-the-Trainer programme not only financially but also by seconding national experts and contributing to the drafting and revising of IAEA Nuclear Security Series documents.
  • Since 2011 Germany has donated around five million euros to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund and more than 6.5 million euros for the ECAS project to modernize the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria. Nuclear Security Fund projects supported by Germany included securing orphan and disused radioactive sources, setting up a global inventory of radioactive sources, monitoring the import and export of radioactive materials to and from Libya and establishing a postgraduate curriculum in nuclear security.
  • Germany has committed to work with the IAEA and its member states on the safety and security of high activity radioactive sources and to establish a roadmap of actions and cooperation in the following areas:
    • Further strengthening and expanding support for the international framework of conventions and IAEA guidelines relevant to the safety and security of high activity radioactive sources throughout their life cycle;
    • Supporting the development and use of alternatives to high activity radioactive sources;
    • Enhancing the efforts of the Ad hoc Group of States that are Major Suppliers of Radioactive Sources to further strengthen and harmonize supplier state activities to improve the safety and security of high risk radioactive sources.
  • Germany actively supports the IAEA in enhancing the Nuclear Security Series by providing nuclear security guidance on computer security, particularly at the recommendations level. In addition, Germany intensively exchanges knowledge and experience regarding the German DBT and guidelines on computer security with other states in bilateral meetings.
  • Germany held the 2015 G7 Presidency and thus chaired the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GPWG) – the largest G7 expert group, which currently includes 30 active members– from June 2014 until the end of 2015. The GPWG includes a sub-working group on Nuclear and Radiological Security (NRSWG), which provides a forum for GP members and international organizations to coordinate their assistance in this field. Germany hosted and chaired three meetings of the NRSWG with a focus on the Global Partnership Action Plan, to be adopted at the Nuclear Security Summit, on the coordination of assistance in response to individual requests as well as on the improvement of coordination mechanisms and procedures in emergency situations.
  • Germany is a founding member of the GICNT and attended all GICNT Plenary Meetings, the last one being held in 2015 in Helsinki. Furthermore, German experts took part in table-top exercises and workshops organized in the framework of GICNT, the most recent being a workshop of the GICNT Response Management Working Group which included a practical exercise in November 2015 and a joint International Maritime Transport Security Exercise which was conducted by Spain and Morocco in cooperation with the IAEA in October 2015.
  • Germany has extended its efforts in bi- and multilateral cooperation with respect to nuclear security of nuclear facilities, computer security and nuclear material transports. In this regard Germany will continue to host meetings and regional workshops for sharing information and good practices regarding, inter alia, threat assessment, Design Based Threats (DBT), legal frameworks, technical countermeasures against e.g. sabotage scenarios during transport, as well as protection against intentional airplane crashes.

Partnering with External Stakeholders

  • Germany remains fully committed to implementing the obligations deriving from UNSCR 1540. It continues to encourage, and, where appropriate and feasible, to assist other states in implementing UNSCR 1540. Moreover, Germany initiated the “Wiesbaden Process” in 2011 to improve cooperation between government and industry, one of the central aims in UNSCR 1540 implementation. Since 2012, Germany has hosted four industry outreach conferences in Wiesbaden, each focusing on different key aspects of government-industry relations in export control and non-proliferation. Last year’s conference took stock of the outcomes that have been achieved so far and tried to identify future trends and challenges. The final report of the conference will be published as a UN Security Council document. It contains concrete recommendations on how to further strengthen the partnership between governments and industry as well as how to best adapt to regulatory requirements from an industrial point of view. In addition, the final report shall be presented as a contribution to the 2016 comprehensive review of Resolution 1540. Germany is proud to have initiated an effective implementation mechanism in the framework of UNSCR 1540 and stands ready to further intensify its commitment.